VZCZCXYZ0009
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGE #0157/01 0791916
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201916Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7108
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHVV/ISLAMIC CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN IMMEDIATE 4163
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000157 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR GY
SUBJECT: JAGDEO UNREPENTANT AFTER LATEST ANTI-US OUTBURST, 
BUT SEEKS COLLABORATION 
 
REF: A. GEORGETOWN 124 
     ¶B. GEORGETOWN 149 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John M. Jones, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: A day after another set of searing public 
criticisms of the U.S. Government and its "condescending 
lectures" on fighting drug trafficking and other issues 
through its annual reports, an entirely unrepentant President 
Jagdeo asserted to the Ambassador on March 19 that the tone 
of these reports should change in the future if the U.S. 
expected countries to cooperate on such issues. He reiterated 
privately what he had expressed publicly and vociferously the 
day before: that he had been asking the U.S. "for years" for 
greater counternarcotics collaboration, including the opening 
of a DEA office in Guyana, but had been "met with silence." 
He nonetheless claimed an interest in developing a framework 
for law enforcement cooperation -- which would involve 
enhanced investigations and prosecutions of drug trafficking, 
weapons smuggling, money laundering, and extraditions to the 
U.S. He reiterated his intention to write to President Obama 
regarding the State Department's "unfair and biased" annual 
reporting on drugs, human rights, and trafficking in persons. 
"It's a different world now," Jagdeo declared to the 
Ambassador. "We're not going to be lectured anymore." End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) At the annual Police Officers Conference in 
Georgetown on March 18, President Jagdeo rnewed his scathing 
public attacks on the U.S. Goernment for what he perceives 
as its double-talkon fighting drug trafficking. Restating 
many of he charges he levied during a public presentation on 
February 27 (reftel A), Jagdeo asserted that hewas "tired of 
the lectures" contained in the Stae Department's annual 
reports on narcotics (the NCSR): "If the U.S. is serious 
about working wit us then this will change." As he has often 
done in the past, Jagdeo used the opportunity to counterunch 
on what he perceived to be the United State' own weaknesses, 
stating that in the fight agaist drugs and crime, "...they 
have the biggest falure of law enforcement and they are the 
largest source of money laundering." Jagdeo criticized publc 
recriminations on the issue, then proceeded toengage in that 
very act by noting: "We can tradetit for tat and the drug 
traffickers would be hapy. I am interested in serious 
collaboration wher there is real assistance, real 
commitment, and esources to match what we say." 
 
¶3. (C) At the Abassador's request, Jagdeo met with 
Ambassador ad PolOff on March 19 to discuss these latest 
remrks, the government's last-minute cancellation ofparticipation in a regional drug enforcement confeence, and 
the President's views about how to mov forward. Ambassador 
began by asking "How can weput things back together again?" 
on the counternrcotics front. Jagdeo responded by saying it 
had o start with "changing the tone of these unfair, iased 
reports from the State Department," particularly the INCSR. 
He alleged: "These reports don't reflect the positive steps 
we have taken," referring specifically to the dismissal of 
nine Customs Anti-Narcotic Unit (CANU) Officers last year, 
including the Head, after they had failed polygraph tests. 
When PolOff noted that this CANU transition had indeed been 
described and even praised in this year's INCSR, the 
President responded that it had received only "one tiny 
mention" in the report. (Note: not true. It was cited in the 
summary and again in the narrative. End Note.) Jagdeo also 
highlighted the passage of several new laws last year that 
enabled wiretapping, plea bargaining, and other useful law 
enforcement tools. PolOff replied that this also had been 
mentioned and lauded in this year's INCSR, in two different 
sections. 
 
¶4. (C) Jagdeo expressed particular exasperation at what he 
perceived as a complete lack of progress on establishing a 
permanent DEA office in Guyana. "This is not a recent thing; 
I've been asking for this for years!" he exclaimed. Referring 
to the March 2008 visit of WHA A/S Tom Shannon, Jagdeo 
averred: "There's a long history to this: we've written, 
we've asked, we even mentioned it when Mr. Shannon was here, 
and nothing has happened." Ambassador inquired what exactly 
the President sought regarding law enforcement collaboration; 
Jagdeo replied that he was interested in a "framework by 
which we can define our exact cooperation. How are we going 
to collaborate, in broad terms? That is what we must 
establish." Taking care to delineate the difference between 
broader policy issues and the operational details of actual 
investigations, Jagdeo claimed he was only interested in the 
 
former: he wanted to clarify the framework, and then let the 
actual enforcement work happen. In response to the 
Ambassador's inquiry about who would be the principal POCs 
for the GoG on such discussions, Jagdeo identified four: 
Cabinet and Defense Board Secretary Dr. Roger Luncheon; 
Minister of Home Affairs Clement Rohee; Guyana Defense Force 
Chief of Staff Gary Best; and Guyana Police Force 
Commissioner Henry Greene. He affirmed: "These are the people 
I trust on this issue." 
 
¶5. (C) PolOff raised the question of the GoG's own 
counternarcotics commitment after a debacle the previous 
weekend regarding a U.S. invitation for CANU Director James 
Singh to attend the regional Drug Commanders Conference in 
St. Kitts the week of March 16-20, with all expenses covered. 
(Note: After belatedly accepting the invite on March 13, 
Minister Rohee rescinded permission for Mr. Singh to travel 
on March 14, with no explanation. End Note.) PolOff asked 
what message the President thought this action sent in the 
context of his pleas for assistance and collaboration. Jagdeo 
evaded that question, and in fact expressed frustration with 
Rohee for having granted the initial permission without the 
Cabinet's consent. (Note: official travel by all GoG 
employees -- at any level of the bureaucracy and even if a 
sponsor is covering all costs -- must be approved by the 
Cabinet in advance before permission to travel is granted. 
End Note.) 
 
¶6. (C) Jagdeo circled back at several points during the 
30-minute meeting to the annual reports that grate on him 
"and many other countries around the world, who feel the same 
way I do." Referring at various points to the Human Rights 
Report and the Trafficking in Persons Report, in addition to 
the INCSR, Jagdeo complained that they were "unbalanced" and 
did not include the government's point of view. PolOff noted 
that he was the principal author of each, and clarified that 
the government's perspective had very much been part of the 
information-gathering process, although numerous GoG agencies 
had failed to respond to multiple requests for even basic, 
non-controversial statistics. (Note: in response to the 
latter point, Jagdeo nearly apologized, asserting that he had 
ordered his ministers to comply with all such requests in 
order to help establish an accurate picture. Jagdeo then 
offered: "If that happens again in the future, drop me a line 
about it." End Note.) PolOff asked if the President 
understood that each of the cited reports were required by -- 
and written for -- the U.S. Congress, and by their very 
nature and structure would not necessarily reflect any 
particular government's perspective. Jagdeo contradicted 
himself impressively within the same response: "I understand 
that. I don't have any problem with you identifying 
deficiencies that exist." Moments later he avowed: "If you're 
going to say bad things about us, we have the right to say 
things about you. The only difference between what I have 
said publicly about you and what you have written about us is 
simply that I did not take the time to put my remarks in a 
report." 
 
¶7. (C) Ambassador noted that post would relay the President's 
interest in a framework for cooperation to Washington, and 
would work to get something together. Jagdeo expressed hope 
that something could be arranged, and looked forward to 
future discussions after his return in early April from an 
18-day trip to the Middle East (reftel B). 
 
¶8. (C) Comment: In President Jagdeo's world, Guyana has met 
the full measure of external expectations regarding its 
commitment to fighting drug trafficking and other crimes, and 
demonstrated its competence and diligence as a partner in 
these areas. This could hardly be further from the truth. The 
individuals he identified to work with on this "framework" -- 
Luncheon, Rohee, Best, and Greene -- are the Four Horsemen of 
Inertia. All have been in their positions for at least 18 
months, and none have shown a proclivity for meaningful 
actions that would truly address Guyana's numerous law 
enforcement shortcomings. Luncheon in particular, as the 
source of virtually all government power outside of the 
President, has repeatedly sought to disembowel the most 
critical reform components of the British-funded Security 
Sector Reform Program. End Comment. 
Jones