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Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD441, POLITICAL TURMOIL, GOING NOWHERE FAST

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ISLAMABAD441 2009-03-01 12:09 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Islamabad
VZCZCXRO5964
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #0441/01 0601209
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011209Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1669
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 9913
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 9783
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 4536
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 1158
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 6841
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 5769
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 000441 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2019 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PINR KDEM PK
SUBJECT: POLITICAL TURMOIL, GOING NOWHERE FAST 
 
REF: ISLAMABAD 439 
 
Classified By: Charge SUBJECT: POLITICAL TURMOIL, GOING NOWHERE FAST 
 
1. (C) Summary: Actors across the political spectrum were 
working to solve yet another self-inflicted political crisis 
in the wake of the Supreme Court's February 25 decision to 
disqualify the Sharif brothers from public office.  Both 
President Zardari's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the 
Sharifs' Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) recognize they 
need to find a way to reconcile, but neither are ready to 
cede ground just yet.  PML-N used a hastily-called National 
Assembly session to compare Zardari to Musharraf and stick to 
its demand for the full restoration of the judiciary. 
PML-N's parliamentary Opposition Leader Chaudhry Nisar spoke 
for nearly three hours, leaving no room for compromise with 
the Zardari regime; PPP's Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani 
responded with only brief remarks, conspicuously defending 
his party not Zardari.  Privately, PPP leaders admitted that 
Zardari probably miscalculated his party's ability to win an 
election to replace Shahbaz Sharif as Chief Minister of 
Punjab and was scrambling for a way forward.  Information 
Minister Sherry Rehman and Law Minister Farooq Naek addressed 
the diplomatic corps late February 28.  Rehman urged the 
international missions to intercede with the Sharifs for 
restraint, repeatedly adding the PPP stands ready to 
negotiate an accommodation with the PML-N; Naek was defensive 
in arguing the GOP had no other option but to impose 
governor's rule in Punjab, supposedly because no party held 
an outright majority in the Provincial Assembly.  Meanwhile, 
clashes between demonstrating PPP and PML-N members 
continued.  The Sharifs, lawyers' movement leader Aitzaz 
Ahsan, and religious Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) chief Qazi Hussain 
addressed one Lahore gathering on March 1.  While the 
rhetorical lines against Zardari were repeated, they also 
held out an olive branch to Gilani's PPP and, for the first 
time, tried to paint Zardari as the U.S.'s lackey.  There is 
a growing assumption across all political parties that the 
U.S. supported Zardari's court manipulation to disqualify the 
Sharifs; we may want to dispel that assumption in the coming 
days, if only to rein in Zardari's growing penchant to 
over-reach.  End Summary. 
 
PML-N: Holding the High Ground 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2. (C) PolCouns met February 28 with Pakistan Muslim 
League-Nawaz (PML-N) parliamentary Opposition Leader Chaudhry 
Nisar just before the National Assembly convened to discuss 
the Supreme Court's February 25 disqualification of PML-N 
leaders Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif to hold elected office 
(reftel).  Nisar gave a lengthy floor speech, nearly three 
hours, punctuated with sloganeering.  He denounced the Court 
decision, called governor's rule ""undemocratic,"" ruled out 
any ""deals"" with Zardari's Pakistan People's Party (PPP), and 
labeled Zardari ""another Musharraf;"" PML-N members then 
walked out of the chamber. 
 
3. (C) Privately, Nisar had no answer for what his party 
would do beyond the actions of the last few days.  He made it 
clear PML-N was not ready for new elections and wanted to 
avoid violence that would prompt the Army to intervene.  He 
revealed that, before the Court ruling, ""95 percent of the 
party"" had opposed joining the lawyers' March 16 sit-in 
because it might lead to violence; now, the party had little 
choice but to support them.  Nisar noted that, immediately 
after the verdict, Shahbaz left the governor's mansion 
because the party did not want to repeat the 1993 scenario 
when a PML-N Prime Minister called in the Army to evict a 
recalcitrant Punjab Chief Minister; back then, the Army had 
refused. 
 
4. (C) The situation called for some kind of compromise, but 
Nisar ruled out including Nawaz in the National 
Reconciliation Order amnesty or requesting the Supreme Court 
to review its latest ruling.  He insisted the only conviction 
against Nawaz was for hijacking (not corruption, despite 
reports to the contrary) and against Shahbaz was for default 
on a debt (which could be fixed with a variety of measures). 
But, said Nisar, the Sharifs were not interested in a 
compromise only for themselves -- the only way out was to 
 
ISLAMABAD 00000441  002 OF 004 
 
 
settle the issue of the judiciary, which boiled down to the 
fate of former Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. 
 Nisar disputed the belief that Chaudhry favored the Sharifs, 
noting it was Chaudhry who refused to step in when Nawaz was 
deported in September 2008. 
 
5. (C) Asked about the Punjab Provincial Assembly, Nisar said 
the PML-N would, of course, put up another candidate for 
Chief Minister -- probably former governor Shahid Hamid. 
Zardari, said Nisar, had miscalculated with governor's rule 
in Punjab and did not have the votes to install a PPP 
government in the province.  PML-N, working with independents 
and smaller parties, could amass 210 votes; 186 are required 
for a majority.  Even if the PPP won over the Pakistan Muslim 
League (PML), it could not reach majority, Nisar calculated. 
Nisar confirmed that 35 PML ""forward bloc"" had visited Nawaz 
on February 27; although they could lose their seats by 
attempting to cross party lines, their presence showed that 
PML president Chaudhry Shujaat could not ""deliver his party"" 
to the PPP. 
 
6. (C) Nisar believed PPP-appointed Governor Taseer must have 
realized the PML-N still held a coalition majority because he 
acquiesced February 28 in unlocking the Punjab Provincial 
Assembly doors, allowing legislative sessions to resume. 
""This was all avoidable,"" Nisar lamented, but the PPP is ""a 
house divided"" and ""cannot get its act together,"" adding PM 
Gilani and other PPP leaders had been negotiating a 
reconciliation before the verdict and other PPP members had 
opposed imposition of governor's rule.  Nisar blamed Zardari 
entirely.  Without elaborating, Nisar described Gilani as now 
being ""a marked man."" 
 
""Disappointed"" in the U.S. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
7. (C) As his parliamentary leader spoke in the National 
Assembly, a somber Shahbaz held his first, post-verdict press 
conference.  He said the PML-N was dedicated to restoring the 
""real"" judiciary and exhorted his followers to hold peaceful 
demonstrations.  The themes were repeated at a March 1 rally 
in Lahore.  The two Sharifs, lawyers' movement leader (and 
PPP Central Executive Committee member) Aitzaz Ahsan, and 
ultra-conservative Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) chief Qazi Hussain 
addressed the crowd.  Shahbaz held out an olive branch to the 
PPP, but not to Zardari, inviting PM Gilani to join the 
lawyers' long march and sit-in, March 12-16.  Nawaz, for the 
first time, charged Zardari of taking instructions from the 
U.S., allowing public policy to be set by powers abroad. 
 
8. (C) In their February 28 meeting, Nisar forewarned 
PolCouns that Nawaz wanted to send a message to the U.S.: he 
is ""disappointed"" in the public U.S. position that this 
controversy is an ""internal affair"" only.  In effect, this 
meant the U.S. was siding with Zardari, Nisar argued.  PML-N, 
according to Nisar, had gone as far as any opposition party 
could go in expressing its interest in working with a new 
U.S. administration.  Recent talks with Ambassador Holbrooke 
had gone particularly well, Nisar noted, and Holbrooke's 
visit to Lahore was appreciated.  But a stronger signal of 
even-handedness was in order, claimed Nisar, if the U.S. 
wanted to avoid getting tied to another unpopular Pakistani 
leader. 
 
On the Defensive 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
9. (C) PM Gilani had little response to Nisar's February 28 
tirade in the National Assembly.  He promised efforts to 
resolve the political crisis in Punjab, saying whichever 
party could form a coalition majority would be allowed to 
form the next provincial government.  He explained his 
concurrence with the two-month governor rule as party 
discipline; though, he conspicuously did not mention or 
defend President Zardari.  Gilani concluded, ""There is no 
wrong without a remedy."" 
 
10. (C) Speaking to the diplomatic corps late February 28, 
Information Minister Sherry Rehman and Law Minister Farooq 
Naek similarly seemed to rationalize the PPP's role in this 
crisis.  Rehman repeatedly noted that her party was willing 
to negotiate with the PML-N to ""accommodate"" the Sharifs. 
 
ISLAMABAD 00000441  003 OF 004 
 
 
She followed this up with a plea to the international 
missions to urge the Sharifs to restrain their party workers. 
 Naek exhaustively explained the Musharraf-era convictions 
underlying the Sharif's disqualification from holding elected 
office.  He also blamed the Sharifs for not appearing before 
this Supreme Court, which the Sharifs do not recognize as 
legitimate.  More defensively, Naek labored to explain the 
need for immediate governor's rule in Punjab, saying the 
de-notification of Shahbaz's June by-election victory was 
""unexpected"" and left the province without any government at 
all.  (Note: In a February 28 meeting of coalition party 
representatives, PPP partners Awami National Party (ANP), 
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) and the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA) caucus reportedly went on record in 
opposition to governor's rule.  One of PPP's founders, 
Shaukat Hayat, also resigned from the party to protest the 
GOP's actions.) 
 
11. (C) But the questions from the diplomats revealed a lack 
of sympathy for the PPP's plight.  Several Arab ambassadors, 
in particular, challenged the PPP's power play that 
necessitated the disqualification of both Sharif brothers. 
Naek barely could keep a straight face when he replied with 
""judicial independence"" as the real culprit of this political 
crisis.  Rehman noted the PPP-led GOP had filed one of the 
petitions against the Sharifs' disqualification, which the 
Court had rejected; Attorney General Latif Khosa had argued 
on the Sharif's behalf, Naek stressed.  (Note: This is only 
technically true.  Minutes after the February 25 verdict was 
announced, Khosa admitted to PolOff that his statement to the 
Court took ""no sides."") 
 
12. (C) Rehman blamed the PML-N for ""plunging the country 
into turmoil.""  She said the PML-N could have tried to 
negotiate a deal with the PPP instead of calling supporters 
to the streets.  Rehman said the GOP would gladly file, on 
the Sharifs' behalf, a review order with the Supreme Court, 
but the PML-N had refused any contact with them.  Both 
ministers repeated the PM, whichever party could form a 
coalition in the Punjab Provincial Assembly would be allowed 
to form a new government and possibly end governor's rule 
before the two-month time limit.  Several times, Rehman 
warned that this political crisis distracted the GOP from the 
economic problems (global recession, rising commodity prices, 
and unemployment) and security crisis (militants in the 
border regions) faced by the country.  ""We did not intend to 
open another front,"" concluded Rehman, verbalizing the 
general sense of desperation that pervaded the briefing. 
 
What next? 
- - - - - - 
 
13. (C) General Secretary to the President Salman Farouqi 
told Charge February 27 that he expected all this controversy 
to be settled before the lawyers' march arrived in Islamabad 
on March 16.  Further, he thought that ""everything would go 
back to the way it was"" in the Punjab, i.e., the PML-N would 
again rule the province in a coalition with the PPP. 
 
14. (C) Presidential Spokesman Farhatullah Babar repeated to 
PolCouns February 28 the PPP line that it had been surprised 
by the verdict against Shahbaz, but that the PML-N had 
provoked the ire of the Court by ""attacking"" (not recognizing 
the legitimacy of) the judges.  PolCouns noted that Governor 
Taseer was giving the impression that governor's rule had 
been planned well before the verdict; Babar responded that 
Taseer had suffered in jail at the hands of the PML-N and had 
allowed his feelings to prejudice his actions.  However, 
Babar did not believe that Zardari had ordered Taseer to be 
quite so uncompromising against the PML-N -- actions like 
locking out the provincial assembly members had been a 
mistake. 
 
15. (C) Babar noted various legal remedies that could 
reconcile the PML-N, including the Sharifs' appealing for a 
Supreme Court review of the decision (admittedly unlikely) or 
their moving for parliament to enact a law or constitutional 
amendment to confirm the Sharifs' eligibility.  The National 
Reconciliation Ordinance only applied to those accused but 
not convicted of crimes, so it would not be possible to have 
it apply to the Sharifs in its current form.  The case 
against Nawaz was airtight legally, but there was more scope 
 
ISLAMABAD 00000441  004 OF 004 
 
 
to help Shahbaz, said Babar. 
 
16. (C) Agreeing that it was important to elect a new Punjab 
Chief Minister as soon as possible, Babar admitted that the 
PPP did not have the votes to rule without the PML-N or the 
PML.  It looked increasingly like the PML-N would be able to 
form a government, said Babar.  PML's Chaudhry Shujaat was 
negotiating the terms of joining the PPP, but Babar felt it 
was unlikely that Zardari would agree to Shujaat's desire to 
be named President of the Senate (second in line to the 
President).  At the February 27 PPP Central Executive 
Committee meeting, there had been prolonged debate about a 
PPP-PML alliance, said Babar.  Many PPP members questioned 
the wisdom of imposing governors' rule at all and were 
skeptical about an alliance with the Chaudhrys, but the 
electoral arithmetic left no other option since a renewed 
PPP-PML-N alliance looked unlikely. 
 
17. (C) Asked if the PML-N could sustain demonstrations, 
Babar said it would depend on the police reaction.  So far, 
the PML-N had not produced large crowds, but in Pakistan any 
incident could spark a huge reaction that would rapidly spin 
out of control, he warned.  Babar's concern was that all of 
this was tailor-made for the militants to exploit.  He 
worried that pushing PML-N ""into the arms of the JI"" or the 
other religious parties would be unwise; it was in Pakistan's 
interest to find a resolution to the current impasse. 
PolCouns noted that this increased the importance of 
controlling crowds peacefully and managing the impact of the 
lawyers' movement.  Babar said the lawyers already had 
rejected PPP offers of food and drink in Islamabad, but the 
government would continue to seek a balance that allowed the 
demonstration but limited violence. 
 
18. (C) Babar agreed that the PML-N was trying to split 
Zardari from the rest of the PPP, especially from PM Gilani, 
but he predicted this effort would fail.  There was a public 
perception problem that Zardari, by controlling both the PPP 
and the presidency, was exerting the same kind of 
double-hatted control that Musharraf had.  Babar admitted 
that Gilani had been left out of the loop on several 
decisions, and this had left the impression that he was 
subservient to Zardari.  Ultimately, however, Gilani would 
follow the decisions of the PPP, Babar was confidant. 
 
19. (C) Comment: All sides appear to recognize that they are 
at an impasse, but no one has found a way forward yet. 
Zardari, perhaps on bad advice from Taseer, seems to have 
miscalculated on governor's rule and may have to eat some 
crow to restore order in Punjab.  Zardari may think this a 
satisfactory meal given the removal, at least for now, of his 
key rival.  The PML-N's assumption that the U.S. supported 
Zardari's efforts to disqualify the Sharifs is widely shared 
across political parties; it is an assumption we may want to 
dispel in the coming days, if only to reduce Zardari's 
growing penchant to over-reach.  End comment. 
 
 
FEIERSTEIN 


d'Affaires Ger...