VZCZCXRO0248
RR RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHGV #0220/01 0750823
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 160823Z MAR 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8130
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2981
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 000220 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR IO/EDA and EEB/OMA 
USUN for JLAWRENCE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN ECON EINV UNGA ECOSOC
SUBJECT: Financial Crisis - Looking for the Magic Bullet 
 
¶1.  SUMMARY:  The global economic downturn was the focus of several 
meetings in Geneva March 9-12.  The UN Commission on Financial 
Reforms (the Stiglitz Commission) slammed U.S. regulatory failures, 
and promoted greater institutional power and money for lesser 
developed countries.  The UN Conference on Trade and Development 
released a report focusing on the triple crises in financial, 
commodity, and currency markets.  The UN apparently has grand 
ambitions leading up to a June Ministerial, as outlined in detail 
below, but we suggest the USG focus on garnering multilateral 
support for practical ways countries can pool their resources to 
lessen the impact of the economic downturn.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------------- 
UN Commission on Financial Reforms 
---------------------------------- 
¶2.  The commission of experts of the President of the United Nations 
General Assembly on reforms of the international monetary and 
financial system held its second, closed-door session in Geneva 
March 10-11.  Joseph Stiglitz, Professor at Columbia University and 
Nobel Prize laureate, who leads the Commission, presented some of 
its key findings to member states at both the UN Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) and the International Labor Organization 
(ILO) on March 12, 2009.  He argued that the United States and the 
United Kingdom are largely responsible for the world financial 
crisis, mainly due to their failure to regulate risk properly. 
Nevertheless, the crisis is harming all countries, so all countries, 
not just the G20, should have a voice in its resolution. 
 
Causes of the crisis 
-------------------- 
 
¶4. Stiglitz attributed the crisis to three underlying problems. 
First, markets were built on a theory of market fundamentalism, 
namely that unfettered markets work perfectly and are 
self-correcting, and this theory failed in practice.  Second, 
management of the Asian financial crisis taught developing countries 
that they should create large foreign currency reserves.  Countries 
built huge reserves, but this dampened aggregate demand and 
aggravated global imbalances.  Third, in the absence of sufficient 
global demand, central banks pursued loose monetary policies, 
allowing debt accumulation by entities that had no capacity to repay 
that debt.  In response to the ensuing global financial crisis, the 
world needs a global economic stimulus package, and institutional 
and regulatory reforms. 
 
Global Stimulus Package and Financial Reforms 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶5.  Stiglitz proposed a new issuance of Special Drawing Rights 
(SDRs) and the auctioning of carbon permits and other global goods 
as a source of new funds for global economic stimulus packages.  He 
stated that one percent of all developed country stimulus packages 
should be allocated to developing countries to stimulate their much 
smaller economies.  There should be no conditionality on that 
stimulus money, because conditionality has forced countries to 
pursue pro-cyclical policies and lose sovereignty.  Stiglitz added 
that there should be "a new international lending facility that 
could deliver aid in a way that is better for donors and 
recipients," but did not elaborate further. 
 
¶6.  Stiglitz also encouraged member states to address competition 
policy at the global level to resolve the problem that some banks 
supposedly have become too big to fail.  He said there should be a 
"financial product safety commission" that could provide guidance 
about the efficacy, use and risk of financial instruments.  There 
also should be some global financial regulation, to avoid regulatory 
arbitrage. 
 
¶7. Stiglitz advocated the establishment of a new global reserve 
system.  He said small changes in voting rights in the Bretton Woods 
organizations (the international financial institutions, IFIs, such 
as the IMF And World Bank) will not make a difference; what is 
needed are big changes in voting rights and the way Executive 
Directors are chosen.  The world needs better global economic and 
financial surveillance, and central banks need a broad reform of 
their policies because central bankers need to address long term 
growth not just inflation. 
 
¶8. Stiglitz encouraged the issuance of GDP-linked bonds by 
developing countries to mitigate risk.  He said this global 
financial crisis will be followed by a sovereign debt crisis and 
that we need to agree upon a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism 
now to deal with it. 
 
Protectionism and Moral Hazard 
------------------------------ 
¶9.  Stiglitz warned that the current stimulus policies can be 
 
GENEVA 00000220  002 OF 003 
 
 
protectionist, singling out the United States and its cosmetically 
amended "Buy America" provisions.  Stiglitz opined that the "Buy 
America" provisions will harm poor developing countries.  Stiglitz 
criticized U.S. and European subsidies, saying they create an uneven 
playing field that is insurmountable for the developing countries. 
Stiglitz suggested a framework of global regulation to curb these 
subsidies and criticized the Doha Development Round as falling 
short.  Stiglitz also recommended that the developed countries open 
their markets further to the least developed countries (LDCs), and 
particularly extend the "everything but arms" tariff relief to more 
countries. 
 
¶10. Stiglitz expressed deep concern about the impact of the US and 
European bail-out packages in terms of moral hazard.  He said that 
the knowledge companies have that they may be bailed-out changes 
their perception of risk.  "The level playing field has been 
destroyed. We need to compensate developing countries for the huge 
advantage bail-outs provided to developed countries." 
 
Reforms and New Institutions 
---------------------------- 
¶11.  Stiglitz suggested the establishment of several new 
institutions and mechanisms: a financial product safety commission; 
a new international lending institution; a sovereign debt 
restructuring mechanism; and a Global Economic Coordination Council 
(GECC).   Stiglitz said the Commission was still debating the role 
of the GECC and whether it should be created as a global regulator, 
promulgating rules, or as a coordinator, overseeing rules which 
would not touch on sovereignty issues.  He explained that government 
regulations do not operate across borders, but we need an entity 
that looks at competition and regulations globally to avoid 
regulatory arbitrage across countries by companies and to address 
the challenges posed by this crisis.  Stiglitz said along with 
regulatory coordination, the GECC could take the IMF's surveillance 
function. According to Stiglitz a lender, like the IMF, has a 
conflict of interest when it conducts surveillance since it looks at 
the world from the standpoint of repayment, so will have an inherent 
bias to promote pro-cyclical policies, while what we need are 
counter-cyclical policies. 
 
-------------------- 
Next Steps at the UN 
-------------------- 
 
¶12.   After Stiglitz presented his oral report, Paul Oquist, Senior 
Advisor from the UNGA President's office, stated that the 
Commission's written report, along with consultations between the 
UNGA President and the G-20, G-7 and G-8, will feed into an outcome 
document drafted by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(DESA) that delegates will negotiate in New York, starting April 12, 
leading to a Ministerial meeting June 1 and 2 to deal with 
contentious issues, and then a heads of state and government meeting 
June 3 and 4.  He provided the following time line for the 
Commission's work and its usage.  He noted the schedule was 
compressed because some countries are running out of reserves and 
need help now. (COMMENT: Oquist presented the schedule and actions 
to occur as accepted facts.  However, after the meeting, several 
delegates told us they were unaware of member state agreement on 
this schedule or plan. END COMMENT). 
 
-- March 20: UNGA president will have received input from the 
Commission, G-20, G-7 and G-8. 
 
-- March 25: UN agencies and regional commissions will provide their 
view on the financial crisis. 
 
-- March 26 and 27: the Commission chaired by Stiglitz will present 
its conclusions and then the four working groups under the 
Commission will present their findings and have a dialogue with 
member states. 
 
-- Early April: the UNGA President with DESA will produce a report 
on the financial crisis. 
 
-- April 13: intergovernmental negotiations on a proposed draft 
outcome document will begin in New York. 
 
-- June 1-2: Ministerial meeting in NY to deal with contentious 
issues. 
 
-- June 3-4: Heads of State and Government meeting in NYC. 
 
¶13.  Oquist put the Stiglitz Commission, and plans for negotiating a 
document on the financial crisis at the UN, in a broader context. 
He said the Monterrey Consensus was a breakthrough, since it was the 
first time that the UN had a financial and economic-focused meeting 
 
GENEVA 00000220  003 OF 003 
 
 
with a Ministerial Declaration.  Up to that point, conventional 
wisdom had been that only the IFIs and US Treasury had expertise to 
deal with financial and economic issues.  Monterrey changed that 
attitude.  Now, he opined, the Stiglitz Commission is another 
breakthrough for the UN to give further voice to the world community 
on these issues. 
 
¶14.  Oquist stated emphatically that the final solutions to the 
global financial crisis need to come to the UN for approval as a 
matter of legality.  The G-7 and G-8 are totally ad-hoc and have no 
basis in international law.  International solutions affect 
everyone, so everyone should have a voice in them for them to be 
legitimate.  Oquist concluded that trillions are being spent to 
reinstate credibility in the global financial system, but to have 
credibility we must have equality and justice where everyone feels 
their interests are represented. 
 
-------------------- 
UNCTAD takes a stand 
-------------------- 
 
¶15.  On March 9, in part as input for the Stiglitz Commission, the 
UNCTAD Secretariat produced a paper on the economic crisis, 
identifying crises in the financial, commodity and currency markets. 
 In his paper, Dr. Heiner Flassbeck, Director, Division on 
Globalization and Development Strategies at UNCTAD, suggested three 
possible solutions to the economic crisis.  The first suggestion was 
a regional currency system with 'planets' and 'satellites,' and a 
managed floating exchange rate with the satellite countries' 
currencies tied to the planets' currencies.  Second, Flassbeck 
proposed establishment of a body for global oversight of financial 
institutions, to identify and restrict usage of financial 
instruments that do not have any social benefits.  The final 
solution Flassbeck offered was debt inflation by developed 
countries, to compensate for insufficient private demand. 
 
¶16.  In a March 10-11 UNCTAD Experts' meeting on Gender and Trade, 
in the context of the financial crisis the USDel suggested UNCTAD 
should monitor trade data to identify which sectors in which 
countries were hardest hit by the global financial crisis, and to 
apply gender analysis to those hardest hit sectors to determine if 
women and men were impacted differently, and finally to inform 
member states of that research and analysis on a timely basis, so 
states could develop gender-aware policy responses.  This suggestion 
was supported by delegates from all regions and NGOs, who all opined 
it would be a practical and constructive way to help limit the 
negative impact of the financial crisis on women and children. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶17.  In our view, the various reports accurately report the causes 
of the economic downturn and the interrelationship between the 
financial, commodity, and currency crises.  Some dispute remains 
regarding proposed solutions.  The real question is how to get past 
economic modeling for ideological purposes, and put into practice 
the widely-accepted view that countries need to act in concert to 
deal with the economic downturn.  For example, the U.S. Treasury 
recently announced it is developing a method for the USG to join 
with private investors to begin buying the mortgage-backed 
securities and other complex financial instruments whose resumed 
trading is so important to the stability of the financial system. 
To address the multilateral dimension of this economic problem in 
concrete terms, the Department might wish to explore the possibility 
of convincing other governments to contribute to that effort to 
attack the financial crisis at its roots.  Ultimately, we will need 
to find ways to deal with overly broad ideas about reforming the 
world's financial architecture, as proposed by Stiglitz and others, 
and develop practical multilateral solutions to global market 
instability. 
STORELLA#