VZCZCXRO6378
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDH #0040/01 0810819
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 220819Z MAR 09
FM AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0046
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0003
RUEHDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 0061

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAHRAN 000040 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
PASS TO NEA/ARP JOSHUA HARRIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/22/2019 
TAGS: SA LE IR PGOV PTER PHUM KIRF KISL KDEM
SUBJECT: SAUDI HEZBOLLAH LEADER WARNS OF SECTARIAN VIOLENCE 
 
REF: 06 RIYADH 4914, 09 RIYADH 1868, 08 RIYADH 270, 09 DHAHRAN 8, 08 RIYADH 1321, 09 RIYADH 346, 09 DHAHRAN 14 
 
DHAHRAN 00000040  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Julie Stineheart, Acting Consul General, EXEC, 
DOS. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
¶1. (C/NF) Key Points: 
 
--------------------- 
 
-- XXXXXXXXXXXX (strictly protect), a popular Shi'a 
cleric and alleged leader of Saudi Hezbollah, met with PolOff 
after years of refusing to meet with USG officials (ref A). 
 
-- XXXXXXXXXXXX declared that the USG could persuade the SAG to adopt 
serious reforms for religious freedom and human rights, but 
chooses not to and is therefore an "enemy" of the Saudi Shi'a. 
 
-- XXXXXXXXXXXX believes that the SAG must take substantive and 
public steps toward fostering religious and national unity among 
Saudi citizens. 
 
-- Echoing other Shi'a leaders, XXXXXXXXXXXX warned that sectarian 
violence may erupt if the SAG does not address Shi'a concerns 
and that it will be worse than Iraq. 
 
¶2. (C/NF) Comment: 
 
------------------ 
 
-- XXXXXXXXXXXX's warning of possible sectarian violence echoes the 
sentiments of a diverse set of sections of the Shi'a community. 
On December 21, a group of young Shi'a voiced their 
dissatisfaction with the SAG, making no attempt to hide three 
rifles and a picture of Hassan Nasrallah on display in the room 
(ref B).  On February 7, XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect), an 
influential Shi'a political activist, warned of an increasingly 
"frustrated and impatient" Shi'a youth (ref C).  In late 
February, XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect), an elected municipal council 
member, said that "the root for trouble" is present in the Shi'a 
community and feared sectarian violence (ref D).  In early 
March, XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect), a vocal Saudi human 
rights activist, raised fears of the Shi'a youth resorting to 
violence unless the SAG takes action (ref D).  Most recently, 
XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect), a well-respected manager and 
journalist XXXXXXXXXXXX, communicated similar concerns about 
sectarian tensions escalating into violence. 
 
End key points and comment. 
 
¶3. (C/NF) A LONG TIME COMING.  XXXXXXXXXXXX, a vocal 
Saudi human rights activist, facilitated a meeting with XXXXXXXXXXXXupon PolOff's request.  Past attempts by Dhahran 
PolOffs to meet with XXXXXXXXXXXX were unsuccessful, with the sheikh 
unwilling to risk "losing the respect of people on the street" 
by meeting with USG officials (ref A).  The meeting took place 
in the late evening of March 7 at XXXXXXXXXXXX's home in Dammam, and 
was attended by the sheikh's three adolescent sons, nephew, and 
his older brother, XXXXXXXXXXXX, who acted as interpreter when 
necessary.  No other Consulate personnel were present. 
(Comment:  Post is not entirely certain why XXXXXXXXXXXX suddenly 
agreed to meet with a USG official.  One possibility is that the 
intermediary, XXXXXXXXXXXX, as a trusted and respected friend, 
persuaded XXXXXXXXXXXX to meet with PolOff.  Another possibility is 
that XXXXXXXXXXXX truly believes that sectarian violence is imminent 
and views the USG as the only entity able to pressure the SAG 
into taking quick and bold action to prevent hostility.  End 
comment.) 
 
¶4. (C/NF) A SOFT HARDLINER.  Many respected Shi'a contacts have 
described XXXXXXXXXXXXas an outspoken, somewhat radical Shi'a 
religious leader with a large and diverse following.  XXXXXXXXXXXX
wears a black turban and goes by the title "Sayyid" as opposed 
to "Sheikh," indicating that he is a direct descendent of 
Prophet Mohammed.  Though many Shi'a religious leaders 
criticized this bold claim, he continues to maintain a large and 
loyal following.  Though previous reporting (refs A, E) suggests 
that XXXXXXXXXXXXis a leadership figure in Saudi Hezbollah, several 
Shi'a contacts play down these claims and believe that he has 
become more moderate, citing his participation in the National 
Dialogue with King Abdullah in 2005.  (Note:  Most credible 
contacts believe that Saudi Hezbollah is a largely inactive 
movement with minimal foreign contact and limited organizational 
capacity.  End note.) 
 
¶5. (C/NF) AMERICA IS THE ENEMY.  During the two-hour long 
meeting, XXXXXXXXXXXX remained cordial but strongly critical of the 
USG and the SAG.  He told PolOff that the Saudi Shi'a have three 
enemies: the Wahabbis, the royal family, and the USG.  He 
explained that the Al Saud family has failed to improve the 
religious freedom and basic rights of Shi'a citizens, and 
continue to placate the intolerant views of the Wahabbi (Sunni) 
extremists.  Moreover, he continued, the USG supports the SAG 
without question and has not pressured the government to improve 
the situation of the Shi'a.  Due to its inaction, XXXXXXXXXXXXviews 
the USG as an accomplice to the SAG's discrimination of the 
Shi'a.  He dismissed PolOff's citation of the USG's annual Human 
Rights and International Religious Freedom reports by saying 
that the SAG has taken no action based on those reports. 
XXXXXXXXXXXX distinguished between the USG and the general U.S. 
population, noting that he did not view the latter as an enemy 
and on the contrary enjoyed his experience in the U.S. in the 
1990s.  (Note:  He did not elaborate on his visit to the U.S. 
End note.) 
 
¶6. (C/NF) THE SAG HAS NOT DONE ENOUGH.  XXXXXXXXXXXX declared with 
frustration that the Shi'a would not wait any more for the SAG 
to bring about real change.  He explained that the Medina 
incident (ref F) is just the latest example of Saudi 
discrimination of the Shi'a.  He was particularly concerned with 
the random stabbing of a Shi'a sheikh by Wahabbi extremists in 
Medina (ref D) and its implications for his community's basic 
sense of security.  XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that it has been nearly four 
years since he participated in the National Dialogue with King 
Abdullah and he still has not seen any results.  He also noted 
that the municipal council elections have provided few benefits, 
citing the minimal authority that the elected officials hold. 
He has dismissed symbolic gestures such as King Abdullah's 
recent meeting with Shi'a leaders as "not enough" (ref G). 
 
¶7. (C/NF) PROUD TO BE SAUDI.  Despite his overt criticism of the 
SAG and the royal family, on several occasions XXXXXXXXXXXX noted his 
desire for national unity among his countrymen.  He told PolOff 
that it should be illegal for one Saudi to call another "Shi'a" 
or "Sunni."  He said, "we are all Saudis" and should not 
differentiate, with all being treated as equal citizens. 
 
¶8. (C/NF) IRAN, HEZBOLLAH.  XXXXXXXXXXXX accused the USG of having 
"double standards" by its support of Israel, and its criticism 
of Iran and Hezbollah.  When PolOff asked him a follow up 
question specifically on Iran, XXXXXXXXXXXX carefully side-stepped 
it.  (Comment:  The measured and politically savvy XXXXXXXXXXXX was 
deliberate in painting a blurry picture of his relationship to 
and views on Iran and Hezbollah.  However, a few days later 
XXXXXXXXXXXX gave an interview on Al-Manaar TV, a satellite station 
viewed by the USG as a propaganda arm of Hezbollah.  End 
comment.) 
 
¶9. (C/NF) ANOTHER WARNING ABOUT SECTARIAN VIOLENCE.  Echoing 
several other mainstream Shi'a leadership figures, XXXXXXXXXXXX
warned PolOff, "Don't be surprised if it comes to violence."  He 
went on to say that the violence would be "double" of that in 
Iraq and that the Shi'a would be "slaughtered" by the SAG.  He 
then said that he recently called on his congregation at last 
Friday's prayers to not demonstrate in the streets, for which he 
received criticism from some of his followers.  He also told 
PolOff that it is not only the Saudi youth that are growing 
frustrated, but also "regular people on the street." 
 
¶10. (C/NF) WHAT THE SAG NEEDS TO DO.  XXXXXXXXXXXX repeated several 
times the need for the SAG to publicly guarantee religious 
freedoms and equal treatment of all Saudi citizens, while justly 
punishing those who violate these rights.  XXXXXXXXXXXX did not lay 
out specific steps the SAG must take in order to avoid conflict. 
 However, he noted some examples of lingering problems that the 
SAG alone can address: the routine closure of Shi'a mosques and 
husseiniyyas in Dammam, Khobar, and al-Ahsa; the religious 
police regularly harassing Shi'a; random arrests of Shi'a 
without due process; no Shi'a graveyards in Dammam and Khobar; 
and under-representation in government, religious, and education 
institutions. 
STINEHART