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OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHKP #0105/01 0890556
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 300556Z MAR 09 ZDK
FM AMCONSUL KARACHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0984
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0443
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0247
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0290
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1835
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 2688
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 4571
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KARACHI 000105 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL PK
SUBJECT: BALOCHISTAN - AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH INSPECTOR 
GENERAL OF FRONTIER CORPS BALOCHISTAN 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY ACTING CONSUL GENERAL CATHERINE RODRIGUEZ 
FOR REASONS 1.4 b and d. 
 
Summary: 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (S) During a March 19 meeting with the Ambassador and 
Rear Admiral Michael LeFever, Chief of the Office of the 
Defense Representative in Pakistan (ODRP), Major General 
Saleem Nawaz Khan, Inspector General of the Frontier Corps 
Balochistan (IGFC-B) said he needed additional resources and 
time to prepare his forces to protect USG supply shipments 
through Balochistan.  He gave the Ambassador a long list of 
equipment and items that the Frontier Corps (FC) needed.  He 
called for greater Afghan efforts to secure the common border 
and said the lack of more border access points had hindered 
control efforts.  Khan was enthusiastic about additional 
assistance funding for the province and supported USG plans 
to expand its presence in Quetta. 
 
Border Protection Strain for Frontier Corps 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S) On March 19, the Ambassador and Rear Admiral Michael 
LeFever, Chief of the Office of the Defense Representative in 
Pakistan (ODRP), met with Major General Saleem Nawaz Khan, 
Inspector General of the Frontier Corps Balochistan (IGFC-B), 
at his headquarters in Quetta.  During the meeting, Khan 
noted that Balochistan is different from the Northwest 
Frontier Province (NWFP) in that it is much larger and, thus, 
more difficult to adequately patrol.  The Frontier Corps (FC) 
has a number of other responsibilities, such as drug 
interdiction, in addition to its counter-terrorism and border 
patrol duties.  The FC is also tied up in the fight against 
Baloch nationalists.  All of this has placed a strain in FC 
resources, he claimed. 
 
FC Needs Resources to Protect Increased Supply Shipments 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶3.  (S) Khan told the Ambassador that he was apprehensive 
about the FC's ability to protect increased supply shipments 
through Balochistan to Afghanistan.  He noted that GOP forces 
have adequately protected shipments using this route in the 
past, claiming that there have been only 18 attacks on supply 
convoys (and alleged that drivers and possibly local 
officials were complicit in many of these).  He claimed the 
attackers had only targeted trucks from two particular 
trucking companies, without naming the companies.  However, 
he said the FC lacks the funds to employ additional troops 
and officers.  Khan said the officer corps was only at 25 
percent strength.  He listed these staffing needs as among 
his top priorities. 
 
¶4.  (S) After the Ambassador pointed out that she expected 
increased troop strength and a corresponding need for 
additional supplies to begin in April and expand rapidly by 
August or September, Khan cautioned that the FC did not 
currently have the resources to protect the supply lines.  He 
added that, even given enough funding, the FC did not have 
enough time to upgrade its operational capability to provide 
sufficient protection to them by August. 
 
¶5.  (S) Khan estimated that he could raise four additional 
wings within 10 ) 12 months, but protecting the Hub to 
Chaman route will take 7 to 8 wings, an additional 4,000 
troops.  If he had more funds, he said he could readily 
supply troops from the market and conduct a "crash course" to 
raise 12 wings in 18 months. 
 
IGFC Balochistan Lists Resource Needs 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) The FC only has one helicopter, in fair condition, 
Khan stated, and has to borrow helicopters from the military 
to conduct operations.  He said the FC needs 8 ) 9 
additional helicopters, enough to move one company quickly to 
sites in the vast, often trackless, province.  Khan also 
listed 70 ) 80 bullet proof vehicles and more bullet proof 
vests among the FC needs. 
 
KARACHI 00000105  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S) The FC also needs better surveillance and 
communications equipment, night vision goggles, better 
weapons, troop transporter and high-powered vehicles to catch 
drug smugglers.  Khan explained that, while the FC has a team 
working with the Pakistani military's Inter Services 
Intelligence Agency (ISI), the FC also needs a separate 
intelligence operations center.  He also suggested the USG 
help fund a U.K. project to construct a FC training center. 
 
Liaison to be Embedded with FC Floated 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) Khan asked for advance warning of U.S. military 
operations affecting Pakistan.  However, he dismissed a 
suggestion by Rear Admiral LeFever (ODRP) to place a USG 
liaison in FC headquarters to coordinate operations, as 
untenable due to security concerns.  Khan was receptive to 
Admiral LeFever's suggestion that the USG and FC in 
Balochistan mirror Operation Lionheart. 
 
IGFC Balochistan Calls for Afghan Cooperation 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) Khan called for an equal Afghan effort to secure the 
common border.  The FC, he explained, has 273 fixed posts and 
conducts 80 ) 100 patrols per night on the border with 
Afghanistan.  The Afghans, he asserted, only conducted 45 
patrols per night on their side of the border.  (Comment: 
Post has no way of verifying these numbers.  End comment.). 
He said increased U.S. troop deployments in southern 
Afghanistan will multiply the number of insurgents crossing 
into Balochistan, necessitating a higher level of Afghan 
cooperation to secure the border. 
 
More Access Points Needed for Routine Travel 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) Chaman is the only official crossing point on the 
1200 kilometer border separating Balochistan and Afghanistan, 
he pointed out.  As a result, it is more convenient for 
people located far from Chaman to cross illegally at closer 
sites.  This has contributed to the FC's difficulty in 
controlling access to the province from Afghanistan.  He 
cautioned that if the GOP tries to block all unofficial 
crossings, it will lead to civil unrest.  To resolve this, 
Khan proposed opening several new official crossing points. 
He said tribal chiefs have told the Afghan government that 
they need more crossing easements. 
 
Biometrics Not Working 
---------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S) While the GOP has attempted to operate a biometric 
crossing system at Chaman, the Afghans have not reciprocated, 
Khan claimed.  According to him, Afghan security forces had 
direct orders not to operate the system at the border 
crossing and local Afghans at the border destroyed their 
biometric equipment.  Khan explained that if the GOP insisted 
on using this system, the Afghans would shut the border 
crossing, causing economic turmoil in the area. 
 
Development Badly Needed 
------------------------ 
 
¶12.  (S) Khan responded enthusiastically when the Ambassador 
informed him that the USG was interested in providing more 
development assistance to the province.  He replied that 
Balochistan needed much development assistance due to neglect 
by the GOP and provincial leaders.  According to him, most 
provincial governors have been tribal chieftains, and their 
traditional viewpoint and lack of a system of governance has 
hindered progress.  Khan claimed GOP appointed governors from 
outside the province have been the force behind what 
development the area has seen. 
 
Development Funding Increases, But Results Lagging 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶13.  (S) The federal government appears to have devoted more 
 
KARACHI 00000105  003 OF 003 
 
 
funding for development in recent years.  The total aggregate 
federal development budget for Balochistan from 1971 to 2000, 
he said, was around $2.3 billion.  From 2000 to 2008, the 
aggregate total rose to almost $4.5 billion.  Still, he said, 
underserved areas begin one kilometer from the main road. 
Because of that, he felt that citizens had good reason to be 
upset at the lack of tangible development.  He added that any 
effort focused on development would be "music to our ears." 
 
Expanded U.S. Presence Would Need Tight Security 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (S) Khan was supportive of a USG proposal for an 
expended presence in Quetta, but cautioned that security 
would be a concern in the city.  As a result, he said that 
the USG should choose the location carefully and advised 
against trying to situate any new facility outside of the 
city, where he said it was not "safe."  Khan did not believe 
that the city's cantonment area would have sufficient room 
for any USG facility. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶15.  (S) Khan was clearly attempting to leverage the meeting 
with the Ambassador to gain additional funds for the FC.  His 
list of needed items seemed to go beyond those required to 
raise additional forces to protect supply shipments. 
However, he appeared genuinely concerned about FC ability to 
raise its capacity in time to fully protect USG supply 
shipments across Balochistan by August. 
RODRIGUEZ