VZCZCXRO4362
OO RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDJ #0150/01 0600839
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 010840Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0164
INFO SOMALIA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/CJTF HOA
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0001

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 000150 
 
SIPDIS SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
SBU DELIBERATIVE PROCESS 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/E AND AF/RSA 
AFRICOM AND CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-03-01 
TAGS: PREL PHSA PBTS MOPS KPKO FR SO DJ RS
SUBJECT: FRENCH FM KOUCHNER'S VISIT FOCUSES ON DJIBOUTI-ERITREA, 
SOMALIA, AND SOMALI PIRACY 
 
DJIBOUTI 00000150  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Eric Wong, Charge d'affaires, a.i., U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Djibouti; REASON: 1.4(A), (B), (D) 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  FM Kouchner's surprise February 21-22 visit to 
Djibouti focused on Djibouti-Eritrea, Somalia, and countering 
Somali piracy, but did not address bilateral issues, according to 
the French Ambassador.  Despite the expiration of the 5-week 
deadline imposed by UNSCR 1862 for Eritrea to withdraw from Ras 
Doumeira, France (and Russia) is awaiting the official release of 
the UNSYG's report before taking any further action.  The French 
Ambassador cited "other mediation efforts" and a possible role by 
Iran.  On Somalia, France is "studying" whether French forces in 
Djibouti may be able to train instructors for Somali security 
forces, albeit on a limited scale.  Noting that EU counter-piracy 
forces from various countries are currently operating from a French 
naval base in Djibouti, the French Ambassador offered the French 
naval base as a possible site for an expanded counter-piracy 
coordination center; however, non-EU counter-piracy forces (e.g., 
anticipated from Japan and Korea) are likely to face some French 
restrictions on using French facilities.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On February 25, French Ambassador Dominique Decherf 
briefed the diplomatic corps on the February 21-22 visit to 
Djibouti of French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner.  Decherf said 
Kouchner's stop in Djibouti (after visiting neighboring Yemen) was 
"certainly a surprise", but that such ministerial-level visits had 
been envisioned following the December 2007 state visit by 
Djiboutian President Guelleh to Paris.  Most recently, the French 
defense minister had visited Djibouti in 2008.  (NOTE: One French 
Embassy contact asserted that the French DCM had received only 24 
hours notice of Kouchner's visit to Djibouti.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) According to Decherf, Kouchner's visit focused on the 
situation between Djibouti and Eritrea, Somalia, and international 
counter-piracy efforts; the visit reportedly did not address 
bilateral Franco-Djiboutian relations, which Decherf characterized 
as normal. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
RUSSIA AND FRANCE: AWAITING UNSYG REPORT ON DJ-ER 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶4. (U) Decherf observed that the unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1862 
in January 2009--calling, inter alia, for Eritrea to withdraw its 
troops, as Djibouti had already done, from the Ras Doumeira area 
bordering Djibouti--had occurred under the French presidency of the 
UN Security Council.  The 5-week period called for by UNSCR 1862 
had expired on February 19, and the UN Secretary-General (UNSYG) 
was to report to the UNSC within one week on the status of 
implementation and on next steps. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Decherf reported that France and Djibouti had "exchanged 
views" on possible UNSC action after the expiration of this 
deadline.  He noted that UNSCR 1862 had been jointly drafted by 
Djibouti and France, and had been introduced by France.  In the 
past, he added, Qatar and Libya had sought to mediate between 
Djibouti and Eritrea (Qaddafi had traveled to Asmara, to no avail); 
perhaps mediation by Iran, as a good friend of both countries, 
could be discussed during the ongoing (February 24-25) visit to 
Djibouti by Iranian President Ahmadinejad.  French officials had 
told Djiboutian counterparts "not to despair," Decherf said. 
 
¶6. (SBU) During follow-up questions, Ethiopia's Ambassador to 
Djibouti observed that Eritrea had clearly rejected UNSCR 1862. 
Decherf responded that during FM Kouchner's visit, "there was no 
conclusion" on next steps; "of course, we have to await the UNSYG's 
report."  For France, there was "a range of possibilities," from 
sanctions to "other mediation efforts."  "At this point, we have 
not decided anything," Decherf declared.  Russia's Ambassador to 
Djibouti Alexander Bregadze added that Russia also took the 
position that it must await the UNSYG's report. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
FOCUS ON SOMALI SECURITY FORCES, NOT AMISOM 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) On Somalia, Decherf reported that France supported the new 
government of Somalia.  FM Kouchner had met with both President 
Sheikh Sharif (who departed Djibouti for Somalia on February 23) 
and with Somalia's new prime minister; Somalia's foreign minister 
 
DJIBOUTI 00000150  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
was attending the international contact group meeting in Brussels. 
The main issue discussed, Decherf said, was how to enhance security 
in Mogadishu, in accordance with the Djibouti Process agreement, 
through the reinforcement of Somali national security forces. 
Kouchner did not discuss AMISOM with Djiboutian officials, Decherf 
said. 
 
¶8. (SBU) According to Decherf, the GODJ had agreed to host training 
of Somali security forces in Djibouti.  Some 10-100 Somalis could 
be trained at existing Djiboutian military schools at Arta or 
Hol-Hol.  French officials were now studying whether the French 
military could assist with "train-the-trainer" instruction in 
Djibouti, just as French forces had previously conducted training 
in Uganda and Burundi for contingents deploying to support AMISOM. 
(NOTE: As of February 28, the Djiboutian military liaison officer 
serving with CJTF-HOA was unaware of plans to train Somali security 
forces in Djibouti, but said the concept above was "feasible."  END 
NOTE.) 
 
¶9. (SBU) Decherf reported that Djiboutian FM Mohamoud Ali Youssouf 
had asserted that the Arab League may finance such training, as 
well as pay salaries for such security forces.  Palestinian 
Ambassador Kamil Abdallah Gazzaz (the dean of Djibouti's diplomatic 
corps) neither confirmed nor denied this assertion, but only noted 
that Somali President Sharif would attend the March 20 Arab League 
ministerial in Doha, Qatar. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
FRENCH OFFER TO COORDINATE COUNTER-PIRACY FROM DJIBOUTI 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) FM Kouchner's discussions with Djiboutian officials on 
Somali piracy were timely, Decherf said, citing February 24-25 
contact group consultations in London.  The Government of Djibouti 
was "preoccupied" with the influx of foreign maritime forces 
seeking to come to Djibouti to support counter-piracy operations, 
Decherf said.  Such forces included ships and planes from the EU's 
Operation Atalanta, the United States, China, Russia, India, 
Turkey, and possibly Japan (septel) and Korea.  Of particular 
concern, Decherf said, were varying rules of engagement--"Indians 
fire without reservation"--as well as different policies on 
detention of suspected pirates (ranging from holding for trial, to 
disarming and release). 
 
¶11. (U) Noting that the January 2009 IMO counter-piracy conference 
in Djibouti had concluded that IMO centers for maritime training 
and information-sharing be established in Djibouti and Yemen 
respectively, Decherf highlighted that the International Contact 
Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) had proposed 
establishing a separate operational center to coordinate military 
(i.e., naval) operations against piracy.  Having such coordination 
occur was "more important than where this coordination takes 
place," Decherf said. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
FRENCH: USE OUR BASE, BUT NOT OUR HOSPITAL 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶12. (U) Decherf noted, however, that coordination among French, 
Spanish, Greek, and UK naval forces was already occurring at the 
French naval base in Djibouti--under the aegis of the EU's 
Operation Atalanta, which would be led by a Greek admiral until 
April, followed next by Spain and the Netherlands.  Coordination at 
the French naval base in Djibouti could readily be expanded to 
include coordination of other (non-EU) counter-piracy forces; 
indeed, the French base could be the location of the CGPCS's 
envisioned coordination center, Decherf said. 
 
¶13. ((U) Observing that on behalf of the EU, he had signed a status 
of forces agreement (SOFA) for EU forces in Djibouti in December 
2008, Decherf said France had agreed to lend its facilities to such 
EU forces (i.e., Operation Atalanta).  As for other foreign forces 
seeking to use French military facilities in Djibouti, particularly 
the French military hospital (Bouffard), Decherf said EU forces 
would be allowed to use Bouffard "as a right," whereas use by 
troops from other countries would be reviewed "on a case-by-case 
basis." 
 
DJIBOUTI 00000150  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------ 
RUSSIA: FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IS PARAMOUNT 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶14. (SBU) Russian Ambassador Bregardze hailed international 
cooperation on counter-piracy, noting that increased military 
presence, not adverse weather, had likely led to the recent 
decrease in pirate attacks.  Uncertainty, stemming from lack of 
uniform rules of engagement, may have a deterrent effect, he said. 
As pirates were known to have informants at ports worldwide, 
international coordination on counter-piracy needed to be discrete 
and varied, so pirates would not know exactly what was being 
coordinated.  International resolve against piracy was necessary to 
maintain freedom of navigation, Bregadze added, especially through 
the strategic Bab-al-Mandeb strait adjacent to Djibouti. 
 
¶15. (C) COMMENT.  Kouchner's impromptu visit highlights the key 
geo-strategic role Djibouti is playing in the Horn of Africa, from 
hosting Somali reconciliation talks and ever increasing 
international counter-piracy forces, to holding the line against 
Eritrean encroachment.  Amb. Decherf's remarks suggest that French 
officials are more seized with seeking to take the lead on 
coordinating other nation's efforts to counter Somali piracy, than 
with the more sisyphean task of reversing Eritrean aggression.  The 
growing number of EU counter-piracy forces working out of French 
military facilities in Djibouti may be rivalled in the future by 
non-EU forces (e.g., from Japan and Korea) seeking to work from 
U.S. facilities, but limited space and SOFA issues for such non-EU 
forces are obstacles that need to be addressed at the Washington 
level.  END COMMENT. 
  
WONG 
 
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