O 020820Z MAR 09
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 000160 
 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR KOCI UN IN NP
SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO POTENTIAL GON MOVES ON 
NON-COMBATANTS IN CANTONMENTS 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 137 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR NANCY J. POWELL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B/D) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  Indian Ambassador Sood hosted a donor 
coordination discussion to review planning for discharge of 
4000 non-combatants from the PLA cantonments.  UNICEF and 
UNDP briefed comprehensive plans for a three-day 
out-processing to be followed by sixty options for vocational 
training.  Considerable challenges remain before any program 
becomes a reality including obtaining GON buy-in, determining 
GON jurisdiction, countering political opposition, scheduling 
and the Indian role.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Indian Ambassador Rakesh Sood hosted a working lunch 
February 26 to review international planning in support of a 
possible move by the GON to discharge the 4000 non-combatants 
currently residing in the Maoist cantonments.  Guests 
included UNMIN Special Representative, American and EU chiefs 
of mission, Danish DCM, UNICEF director, and UNDP office 
director.  Sood briefed the group on PM Dahal's comments to 
Indian Foreign Secretary Menon (reftel) that he planned to 
discharge the 4000 as soon as possible, perhaps in as little 
time as six weeks.  UNMIN representative commented that this 
was consistent with her discussions with deputy PLA 
commanders in two cantonments, who exhibited a willingness, 
for the first time, to consider segregating the 
non-combatants. 
 
¶3.  (C)  UNDP and UNICEF briefed on a joint plan (to cover 
both minors and adults) that has been coordinated with the 
GON Peace and Reconstruction Ministry in both the current and 
former governments and with UNMIN.  The essence of the plan 
calls for non-combatants in a cantonment to be segregated and 
to enter into a three-day out-processing program that would 
provide them with a description of post-cantonment 
alternatives, a formal deactivation ceremony, and transfer to 
one of sixty pre-existing vocational programs or to a holding 
center for return to their families.  Minors would also be 
provided with assistance in tracing their families.  At the 
conclusion of the vocational programs, which run for ninety 
days to one year, additional assistance is planned in the 
form of job placement assistance and micro credit.  Using the 
UNDP/UNICEF plan, funds from the UN Trust Fund and the Nepal 
Peace Trust Fund should be available to manage the three-day 
out-processing and the vocational training.  Additional funds 
will be needed for the final phase. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Sood indicated that the GOI had been approached to 
provide assistance based on its programs for retiring Indian 
Gurkha soldiers.  These involve basic vocational training 
only. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Participants discussed the following challenges 
facing the discharge of non-combatants: 
 
¶A.  Assisting the GON to find the right balance between 
acting quickly and acting effectively.  All were agreed that 
the handling of the 4000 would set an important precedent for 
the 19,000 PLA who will remain in the cantonments even though 
many of the issues are quite different.  Participants 
emphasized the importance of individuals being free to make 
their choice and of real alternatives for them to choose 
from.  It is also important the GON feel that it owns the 
process, but is willing to accept international expertise and 
financial assistance. 
 
¶B.  Determining which part of the GON will have jurisdiction. 
 Although UNICEF and UNDP have been working with the Peace 
Ministry for over two years, it appears that the jurisdiction 
for the 4000 may shift to the Army Integration Special 
Committee (AISC), which assumed responsibility for camp 
management when it was created in January.  Neither UN body 
has briefed the AISC.  On February 27 Ambassador Powell 
encouraged the Prime Minister, chairman of the AISC, to reach 
out to UNDP and UNICEF to obtain a briefing for the AISC and 
to make use of the UN planning. 
 
¶C.  Countering Nepali Congress opposition.  Nepali Congress 
AISC member Ram Mahat has been very vocal in his opposition 
to any use of GON funds (this would include the Nepal Peace 
Trust Fund) to provide support to the 4000, arguing that 
these folks did not participate in the fighting and are no 
different than thousands of other poor Nepalis, who do not 
have access to such programs.  He has been deaf to arguments 
that other poor Nepalis have not spent the last thirty months 
in a military-like situation and are less likely to join the 
YCL or other groups engaged in criminal activities.  Mahat 
could use his opposition to block consensus which must be 
achieved in order for the AISC to take action.  Ambassador 
Sood plans to reach out to NC President Koirala to encourage 
the NC to take a more positive position on the UN proposals. 
 
¶D.  Segregating the non-combatants.  The Peace Ministry has 
proposed that the 4000 non-combatants be aggregated in one 
satellite cantonment for out-processing.  The UN prefers that 
the out-processing occur camp-by-camp according to a schedule 
worked out with UNMIN and the PLA commanders.  They believe 
there is no reason to displace residents of one of the 
satellite cantonments, create a new infrastructure for the 
three-day processing, and incur significant transportation 
costs.  In addition, processing all 4000 at one time in one 
location would probably require additional time or a massive 
infusion of personnel. 
 
¶E.  Determining the Indian role.  Although the meeting was 
held at Ambassador Sood's initiative and he appeared to be 
pleased with the status of the UN planning, the outstanding 
request for Indian assistance and the Indian preference for 
unilateral assistance rather than donor coordination left 
some questions in the minds of the other participants as to 
India's position on the UN programs. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Comment.  Provided all elements of the GON are 
willing to accept something like the UNICEF/UNDP proposal, it 
appears that sufficient funding and expertise are available 
for this phase.  Post will be working with USAID and DOD to 
examine possible assistance to the final phase based on 
experience in other post-conflict countries and with our 
current vocational education programs. 
 
 
POWELL