O 061908Z MAR 09
FM AMCONSUL LAHORE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3945
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY KABUL 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
CIA WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
AMCONSUL LAHORE

S E C R E T LAHORE 000041 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/6/2034 
TAGS: PGOV PTER KDEM PK

SUBJECT: (S) SHAHBAZ SHARIF OPEN TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH PRESIDENT  ZARDARI 
  Derived from: DSCG 05-1, D 
 
¶1. (S) Summary:  In a March 6 meeting with Principal Officer,  Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N) President Shahbaz Sharif  laid out a number of preconditions for a quick negotiated  settlement to the current political impasse with President Asif  Zardari including that (1) the agreement included concrete  progress to resolve the judges' issue and (2) their was a  guarantor to ensure President Zardari lived up to his  commitments.  Shahbaz suggested that either a dismissal of all  judges who had taken an extra-constitutional oath -- including  former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry -- or creation of a  constitutional court superior to the Supreme Court might offer  ways to resolve the issue but noted that Nawaz Sharif had not  yet been consulted on these ideas.  Shahbaz worried that if the  current political impasse was not resolved prior to March 12,  the long march could be exploited both by terrorists and by  elements of the establishment who still wished to derail the  democratic process.  While Shahbaz reposed continued confidence  in Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Kayani and suggested that Kayani  could be used to pressure Zardari towards a reasonable  agreement, Shahbaz cautioned that Kayani was only one general  and that others were undoubtedly pushing Kayani to use the  current political impasse as a pretext for intervention in the  system.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (S) Principal Officer met March 6 with PML-N President  Shahbaz Sharif to deliver talking points provided by Ambassador  Holbrooke.  Shahbaz immediately accepted that a quick negotiated  settlement of all of the Sharifs' outstanding issues with  President Zardari was in the national interest and stated that  he and his brother were fully prepared to be constructive  participants in a dialogue process that yielded concrete  results.  However, Shahbaz cautioned that it was President  Zardari who had initiated this latest political crisis through  his pressure on the Supreme Court to disqualify the Sharifs and  that it was President Zardari who would need to show himself  open to a final negotiated settlement.  Shahbaz opined that any  trust in President Zardari's intentions was gone, owing to his  habit of negotiating and then breaking deals with the Sharifs. 
Shahbaz stated that he was only interested in dialogue if it led  to concrete commitments from Zardari that would finally resolve  the outstanding issues dividing the parties, particularly the  judges' issue.  He also stressed that given Zardari's past track  record on agreements, any settlement would need to include a  guarantor, who could exercise pressure on both sides to fulfill  commitments.  Shahbaz did not offer comment on to which party he  would like to serve as guarantor, deferring instead to his elder  brother. 
 
¶3. (S) Shahbaz stated that for any reconciliation between the  PML-N and President Zardari to proceed, the President would at a  minimum have to resolve a formula that restored Shahbaz's  government, restored Nawaz's eligibility, and restored -- if  only for a few moments -- former Chief Justice Iftikhar  Chaudhry.  Shahbaz stated that the first two issues could easily  be resolved through presidential decree and/or parliamentary  action, if both the PML-N and PPP leadership agreed to do so. 
On the Iftikhar Chaudhry issue, Shahbaz suggested two possible  compromises (although he noted that his brother might have  separate complimentary or conflicting ideas).  First, he  proposed that President Zardari announce Chaudhry's restoration  concomitant with a parliamentary decision, removing all judges  who have taken oath under a provisional constitutional order  (PCO) from office.  Under this formula, Chaudhry, who took a PCO  oath following Musharraf's 1999 coup, along with most other  senior judges would be removed from office.  The parties could  then implement the provisions of the Charter of Democracy, which  lays out a system for multiparty consultation and agreement on  judicial appointments.  Second, he suggested that the  Constitutional Court, envisaged in the Charter of Democracy, be  established and that it be made superior to the Supreme Court. 
Iftikhar Chaudhry's restoration as Chief Justice would then have  little measurable impact, as the Constitutional Court, staffed  by appointees from both parties, could nullify his decisions. 
 
¶4. (S) Shahbaz agreed with USG concerns that the current  political impasse was distracting attention from issues of  national importance.  He also expressed his concern that  terrorists could exploit the current demonstrations and the  planned long march to carry out attacks on the public and  political leaders.  He also expressed concern that while he and  his brother could confidently control PML-N elements in the long  march and keep them peaceful, people from numerous other  organizations outside their influence would also be  participating.  Shahbaz expressed serious reservations that in  the current emotionally charged climate, these elements could  resort to vandalism and/or violence.  If such occurred, Shahbaz  worried that the army might be tempted to intervene in the  political system. 
 
¶5. (S) Shahbaz expressed great faith in Chief of Army Staff  Kayani's commitment to civilian rule and democracy.  He stated  without prompting that Kayani was the least likely army officer  to intervene in the democratic process.  However, he cautioned  that Kayani, unlike Musharraf, was surrounded by corps  commanders who were effectively his equals in terms of  seniority.  If these officers pressed for a direct or  Bangladesh-style indirect intervention in the system, Kayani  would have no choice but to comply with their wishes.  Shahbaz  stated that he hoped Kayani would play a constructive role at  this time in pressing all political leaders to resolve their  outstanding issues quickly and through negotiation. 
 
¶6. (S) Shahbaz remained optimistic that if a provincial election  for Chief Minister were declared, the PML-N could muster the  necessary votes to elect its candidate (currently Sardar  Zulfiqar Khan Khosa -- an 80 plus year old former Punjab  Governor from Dera Ghazi Khan currently serving as PML-N's  Punjab President) as Chief Minister.  Shahbaz was confident that  under no circumstances would PML-N or PML forward block members  vote for the PPP, as, he argued, they are mindful that the next  elections will go to the PML-N and these members wish to win a  second term.  Shahbaz claimed that he was open to an alliance  with the PML, provided that the PML dropped its initial demand  that the Chief Minister slot go to the PML, as there was no way  he could sell that to Nawaz.  Shahbaz reported that he was in  regular contact with Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and Chaudhry  Pervaiz Elahi (through intermediaries) regarding a possible  deal, but noted that at least initially, the PML would need to  agree to a partnership without preconditions -- in order to win  over Nawaz.  Ministries would, of course, be provided  appropriate to the PML's status as a ""junior coalition partner."" 
 
¶7. (S) Comment:  Shahbaz Sharif seemed slightly more open than  during his meeting a week earlier to reconciliation with  President Zardari.  However, he seemed extremely cautious about  any direct dialogue with President Zardari absent an outside  guarantor and pre-agreement from Zardari to resolve all issues  including the restoration -- even if only symbolic -- of Chief  Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry.  Post believes that Shahbaz has not  discussed his various ""solutions"" in detail with his elder  brother Nawaz Sharif, who will ultimately have to acquiesce to  any final deal.  Shahbaz offered no assurances that the PML-N  was prepared to end its street protests / public meetings  unilaterally, placing the blame for any disruptive consequences  on President Zardari, who Shahbaz regards as provocateur. 
Shahbaz remained pessimistic about President Zardari's desire to  pursue reconciliation.  End Comment 
 
  HUNT