P 241311Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
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S E C R E T DOHA 000205 
 
 
DHAKA FOR POL/ECON, DEPARTMENT FOR DS AND DSS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2019 
TAGS: AMGT ASEC ECON KSPR PREL QA
SUBJECT: KEY TRENDS IN QATAR OVER THE NEXT 36 MONTHS - AN 
UPDATE 
 
REF: A. 2008 DOHA 664 
     ¶B. DOHA 140 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b and d). 
 
¶1. (C) Embassy Doha's second interagency off-site was held 
March 3, 2009 at CENTCOM Forward HQ at Camp As-Saliyah (see 
ref A).  This was the second such off-site (see ref B). 
These interagency off-sites will be held twice yearly, with 
the objective of reviewing and updating our field interagency 
assessment of key trends in Qatar over the coming 36 months. 
Specifically, the interagency team focused on: 
 
-- The most important trends with greatest implications for 
U.S. national interests in Qatar. 
-- Our expectations for those trends over the next 36 months. 
-- Whether these expectations have changed since 
establishment of the Mission's first field interagency 
assessment in September 2008. 
 
¶2. (C) The off-site concluded with a discussion of the USG 
policy imperatives which flow from these trends, and a look 
at mechanisms for interagency synchronization to most 
effectively pursue those policy imperatives.  This cable 
presents Embassy Doha's updated analysis of key trends in 
Qatar.  A discussion of policy imperatives and mechanisms for 
interagency synchronization will be discussed in a separate, 
classified Interagency Field Synchronization Plan. 
 
------------------------------- 
POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC TRENDS 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) A review and update of Qatar's political and 
diplomatic trends reveals the following: 
 
-- (C) The uncontested domination of Qatari politics by the 
Al Thani family will continue through the next 36 months. 
Though we have little detailed knowledge of the internal 
workings of the family, it appears that the rule of the 
current Amir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani is secure (his 
health notwithstanding).  We expect a smooth transition in 
power to his son after his passing, based on what we know 
today. 
 
-- (C) All critical decisions in the country, whether 
political, legal, or economic, continue to be made by a tight 
circle of Al Thani family members.  So intertwined are the Al 
Thanis with the fiber of the nation that it may be said that 
the fate of Qatar is the fate of the Al Thanis and their 
rule.  The twin roles that personality and risk play in the 
creation and execution of Qatar's foreign and domestic 
policies will continue to be dominant. 
 
-- (C) Al Jazeera Satellite Television Network will continue 
to be an instrument of Qatari influence, and continue to be 
an expression, however uncoordinated, of the nation's foreign 
policy.  Qatar has continued efforts to mend political fences 
damaged by Al Jazeera's broadcasts, for example with the 
November 2008 visit of Jordanian King Abdullah.  Those 
efforts will continue. 
 
-- (C) Qatar will continue to position itself as a mediator 
to secure the regional diplomatic role the Al Thanis crave. 
It will do so not just for reasons of pride and ego, but in 
order to reduce instability in the region on the assumption 
that political and economic instability is especially 
threatening to tiny states such as Qatar. 
 
-- (C) The Amir and a small circle of family members making 
all the major decisions in the country will continue their 
demonstrated commitment to the rule of law and to more 
participatory government. Qatar will continue its slow march 
toward a more participatory Qatari society, restrained by 
concerns that more democracy may put a brake on the Amir's 
progressive agenda.  GOQ sources say that Advisory Council 
elections may be held as early as mid-2010.  The Permanent 
Elections Committee will continue to accept technical 
training from NGOs, including U.S. organizations. 
 
-- (C) Qatar will continue to rely heavily on foreign labor. 
Because they are so outnumbered by foreigners, Qataris will 
continue to regard foreign workers as a security, rather than 
a human rights, concern. Qatar will seek workers from 
countries currently under-represented in their expatriate 
labor pool in order to avoid being grossly outnumbered by one 
nationality, such as Indians. 
 
-- (C) The Qataris themselves will continue to experience 
alienation in the face of cascading change.  The increase in 
the Qatari population has come largely from societies with 
different religious, linguistic, and cultural norms than 
Qatar.  They tend to be Hindu or Buddhist, and few speak 
Arabic.  Gross economic disparities will lead to a mammoth 
increase in the currently low crime rate. 
 
--------------- 
MILITARY TRENDS 
--------------- 
 
¶4. (C) A review and update of Qatar's military trends and 
expectations reveals the following: 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF QATAR'S MILITARY 
 
-- (C) Qatar's goal of creating a professional military force 
will remain a challenge.  Losses through retirement in the 
senior ranks will be compounded by the difficulties the GOQ 
faces in grooming junior Qatari officers to assume 
leadership.  Qatar continues to rely on third-country 
nationals, particularly in the enlisted ranks, and the 
possibility that sensitive U.S. military information will be 
compromised will continue to cause concern in our bilateral 
military relationship. 
 
-- (C) The Qatari military will continue to seek foreign 
sources of professional military training and education. 
(Rebuffed by the U.S. Military Academy, Qatar now plans to 
cooperate with the French school, St. Cyr, to create a 
military academy in Qatar. Junior officers will begin 
military training in the U.S. next month.) 
 
-- (C) Due to the global economic crisis, Qatar may extend 
its timelines for acquisition of defense equipment, including 
U.S. defense sales.  The Qatari military is delaying its 
purchase of 17 weapon systems that they had earlier sought to 
purchase.  While the C17 and C103J purchases are still on 
track, the GOQ is delaying the purchase of helicopters and 
other defense items. 
 
-- (C) Although Qatar will continue to express a preference 
for many U.S. defense systems, the Qatari military will 
continue to find frustrating the U.S. system of foreign 
military sales (FMS).  The requirement of congressional 
notification and reduced access to sensitive technology will 
discourage the Qataris from purchasing U.S. systems.  Qatar 
will seek to purchase weapons from France and other European 
countries as a result of their frustrations. 
 
-- (C) Qatar will continue to develop a capacity to conduct 
humanitarian assistance missions in the region.  (This 
explains Qatar's purchases of C17 and C31J aircraft.) 
 
 U.S.-QATAR MILITARY RELATIONS 
 
-- (C) In the near term (next 12 months):  The U.S. will want 
continued freedom of use and access at Al-Udeid Air Base, 
while Qatar will want to ensure that we are respecting 
Qatar's sovereignty.  The inherent frictions created by these 
interests will cause us to experience continued tactical and 
operational problems, particularly involving customs and 
immigration.  Some tactical irritants will impede missions in 
the region. 
 
-- (C) In the Mid-Term (next 24 months): Our stringent FMS 
requirements, and Qatar's own acquisition slowdown, will 
impede the goal of increasing Qatar's military capacity. 
 
-- (C) The development of a closer U.S. - Qatari military 
partnership will be frustrated by interoperability issues 
created by Qatar's purchases of French weapons systems. 
 
-- (C) Owing to the global economic crisis and their own 
budgetary cutbacks, Qataris are no longer amenable to paying 
the full cost of our relocation costs from Camp As-Saliyah to 
Al Udeid Air Base, particularly costs related to temporary 
facilities relocation (FFA costs).  They will scrutinize line 
items of every purchase more closely and will not make 
purchases frivolously.  This trend may continue over the 
longer term, depending on the state's revenues from oil and 
gas. 
 
-- (C) In the Long Term (36 months): Expansion of our 
military relationship with the Qataris will be affected by 
the quality of our political relationship.  Our political 
relationship will also be significantly affected by our CT 
relationship. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
COUNTERRORISM AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION TRENDS 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) A review and update of Qatar's counterterrorism and 
counter proliferation trends reveals the following: 
 
-- (C) Qatar is growing in importance as a transit hub in the 
Middle East.  In 36 months, Qatar will have a new 
international airport and there will be further growth in the 
number of people traveling to, and through, Qatar.   This 
increase will accordingly increase the counterterrorism and 
counterproliferation challenges, further taxing the GOQs 
already strained security infrastructure. 
 
-- (S) Doha is likely to emerge as a transit point for 
illicit technology.  Those attempting to transit with illicit 
technology are likely to be non-Qatari, so the possibility 
exists that the authorities will take measures to stop it. 
Although there are no notable instances of lack of 
cooperation in counterproliferation, we have seen instances - 
such as cases of North Korea using Qatar Airways to move 
prohibited technologies - in which the GOQ was unable to 
monitor these activities due to lack of expertise.  Such 
instances are likely to recur. 
 
-- (S) The GOQ has the financial resources to purchase 
security equipment for installation at airports, but lack the 
expertise and personnel to implement it effectively.  Given 
the small population of Qataris, filling all positions in 
security and immigration with Qatari citizens will become 
even more difficult in the next 36 months. 
 
-- (S) Counterterrorism cooperation from the Qatari 
Government is currently poor, although there have been very 
recent indications of improvement.  The level of cooperation 
from Qatar on counterterrorism and countproliferation 
cooperation is intertwined to some degree with the bilateral 
political relationship, and will continue to be so. 
 
-- (S) Qatar will continue to be an inconsistent partner in 
combating terrorist financing, unless continually prodded. 
Qatar has been reluctant to fight terrorist financing for 
reasons we do not fully understand.  We do believe Qatar has 
been reluctant to combat the financing of terrorist groups 
and activities in part because it does not want to invite an 
attack by antagonizing terrorist groups. 
 
-- (S) Due to its small size and great wealth, Qatar will not 
be a major source of jihadists.  Qatar's citizens can, 
however, support terrorism financially, and the capacity of 
the Qataris to do so may outstrip the ability of the 
government to stop it. 
 
-- (S) The American military presence in Qatar will continue 
to be a target for terrorism. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
LAW ENFORCEMENT, LEGAL, AND JUDICIAL TRENDS 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) A review and update of Qatar's crime and law 
enforcement, legal, and judicial trends reveals the following: 
 
-- (C) The population of Qatar has doubled in the past 5 
years to more than 1.6 million people.  This growth and the 
societal changes that have accompanied it have outpaced the 
ability of Qatar's government to address effectively the 21st 
century law enforcement challenges it faces. 
 
-- (C) Qatar's crime rate is still among the lowest in the 
world, but there has been a 330% increase in violent and 
non-violent crime since 2005.  This trend will continue due 
to the increase in the expatriate population, rapid economic 
development, widespread use of the Internet, and the MOI's 
slow pace to adapt to and implement necessary institutional 
changes.   The Qatari government will continue responding to 
this threat by adopting biometric technologies and 
information sharing with other law enforcement jurisdictions. 
 
-- (C) The Qatari judiciary is largely independent.  Qataris, 
not just foreigners, are prosecuted for criminal conduct 
according to the same standards as expatriates.  This 
approach represents a commitment to rule of law at the 
highest levels of the GOQ and will continue. 
 
-- (C) There are only 90 prosecutors and 120 judges in the 
country, many of whom hear both civil and criminal cases; the 
judicial system is overwhelmed.  This trend will likely 
continue. 
 
-- (C) Qatar's Chief Justice is committed to reforming the 
Qatari judicial system, which has no alternative dispute 
resolution procedures or alternative sentencing measures such 
as probation.  Plea-bargaining is not practiced.  Those 
reform efforts will continue, though limited by Qatar's human 
resource constraints. 
 
-- (C) With increased flows of money into and out of Qatar, 
the country is susceptible to economic crimes, but is still 
ill-equipped to deal with them.  In particular, rapid 
economic development is increasing the opportunities for 
money laundering and cybercrime in the country despite 
expanded GOQ efforts to combat it. 
 
-- (C) The Ministery of Interior (MOI) is the largest 
employer in Qatar, with a workforce of approximately 10,000 
people. However, Qatar has perhaps the lowest per capita 
police to resident ratio in the world, one policeman for 
every 800 residents.  By comparison, the average ratio in 
Western countries is one policeman to 300 residents. 
 
-- (C) The MOI will continue to face a formidable challenge 
in qualitatively staffing and retaining its officer corps and 
enlisted ranks.  The Qatar MOI's senior leadership is 
reaching retirement age; there is a shortage of junior 
officers, as the drive to fill more private sector jobs and 
expanding economy is providing them with economic incentives 
to leave the public safety/security services. 
 
-- (C) The Internal Security Force (ISF), which is the elite 
component of the MOI, trains constantly, but without 
identified training goals or measures.  There is considerable 
scope for training and cooperation between the U.S. military, 
particularly Special Operations Forces, and the MOI. 
 
-- (C) The Minister of State for Interior Affairs, Sheikh 
Abdallah bin Nasser Al Thani, will continue to command 
respect and influence in the eyes of the Amir and Crown 
Prince. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
TRENDS IN THE ECONOMY, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶7. (S) A review and update of trends in Qatar's economy 
reveals the following: 
 
-- Overall, the outlook for Qatar's economy remains positive 
over the coming 36 months, though the upward trajectory is 
moderated by the global economic crisis and drop in commodity 
prices.  It's only partly cloudy here economically, although 
more clouds are appearing on the horizon. 
 
-- (S) The "megatrend" driving all other economic and 
environmental trends continues to be the exploitation of 
hydrocarbon resources.  In the next three years, Qatar will 
double its output of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to 77 
million tons per annum.  A diversified contracted customer 
base will provide some stability to Qatar's income from a 
drop in demand in any one country/region. 
 
-- However, the sharp drop in oil and natural gas prices (the 
latter are often linked/indexed to the oil price) will reduce 
Qatar's GDP growth and the major surpluses seen in recent 
years may disappear. (For example, Q4 2008 GDP was 23 percent 
lower than Q3, though still slightly larger than Q4 2007). 
Ramping gas production is likely to still offset the drop in 
commodity prices.  But if oil drops below USD 45 per barrel, 
Qatar will have to revisit its budget plans. 
 
-- (S) Moreover, Qatar's additional natural gas supply will 
result in further downward price pressure for natural gas in 
the short-term. Demand for natural gas has softened 
significantly with the global economic crisis. 
 
-- Banking, real estate, stock prices and the labor market 
have softened.  Strong government spending should outweigh 
these negative effects. 
 
-- Most of the wealth will remain under the control of the 
state, which distributes it via government spending.  Even 
among Qataris, however, a disparity in wealth will continue. 
 
-- (S) Qatar's economy will continue to be dependent upon 
both managerial/technical expertise and manual labor from 
abroad.  Although Qatar is undertaking educational reforms 
which will fill some human resources gaps over the long-term, 
the ambitions of the elite for Qatar's future are greater 
than the capability of the local population to implement it. 
Calls by the country's leadership for "Qatarization" - the 
drive to move Qataris into managerial and technical positions 
in place of foreign workers - will continue publicly, while 
genuine implementation will fade or not be achieved. 
 
-- (S) The financial sector will experience a qualitative and 
quantitative increase.  The Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) 
will play an important role, though will be more cautious in 
the face of the global financial downturn.  The economic 
crisis may have set back plans for a single, unified, 
regulator though this could still be formed within 3 years. 
Insurance products will become increasingly important as a 
means of protecting investments. 
 
-- (C) Debt among Qataris is high and will remain so.  Banks 
will refrain from pressuring Qataris to pay those debts.  If 
banks feel increasing pressure from deterioration in assets, 
they will likely seek relief from the GOQ.  The trend toward 
tighter liquidity and the greater use of Islamic banking 
options will continue. 
 
-- (C) There will be piecemeal liberalization and 
diversification, and Qatar is likely to become more cautious 
in its plans for development of its financial sector.  The 
telecommunications industry is gradually being opened to the 
private sector, and some economic decisions, such as patent 
and trademark regulations and standards, will be made in 
concert with GCC partners. 
 
-- (C) Qatar's role as a regional and international 
transportation hub will grow.  Doha International Airport 
will serve an estimated 10 million passengers in 2008.  This 
is a fivefold increase from a decade ago.  Phase One of the 
new airport is scheduled to open in 2010 with a passenger 
capacity of 24 million.  Qatar Airways will increase its 
route network, including its U.S. destinations.  There are 
plans for a new seaport which will increase capacity by five 
times in the first phase.  Hotel capacity will quadruple from 
the current 7000 rooms by 2012. 
 
-- (C) Qatar will continue its commitment to becoming a 
leader in science and technology.  Relaxed investment laws 
will attract more foreign participation in the science and 
technology sectors.  Internet usage has already increased to 
more than 300,000 users, an increase of 866% since 2000, and 
is expected to grow further. 
 
-- (C) There will be growing concern over the environment and 
food safety, but pollution will continue to be a major 
problem.  The newly established Ministry for the Environment 
exemplifies this growing concern for the environment.  Energy 
companies in Qatar are increasingly involved in trying to 
address environmental challenges. 
 
-- (C) The rapidly increasing population will strain public 
services such as water supplies, roads, and other 
infrastructure components.  Electricity demand is expected to 
increase from 3419 megawatts in 2008 to over 10,000 megawatts 
in 2012.  Water usage will grow from 150 million gallons per 
day in 2008 to 330 million gallons per day in 2012. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
TRADE AND INVESTMENT TRENDS AND PATTERNS 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) A review and update of Qatar's trade and investment 
trends reveals the following: 
 
-- (C) Qatar will continue to be plagued by a lack of human 
capital. 
 
-- (C) Qatar will continue to seek the latest technologies 
and will look to U.S. leadership in this area.  The Qatari 
leadership knows that its fossil fuel supplies will run out 
and is determined to use its current wealth to integrate 
technology into its economy and society.  But other than the 
mere desire to acquire new technologies, there does not 
appear to be a coherent strategy that identifies Qatar's 
technology needs and how to fulfill them in a systematic way. 
 
-- (C) Qatar spends USD 180 billion combined in the following 
sectors:  oil and gas, health and medical sanitation 
projects, information communication technology, aerospace, 
architecture construction engineering, safety and security, 
franchising and education/training.   These huge expenditures 
will continue and the potential opportunities for U.S. 
exporters will grow. 
 
-- (C) Qatar will seek to become a "mega-brand" by marketing 
itself as an international destination of "global" quality. 
Qatar however lacks the services and supplies to sustain its 
ambitions to become a global "brand name."  The poor quality 
of labor (born in part of a disenfranchised labor force) and 
sparseness of services may cause major bottle-necks in its 
infrastructure.  There will continue to be opportunities to 
leverage our expertise in a country with an ill-trained 
native workforce. 
 
-- (C) Qatar's pattern of "creative destruction" will 
continue its growth trend, sweeping away the old and 
replacing infrastructure with larger and more modern 
versions.  This will represent expanded opportunities for 
U.S. businesses. 
 
-- C) Qatar recognizes that the U.S. is the world's leader in 
education and training, and education and training will 
provide enormous opportunities for the U.S. 
 
-- (C) The U.S. will remain the top exporter to Qatar 
bolstered by Qatar's big ticket purchases of Boeing and 
Lockheed aircraft.  At the same time, an informal quota 
system will persist whereby the Qataris purchase from a 
variety of nations to curry favor with different governments. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
TRENDS IN PUBLIC OPINION, MEDIA, AND EDUCATION 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶9. (C) A review and update of Qatar's public opinion, media, 
and education trends reveals the following: 
 
PUBLIC OPINION 
 
-- (C) Despite the change in the U.S. administration, and 
regional issues such as Iraq, Iran and Palestine, trends in 
public opinion regarding the USG will continue to be volatile 
for the next 36 months. 
 
-- (C) Qataris will remain evenly split over whether it is a 
good idea to have a close relationship with the U.S.  In 
recent CENTCOM polling, fifty-three percent oppose the U.S. 
use of Al Udeid Air Base.  But sixty percent of the polling 
sample maintained that security is the main benefit of 
bilateral relationship with the U.S., thus justifying the 
presence of Al Udeid Air base. 
 
EDUCATION 
 
-- (C) Government financial support and a desire to provide 
more Qataris with quality higher education will continue to 
fuel the education sector in Qatar.  Education City will 
attract two new schools with international reputations - 
probably from the United States - a law school and an 
institution offering an MBA. The education system will 
continue its standardization and major reform, mostly 
borrowed from Western models including the United States. 
 
-- (C) The Qatari Government's earlier intent that the 
Ministry of Education be replaced by the Supreme Education 
Council has been reversed.  Government schools are expected 
to exercise more autonomy along the lines of the independent 
schools formerly administered by the Supreme Education 
Council, as the Ministry of Education works to establish a 
common core curriculum across schools in Qatar. 
 
-- (C) Female students will continue to dominate higher 
education, as percentages of university-educated women 
continue to trend upwards and rates for men trend downwards. 
Almost 46% of Qatari women between the ages of 25 and 29 have 
acquired university level education.  Amongst Qatari men 
within the same age group, only 26% had university education. 
 
-- (C) The lack of an educated workforce will persist due to 
the opportunities Qataris have to make money without first 
becoming educated.  There is a lack of incentive for Qatari 
males to finish secondary school. 
 
-- (C) The rigorous admission requirements of U.S. 
universities in Qatar Foundation (QF) create a disconnect. 
Students at QF schools are seen as elites. There is a growing 
friction between the elites and non-elites. 
 
-- (C) While Qatar earlier sought to adopt an 
Australian-style model of education involving a blend of 
academic and technical coursework, it now appears that the 
country will adopt the U.S. model of  community college 
education.  Qatar currently lacks the community college and 
vocational training system needed to respond to private 
sector needs. 
 
MEDIA 
 
-- (C) Al Jazeera (AJ) maintains high viewership in Qatar 
with more than 50% of the media market share.  Over the next 
36 months, there will be a steady expansion of AJ in Africa 
and Asia, and through subsidiaries into other markets, such 
as Turkey.  AJ will slowly but steadily lose market share 
within the region as computers improve their regional appeal. 
 
-- (C) Qatar's commitment to a free press will remain limited 
to news about other countries.  Newspapers in Qatar, both 
English and Arabic, will discuss certain political and 
economic issues candidly but never criticize the ruling Al 
Thani family or Qatar's foreign policy. 
 
-- (C) According to several polls, about 40% of Qataris get 
information from newspapers and this high rate of readership 
is likely to continue.  The presence of Northwestern 
University's Medill School of Journalism may affect local 
media coverage, but primarily beyond the 36-month window. 
 
-- (C) The GOQ will continue to use the media to float trial 
balloons on proposed changes in national laws.  It will also 
use the media to craft public opinion in its favor. 
 
------------------ 
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 
------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) A review and update of Qatar's demographic trends 
reveals the following: 
 
-- (C) The official population figure as reported to the 
public is 1.63 million.  This demonstrates continued rapid 
growth. 
 
-- (C) The actual population, according to a recent comment 
by the Minister of State for the Interior, is two million. 
As many as 1.8 million of this population is of foreign 
origin.  These numbers are expected to grow among every 
nationality and region of origin, checked only by Qatar's 
economic prospects and Qatari security concerns about certain 
nationalities such as Pakistanis and Iranians. 
 
-- (C) As the foreign population grows, Qataris will become a 
smaller minority in their own country despite a relatively 
high birth rate.  Qatar will not increase the size of its 
citizen population by gradually easing restrictions on 
naturalization. 
 
-- (C) South Asians from India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, 
and Pakistan account for an estimated 800,000 to 900,000 of 
the expatriate population and work in a variety of sectors, 
including construction, import/export, labor, business, and 
information technology.  The Indian expatriate community 
remains the largest in Qatar.  The Nepalese community grew 
from 200,000 to 300,000 during 2008, and is now the second 
largest. 
 
-- (C) The Qatari population is likely to get younger. 
Despite the expectation of a longer life expectancy, Qataris 
continue to have large numbers of children.  The estimated 
median age of the Qatari population is between 31 and 32 
years. 
 
-- (C) Qataris under the age of 35 will be increasingly well 
educated, urban, and wealthy.  They will possess an 
extraordinary range of opportunities distracting from the 
business of building their country. 
 
-- (C) Several Arab countries' nationals have a major 
presence in Qatar, including Egypt, Palestine (typically 
long-term residents), Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan, and 
Syria.  Expatriate Arabs constitute an estimate 300,000 to 
400,000 of the population.  They tend to work in engineering, 
accounting, import/export, education, energy, services, 
hotels, and beauty. 
 
-- (C) An estimated 200,000 East Asians live in Qatar.  They 
are mainly from the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, South 
Korea, and China.  East Asians are prominent in the fields of 
mechanical technology, energy, construction, engineering, 
housekeeping, and labor. 
 
-- (C) There are an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 Iranians 
living in Qatar.  Many Iranians in Qatar are long-term 
residents.  The Qatari Shia population is estimated at 10 
percent of the Qatari national population.  Qatari women 
marry Iranian men, a rare instance of a female Qatari 
marrying a foreign husband. 
 
-- (C) There are as many as 40,000 Africans living in Qatar. 
They come from Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
and South Africa.  African expatriates work mainly in 
construction, labor, trade, import/export, energy, and oil 
services. 
 
-- (C) Europeans account for an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 of 
the expatriate population.  They are generally citizens of 
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, and Turkey. 
Europeans work in energy, shipping, engineering, 
construction, management, education, finance, and investment. 
 
-- (C)  There are at least 10,000 to 12,000 expatriates from 
North and South America (excluding the U.S.) residing in 
Qatar.  They are mainly from Canada, Brazil, Venezuela, 
Mexico, and Colombia.  These individuals work in energy, 
oilfield services, education, and for Qatar Airways. 
 
-- (C) The American citizen population will continue to grow, 
with the growth in the energy and educational sectors and 
with the increased U.S. military presence.  There are 
approximately 8,000 American citizens registered with the 
U.S. Embassy in Doha, compared with only 1,500 in 2000.  Over 
170,000 U.S. citizens transited through Doha in 2007, and 
this figure will grow as Qatar's airport expands and its 
national airline grows. 
 
-- (C) At any given time, the Embassy estimates that there 
are approximately 15,000 private American citizens present in 
Qatar.  American citizens are prominent in the energy 
industry, working for ExxonMobil, Conoco Phillips, 
Occidental, Chevron, and various energy services companies. 
American citizens also work for military contractors, the 
U.S. universities at Education City, the American School of 
Doha, and a wide range of educational institutions in Qata. 
Continued growth in the education and energy sctors will 
bring in more American citizens over te next three years. 
 
 
LeBaron