VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0308/01 0821317
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231317Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3916
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS MANAGUA 000308 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR S/ES-O/CMS EPARRA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AMED AMGT ASEC KSAF KSEO SENV TBIO KFLU NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA: PANDEMIC AND AVIAN INFLUENZA TRIPWIRES 
AND MISSION RESPONSE PLAN 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 006306 
     ¶B. MANAGUA 0275 
 
¶1. (U) Summary and Introduction:  With no cases of the 
virulent H5N1 Avian Influenza (AI) strain existing yet in the 
Americas, the Emergency Action Committee  reviewed and 
approved the Mission Response Plan and Tripwires for Pandemic 
and Avian Influenza.  The plan recognizes Nicaragua,s 
current incapacity to identify an avian or human H5N1 
infection.  Following is the text of the plan.  End Summary 
and Introduction. 
 
Begin text: 
 
Overview 
-------- 
¶2. (U) Nicaragua has no in-depth planning to handle Pandemic 
Influenza or Avian Influenza.  There is nominal surveillance 
and minimal stockpiling of medical supplies, but no 
stockpiles of antiviral drugs, no educational programs, and 
no integrated management in place.  Nicaragua,s Ministry of 
Health has a written plan for Avian Influenza Pandemic 
Preparedness and Response, but it has not been distributed to 
hospitals at the local level and so is unlikely to be 
effective.  Nicaragua also does not have the capability to 
identify an avian or human H5N1 infection.  The symptoms of 
AI are not distinguishable from other types of influenza 
without the availability of specialized testing.  Specimens 
will need to be sent to laboratories in the United States 
(the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), or the National 
Veterinary Laboratory in Ames, Iowa).  Nicaragua does not 
have the medical resources to treat more than a handful of 
patients infected with Avian or Pandemic Influenza. 
Medication and equipment are severely limited.  There are 
only a handful of ventilators nationwide.  There is no plan 
to handle overflow of patients at alternate sites.  Nicaragua 
will not, therefore, be able to treat large numbers of 
infected patients effectively, nor to accept patients with AI 
or Pandemic Influenza from neighboring countries.  Nicaragua 
does not have the public health resources to manage mass 
fatalities. 
 
¶3. (U) The persistence of the H5Nl AI since its appearance in 
Hong Kong in 1997 indicates that it is unlikely to disappear 
from the environment.  Moreover, it has evolved gradually, 
increasing its lethality and broadening the range of species 
that it can infect and kill.  Since December 2003 there has 
been sporadic and increasing animal-to-human transmission. 
As of the week of March 2, 2009, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) reports 409 confirmed human cases of AI 
Influenza with a mortality rate of 62.6%.  The majority of 
cases are in children and adults under the age of 40 years 
old.  The highest mortality is in the 10 to 19 year old age 
group.  The incidence among poultry workers has been minimal, 
suggesting that, at this time, AI is not easily transmitted 
to humans.  Human-to-human transmission has not been 
documented (though it was suspected in a handful of cases). 
There has never been a human epidemic with an H5 influenza 
strain.  Thus, people of all ages are presumed to be highly 
susceptible.  After widespread use of anti-influenza drugs 
amantadine and rimantidine in China, the H5N1 influenza A 
virus has become resistant to these drugs.  The 
neuroaminidase inhibitors oseltamivir (Tamiflu) and zanamivir 
(Relenza) are still effective most of the time, but 
resistance to Tamiflu has been documented. 
 
¶4. (U) Should sustained human-to-human transmission of a 
highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza begin, worldwide spread is 
expected in days to weeks, despite efforts to contain the 
virus by closing borders and quarantining ill persons.  The 
short incubation period, the spread of virus by infected 
persons 2-3 days before they become ill, and the highly 
infectious nature of the virus will accelerate the 
development of a pandemic.  The pandemic could devastate the 
world like a &global tsunami.8 
 
¶5. (U) There have as yet been no cases of H5N1 AI of any type 
in the Americas.  Other variant AI strains have been recorded 
throughout the Americas in recent years, including a recently 
confirmed occurrence of the low pathogenic H5N2 virus in the 
Dominican Republic on December 21, 2007. 
 
¶6. (U) In response to the small number of cases of documented 
animal-to-human avian infection transmission, human and 
animal health organizations have taken the following steps: 
 
    a. Monitoring wild and domesticated bird populations for 
H5N1; 
 
    b. Analyzing genetic changes in the virus; 
 
 
    c. Culling affected domestic bird populations and 
isolating human cases; 
 
    d. Sharply increasing the production and storage of 
oseltamivir (Tamiflu) and zanamivir (Relenza); 
 
    e. Accelerating the process of vaccine production. 
 
¶7. (U) In the region of Mexico and Central America, Mexico, 
Panama, and El Salvador may be at greatest risk for entry of 
Pandemic Influenza due to their larger populations, and human 
migration and cargo traffic patterns.  In Panama, daily cargo 
traffic includes a large number of ships from Asia.  Also, 
Mexico and the countries of Central America are on the flight 
path of numerous migrating birds.  It is quite possible that 
AI could spread from Siberia to Alaska and southward to 
Western Hemispheric countries. 
 
Assumptions 
----------- 
 
¶8. (U) When formulating tripwires, the following facts and 
assumptions were considered: 
 
    a. The H5N1 highly pathogenic AI does not yet exist in 
the Western Hemisphere. 
 
    b. H5N1 does not yet efficiently infect humans. 
 
    c. It is highly probable that Pandemic Influenza, 
resulting from sustained human-to-human transmission of AI 
will begin in East Asia because of the number of birds 
infected there, the proximity of people to birds and, 
historically, the widespread presence of a variety of 
influenza viruses in that region. 
 
    d. Once sustained human-to-human transmission of a 
pandemic influenza starts, it is very likely to appear in 
multiple sites, and quickly spread to distant countries. 
Therefore, the local decision to evacuate dependents and 
non-essential personnel to the United States must occur when 
sustained human-to-human transmission has been documented 
anywhere in the world (most likely Asia).  By the time 
sustained human-to-human transmission appears in the Western 
Hemisphere, with the probable closing of national frontiers 
and suspension of air traffic, it will most likely be too 
late for any type of evacuation other than in-site quarantine 
and sheltering-in-place. 
 
    e. In view of the much greater air travel to the United 
States, Pandemic Influenza is more likely to appear in the 
United States before Nicaragua. 
 
    f. The presence of Pandemic Influenza in any neighboring 
Central American country should be considered equivalent to 
the presence of Pandemic Influenza in Managua, Nicaragua. 
 
    g. All cross border traffic by land, sea, and air will 
very likely be blocked as soon a human-to-human transmission 
of Pandemic Influenza is suspected in Nicaragua or its 
neighboring countries. 
 
    h. Vaccine development may take four months after the 
onset of a human pandemic.  Distribution of the vaccine is 
most likely to occur in the &first-world8 countries first, 
and then, because of the likely closure of borders during a 
pandemic, distribution would be prevented from reaching other 
countries. 
 
    i. A human pandemic will cause a catastrophic disruption 
of the host nation,s economy and security organizations. 
 
Nicaragua Tripwires - Introduction 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) The most critical tripwire is the appearance of 
sustained human-to-human transmission anywhere in the world 
(most likely outside of the Western Hemisphere).  At this 
point, U.S. Embassy Managua will have to take immediate steps 
to evacuate dependents and non-essential personnel to the 
United States.  The appearance of human-to-human contagious 
Pandemic Influenza in the Western Hemisphere and anywhere in 
the Americas would be the final tripwire, requiring final 
preparations for sheltering in the Embassy compound of 
essential Embassy personnel, long)term quarantine, and 
decisions about when to initiate prophylactic treatment with 
oseltamivir (Tamiflu) and/or zanamivir (Relenza).  Once a 
Pandemic Influenza epidemic appears in the Western 
Hemisphere, the probable closing of national frontiers and 
 
suspension of air traffic will foreclose any other evacuation 
options. 
 
¶10. (U) The Emergency Action Committee (EAC), will be 
required to meet each time a tripwire is crossed in order to 
confirm that the criteria for that tripwire has been met and 
to initiate specific actions.  When each tripwire is met, the 
Consular Section will need to issue a warden message to all 
Americans living within Nicaragua.  The EAC will need to 
determine what public announcements and travel warnings 
should be sent to the Department of State for approval and 
final publishing on the Embassy Website and distribution 
through the Consular Warden System.  Advice should be 
obtained from Washington about press announcements. 
 
¶11. (U) The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
stockpiles a vaccine against H5N1 Avian Influenza in order to 
provide some protection for critical personnel in the early 
stages of a pandemic.  In a pandemic, however, it is expected 
to take several months to develop and produce a vaccine 
matched to the new pandemic influenza strain.  Once a vaccine 
has been developed and deployed, the primary objective will 
be to vaccinate as many as possible and as quickly as 
possible.  However, because of the improbability of any 
developed vaccine reaching a pandemic country before 
frontiers have closed, the following tripwires assume that 
the pandemic begins before there is an adequate supply of 
protective vaccine. 
 
US Embassy Managua Tripwires for Pandemic Influenza 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶12. (U) Tripwire One: only animal-to-animal and sporadic 
animal-to-human transmission (Federal Government Response 
Stage 0, WHO Phase 3). 
 
    a. Stage One: no AI in the Western Hemisphere (present 
situation). 
 
        i. Post shows vigilance in reviewing reports from 
international monitoring groups and international news. 
        ii. Informational updates are provided to the Mission 
from the FSHP and RMO. 
        iii. MED strongly recommends yearly influenza 
vaccinations for all personnel (these do not protect against 
AI). 
        iv. Personal protective equipment (PPE):  gloves, 
goggles, N95 masks, and reusable respirators for healthcare 
workers, Tyvek suits, are stockpiled as needed for the 
mission size; a stockpile of antibiotics might be considered 
in order to treat secondary bacteria pneumonias that commonly 
occur with influenza. 
        v. Tamiflu (oseltamivir) and Relenza (zanamivir) 
stores are in a temperature-controlled, highly secure 
environment. 
        vi. As appropriate, advise individuals including 
American citizens, to purchase prescriptions of Tamiflu 
through their insurance company pharmacy plan. 
        vii. Review administrative leave plans; staff should 
prepare to perform as much work at home as possible should 
the situation worsen. 
        viii. Review the Mission minimal staffing list of 
personnel; review Embassy supplies of food, water, 
antivirals, and other medication and equipment; review 
security conditions for employees and families at residences 
and in public venues; review/test emergency preparations, 
communications procedures; review/update warden system and 
F-77 Report. 
        ix. The Hospital Militar is the designated SARS 
hospital and is also the designated hospital to treat victims 
of Avian or Pandemic Influenza, according to SINAPRED,s 
Nicaraguan National Avian Influenza Plan. 
        x. Consular Section continues outreach for private 
American citizens (Amcits) on AI preparedness, including food 
and water storage.  The Embassy Internet home page features 
information on Avian Influenza preparedness: 
http://nicaragua.usembassy.gov/emergency services2.html. 
        xi. Consular, Economic and RSO sections will canvass 
American companies and organizations to determine whether 
they have their own contingency plans in the event of a 
pandemic. 
        xii. Economic section will query airlines that 
provide direct flights between Nicaragua and the United 
States to determine if they have contingency plans in the 
event of a pandemic.  Of particular importance is whether 
these companies would increase flights prior to an epidemic 
reaching the Western Hemisphere and whether they have 
received information from the host nation discussing criteria 
that would halt flights if human-to-human transmission 
started in the Western Hemisphere. 
 
 
    b. Stage Two: appearance of AI in the Western Hemisphere, 
countries bordering Nicaragua 
 
        i. The EAC meets to review, revise, if necessary, 
tripwires, and implement required actions. 
        ii. Heighten vigilance; contact host nation agencies 
monitoring bird populations; contact public health services 
surveying hospitals for the occurrence of human disease; 
inform the host government of the Embassy,s intention to 
release a statement regarding Avian and Pandemic Influenza. 
        iii. U.S. Embassy issues a MGT notice, announcement 
in the Embassy bulletin (Tiscapa), and Consular Warden 
Messages (CWM) advising avoidance of all birds and hand 
washing after handling uncooked poultry products.  The 
Embassy adds the text of the CWM to the AI link on the 
Mission,s webpage. 
        iv. The EAC reviews whether travel in the region 
should remain unrestricted. 
        v. The Mission advises all employees and their 
dependents to remain home if they develop respiratory illness 
and fever.  Health Unit personnel decide whether they need to 
implement the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) and 
respirators when evaluating persons with respiratory illness. 
 In a Consular Warden Message (CWM), Amcits are advised to 
seek physician consultation should they develop respiratory 
illness with fever. 
        vi. Consular and Embassy press officers have 
available Avian and Pandemic Influenza talking points for use 
in appearances on local radio and television programs, and 
Internet chat rooms. 
        vii. Human Resources (HR) prepares travel orders for 
non-essential personnel and dependents, who would very likely 
be evacuated when human-to-human transmission begins. 
        viii. Section chiefs advise LES (FSN) employees that 
they should keep their U.S. visas current.  U.S. personnel 
are advised to submit B referrals for nannies who might 
accompany their families back to the United States. 
        ix. Embassy Public Affairs Section releases a 
statement describing the Embassy,s increased vigilance and 
offers advice about personal protective measures.  The 
Consular Section releases a CWM advising all Amcits of 
precautions the U.S. Embassy is taking for its personnel. 
        x. The Consular Section considers decreasing visa 
appointments to focus more resources on American Citizens 
Services and decrease risk of unnecessary exposure. 
 
    c. Stage Three: documentation of animal-to-human 
transmission of AI in Nicaragua. 
 
        i. The EAC meets to assess situation and initiate 
actions defined by established tripwires. 
        ii. Both American and FSN personnel with fever and/or 
respiratory illness are told to remain at home (on 
administrative leave) until 10 days after recovery. American 
personnel will be advised to impose the same restrictions on 
their domestic employees. 
        iii. The Health Unit staff uses PPE and infectious 
disease precautions when evaluating persons with fever and 
respiratory illness.  Possibly consider setting up a triage 
area in the Employee Parking Lot to contain the spread of 
infection. 
        iv. The Health Unit staff will use non-expired 
influenza quick test kit to test all ill individuals with 
symptoms suspicious of influenza for influenza A and B. 
        v. Health Unit staff monitors the human cases closely 
through communication with local health providers and, 
possibly, visits to the hospitals.  If the victim is a 
private American citizen, a Consular Officer will be assigned 
to monitor the situation with the Health Unit staff, in order 
to communicate with family members. 
        vi. The Health Unit staff in collaboration with the 
RMO and State MED review use of PPE, decontamination 
procedures, and conditions that require use of Tamiflu and/or 
Relenza. 
        vii. The Embassy holds Town Hall meetings for the 
Embassy community and private American citizens.  The Mission 
strongly advises avoiding contact with live birds and 
thoroughly washing hands after handling chicken and other 
previously butchered poultry in the kitchen. 
        viii. Consular Warden Message communicates the advice 
provided at the Town Hall meeting and additional information 
is placed in the Embassy,s Webpage on AI. 
        ix. The Public Affairs Section will assume 
responsibility for &risk communication,8 creating public 
messages to both the Mission community and the host nation. 
        x. Embassy officials should meet with school 
officials to discuss tripwires for school closure. 
        xi. Based upon the number of reported cases, the EAC 
reviews the need for voluntary departure of dependents. 
 
        xii. The EAC assesses whether travel should be 
restricted in some areas of the region. 
        xiii. The Mission begins use of a database to 
register all official and private citizen Americans infected 
with AI. 
        xiv. The Mission will train a group of individuals to 
screen visitors to the Embassy compound, using a 
questionnaire, noting travel, contact with others who have 
traveled to an epidemic region, contact with live poultry, 
and clinical symptoms of respiratory disease and fever. 
        xv. The Consular Section limits visa applicants to 
emergency cases only. 
 
    d. Stage Four: apparent increase in animal-to-human 
transmission of AI in Nicaragua or neighboring countries. 
 
        i. The EAC meets to review information, assess 
whether this new tripwire has been crossed, and initiate 
additional actions. 
        ii. The EAC restricts travel to regions reporting 
increased animal-to-human transmission of AI. 
        iii. The Health Unit and USAID AI working groups will 
communicate frequently with officials of the WHO, CDC, and 
Government of Nicaragua (GON) investigating avian and human 
infections (SINAPRED and MINSA).  The EAC will be provided 
frequent updates, and the EAC will meet when necessary to 
assess new events information. 
        iv. Mission personnel and their dependents will be 
advised to stockpile enough food and water for at least two 
weeks and keep travel documents and personal items ready for 
rapid evacuation to the U.S., should it become necessary. 
        v. Consular Section updates warden messages and 
Embassy webpage as new information appears and new decisions 
are made. 
 
¶13. (U) Tripwire Two: confirmed human-to-human AI cases 
outside of the Western Hemisphere (Federal Government 
Response Stage 2), AI affecting entire families, increased 
infection among health care workers, or transmission, 
anywhere in the world (WHO Phase 4 or 5, depending upon the 
degree of human-to-human transmission). 
 
    a. Stage One: case clusters occurring, but not in the 
Western Hemisphere. 
 
        i. The EAC, in consultation with the Operations 
Center,s Crisis Management Staff (S/ES-O/CMS) and, if 
applicable, the State Department Task Force, confirms that 
tripwire has been crossed.  The EAC meets frequently to 
follow developments, review actions, and assess the 
possibility that sustained human-to-human transmission has 
started. 
        ii. The Embassy prohibits Mission personnel from 
traveling to the region where AI clusters have been 
discovered. 
        iii. Non-essential staff and dependents are advised 
to prepare luggage and travel documents and to be on stand-by 
for authorized departure. 
        iv. The Mission continues with full staffing. 
        v. Personnel should increase stockpiles of water and 
food, in order to survive a quarantine of 12 weeks, or longer. 
        vi. Consular Warden Message and Embassy Webpage are 
updated to reflect guidance provided to Embassy personnel. 
        vii. The Consular Section limits visa applicants to 
emergency cases only. 
        viii. The Mission provides a back-up duty officer to 
assist in answering phone calls and inquiries from concerned 
U.S. Citizens after hours. 
 
    b. Stage Two: sustained human-to-human transmission, 
resulting in Pandemic Influenza epidemic confined to regions 
outside the Western Hemisphere. 
 
        i. The EAC meets frequently to analyze new 
information and implement new decisions. 
        ii. Mission requests AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE for all 
dependents and non essential personnel to return to the U.S. 
        iii. Increase frequency of Mission and Consular 
Warden Messages to update the Mission and Amcits on Embassy 
actions. 
        iv. The EAC reviews plans for the evaluation and 
treatment of infected persons and the means of transport of 
ill persons to local hospitals. 
        v. The Embassy prohibits travel to regions with 
human- to-human transmission. 
        vi. Mission personnel may continue to travel within 
the Western Hemisphere, with the understanding that freedom 
of travel may become quickly restricted everywhere.  Travel 
restrictions need to be reviewed day-to-day. 
        vii. Consular Section re-emphasizes advice to 
 
American citizens in country to stockpile additional water 
and food in preparation for possible prolonged home 
quarantine. 
        viii. Mission considers moving all essential Embassy 
personnel into Embassy compound for the duration of the 
pandemic. 
        ix. The Mission reviews its plans to stockpile water 
and food, considering that the remaining Mission personnel 
may have to move to the Embassy compound for security reasons. 
        x. Mission screens all individuals entering the 
compound. 
        xi. The Consular Section continues to limit visa 
applicants to emergency cases only. 
 
¶14. (U) Tripwire Three: documented human-to-human 
transmission of Avian or Pandemic Influenza in the Western 
Hemisphere (Federal Government Response Stage 2 or 3, and WHO 
Phase 5 or 6, depending upon the degree of human-to-human 
transmission:  significant, or  efficient and sustained,). 
 
    a. Stage One: case clusters occurring in the Western 
Hemisphere, in Central America, or in Nicaragua. 
 
        i. The EAC, in consultation with the Operations 
Center,s Crisis Management Staff (S/ES-O/CMS) and, if 
applicable, the State Department Task Force, confirms that 
tripwire has been crossed.  The EAC meets frequently to 
follow developments, review actions, and respond quickly in 
initiating new actions. 
        ii. The Embassy prohibits travel to countries (and 
perhaps adjacent countries) except the U.S., where only the 
affected states should be avoided. 
        iii. The Mission stops hosting public events and 
advises personnel to avoid public gatherings. 
        iv. Consular section sends warden messages announcing 
authorized departure of dependents and suggesting that 
private Amcits consider returning to the US.  Travel 
restrictions for official personnel and the new policy of 
social avoidance are also publicized. 
        v. Health Unit personnel set up outdoor or 
alternative patient evaluation site (staff parking area). 
American Employees with fever and respiratory illness are 
placed into Embassy compound building designated for pandemic 
victims.  Persons who have returned recently from the country 
with case clusters will be housed in a designated Embassy 
compound building and will be required to remain in the 
building for quarantine for ten (10) days.  Persons that 
become ill during the time of quarantine will be transferred 
to the designated Embassy compound building. Persons without 
symptoms after the 10 day quarantine period will be released 
to the NEC building for housing purposes. 
        vi. The Consular section informs the State Department 
that it has suspended service to persons with respiratory 
illness or fever.  Consular section meets with Health Unit 
staff to discuss precautions in meeting with visa applicants. 
        vii. The Consular Section, with assistance from other 
units within the Embassy, Consular Affairs (CA), and 
S/ES/CMS, sets up a 24-hour telephone and email task force to 
manage the deluge of inquiries coming from U.S. Citizens. 
The Consular Crisis Management System is used to track 
inquiries. 
        viii. The Marine Security Guard will be divided into 
two groups, which live separately (in order to try to avoid 
loss of all MSG personnel to illness simultaneously).  Also 
consider augmenting the security force with MILGP/DAO 
personnel as needed.  The Mission will ensure that controlled 
and classified documents have been reduced to less than 
one-hour destruction time. 
 
    b. Stage Two: sustained human-to-human Pandemic Influenza 
spreads to the Western Hemisphere, including the U.S., 
Mexico, neighboring Central or South American countries, or 
Nicaragua itself.  (All regional and other international 
travel is likely to be restricted; the host nation,s borders 
will very likely be closed, medical evacuations will not be 
allowed, nor is it likely that they will be possible.) 
 
        i. The EAC meets to review, revise, and initiate new 
actions. 
        ii. Health Unit staff will provide medical care to 
ill persons housed in the designated Embassy compound 
building, reporting to the Consular Section, who will report 
to families and others. 
        iii. The Consular Section closes to the public (in 
consultation with CA). 
        iv. The Consular Section drafts a travel warning and 
requests State Department approval and dissemination.  The 
travel warning is disseminated to the local American 
community, and private Amcits are strongly advised to avoid 
travel to Nicaragua.  All incoming official travel is 
 
prohibited, unless the persons are needed to investigate and 
combat the AI or Pandemic Influenza. 
        v. Mission informs the State Department that persons 
in neighboring countries infected with Avian or Pandemic 
Influenza cannot be transferred to Nicaragua, due to 
inadequate medical facilities. 
        vi. Mission and Consular Warden Messages are 
disseminated frequently, updating official Americans and 
private Amcits about Embassy advice and actions.  The Embassy 
Webpage is updated day-to-day. 
        vii. The Mission records details of all Americans, 
Mission personnel and private citizens who become sick, 
quarantined, or hospitalized with Avian or Pandemic Influenza 
in the established database.  The CMS database is used to 
track cases of private U.S. Citizens infected with AI or 
pandemic flu. 
        viii. The mission initiates plan to distribute 
Tamiflu/Relenza to Health Care workers and other Embassy 
personnel, as advised by State MED and CDC. 
        ix. The Mission ascertains from Nicaraguan public 
health officials morgue location and procedures to transfer 
the dead to the morgue.  The Consular section is informed in 
order to record information and notify families. 
        x. Water and food supplies will be consolidated at 
the Embassy compound. 
 
¶15. (U) Tripwire Four: the pandemic situation results in 
civil unrest (Federal Government Response Stage 3, and WHO 
Phase 6). 
 
    a. Stage One: the pandemic situation is such that random 
acts of violence or an increase in threats are occurring. 
 
        i. As soon as Tripwire Four is crossed, front office 
calls State Department Ops Center to report on the developing 
situation. EAC, in consultation with the Operations Center's 
Crisis Management Staff (S/ES-O/CMS) and the State Department 
Task Force, confirms that tripwire has been crossed. 
        ii. Request an update to the Travel Alert or a Travel 
Warning to reflect current circumstances and post actions. 
If the Department issues a revised Travel Alert or Travel 
Warning, posts should promptly disseminate it to the local 
American community. 
 
    b. Stage Two: The pandemic situation is such that the 
local government cannot contain civil unrest, much of which 
is directed against the U.S. Embassy and Americans, who may 
be perceived as having food, water and medications, and 
refusing to share same.  American homes may be broken into by 
mobs seeking medications and food, and numbers of Americans 
may be seeking refuge at the Embassy. 
 
        i. Request conference call via State Operations 
Center with CMS (Crisis Management Support), CA/OCS, and the 
regional bureau's EX office to discuss requesting ordered 
departure. 
        ii. Request Ordered Departure status from the 
Department, and provide post's assessment of the current 
situation.  Include information about potential numbers of 
private Americans departing, and about transportation 
availability. 
        iii. If Ordered Departure status is granted, the 
following actions will become necessary: 
 
-- If more transportation is needed than is available,
request Department assistance. A/LM is responsible for
arranging increases in regularly scheduled flights to post,
charters, etc.
-- If departure will not be possible via regularly-scheduled
commercial flights or chartered commercial aircraft, CMS and
the regional Bureau will discuss request for DOD assistance.
Ambassador should brief the relevant combatant command on the
situation at hand.
-- Depending on departure option(s) selected, identify
preferred options for internal movement, staging points,
routes, assembly areas, embarkation points, etc.  Also,
consider transportation, timing, and size of group movements.
-- If potential transportation includes stopovers at a
location where there is a U.S. diplomatic post, include
transit post(s) as info addressee on all related cable
traffic.  Provide guidance to transit post on services
required for those departing, such as special medical needs,
diapers, etc.
-- Inform other foreign missions of drawdown status.
-- Disseminate the Travel Warning (issued by the Department
when Ordered Departure is granted) to the American community
via post's warden system and Internet website.  The
communication to the private American community should
strongly urge private Americans to review their individual
circumstances and consider whether they should relocate to

the United States at this point.  It should note that those
who do not depart should be prepared to remain in country,
and that embassy services may soon become unavailable to
those who stay.  Note that warden system and website updates
may also become unavailable, and that Americans who stay
should monitor the State Department website, and,
specifically, http://travel.state.gov.
-- Consult with M/FLO for services to personnel who depart
post.
-- Request that the Department impose Minimize status.
-- Ensure the guidelines in 4 FAH-3 H-830 "Emergency
Evacuation Fiscal Policy" are followed by all agencies at
post.
-- Contact the regional bureau to replenish post operating
funds to sustain post operations, and also contact K Fund
Manager, RM/CFO, for special K funds for evacuation related
operations and evacuee travel.  Charter aircraft will be
funded at the Department level.
-- Confirm travel orders are prepared for departing post
personnel. Consider actions that must be accomplished in the
event all employees depart post and operations are suspended.
Be ready to initiate document destruction plan.
-- Arrange administrative control of residences and personal
property of departing U.S. Government personnel.
-- Designate liaison officers, arranging at high level to
ensure acceptance by host government and ensuring
communication capability.
-- Consider disposition of pets. (State Department policy
precludes evacuating pets via chartered or military aircraft
or ships, and they therefore require alternate
accommodations. Working animals, such as guide dogs, are not
considered pets and will be accommodated if possible.)
-- Consider assigning officers at the main ports of departure
to offer routine consular services, assist in liaison with
local authorities, and track private Americans leaving the
country via the Consular Task Force application.  Assign
personnel only after consultation with post's Regional
Medical Officer or Foreign Service Health Practitioner in
case additional protective measures are advised.
-- Update personnel lists on WebPASS Post Personnel System
(PS), making sure that TDY personnel have been included, and
that the Emergency Management System module is current in its
tracking of travels and destinations.  If computers are not
functioning, transmit up-to-date staffing pattern to
S/ES-O/CMS, CA and post's regional bureau, including
breakdown of employees and family members by agency and names
of TDY personnel, and indicating who is out of country and
their status (TDY, annual leave, home leave, R&R).

        iv. At the discretion of the Chief of Mission, in
coordination with the Department, assistance may be extended
to other foreign nationals when humanitarian or U.S. national
security interests dictate. Post must obtain prior approval
from the Department before offering departure assistance.
Points to cover in such local discussions may include:

-- The U.S. Government will consider assisting third-country
nationals (TCNs) and host-country nationals in departure on a
case-by-case, space available, and reimbursable basis when
doing so serves U.S. interests and the passenger(s) has
appropriate travel documents, including a valid visa for
entry to the United States.
-- Priorities of movement and how they will be integrated
into departure plans.
-- Reimbursement for departure assistance to third-country
nationals is billed directly from the U.S. Government to the
government of the individual (except where the national is a
family member of a U.S. citizen in which case the national
becomes part of the U.S. citizen's individual promissory
note).
-- Advance travel documentation.
-- Sharing of personnel assignments, communications and other
management considerations for the departure process.
-- Screening procedures at assembly and embarkation areas.
-- Responsibilities at safe haven, transit points or final
destination.
End Text.

SANDERS