VZCZCXRO8554
OO RUEHDT RUEHPB
DE RUEHJA #0447/01 0720937
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 130937Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1825
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000447 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP 
NSD FOR E.PHU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2019 
TAGS: PREL KTIA ASEAN ID
SUBJECT: ASEAN SECRETARIAT -- POSITIVE MOMENTUM ON TIES 
WITH U.S. 
 
REF: A. CANBERRA 239 
     ¶B. 08 JAKARTA 2266 
 
Classified By: Pol/C Joseph L. Novak, reasons 1.4(b+d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The Secretary's February 18 visit to the 
ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta has generated positive momentum 
regarding U.S. engagement with Southeast Asia.  ASEAN 
Secretariat officials welcome the U.S. decision to pursue 
accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and look 
forward to working with us on this process.  They described a 
greater role for the Secretariat following the recent ASEAN 
Summit and entry into force of the ASEAN Charter. 
Indonesians increasingly seek to play a leading role in the 
regional organization and call for it to do more to promote 
democracy and human rights.  END SUMMARY. 
 
LOOKING FORWARD TO TAC ACCESSION 
 
¶2.  (C) ASEAN Secretariat officials in a March 12 meeting 
with poloff welcomed Secretary Clinton's visit and 
announcement that the United States would begin the formal 
process toward accession to the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC).  Thailand, as ASEAN Chair would be our 
partner negotiating the instrument of accession, according to 
Termsak Chalermpalanupap, Special Assistant to the Secretary 
General.  Termsak noted that he and other Secretariat 
officials have facilitated numerous previous TAC accessions 
and will work with the USG and RTG to move the process 
forward. 
 
¶3.  (C) Secretariat officials emphasized that the TAC is 
primarily a political rather than a legal document.  It 
reflects acceptance of broad principals of cooperation and 
peaceful coexistence.  It does not commit the partner to 
specific actions.  Officials noted that ASEAN has never 
invoked the TAC "to stop" any signatory from taking specific 
actions, nor has it been used to compel a signatory to do 
something. 
 
¶4.  (C) ASEAN officials understand that the United States may 
have concerns about elements of the TAC.  They suggested that 
the process of Australia's accession may be a useful model 
for us to follow.  (Note:  Ref A reviews this in more 
detail.)  Australia raised two key concerns, according to 
Termsak: 
 
--Would accession to the TAC have an impact on its relations 
with non-ASEAN signatories (such as North Korea)? 
 
--Would the TAC impose any legally binding restrictions on 
Australian foreign policy (e.g. could ASEAN invoke the 
treaty's non-interference provision in an attempt to halt 
Australian criticism of Burma)? 
 
Secretariat officials assured us that accession to the TAC 
entailed no such limits or obligations.  Termsak promised to 
provide us with an exchange of correspondence between the 
governments of Australia and Laos (the ASEAN Chair at the 
time of Australia's accession) and other documents that 
clarified these matters.  (Note:  Mission will forward these 
items to Ambassador Marciel and to EAP/MTS and EAP/RSP.) 
 
EMPOWERING THE SECRETARIAT 
 
¶5.  (SBU) In a diplomatic corps briefing on the recent ASEAN 
Summit held on March 12, Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan 
outlined a greater role for the Secretariat.  An important 
aspect of this effort will be the establishment of a 
permanent Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR) based 
at the Secretariat. The CPR will replace the current ASEAN 
Standing Committee as the organization's key coordinating 
body.  Surin hopes to center more of the organization's 
activities at the Secretariat as a way to cut down on the 
proliferation of meetings.  (Note:  Last year, ASEAN held 
over 700 separate meetings on a variety of subjects.)  The 
regional body plans to add 26 new staff positions over a 
four-year expansion to meet the administrative demands of 
these enhanced responsibilities. 
 
¶6.  (C) The Secretariat is also moving forward with plans to 
create an ASEAN Human Rights Network.  The Network will 
consist of university-based centers that will conduct 
teaching and research on human rights-related topics.  The 
Secretariat does not want the Network to be an official ASEAN 
entity because the organization's consensus decision-making 
process would allow countries like Burma to block any 
 
JAKARTA 00000447  002 OF 002 
 
 
worthwhile initiatives.  However, the Secretariat endorsed 
the Network and will support it financially.  ASEAN officials 
told us they hope the Network will put pressure on the ASEAN 
Human Rights Body (AHRB) to take more decisive action re 
human rights violations within SE Asia. 
 
¶7.  (C) Secretariat officials are still considering locations 
for the Network centers and expect the first to be 
established in Singapore, probably in cooperation with the 
National University of Singapore.  Subsequent centers will 
likely be established in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and 
the Philippines.  It is unlikely that the Network will have 
any presence in Burma, Laos or Cambodia for the near future. 
At our suggestion, the Secretariat will look for ways that 
any Indonesia-based center can cooperate with the Indonesian 
government's Bali Democracy Forum (see ref B). 
 
PRESSING INDONESIAN LEADERSHIP 
 
¶8.  (C) Indonesian leaders are cautiously pushing the 
regional organization to play a more active role.  Following 
the recent ASEAN Summit, President Yudhoyono called for ASEAN 
to engage in a more inclusive dialogue with NGOs and civil 
society groups in areas like human rights, the environment 
and sustainable development.  He reiterated Indonesia's view 
that the AHRB must be a credible body devoted to promoting 
human rights, the rule of law and freedom of expression. 
 
¶9.  (C) In this statement, Yudhoyono walked a fine line, as 
ASEAN's principle of non-interference in each other's 
internal affairs remains a deeply held value by many senior 
Indonesian officials.  However, many influential foreign 
policy thinkers, parliamentarians and NGOs here have become 
increasingly impatient with what they see as ASEAN's 
constraints on Indonesian actions.  They believe that 
Indonesia, as ASEAN's largest member, should be more 
aggressive in leading the organization. 
 
HEFFERN