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Viewing cable 09JAKARTA347, SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ),

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09JAKARTA347 2009-03-02 02:06 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Jakarta
R 020206Z MAR 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO AMCONSUL SURABAYA 
SECSTATE WASHDC 1611
INFO CIA WASHDC
USPACOM HONOLULU HI
FBI WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T JAKARTA 000347 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/EAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2019 
TAGS: ASEC PTER
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ), 
SPRING 2009 
 
REF: STATE 13023 
 
Classified By: Jeff D. Lischke, Regional Security Officer for reasons 1 
.4 (a+b+c) 
 
 POLITICAL VIOLENCE: 
 
1.  (SBU) Demonstrations 
 
A. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country 
capable of carrying out significant anti-American 
demonstrations? 
 
Yes. Segments of Indonesia's Muslim and Papuan communities 
are capable and at times will carry out anti-American 
protests. Most demonstrations, though not all, are by Muslim 
groups peacefully protesting U.S. foreign policy in the 
Middle East.   Most recently, several different Muslim groups 
protested at the Embassy, the Consulate in Surabaya and the 
American Presence Post in Medan because of the Israeli 
incursion into Gaza. Demonstrations were daily and numbered 
from 50 to tens of thousands.  There have also been several 
small peaceful demonstrations at the U.S. Embassy by members 
of the Papuan ethnic group (OPM) protesting to promote their 
interests. 
 
B. Have there been anti-American demonstrations in the 
country within the last 12 months? 
 
Several, but all peaceful.  Only one resulted in the arrest 
of four demonstrators. 
 
C. Have demonstrations taken place near or in front of U.S. 
diplomatic facilities? 
 
Yes, in front of the Embassy in Jakarta, the Consulate 
General in Surabaya and the APP in Medan, all peaceful. 
 
D. What is the average size of an anti-American demonstration? 
 
In this reporting period the size of the demonstrations has 
ranged from 25 to tens of thousands. 
 
E. Are anti-American demonstrations usually triggered by U.S. 
foreign policy initiatives, military actions, or by domestic 
issues? 
 
Generally, the anti-American demonstrations are almost always 
triggered by U.S. foreign policy/military initiatives 
relating to the Middle East and our relationship with Israel 
and not by domestic issues. 
 
F. Are demonstrations generally violent or peaceful? 
 
Anti-American demonstrations in the last 12 months have been 
peaceful. The protesters typically chant anti-American 
messages and use portable sound equipment to broadcast 
anti-American rhetoric. The police support is excellent and 
always responsive to the Embassy's requests. 
 
G. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage to 
USG property or injuries to USG employees? 
 
The demonstrations have not been violent; no damage to U.S. 
Government property or injuries to U.S. personnel occurred 
within the last 12 months. 
 
H. If violent, have any demonstrators ever penetrated our 
perimeter security line? 
 
N/A. 
 
I. Have there been anti-government demonstrations in the 
country within the last 12 months? 
 
Yes. 
 
J. Have demonstrations taken place near or in front of U.S. 
diplomatic facilities? 
 
Yes.  The U.S. Embassy is located next to the office of the 
Vice President of Indonesia and directly across from a large 
public park in proximity to the Presidential Palace.  It is 
common for anti-government demonstrations or rallies to occur 
at these locations. 
 
K. What is the average size of an anti-government 
demonstration? 
 
50 to several thousand. 
 
L. Are demonstrations generally violent or peaceful? 
 
Generally peaceful, however one demonstration at the National 
Unity Monument turned violent in June 2008. The monument is 
located across the street from the U.S. Embassy. 
 
M. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage to 
USG Property? 
 
No. 
 
2. (SBU) Macro Conflict Conditions 
 
A. Is the host country engaged in an interstate or intrastate 
conflict? (This may include battles between organized and 
violent drug cartels.) 
 
No. However, in the province of Papua there are long-standing 
low level separatist movements who in the past have engaged 
in isolated acts of violence to further their cause. 
 
B. If an intrastate conflict, is it an insurgency limited to 
a specific region or is it a countrywide civil war? 
 
The current area with low level separatist movements in 
Indonesia is limited to Papua. 
 
C. If limited to a specific region, are any U.S. diplomatic 
facilities located in this region? 
 
No. 
 
D. Have any of the factions involved in intrastate conflicts 
signaled or demonstrated an anti-American orientation? 
 
Yes. Islamic extremist groups in Sulawesi, Papua and Aceh 
occasionally indulge in anti-U.S. rhetoric. 
 
3. Host Country Capabilities 
 
A. (SBU) Are law enforcement agencies professional and well 
trained? 
 
They are responsive to requests by the Embassy for support 
and their response to the daily and sometimes large 
demonstrations as a result of the Gaza issue was excellent. 
However, Indonesian law enforcement capabilities vary widely 
by unit and organization and corruption is present at all 
levels. 
 
B. (SBU) Have they been trained by U.S. agencies?  If so, 
please elaborate on effectiveness of training. 
 
Yes.  The Embassy's most robust engagement with the 
Indonesian National Police (INP) is through the Diplomatic 
Security Services Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (DS/ATA) 
and the DOJ's International Criminal Investigators Training 
Assistance Program (ICITAP), funded largely by State/INL.  In 
addition, the Embassy actively nominates officers to attend a 
variety of training courses at the International Law 
Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok.  Other training and 
development opportunities for the police are offered through 
the Joint Inter-Agency Task Force West (JIATF-West) and to a 
lesser extent USAID and DOD programs.  The Indonesian police 
have demonstrably improved their ability to handle CT 
investigations and crises in recent years. The variety and 
depth of ICITAP's programs with the INP effectively cover a 
wide swath of issues, from improving the police force's 
handling of civil unrest to maritime security. 
 
C. (C) Are law enforcement agencies confronted with serious, 
widespread corruption inside their agencies? 
 
Yes.  Corruption is present at all levels but most 
significantly in their anti-vice/drugs units, traffic control 
and personnel responsible for issuing licenses and permits. 
The current police chief has initiated far-reaching programs 
to attack the corruption problem, but any significant change 
will take time. 
 
D. (S/NF) Are the intelligence services professional and 
capable of deterring terrorist actions? 
 
Yes, given specific, actionable intelligence information, 
Indonesia's intelligence services and police are capable of 
deterring a terrorist action.  The three primary Indonesian 
intelligence and security services are generally competent in 
both physical surveillance and covert technical collection 
methods, but are hampered by weak analytic components, 
chronic budgetary constraints and poor operational 
coordination that seriously degrade their capabilities. 
 
E. (S/NF) Have the intelligence services been cooperative 
with U.S. embassy requests for information and support? 
 
Yes. The Indonesian intelligence services have been generally 
cooperative on requests for information and support, though 
sometimes not on the more sensitive issues.  Host country 
intel services have shown occasional reluctance in sharing 
threat reporting with the U.S. Embassy for fear that the USG 
will issue new warden notices or reinstate the recently 
lifted travel warning which directly affects their tourism 
trade.  The Embassy has consistently received CT related 
reporting, particularly from the INP concerning the results 
of various raids. 
 
F. (SBU) Assuming there have been significant terrorist 
threats in recent years, have host country security services 
been able to score any major anti-terrorism successes? 
 
Yes.  On July 1, 2008, Indonesian National Police 
counter-terrorism units arrested 10 JI members in Palembang, 
South Sumatra after an exhaustive 14 month investigation. 
Numerous improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were confiscated 
along with weapons and ammunition. Police interrogations of 
the 10 JI members indicated they planned to attack areas 
where westerners frequent using the confiscated IEDs. 
 
G. (SBU) Has host country been responsive (re: timeliness and 
allocation of resources) to embassy requests for protective 
security? 
 
Yes.  Police support for protective security (PRS) operations 
is excellent. 
 
H. (SBU) How does the embassy assess the overall security at 
major airports in the country? (excellent, very good, 
good/average, or poor) 
 
Average or below average. In October 2007, the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) determined that airport safety 
at Bali's Ngurah Rah International Airport met International 
Civil Aviation Organization standards and removed the 
December 2005 Public Notice warning on state of aviation 
security at that airport. USG officials have not conducted 
formal or informal assessments of any other airport in 
Indonesia, but security standards are generally viewed to be 
below average. 
 
I. (SBU) How effective are customs and immigration controls 
agencies? (effective, average, or ineffective) 
 
Ineffective.  Customs and Immigration offices along 
Indonesia's huge porous border receive little GOI attention, 
and the lack of funding and training for effective equipment 
to monitor passenger travel makes it extremely difficult to 
implement entry/exit control measures. Post funded several 
workshops to improve immigration security in 2009. 
 
J. (SBU) How effective are border patrol forces? (effective, 
average, or ineffective) 
 
Ineffective.  The Indonesian military conducts minimal border 
patrol activities along Indonesia's borders.  Neither 
Immigration nor Customs possesses such a capacity. 
 
-------------------- 
Indigenous Terrorism 
-------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Anti-American Terrorist Groups 
 
A. (U) Are there indigenous, anti-American terrorist groups 
in country? 
 
Yes. 
 
B. (U) If yes, how many?  Please name groups. 
 
The best known group is the regional Jemaah Islamiyah 
(JI) terrorist network.  Though JI is not specifically built 
around an anti-American agenda, anti-Americanism is a 
consistent theme used to provoke violence against western 
targets.  JI is an outgrowth of the Darul Islam (DI) 
movement, as is Negara Islam Indonesia (NII).  Other active, 
violent groups with the potential to be anti-American 
include: the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Hizbut Tahrir 
(HTI), the Islamic Youth Movement (GPI), Laskar Jundullah, 
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and the Indonesian Islamic 
Students Action Association(KAMMI). 
 
C. (U) Have groups carried out anti-American attacks within 
the last 12 months? 
 
No. 
 
D. (U) Were any of these lethal attacks? 
 
N/A 
 
E. (U) Have groups attacked U.S. diplomatic targets? 
 
No. 
 
F. (U) Have groups attacked U.S. business, U.S. military, or 
U.S. related targets? 
 
Not in the past 12 months.  There have been no major 
terrorist attacks against U.S. or western interests since the 
2005 Bali bombings. 
 
G. (U) Have groups limited their attacks to specific regions 
or do they operate countrywide? 
 
Some extremist groups, such as FPI, HTI and Laskar Jundullah, 
tend to concentrate their activities in specific parts of the 
country.  However, terrorist groups like JI have small 
operational cells based in Java and Sumatra, but have the 
capabilities to act elsewhere in the country. 
 
H. (U) If attacks are limited to regions, are there any U.S. 
diplomatic facilities located in these regions? 
 
No. 
 
5.  Other Indigenous Terrorist Groups 
 
A. (SBU) Are there other indigenous terrorist groups (not 
anti-American) in country? 
 
Yes. As mentioned in 4b, there are several groups in 
Indonesia based on extremist ideologies, not explicitly 
anti-American, but which exploit an anti-American or a more 
general anti-western agenda to justify their operation. 
 
B. (C) If yes, how many? Please name groups. 
 
The exact number of groups is unknown.  Many known JI 
operatives have ties to several groups, such as the various 
Laskar groups and the previously mentioned DI and NII, 
creating the complex interconnected network found behind most 
of the major terrorist attacks in Indonesia. 
 
C. (U) Have groups carried out attacks in the capital or in 
areas where U.S. diplomatic facilities are located? 
 
No, nothing of significance since the 2005 Bali attack. 
 
D. (U) Were attacks lethal and/or indiscriminate? 
 
None since the 2005 Bali attack. 
 
E. (U) Have any Americans been killed or injured in these 
attacks? 
 
In the 2002 Bali attack Americans were killed and injured. 
There was at least one American injured in both the 2003 
Marriott bombing and the 2005 Bali bombing. Since 2005 no 
Americans have been killed or injured as a result of a 
terrorist attack in Indonesia. 
 
----------------------- 
Transnational Terrorism 
----------------------- 
 
6. Transnational Terrorist Indicators 
 
A. (S/NF) Are there any foreign terrorist groups that have a 
presence in country? Provide names. 
 
No, there are no foreign groups in country. Some members of 
the JI network, however, may maintain ties to Al-Qaeda. 
 
B. (SBU) How does post assess this presence?  Is it an 
operational cell?  Financial cell?  Support cell?  Propaganda 
cell? 
 
N/A, there are no known foreign terrorist groups in country. 
 
C. (SBU) Is the host government sympathetic to these groups? 
 
No.  Official GOI policy does not support or sympathize with 
terrorist groups.  The government feels constrained in taking 
pre-emptive action when there is not a strong case to be made 
in the Indonesian legal system.  The GOI executed three 
terrorists convicted in the Bali 2002 attack in November 2008 
with minimum reaction by the Indonesian public. 
 
D. (C) Are there suspect non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) in the country that have a relationship with any of 
these groups? 
 
Yes.  Branches of Kompak, a charity arm of Dewan Dakwah Islam 
Indonesia (DDI), in particular has been known to provide 
assistance to JI-linked groups in the past and has 
facilitated jihadi training and activities in the Southern 
Philippines, Central Sulawesi and Ambon/Maluku.  It is 
unknown whether or not they are still active in Central 
Sulawesi since the police raids of January 2007. 
 
E. (SBU) Are there any ethnic or religious communities in 
country that are sympathetic to these groups? 
 
Yes.  A number of people in Indonesia consider the U.S. to be 
inimical to Islam and its aspirations.  While some Indonesian 
groups are anti-western, they are not aligned with terrorist 
organizations. 
 
F. (S/NF) How does post assess the level, intent, and scope 
of hostile intelligence services (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Serbia, 
Sudan, et. al.) in country relative to potential 
anti-American terrorist acts? 
 
The embassy has not seen any indication that hostile third 
country intelligence services are actively engaged in 
plotting or planning anti-American activity or anti-American 
terrorist acts. 
 
G. (SBU) How does post assess the availability of weapons and 
explosives in country or from nearby countries for hostile 
terrorist elements? 
 
Explosives and weapons are readily available in Indonesia (as 
witnessed by the accidental detonation of fish bombs at 
various locations in Indonesia in the past 12 months). 
Indonesia's insufficient border controls allow for easy 
smuggling of contraband of this nature, particularly between 
Indonesia's conflict areas and the southern Philippines and 
southern Thailand. 
 
 
HUME