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FM AMEMBASSY MALABO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0469
INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA IMMEDIATE 0036
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0011
RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE IMMEDIATE 0022
RUEHMA/AMEMBASSY MALABO 0533
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE IMMEDIATE 0273
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 0103
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 0069

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 MALABO 000027 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
KHARTOUM FOR FERNANDEZ; HARARE FOR CHISHOLM; YAOUNDE FOR DATT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL ECIN ECON EFIN PGOV EPET ENRG KCOR PINR
SOCI, EK 
SUBJECT: EQUATORIAL GUINEA RAW, PAPER 4:  THE BUSINESS OF CORRUPTION 
 
REF: MALABO 26 AND PREVIOUS 
 
¶1. (U) Triggered by changes underway in Washington D.C., 
upcoming personnel rotations in Embassy Malabo and animated by 
the recent attack on the capital, this is the fourth in a series 
of cables intended to update our perspective on Equatorial 
Guinea, and to provide a ground-level view of one of the world's 
most-isolated and least-understood countries to interested 
readers. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  The low level of institutional development 
and peculiar financial management mechanisms may inflate 
perceptions of corruption in Equatorial Guinea (EG).  Suddenly 
rich, the country's over-reliance on now-defunct Riggs bank, a 
lack of conflict-of-interest rules and a legacy of moonlighting 
further complicate EG's record.  While significant concerns over 
the level of corruption remain, and as growing oil revenues fuel 
the local commercial boom, there are signs EG is moving toward 
improving public finance management -- and U.S. engagement is 
helping achieve results.  End SUMMARY 
 
¶3.  (SBU) As in many other areas, Equatorial Guinea (EG) has a 
bad reputation when it comes to transparency and corruption. 
Numerous IOs/NGOs rate the country as one of the world's worst 
performers.  However, these organizations may be working from a 
position of bias and with poor information.  To our knowledge, 
none of them have undertaken recent on-the-ground surveys here. 
On the contrary, there are signs the perspective of the problem 
in EG may not be in complete alignment with reality.  Moreover, 
assessments rarely take into full account the country's level of 
societal and institutional development. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Legacy Issues:  Part of the problem is the peculiar 
nature of the EG social environment.  According to the former EG 
treasurer, who retired in 1993 just before the oil revenues 
started to flow, lack of resources in its early days often led 
the government to compensate officials with in-kind transfers. 
Land, operating licenses and import concessions were common 
forms of "payment" to ministers and other ranking officials 
during a period when "there was often no money to pay salaries." 
 The practice began with EG government seizure of "abandoned" 
Spanish colonial holdings -- and their subsequent redistribution 
to officials as a means of compensation.  As testament to the 
then-prevailing level of abject poverty, former U.S. Ambassador 
to EG Chester Norris (1989-1992) relates having to personally 
loan money to President Obiang himself so he could "buy gasoline 
to go to local political events."  During the period of the 
"skinny cows," officials were only expected to be in the office 
three days a week.  The remainder of the time they worked their 
farms or businesses in order to feed their families.  During 
that period -- when local markets sold onions by the quarter, 
tomato paste by the spoonful, and the handful of taxis in 
circulation in Malabo required advance booking for use -- many 
Equato-Guineans energetically sought to avoid poorly-compensated 
government jobs.  Some could not; especially those close to the 
president.  Having himself come to power in a coup (one likely 
supported by outside forces) and constantly under threat of 
overthrow, he purchased loyalty by any means available. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Those private entrepreneurs who mocked their poor 
public officials now see the tables turned.  Once oil money 
started to flow in the mid '90s, many officials found themselves 
in improved positions.  Money and power accumulated within the 
government.  In addition, the once-meager returns from the 
earlier in-kind compensation for officials mushroomed as the 
economy expanded at one of the world's fastest rates.  For one 
example, the single license to import cement into country has 
become extremely lucrative (NOTE: this license belongs to 
ABAYAK, a company partially owned by the president and first 
lady).  In another, the only person authorized to provide notary 
services in Malabo is now one of the country's wealthiest men. 
These legacy privileges have been closely guarded by those 
receiving them, but demands from the younger generation and 
growing appreciation for competition is leading to gradual 
opening.  The outgoing, but-still-powerful Minister of National 
Security once had the only modern hotel in Malabo.  He built it 
on land that was part of his "skinny cow" compensation package, 
situated along the 4-lane airport highway that was until 2000 a 
single, muddy track.  His now-aging hotel faces stiff 
 
MALABO 00000027  002 OF 005 
 
 
competition from newer, more upscale arrivals: a French-owned 
"5-star" Sofitel, a Lebanese-run EG government complex, and 
(soon) a 300-bed Lebanese-owned Hilton Hotel near the Malabo 
airport.  Forced to innovate, the former minister has just 
opened Malabo's first European-style bakery and associated 
ice-cream shop on his premises.  Competition works. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Legal Corruption:  Representatives of a foreign, 
internationally-recognized law firm working closely with U.S. 
oil companies in EG for years tell us they are aware of rumors, 
have seen fully exploited "grey areas" but have never 
encountered a "smoking gun of outright corruption."  They 
describe EG's anti-corruption statutes as "even more stringent 
than the (U.S.) Foreign Corrupt Practices Act."  In practice, 
officials caught in the act are more often quietly removed from 
office and/or banished to some hinterlands task as penance than 
they are prosecuted.  We know of not a single court case. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Moreover, one major flaw remains:  EG has no law 
limiting or even defining conflict of interest.  Most ministers 
continue to moonlight and conduct businesses that often conflate 
their public and private interests.  The Minister of Justice has 
his own private law firm, in which he maintains an active hand 
and open interest -- and which is not illegal under current EG 
law.  In similar fashion, the Minister of Transportation and 
Communications is director of the board and owns shares in the 
parastatal airline, not to mention the national telephone 
company.  The custom of simultaneously maintaining both official 
and private activities that became entrenched in the era of 
skinny cows has not been altered for the fat ones.  There is 
public grumbling but little internal pressure to change the 
rules.  Nonetheless, occasionally lines do get crossed.  We 
understand the former Minister of Fishing and Environment lost 
his job when it was discovered he was occasionally going to 
Spain to sign over fishing licenses out of view of the rest of 
the government.  There were also rumors that corruption led to 
the former Prime Minister's ouster (i.e., Ricardo Mangue).  High 
officials appear to be insulated from prosecution, but 
apparently can't expect impunity. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Family Matters: EG has an extremely tight, intricately 
interconnected society (REFTEL).  There are no arms-length 
transactions here.  The traditions of the predominant Fang tribe 
prevail, and the bonds of family are as strong as they are in 
any other culture.  By American standards, these bonds are 
exceedingly powerful.  Ministers themselves fall victim to these 
traditions and appear unable to avoid pressures to intercede in 
mundane matters on behalf of even lower-class family members. 
Failure to do so can result in loss of influence and 
ostracization within the family and clan.  During a meeting with 
the powerful Minister of Interior in which he was interrupted by 
a telephone call, we were surprised to hear him engage in 
translation and explanation of a routine administrative document 
for an elderly aunt.  "She doesn't read well and she speaks poor 
Spanish," he apologized. "These family matters must be attended 
to here."  The tug of family and the opportunity for abuse of 
power are clear. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Among those close to the president, two individuals 
are singled out for criticism both here and abroad -- the first 
lady, and her son, the "primogeniture" of President Obiang. 
"Teodorin" (or "little Theodor") as the son is known, lives the 
life of an international playboy and is widely accused of 
corruption.  His purchase of a $34 million mansion in Malibu, 
California once made Forbes magazine and attracted a great deal 
of attention.  Yet when we probe him on the issue of corruption, 
he explains that during the time of the "skinny cows," the 
government "granted" him a concession to lumber a large tract of 
pristine continental jungle.  The company he formed (and which 
he still owns, even though he is currently Minister of 
Agriculture and Forestry), brought in a Malaysian contractor 
with 40 teams of well-equipped lumberjacks who clear-cut, 
transported and shipped a wealth of whole logs to Asian markets 
-- leaving Teodorin with a large windfall.  It also ruffled 
enough feathers that a new law was introduced that prohibited 
the exportation of whole logs and limiting clear-cutting.  In 
the meantime, Teodorin continued entrepreneurial activities that 
often included purchase of foreign real estate.  "I've been very 
 
MALABO 00000027  003 OF 005 
 
 
lucky in business," he told us, "and I like to live well.  My 
house in Malibu is now worth twice what I paid for it." 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The origins of his mother's initial grubstake were 
based in real estate, and by any measure she has since become a 
formidable local real estate baron.  As the oil business took 
off, anyone with residential properties that supplied the basics 
(i.e., running water, electricity) saw demand for their 
properties soar.  Earlier than most, the first lady identified 
and built into EG's sizzling real estate boom, where 100% return 
on investments in western-style construction can come within a 
single year of completion.    Of course, it doesn't hurt with 
marketing if you are the first lady, and land for construction 
may be easier to come by than for some others.  The president 
himself acknowledges his "private interests in Equatorial 
Guinea," which include support for his wife's real estate 
ventures.  Once, in a new, stately presidential palace suite, 
waving a hand, he told us, "This doesn't belong to me.  It 
belongs to the people.  But I have to take care of my family, so 
I maintain private interests on the side." 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Anecdotal Indicators:  Given the poor level of 
institutional development, the absence of appropriate law and 
the whiplash EG has experienced in going from poverty to riches 
in such a short period (a decade ago EG was among the very 
poorest countries in the world -- it now has one of the highest 
per capita incomes of any population), it is appropriate to 
focus on the issue of corruption.  Yet apart from the obvious 
conflicts of interest, the rumors and accusations, there are 
some positive signs.  Most EG government revenue is generated by 
exploitation of the country's growing oil and gas reserves.  All 
production is currently led by U.S. oil companies extremely 
sensitive to the requirements of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act.  Thus we have a reasonable level of confidence 
regarding the accounting up to the point that royalty payments 
enter EG accounts. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) In this area too, there are positive signs.  EG is a 
member of the 6-nation Central African Franc monetary union.  In 
the past decade, and in competition with much larger countries 
such as Cameroon, Gabon, and Congo, EG's reserves in the 
associated Central African Bank went from a rounding error to 
over 60% of the sum total.  While leaks are likely, a system 
hemorrhaging money to corruption is unlikely to have amassed 
reserves at such a rapid rate.  A recent visitor from the 
secretariat of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI -- for which EG is voluntarily a candidate country) was 
"pleasantly surprised" to find EG's accounts to be in such good 
order. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Riggs Rigged:  The 2005 collapse of venerable Riggs 
Bank in Washington D.C. continues to hang over EG like a cloud. 
At the time of the Senate/OCC investigations, EG was discovered 
to have the largest cumulative balance in the bank.  Yet study 
of the record shows the bank itself to have been at fault with 
regard to its reporting responsibilities, while the accounts 
associated with EG can be reasonably explained.  Based on our 
conversations here, Equatoguineans readily accepted Riggs' 
advice regarding accounts and accounting -- assuming the bank 
was "acting properly." As the increasing flow of 
dollar-denominated oil revenues built up, and attractive 
interest income streams ensued (which was not always the case 
with EG funds held in the BEAC -- the Central African central 
bank), individuals associated with the EG government began to 
open private accounts.  Both the amounts in the government 
accounts and those in individual accounts are easily in line 
with amounts generated respectively by oil revenues and private 
activities of those concerned.  Recognizing the crippling human 
capacity challenges in the country and the need for western 
(particularly U.S.) education, the EG government even worked 
with the bank to set up accounts for two separate scholarship 
funds, which the bank (poorly) administered.  EG leaders were 
"surprised" to learn U.S. government investigators took a dim 
view of this arrangement. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) As a country, EG has poor level of appreciation for 
international best practices in accounting.  From the EG 
perspective, the country relied on Riggs for good advice, which 
 
MALABO 00000027  004 OF 005 
 
 
it did not receive.  EG continues to struggle with very meager 
institutional development in the area of public finance and 
financial management.  One element scrutinized by U.S. 
investigators of the Riggs affair was the peculiar signatory 
authority utilized on EG accounts.   Long after closure of its 
Riggs accounts, President Obiang is still proud to say he is 
paymaster for the EG government.  He continues to personally 
maintain control of the checkbook, "because I've learned I can't 
trust anyone else."  Countersigned checks are his way of 
ensuring money goes where intended.  He has been attacked by 
some for exerting this level of control, but given what we know 
about the current low level of institutional development and 
lack of capacity, it may be more prudent than immediately 
apparent.  There are very large numbers of public projects 
underway and the president is famous for making surprise 
personal appearances to spot-check for progress, conformity and 
quality.  The tactic is reported to keep contractors on their 
toes.  Nevertheless, it is in these downstream, public 
expenditures that we lose visibility and in which the greatest 
opportunities for corruption persist.  Rumors abound of 
influence buying, bid rigging and kickbacks.  Without developed 
institutional oversight and internal controls, one person can't 
supervise everything, but woes betide those who are caught in 
the act. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Progress:  There are two bright spots and a promising 
glimmer regarding improvement in EG's management of public 
finances, all of which have significant USG angles.  One is the 
unique "Social Development Fund" (SDF) whereby EG ministries are 
learning to manage project development, planning and execution 
in ways that are consistent with international best practices. 
SDF is fully funded by the EG government, and involves direct 
payment to USAID for 3 years and about $15 million worth of 
technical assistance to establish mechanisms and procedures for 
social projects that range from health to education.  An 
overarching goal is to set in motion institutional development 
leading to a government-wide system that meets international 
standards.  After fits and starts, the Fund has moved into the 
execution phase of initial round of projects, with dozens more 
in development and new ministries coming onboard. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Another promising sign is EG's determination to 
become a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI), an international effort supported by former 
British PM Tony Blair and Transparency International's Peter 
Eigen.  Encouraged by the embassy, EG has mounted a serious, 
voluntary effort to obtain candidate status and move toward full 
membership.  In another demonstration of the capacity challenges 
confronting the country, the key stumbling block is not 
accounting and transparency so much as a very low level of 
development of the country's nascent civil society -- a key 
"watch-dog" component of the EITI process.  With a 200 million 
euro project underway, the EU is engaged in helping civil 
society grow to fill this gap. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Finally, we have been told by the Minister of Finance 
that EG will pursue a request for USG assistance (specifically 
Treasury Department official technical assistance) in 
professionalizing his ministry, and which the government of EG 
will partially or fully fund.  His letter making this request 
has been drafted and is "awaiting the council of ministers 
approval," expected soon. 
 
¶18.  (SBU) Conclusion:  While we make no claim of having 
undertaken an exhaustive study of corruption in EG, we find 
local nuance and "ground truth" to be at odds with 
often-exaggerated claims made by the international press and 
even by NGO's that focus on this issue set.  Flush with oil 
money, the value of corrupt actions is probably growing. 
However, anecdotal evidence suggests the incidence of corruption 
is declining.  Businessmen describe EG as a "good place to work, 
but a hard place to do business."  I.e., while it is relatively 
safe and secure, many of the actors who populate the country are 
working the angles for their own personal and family benefit. 
The FCPA and resulting performance of U.S. oil companies has 
helped secure a reputation for Americans of being honest and 
straight, which helps keep the worst of the crooks at bay. 
Other international players may have less integrity.  The good 
 
MALABO 00000027  005 OF 005 
 
 
reputation we enjoy attracts EG leaders who want to see the 
business and legal environment improve.  Here too, additional 
U.S. assistance can help, as the results above show. 
SMITH