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UNCLAS LIMA 000480 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP 
Posts for Fraud Prevention Managers 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC PE
Ref: 08 State 74840 
 
SUBJECT: Fraud Summary: Lima 
 
¶1. (U) Post is submitting its semi-annual fraud summary for 
September 2008 - February 2009.  Responses are keyed to paragraph 
markers in reftel.  Post continues to submit septel spot reports on 
specific cases of interest. 
 
ITEM A: COUNTRY CONDITIONS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Peru's economy is faring far better in the financial crisis 
than most countries in the region.  Although the growth rate was 
previously soaring at nearly 9 percent, its revised forecast for 
2009 still remains positive at 5 percent, according to Peru's 
Central Bank's January 2009 "Inflation Report".  Lima's NIV refusal 
rate is also lower.  The period of December 1, 2008 to February 28, 
2009 showed a 32 percent refusal rate, compared with 43 percent for 
the same period in the previous year. 
 
¶3. (U) Peru is a high fraud post.  False documents are easily 
available, as are genuine documents containing false information. 
Document vendors work in plain sight, and have approached Embassy 
officers on their way to work, mistaking them for potential clients. 
 Vendors and "visa fixers" coach applicants on potential questions, 
and the "correct" answers to provide.  They provide false addresses 
in more upscale neighborhoods and even loan out clothes for the 
interview.  FPU and RSO are working to curb their activities.  Post 
has seen vendor rings not only for tourist NIVs, but for nearly 
every work-authorization visa category.  See NIV fraud below, under 
the false H2B petition. 
¶4. (U) Peruvian National Police anti-fraud units work closely with 
the Embassy on investigations of human trafficking and visa forgery 
rings. 
ITEM B: NIV FRAUD 
----------------- 
 
¶5. (U) Fraud is widespread in all categories of NIVs. B1/B2 
applicants frequently obtain and submit fraudulent supporting 
documents to demonstrate their ties to Peru.  Back-dated immigration 
entry stamps are a continuing problem, and applicants that DHS turns 
around at the border frequently admit to paying Peru's immigration 
officials approximately 100-500 USD for them. In cases where an 
applicant presents confirmed false documents that are material to 
the case, Post works with the local police, who often detain the 
applicant with the goal of identifying and ultimately prosecuting 
the vendor. Post also works with the police to follow up on 
investigations of possible document vendors. 
 
H2A Sheepherders 
 
¶6. (U) Approximately 90 percent of U.S. sheepherding jobs are filled 
by Peruvian nationals on H2A visas.  Past fraud trends have 
included: fraudulent petitions; genuine petitions sold to malafide 
applicants who were never hired for the job; and admissions by 
applicants that they paid fees of up to 5000 USD to visa fixers. 
Post has taken significant measures to reduce fraud surrounding the 
petitions.  Petitions that do not have the applicant's name already 
listed on it are referred to FPU, which then contacts the 
petitioning agency or the ranch itself to verify the applicants. 
All petitions must appear in PIMS before visa issuance. 
 
¶7. (U) In the meantime, a longstanding problem remains in the 
spotlight: H2A extortion and trafficking, perpetrated by fellow 
villagers or sheepherders already in the U.S.  It is common for a 
sheepherder to recommend a brother-in-law or cousin to their 
employer, and then exact a fee - often one month's salary - for the 
"favor." 
 
¶8. (U) More egregious examples exist.  In January 2009, a ranch 
informed Post that one of their sheepherders was unable to return to 
Indiana.  A visa fixer had taken possession of his visa-ed passport 
and demanded 2000 USD in exchange for returning it.  FPU spoke to 
the applicant, and learned that he had obtained his first H2A 
position in 2004 by paying 4000 USD to this visa fixer.  The 
applicant stated that he believed this was a standard process.  Due 
to his lack of access to information and low level of education, FPU 
was inclined to believe him.  He also stated that this visa fixer's 
family was powerful in his mountain village, and that he feared 
involving the police.  FPU revoked the visa that had been issued and 
reissued a second visa once the applicant obtained a new passport. 
(Post is working with the Public Affairs Section to educate the 
Peruvian public, specifically in isolated sheepherding areas, about 
extortion in H2 visa petitions; see "Areas of Particular Concern"). 
 
I Visas 
 
¶9. (U) Journalist visas have historically been a fraud-ridden 
category.  Despite our SOP that all I applicants be vetted with 
Embassy's Public Affairs office through FPU, fraud continues.  No 
government office or association exists in Peru to issue journalist 
credentials, and the College of Journalism refuses to issue 
credentials to "non-professional" journalists.  The difficulty is 
that "professional journalists," i.e. those educated as such, 
account for only 20 percent of the journalists working in Peru.) The 
following examples illustrate some of the recent I visa fraud 
encountered. 
 
¶10. (U) In November 2008, the director of a press agency applied to 
renew his I visa, and to accompany two assistants applying for first 
time I visas.  On his prior trip, two different assistants 
accompanied him.  The interviewing officer inquired as to the 
whereabouts of the first two assistants.  She stated that he 
"appeared nervous" and that he "was sweating during the interview 
with short answers to questions."  She referred the cases to FPU for 
the standard confirmation, but also requested an extra step - a 
verification that his prior assistants had returned to Peru.  They 
had not.  The case was referred to the police. 
 
¶11. (U) The second case regards a media company owned by five 
brothers, well known in Northern Peru. Two of the owners applied for 
a revalidation of their I visas, and also applied with an assistant. 
 FPU noted that the owners had already traveled with a number of 
assistants, and ran an ADIS check on the travel history of everyone 
associated with the company.  Surprisingly, the assistants had all 
traveled well, but two of the five owners had significant stays in 
the U.S.  One was admitted for one month but stayed nearly two 
years, while the other stayed for more than five years.  Although he 
was admitted for duration of status, he claimed on his visa 
application that it was a 13 day stay. 
 
H2B: Fake Petition 
 
¶12. (U) In January 2009, Post interviewed an applicant for an H2B 
position as a horse groomer.  The application was sent to FPU for a 
standard H2 employment verification.  When the investigator called 
the employer, she stated that she had never offered a job to the 
applicant.  In addition, she stated that she no longer works with 
the law firm listed on the petition.  When contacted, the law firm 
stated that they had never filed for a petition on behalf of this 
applicant, and pointed out several errors on the petition.  Finally, 
DHS reported that there was no record of the petition receipt 
number.  FPU alerted the Assistant Regional Security Investigator 
(A/RSO-I) who stands ready to interview him, but the applicant has 
failed to show to any follow-up appointments. 
 
J1 Work and Travel: Fake Transcripts 
 
¶13. (U) The 2008 J1 Summer Work and Travel (SWT) season began mid 
September and continued through December.  During that time, Post 
processed close to 10,000 SWT visas.  A primary concern during J 
season is the frequency of false transcripts.  Post routinely 
requests these transcripts so that we can ensure that the students 
are duly enrolled.  Previous validation studies have also confirmed 
that students with above-passing grades are much more likely to make 
timely returns at the end of their program.  Post's J1 officer and 
FPU familiarize line officers with transcripts from the most 
frequently-seen universities, and when officers suspect a false 
transcript (often only detectable with eye loops), Post calls the 
university's registrar.  A surprising number of the students 
presenting false transcripts were registered as full-time students, 
and their actual grades were not poor.  Line officers agreed that if 
these students had presented their true transcripts, they may have 
found them to be serious students with strong ties to their 
university programs.  However, these students were motivated to 
inflate their grades due to rumors circulating about what the 
minimum requirements were.  Because of this, post does not plan to 
routinely request transcripts in the coming SWT season. 
 
¶14. (U) It is important to note that, despite the number of fake 
transcripts presented, validation studies of Lima's J1 visas 
continue to show an extremely high return rate of those whose 
applications are approved. 
 
ITEM C: IV FRAUD 
---------------- 
 
¶15. (U) Immigrant visa fraud is common in both family- and 
employment-based IV categories.  Mala fide applicants often use 
fraudulent birth and marriage certificates to support their cases. 
 
16.(U) Marriage fraud in Lima is the most common type of IV fraud 
and ranges from individual American citizens being duped by fiances 
with no desire to marry to well thought-out scams by Lawful 
Permanent Residents (LPRs) and Amcits trying to help family or 
friends get to the United States.  Fraud indicators include 
applicants who meet through coincidence online or over the phone 
when a friend or a family member introduces them and petitioners who 
travel to Peru just once in order to get married (and pose for 
pictures of the couple to be submitted to the IV unit) and then 
never return.  Post tries to combat this type of fraud by requesting 
interviews with both the petitioner and beneficiary when the 
applicant cannot provide sufficient proof of relationship.  This 
occurred in approximately 4 percent of our marriage based cases for 
this reporting period.  Fraud relating to derivatives and other 
petitionable relationships is common as well. 
 
¶17. (U) While not as rampant as relationship fraud, employment-based 
IV fraud is found in the E3 and EW categories.  Usually the fraud 
occurs in the form of fraudulent employment experience or education 
letters. 
 
ITEM D: DV FRAUD 
---------------- 
 
¶18. (U) Peru graduated from the DV lottery on Sept. 30, 2007. 
 
ITEM E: ACS/PASSPORT FRAUD 
------------------------- 
 
¶19. (U) ACS caught two cases of photo-substituted passports, during 
their applications for renewals. In both cases, the passports 
(issued in 1999 and 2006) had the laminate edge by the photo 
completely lifted.  In one case, the American citizen's original 
photo (confirmed in PIERS) was in the passport, but it had clearly 
been cut for removal and came out of the passport easily.  The 
signature on the passport also looked different from the signature 
on the application or in PIERS.  The FPM and the A/RSO-I interviewed 
the applicant, and then the A/RSO-I opened an investigation.  The 
suspicion is that the American citizen pulled out his photo and kept 
it, giving his passport to someone else for travel, and then 
re-inserted his photo before coming to the Embassy.  Since he could 
provide proof that he is who he says he is, a limited passport (as a 
replacement for a damaged passport) was issued.  In the other case, 
the photo of the applicant appeared to be scanned onto the laminate, 
although the photo again matches PIERS, and no other identities come 
up through FR on Demand. The applicant also has a child support hit, 
which he was supposed to resolve when a previous one-entry passport 
was issued.  We believe he simply departed the U.S. on his Peruvian 
passport without ever paying the child support that led to the HHS 
hit. Since the passport he presented was expired, the FPM canceled 
and kept it.  He has not yet returned to the embassy, and the case 
is pending. 
 
¶20. (U) Post recently encountered a Consular Report of Birth Abroad 
(CRBA) case involving in vitro fertilization where fraud was 
indicated. The couple had claimed that the wife had carried the 
child, when in reality a non-citizen third party had given birth. In 
the same week, another CRBA case that had been referred for DNA 
testing came back as not at match.  Post subsequently re-instituted 
a former SOP to refer a CRBA application to FPU if: a) the child was 
born out of wedlock; b) citizenship is being transmitted through a 
father who does not live in Peru; or c) the CRBA is not being 
registered in a timely fashion.  A specialized training is currently 
being prepared for ACS, with details to follow in the next Fraud 
Summary. 
 
ITEM F: ADOPTION FRAUD 
---------------------- 
 
¶21. (U) Adoptions in Peru are marked more by applicants potentially 
not qualifying under U.S. immigration law as orphans rather than 
more direct fraud through documents or false relationships. It is 
not unusual for Peruvian-Americans to adopt young relatives such as 
nephews and nieces, and while the adoption "by exception" is legal 
under Peruvian law, the adopted child may not be an orphan as 
defined in the FAM. The child often still lives with one or both 
biological parents, making the adoption a matter of convenience or 
opportunity. IV and FPU work closely to ensure the integrity of 
adoption-related IVs in Lima. 
 
USE OF DNA TESTING 
------------------ 
 
¶22. (U) Most DNA requests originate from the IV section, with a few 
requested in ACS.  A red flag indicator is a late-registered birth 
certificate, as most birth certificates should be registered within 
1-3 months of a child's birth.  If a birth certificate is registered 
late, applicants are given the opportunity to prove their 
relationship through other means.  If the officer is not convinced, 
a DNA test is requested.  The IV chief must approve all requests for 
DNA testing. 
 
¶23. (U) For this reporting period, the IV Section requested DNA 
results for 18 cases.  Of those, 13 showed a biological match, 1 
returned as negative for a match, and 4 have not yet followed 
through.  In ACS, 1 returned a negative result and 2 applications 
were withdrawn.  There were 17 positive matches. 
 
¶24. (U) Post does not have any operational concerns with DNA 
testing.  It is considered a successful fraud deterrent, and at 
times critical to establishing relationships.  The ACS unit and FPU 
coordinate unscheduled periodic visits to the two certified DNA 
laboratories to ensure proper procedures are being followed. 
 
ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶25. (U) DHS/CIS officer assigned to post handles these matters.  FPU 
enjoys excellent cooperation with the local DHS office, as the two 
offices prioritize each others' requests for information. 
 
ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST TRAVEL 
------- 
 
Lima as transit point for PRC smuggling 
 
¶26. (U) Lima is a transit point for illicit travel, and became even 
more attractive as such when neighboring Ecuador instituted its 
recent visa-free immigration policy.  In Septel STATE 000123, Post 
reported that a ring had been busted for smuggling Chinese 
asylum-seekers to the U.S. with phony home-made Japanese passports. 
A search of the ring's "labs" suggested they were also targeting 
Korea's recent accession to the Visa Waiver Travel program, as the 
search turned up Korean passports and Korean immigration stamps. 
 
¶27. (U) The route for the smuggled PRC nationals would begin with a 
flight from China to Ecuador, and then an overland journey from 
Ecuador to Peru.  They picked up the phony passports in Peru, and 
then purchased tickets to fly "home" to Japan via a U.S. Port of 
Entry.  (Once Peruvian Immigration began presenting obstacles for 
them, they would travel overland again to leave from Bolivia, 
Brazil, and sometimes Argentina.)  During the flight to the U.S. 
they would destroy the phony passports, and present their PRC 
passports at the POE.  Post responded to this discovery by alerting 
DHS and other law enforcement agencies at post, as well as through 
the reporting cable. 
 
Peruvian robbers doing "business" in Cairo? 
 
¶28. (U) A curious connection has emerged between Peru and Egypt: 
seven Peruvians have been arrested in Cairo during this reporting 
period.  The first three were arrested for a bank heist of one 
million USD.  The next four were arrested for attempting to rob a 
money exchange office.  Two more malafide travelers, one Peruvian 
and one traveling on a fake Peruvian passport, were detected en 
route to Cairo.  The traveler with the fake Peruvian passport was 
spotted in Bangkok, with the following travel plans: Phnom 
Penh-Bangkok-Cairo-Bangkok-Kuala Lumpur-Amsterdam-Lima. The second 
traveler was arrested in Rio de Janeiro, ostensibly on his way to 
Cairo, but with a false Mexican passport hidden in the sole of his 
flip-flop shoe.  His true destination was apparently Mexico, and he 
presumably purchased the ticket to Cairo as a cover.  Post is 
working with RSO, the Peruvian National Police, Interpol, and U.S. 
Embassy Cairo to determine if this is part of a larger ring, and who 
might be funding these trips. 
 
Sri Lankans: destination Lima 
 
¶29. (U) The Peruvian police have reported three waves of Sri Lankan 
males arriving in Lima within weeks of each other, with Peruvian 
visas issued in India.  The most recent wave arrived from Brazil in 
January.  The police stated that a Sri Lankan who had arrived in the 
previous weeks met them at the airport.  They appeared not to know 
each other well, and took a taxi to an unknown destination.  The 
onward destination in these cases seems to be Canada.  FPU has 
alerted colleagues at the Canadian Embassy. 
 
Washed Visas 
 
¶30. (U) DHS's office of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) stays in 
close contact with Post regarding cases of malafide travelers, 
usually traveling from Peru to a U.S. Port of Entry.  It is not 
uncommon for travelers to use real passports with altered U.S. 
visas, either traveling under their real name or a completely false 
one.  Airlines are very helpful partners in identifying a false 
visa.  For example, in December 2008 COPA airlines contacted CBP 
about a traveler who fled the Lima airport when authorities noticed 
her false visa in a passport issued in a different name.  She had 
fled the airport when detected, and local authorities could not 
determine her true identity.  CBP scanned a copy of the visa and 
emailed it to Post.  When her picture was run through Facial 
Recognition, the CCD matched her photo with her three recent visa 
refusals.  Post's access to the Peruvian national registry database 
(RENIEC) allowed FPU to verify her true identity. We shared her true 
identity with local authorities so she could be prosecuted for 
passport fraud. 
 
Drug Cartel 
 
¶31. (U) At the request of Department of Treasury officials, FPU 
investigated partners of the incarcerated Peruvian drug lord 
Fernando Zevallos Gonzales, whose family has been named under the 
Kingpin Act.  Post identified 14 key associates and 23 
Peruvian-registered businesses related to his drug-running scheme 
and immediately revoked the visas of those listed as key business 
contacts.  In addition, FPU used the Peruvian business database, 
SUNAT, to identify the legal representatives and managers of the 23 
companies, sharing the data with Treasury.  Post found four more 
visa holders this way, and prudentially revoked their visas as well. 
 
 
DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶32. (U) FPU refers cases that appear to involve organized fraud to 
the A/RSO-I, who determines if and where a criminal element is 
present and follows up on the investigation.  There is significant 
information-sharing and discussion between the Consul General, the 
FPM and the A/RSO-I regarding ongoing cases. 
 
HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY 
-------- 
 
¶33. (U) Peru issues the Andean Community passport, which is ICAO 
compliant.  The passport has a laminated bio-data page and a 
digitized photo.  The photo and signature of the holder are 
incorporated into the basic material of the data page.  A Peruvian 
citizen can easily obtain and use a new or second passport in a true 
or false identity to conceal illegal stays in the United States or 
for other illicit purposes. 
 
¶34. (U) Peruvian civil documents vary between each municipality and 
are relatively easy to falsify and obtain.  Corrupt notaries and 
municipal officials have been known to accept payment to issue 
authentic civil documents using false personal data.  Peruvian law 
allows late registrations of birth based on minimal evidence - a 
sworn statement of a witness many years after the fact is 
acceptable.  With birth certificate in hand, a legitimate passport 
in a false identity can be easily obtained.  A birth certificate 
issued within the last three months is required to renew or obtain a 
first-time passport.  Post has access to the Peruvian National 
Identity database, a web-based application that provides access to 
the information submitted to obtain the Peruvian National Identity 
card.  However, as with passports, Post often encounters genuine 
registrations in this system based on false bio-data. 
 
COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶35. (U) Peruvian statutes include laws against visa fraud, alien 
smuggling and trafficking in persons.  Although Post works closely 
with the Peruvian National Police's anti-fraud division on many 
investigations, outside of this unit, results in case follow up and 
application of existing laws vary widely.  FPU enjoys good relations 
with Peruvian immigration authorities (DIGEMIN) who host FPU 
training teams in various parts of the country. Airline 
representatives consistently indicate unwillingness to provide 
information on malafide passengers to the local police due to their 
stated concerns that the police may be corrupt. 
 
AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN 
--------------------------- 
 
¶36. (U) H2 visas remain a heightened area of concern for Post.  FPU 
is working on a joint initiative with the Public Affairs Section to 
air public announcements in sheepherding communities in order to 
educate potential applicants on what is and is not allowed in the 
visa application process. 
 
¶37. (U) Cooperation with other posts is frequent and very useful. 
Recent exchanges with Bogota, Quito, Cairo, and Rio de Janeiro have 
covered issues ranging from validating a birth certificate to 
sharing information about a Peruvian traveling through South America 
with a false U.S. passport. 
 
¶38. (U) In addition, the information exchanged between FPU and 
Post's local DHS office is vital, and covers a wide range of issues. 
 Consular officers often have questions about incomplete information 
entered into the CCD, which can only be resolved by contacting DHS. 
Lima's FPU recognizes that its workload and operations are helped 
greatly by the quick responses from the local DHS office. 
 
¶39. (U) As will be further reported septel, Post's Consular Section 
and DHS/CIS Laguna Nigel Service Center held a joint Digital Video 
Conference on March 25, 2009, to "meet" one another and answer 
questions about Petition processing. 
 
STAFFING/TRAINING 
----------------- 
 
¶40. (U) Post's FPU consists of one Fraud Prevention Manager, an 
entry-level officer position which rotates through the Unit every 
three months, three full time LES investigators, a part-time 
rotational LES administrative position and the A/RSO-I.  Two of 
Post's fraud investigators have traveled to Washington for training. 
 Post's FPM took Fraud Prevention for Consular Managers at FSI in 
February 2009.  The senior LES investigator/supervisor and the LES 
clerk took the FSN Fraud Prevention workshop at FSI in 2002 and 2007 
respectively. 
 
MCKINLEY