R 020836Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2405
NVC PORTSMOUTH 2168

UNCLAS KUALA LUMPUR 000150 
 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC EAP MY
 
SUBJECT:  MALAYSIA FRAUD SUMMARY (SEPT 2008 - FEB 2009) 
 
REF:  08 STATE 74840 
 
¶1.  SUMMARY:  Malaysia is not a country associated with a high level 
of fraud in immigration and travel matters involving the United 
States.  However Malaysia is a destination and transit point for 
many forms of illegal travel and human trafficking.  The country, as 
a whole, enjoys a relatively high level of educational and economic 
opportunity for its citizens, and imports a large number of foreign 
workers to fill local jobs.  The recent economic crisis has led to 
many layoffs, however, and calls for curtailing the entry of foreign 
labor.  While these factors could cause some to seek better 
opportunities abroad, we believe the effect on the United States 
will be minimal.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶A.  Country Conditions: 
 
¶2.  Malaysia is a relatively prosperous country with an economy that 
runs the gamut from high tech industries to subsistence agriculture 
and everything in between.  Formal unemployment is low and job 
opportunities relatively abundant.  Most guest workers come from 
Indonesia, the Philippines and the Indian subcontinent, and are 
employed in low skill areas, particularly the agricultural and 
construction fields and as domestic servants.  The availability of 
jobs and possibilities on the local economy has contributed to a low 
level of visa fraud.  While the worldwide economic crisis is 
beginning to hit Malaysia, the country's long-term economic 
prospects remain good, and the current downturn is not likely to 
result in significantly greater levels of fraud. 
 
¶3.  Malaysia is a multiethnic and multiracial society, with ethnic 
Malays making up something over half the population, and citizens of 
Chinese and Indian descent and non-Malay indigenous groups making up 
the rest.  Tensions between the groups have rarely erupted in 
violence, though non-Malays frequently complain about preferential 
treatment of Malays in many spheres.  Ethnic minorities and the 
political opposition have increasingly challenged the race-based 
status quo over the past several years.  Reportedly, there has been 
an increase in the out-migration of ethnic Chinese in recent years. 
However, we do not believe that perceptions of unequal treatment 
have been or will become a serious inducement to visa fraud. 
 
¶B.  Non-Immigrant Visa (NIV) Fraud: 
 
¶4.  Post does not see a great deal of fraud in the visa process. 
Typically, fraud involves misrepresentation of an applicant's 
income, job or family circumstances, claims that may be supported by 
easily identifiable fraudulent financial documents or job letters. 
Less commonly, applicants will obtain fraudulent stamps in their 
passports to hide overstays in the U.S.  The B1B2 category is 
probably the most prone to misrepresentation, but even so we have a 
90% plus approval rate and a very low 1% to 2% overstay rate in this 
category.  The largest group of overstayers is Malaysian-Chinese, a 
conclusion confirmed by validation studies.  Our officers and FSNs 
are trained in recognition of documents or patterns indicative of 
fraud.  We have two Mandarin speaking officers full time at 
interview windows; in fact our staff -- FSN and FSO -- speaks a 
total of 15 different languages, which enables us to meet the needs 
of our applicant population.  We encourage student visa applicants, 
making college and high school outreach visits to provide visa 
application information and to humanize the face of the visa 
process.  The number of student visa applicants has increased over 
the last several years and is now approaching levels not seen since 
the pre-September 11 time period.  We see little fraud in this 
category.  Our approval rate for students is above 95%, and most of 
our refusals are third country nationals who cannot demonstrate ties 
to Malaysia. 
 
¶C.  Immigrant Visa (IV) Fraud: 
 
¶5.  Our IV fraud revolves around applicants who have violated 
immigration laws in the past -- overstays, working while on a B1B2 
visa or things of this nature.  We see few cases of relationship 
fraud.  Our IV workload is relatively low, only around 600 per year, 
enabling us to devote maximum time to verifying cases.  Most of our 
cases are family-based and are reasonably easy to investigate in 
Malaysia. 
 
¶D.  Diversity Visa (DV) Fraud: 
 
¶6.  Malaysia has very few DV applicants and has not experienced DV 
fraud in the last year. 
 
¶E.  ACS and U.S. Passport Fraud: 
 
¶7.  In the last year we have investigated several suspicious 
passport and citizenship cases, but did not find any instances of 
fraud.  We have not detected fraud in any other type of in ACS 
case. 
 
¶F.  Adoption Fraud: 
 
¶8.  Malaysia has a very low rate of adoption, particularly by 
 
foreigners.  There are two factors that keep the rate so low: (a) 
Islamic societies do not encourage adoption and specifically 
prohibit adoption of Muslim children.  With a majority Muslim 
population, Malaysia has little history of adoptions by foreigners. 
(b) The availability of adoptable children is very limited, as 
families tend to take in the children of relatives who die or cannot 
support them.  Our low level of adoptions makes it possible for us 
to fully explore and verify the cases we handle. 
 
¶G.  Use of DNA Testing: 
 
¶9.  We have requested DNA testing in five passport cases over the 
past six months; in all cases the claimed relationship was 
confirmed.  We have not requested testing in any IV or visas 92/93 
case in the past six months, but have received a few requests from 
DHS to arrange and witness tests for them.  Suggestion of the 
possibility of DNA testing has caused several applicants to 
reconsider their applications.  There have not been any cultural 
problems with DNA testing nor are there any operational concerns 
with testing at Post. 
 
¶H.  Asylum and Other DHS Benefit Fraud: 
 
¶10.  We process a handful of visas 92/93 cases.  We have generally 
detected little fraud, though we recently returned a case for 
revocation because we believed the relationship was fraudulent. 
There is little demand for other DHS services, and we have not 
experienced any cases of fraud. 
 
¶I.  Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, Terrorist 
Travel: 
 
¶11.  Malaysia, like its neighbors, is a nexus for the illegal 
movement of people.  The main transit point in Malaysia for illegal 
travelers is the Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA).  A 
variety of nationalities have used or attempted to use KLIA for 
document swaps.  Imposters and travelers with fake or altered 
documents, including Africans, Europeans, Asians, Australians, and 
North Americans, have been detected.  The Embassy regularly 
participates in airport interdiction exercises, working alongside 
airline personnel boarding flights destined to the United States to 
detect fraudulent activity.  Immigration authorities recently told 
us they have begun regular patrols through these areas in an attempt 
to better detect and deter this activity.  But a number of security 
holes remain at KLIA -- most specifically arriving and departing 
passengers use the same common areas and are able to mingle at 
will. 
 
¶12.  We benefit from good cooperation with other missions on 
trafficking and related issues.  There are monthly meetings of fraud 
and airport liaison officers of like-minded missions in which issues 
of common concern are discussed and information on recent cases 
shared.  Other countries stage regular KLIA interdictions where 
airport liaison officers observe and help check boarding documents. 
Post also participates with these missions in a variety of training 
activities for airline staffers and immigration officers. 
 
¶13.  On December 7, 2008 a Japanese Airlines ground agent detected a 
questionable passenger about to board a flight to Narita/Tokyo.  The 
passenger presented an American passport to the ground agent along 
with a recently purchased ticket.  As recently purchased tickets are 
a fraud indicator in Malaysia, the ground agent questioned the 
passenger about her travel plans.  The passenger could not speak 
English, and when questioning began she left the check-in area and 
disappeared.  Subsequent examination of her American passport 
revealed that the passport was stolen in July of 2006 in Toronto, 
Canada.  The passport was photo subbed, but was of particularly good 
quality.  The passport and relevant documents, including copies from 
PIERS of the original application and the passenger's routing 
information were turned over to our RSO for further investigation. 
 
¶14.  The city of Ipoh is the major source of illegal and falsified 
documents in Malaysia.  Although passports are not commonly forged, 
many other documents and the national identity card can be obtained 
in Ipoh.  We believe that most of the fraudulent financial and 
employment documents presented by our NIV applicants originate in 
Ipoh.  RSO has an open investigation regarding over 100 B-1/B-2 
recipients who used fraudulent documents associated with Ipoh from 
¶2007. 
 
¶J.  DS Criminal Fraud Investigations: 
 
¶15.  The Consular Section and RSO work cooperatively on 
investigations, sharing information on a regular basis and 
participating jointly in activities such as the monthly diplomatic 
community fraud council meetings.  RSO has been helpful in a number 
of instances providing crime trend data and information regarding 
stolen American passports.  RSO has also worked with the Consular 
Section to develop a protocol with the Royal Malaysia Police for the 
investigation of counterfeit Malaysian government issued documents 
that come to our attention. 
 
¶K.  Host Country Passport, Identity Documents, and Civil Registry: 
 
¶16.  Malaysia produces civil documents with effective and 
appropriate security features.  The Malaysian passport is machine 
readable and has several levels of anti-fraud protection. 
Malaysians are also required to have personal identification cards 
from an early age.  It is possible that passports and identity cards 
have been issued to unqualified individuals through official 
corruption, but we have no clear evidence.  However, blanks of both 
have been stolen in the past and sold for fraudulent use.  The 
Malaysian government has embarked on an effort to issue passports 
more quickly and cheaply, which some fear will compromise the 
document itself (through abandonment of some anti-fraud features) 
and the issuance process. 
 
¶17.  We have detected forged entry and exit stamps in the passports 
of visa applicants, usually for the purpose of hiding previous 
overstays.  Our FSNs have become entry/exit stamp experts, an 
excellent resource in detecting questionable stamps. 
 
¶L.  Cooperation with Host Government Authorities: 
 
¶18.  Cooperation with Malaysian Government Authorities often depends 
on which office or person one is dealing with.  We have generally 
positive and mutually helpful relations with the Immigration staff 
at KLIA and with officers in the Home Ministry (Malaysian 
Immigration's parent agency).  We conduct regular training and 
exercises at the airport, which has resulted in identifying 
fraudulent travelers and the discovery of altered or fake travel 
documents. 
 
¶19.  Overall, Malaysian efforts to counter immigration-related fraud 
are sporadic and of mixed effectiveness.  Punishments under 
Malaysian law for immigration-related fraud, when committed by 
Malaysians, tend to be comparatively light, including confiscation 
of passports and difficulty in obtaining replacements. 
 
¶M.  Areas of Particular Concern: 
 
¶20.  We have no areas of concern beyond those discussed above. 
 
¶N.  Staffing and Training: 
 
¶21.  Post does not have any full-time FPU employees; our deputy 
section chief is our designated Fraud Prevention Manager and is 
assisted by one FSN.  Both have received FSI fraud training.  Our 
part-time consular officer has airport liaison, immigration training 
and flight interdiction efforts as part of his regular duties.  We 
have been successful in obtaining appropriate training for 
interested officers and FSNs, all of whom assist in anti-fraud 
activities.  In addition, all consular staff receive an airport 
orientation and participate in flight interdiction on a regular 
basis, insuring that everyone is familiar with the fraud environment 
in Malaysia.  Officers under the Singapore DHS OIC regularly visit 
Kuala Lumpur to conduct training at KLIA and advise Post on a 
variety of issues. 
 
RAPSON