VZCZCXRO0101
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHIHL #0021/01 0640609
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 050609Z MAR 09
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1155
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 1228

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000021 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KCOR PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: COMMISSION ON INTEGRITY WORKING UPHILL IN HILLAH 
 
REF: HILLAH 00009 
 
HILLAH 00000021  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU)  Summary:  The Babil branch of the Commission on 
Integrity is striving to improve anti-corruption enforcement in 
the province against a tide of legal constraints and lack of 
public confidence.  The office has processed hundreds of cases 
since 2006, of which around a quarter were dismissed under last 
year's Amnesty Law.  Countless other corruption cases are 
omitted from official statistics because of the non-transparent 
utilization of Article 136(B) of the Iraqi criminal code, which 
enables a minister to block criminal cases against any ministry 
employee at will.  These legal obstacles to COI's efforts likely 
explain the dearth of investigations and/or prosecutions against 
government officials in the province for corruption-related 
violations, as well as the Babil public's lack of faith in Iraqi 
government anti-corruption efforts, as revealed in a late 
February poll by a non-partisan Hillah legal newspaper and 
working groups at a PRT-sponsored business environment 
conference.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
MOST CASES COORDINATED WITH MINISTERIAL IG'S 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) Babil PRT Econoff and Rule of Law Advisors met March 1 
with Basim al-Kaisy, the head of the Babil office of the 
Commission on Integrity (COI).  Al-Kaisy explained that his 
office had once had responsibility for other COI offices in 
south/central Iraq, but that in recent months COI Commissioner 
Judge Rahim al-Ugaili had appointed new office heads throughout 
the region to establish offices with a provincial, rather than 
regional, scope.  Al-Kaisy explained that he was responsible for 
administrative coordination with Baghdad, overseeing 13 
investigators in Babil. 
 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) Al-Kaisy detailed the process by which COI handles its 
cases.  He said the COI receives leads for corruption cases from 
a variety of sources, including its phone and email 'hotline,' 
complaints made in person, inspection reports from the Board of 
Supreme Audit, and newspapers.  Once COI has suspicion of 
corruption, one of its investigators contacts the Baghdad-based 
Inspector General of the relevant ministry, who prepares a 
preliminary report for COI on the alleged corruption.  Al-Kaisy 
said that COI investigators sometimes work with security 
officials embedded in the respective ministries to uncover 
additional information.  A three-person committee at the Babil 
COI office, consisting of a lead investigator and two other 
investigators, then reviews the IG's report to determine whether 
there is sufficient evidence to pursue criminal prosecution.  If 
the committee deems the case an administrative violation and 
wishes to close the case, it must forward the dossier to Baghdad 
for review by COI Commissioner Judge Rahim who will then allow 
Babil to close the case or request further investigation.  If, 
on the other hand, the committee decides that it is worth 
pursuing a corruption conviction, the Babil office of COI may 
forward the case to an investigative judge (IJ) in Babil. 
Al-Kaisy said all of his office's cases followed this procedure 
except in the case where the case involved a secret informant or 
a transfer from another court; in these instances, COI could 
forego coordination with the relevant IG and send its case 
directly to an IJ. 
 
 
 
136(B) AND WEAK IG'S 
 
UNDERCUT COI'S EFFORTS 
 
---------------------- 
 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) Al-Kaisy highlighted Article 136(B) of the Iraqi 
criminal code, which states a minister can block criminal cases 
against a ministry employee at will, as 'one of the main 
obstacles' to COI's work.  Al-Kaisy described a case in which 
COI had received a tip about a government department head 
planning to bribe another government official.  COI conducted an 
elaborate sting operation, in which it photographed the bribe 
taking place and confiscated a one million dinar (approximately 
USD 870) payment.  Just as COI was preparing to arrest the 
suspect, the unspecified minister blocked the case from going 
forward and transferred the government official who had received 
the payment to al-Kut.  In another case, al-Kaisy said, the 
Minister of Health blocked charges against 10 employees in his 
ministry.  The impact at the provincial level of the abuse of 
136(B), al-Kaisy indicated, was a loss of public confidence in 
 
HILLAH 00000021  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
the COI's ability to combat corruption. 
 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) Al-Kaisy outlined other constraints to more effective 
anti-corruption enforcement in the province.  He stressed  'the 
IGs' ineffectiveness is not taken seriously by their ministers.' 
 Their independence is critical to the COI's effectiveness, 
al-Kaisy suggested, because of the requirement to coordinate COI 
investigations through IGs prior to submitting information to an 
IJ.  He also said the continued delay in Council of 
Representatives' confirmation of COI Commissioner Rahim had 
weakened COI's credibility and effectiveness.  One glimmer of 
hope was the relative safety in which COI investigators were 
able to function in Babil compared to Baghdad.  Unlike Baghdad 
investigators, those in Babil did not need to worry on a daily 
basis about their personal safety in conducting their official 
duties, he said. 
 
 
 
FEW CASES AGAINST HIGH RANKING OFFICIALS, 
 
MANY AMNESTY LAW DISMISSALS 
 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Al-Kaisy provided Babil PRT with an unofficial record 
of COI's case log between 2006 and 2008 which revealed a large 
number of cases dismissed under the Amnesty Law and few cases 
going to trial, particularly for high level government 
officials.  Some of the numbers, however, may overlap, notably 
the dismissals under the Amnesty Law.  According to COI, of the 
540 cases 'resolved' between 2006 and 2008, 178 were dismissed 
due to the Amnesty Law, 159 were transferred to other courts or 
merged with other cases, 129 cases were closed, 30 were 
transferred to other COI branches, and 44 remain before criminal 
courts.  184 cases from 2006-2008 remain 'unresolved,' according 
to the COI statistics.  While the data do not reveal the total 
number of cases that went to trial and for which a conviction 
was ultimately attained, they do outline the composition of 
detainees in Babil Province who were held in calendar year 2008. 
 Of the 94 individuals in custody, only two had held the rank of 
Director General or higher (one from the Ministry of 
Municipality and the other from the Ministry of Higher 
Education).  Ministries with the most detainees in 2008 for 
corruption-related crimes were the Ministries of Municipality 
(24), Industry (12), Finance (10), Justice (8) and Health (8). 
Detainees from other ministries ranged from one to six. 
 
 
 
PUBLIC HAS LITTLE FAITH 
 
IN GOVERNMENT ANTI-CORRUPTION WORK 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) In a February 26 business environment conference 
sponsored by Babil PRT (reported septel), two independent 
working groups of local business leaders identified corruption 
as one of the top five impediments to greater private sector 
development in Babil Province.  In late February, Babil's 
Al-Meezan, an independent newspaper focused on legal issues, 
conducted a survey of perceptions of corruption in Babil 
province.  While we do not know the methodology of the survey, 
the large sample size offers some degree of insight into the 
widespread public concern about the prevalence of corruption in 
the province and perceptions of government's inability to combat 
it.  Of the 1000 participants (584 men and 416 women) surveyed, 
921 revealed to al-Meezan that they believed corruption existed 
in a variety of government sectors.  730 had been personally 
subject to administrative corruption by a government civil 
servant.  The offices considered most corrupt in Hillah were the 
real estate department of the Ministry of Justice (248 votes), 
the office of taxation (157), the Ministry of Health (155), the 
Babil municipal government (138), the police (147), and the 
Ministry of Education (110).  Respondents cited weak enforcement 
of anti-corruption laws and the paucity of legal proceedings as 
the main enabler of corruption (621 votes), followed by lack of 
nationalism and pride in Iraqi civic institutions (265), 
followed by personal reasons (123).  The entities and mechanisms 
deemed most likely to combat corruption were the media (300 
votes), civil society (200), government oversight (180), and the 
independent anti-corruption agencies (80).  With regards to the 
COI, 113 respondents deemed its work in battling corruption very 
important, 203 said it was important, and 684 said it was 
unimportant. 
HILLAS