VZCZCXRO2971
PP RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHEG #0470/01 0771553
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 181553Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1950
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 0197
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0221
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0259
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 1262
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0004
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0248
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0274

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 000470 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/ARP, AF/SPG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2019 
TAGS: PREL PREF KPKO PHUM KICR KISL EAID QA LY ER
CD, SU, EG 
SUBJECT: DARFURI LEADERS IN CAIRO SUPPORT ICC ARREST 
WARRANT, CONDEMN NGO EXPULSIONS 
 
CAIRO 00000470  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Minister Counselor for Economic and Political Affairs 
William R. Stewart for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. Key Points 
 
-- (C) We met with Cairo office representatives from the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Sudanese Liberation Army 
(SLA)-Minni Minawi, SLA-Unity, The Sons of the Fur (who have 
strong ties to SLA-Abdel Wahid al-Nur), and the Darfuri Arab 
Democratic Popular Front (DPF) on March 8, 10 and 12 to gauge 
local Darfuri community reaction to the ICC's arrest warrant 
for Sudanese President Bashir. 
 
-- (C) All of the Darfuri leaders support the ICC decision to 
issue an arrest warrant for Bashir and all condemned the 
Government of Sudan's (GOS) expulsion of NGOs. 
 
-- (C) SLA-Unity and SLA-Minawi would like to see the 
Government of Egypt (GOE) take a larger role in helping to 
resolve the crisis in Darfur.  JEM and Fur felt Egypt is too 
biased toward the GOS to have a role in the Darfur peace 
talks. 
 
-- (C) None of the groups view the Arab League as a fair 
mediator in Darfur.  Only the JEM said that the AL could play 
a facilitator role in peace negotiations. 
 
¶2. (S) Comment: While the Darfuri groups in Cairo agree that 
Bashir should be arrested, and the NGOs should remain in the 
country, they agree on little else.  The JEM and DPF leaders 
that we met were much more cerebral and strategic than the 
SLA leaders.  The JEM conferred about our questions and 
coordinated their answers, and the DPF Secretary General 
consistently referred to decisions taken at a recent 
"Secretariat meeting."  The JEM were the only group to 
mention that China's continued support for the GOS prevents a 
resolution to the situation in Sudan. The DPF addressed the 
GOS' intent to use Islamic groups to aid in the defense 
against the "Western-backed ICC." The Sons of the Fur were 
comfortable "playing the victims," and lacked a plan for how 
to represent their cause.  The only point where they showed 
some direction was when we discussed Abdel Wahid al-Nur and 
his group's desire to participate in any U.S.-backed peace 
talks.  SLA Unity's leader focused the need to involve all 
internal factions and regional countries in the peace 
process, but he provided no direction for how to bring the 
parties together. SLA Minawi leaders are upset that the 
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was never implemented.  The 
group would like the USG to push for the DPA as the basis for 
all future negotiations or would like to get out of the deal 
and renegotiate with the GOS. End Comment. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Unanimous Support for the ICC Arrest Warrant 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) On March 8-12, we met with local Darfuri leaders to 
get their views on the ICC arrest warrant for Sudanese 
President Bashir, the effects of this warrant on the local 
Darfuri community, and ascertain their observations on the 
roles that Egypt and the Arab League can play in future peace 
negotiations. 
 
¶4. (C) Mohamed Sharaf, head of the JEM's Cairo office and 
Idris Mahmoud, head of JEM's Europe office told us that JEM 
believes the arrest warrant against Bashir is a "victory for 
justice and the victims in Darfur."  Sharaf stated that 
Bashir should present himself before the court and justify 
his innocence claim.  He said the JEM does not support an 
Article 16 deferment of the ICC procedures because this would 
be against peace and justice.  Ibrahim Ishaq, Director of the 
Sons of the Fur Organization, which has close ties to 
SLA-Abdel Wahid al-Nur, told us that the GOS targeted the Fur 
people for ethnic cleansing and they support the decision of 
the ICC to arrest Bashir.  Gamal Hamed, the SLA Unity 
representative in Cairo stated his organization supports the 
arrest warrant as part of the process for justice and human 
rights because the GOS "used starvation, denial of medical 
care and rape as weapons of war."  Mohamed Nour, advisor to 
 
CAIRO 00000470  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
Minni Minawi, told us that the ICC arrest warrant will help 
Sudan achieve justice, which must precede any peace deal.  He 
stated that arrest warrant is a separate issue from future 
peace talks, and its deferment should not be a carrot for 
progress on the peace front.  Nour said that the arrest 
warrant will not affect the CPA or DPA.  He stated that Ali 
Osman Taha was the architect of the CPA and suggested he 
could easily take over the leadership of the National 
Congress Party.  Osama Hassan, Secretary General of the 
Democratic Popular Front that he supported the arrest warrant 
for Bashir because he was responsible for the air campaign 
that targeted Darfuri civilians. 
 
¶5. (C) All the leaders stated that the GOS organized the 
demonstrations against the ICC arrest warrant including those 
in El Fasher.  Sharaf and Nour said that Sudanese Security 
forced students, workers, and IDPs to participate in the 
rallies under the threat of arrest.  However, they stated 
that President Bashir is comfortable enough with the GOS's 
control over Darfur to appear in public. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
NGO's Expulsion Dangerous to Humanitarian Situation 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶6. (C) Mahmoud called the GOS's expulsion of NGOs from Darfur 
a "war crime."  He said that China's objection to condemning 
the action was a negative message that it will support the 
GOS no matter what the humanitarian cost. Noura Sharaf 
al-Din, Head of the Fur's Women and Children Committee told 
us that there had already been two deaths in the Kalma Camp 
that were related to the NGO shut down.  Hamed stated that 
without the NGOs there were no other organizations to provide 
food and medicine for the people in Darfur.  Nour said that 
SLA-Minawi believes the expulsion will only worsen the 
humanitarian situation in Darfur.  He said that the inability 
of the U.N. to prevent this action shows that the world is 
not concerned with the humanitarian issues in Darfur.  Hassan 
told us that the expulsion of the NGOs was an "irresponsible 
act" by the GOS.  He said that the NGO that were targeted 
supply about half of the humanitarian aid in Darfur, and 
their inability to work will only worsen the situation by 
subjecting more Darfuris to starvation and hunger. 
 
----------------------------- 
Doha Talks Not Representative 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Sharaf told us that there is value in the Doha talks 
because Qatar is neutral and a good mediator.  However, he 
was quick to state that the GOS already violated the 
"Goodwill Agreement" that was signed in February by kicking 
out the NGOs and failing to release JEM prisoners. Both the 
Fur and SLA-Minawi stated that the talks in Doha would not 
work because they only included the JEM and the GOS.  Nour 
told us that "Qatar doesn't understand Darfur." Abdel Karim 
Abdel Mowaly, Vice President of the Sons of the Fur, told us 
that a Zaghawa/Sudanese Government deal that excludes the Fur 
could not possibly resolve the situation in Darfur.   Hamed 
told us that SLA Unity does not support the Doha Talks 
because "Qatar is only interested in saving Bashir."  As a 
result, SLA Unity will not interact with either Qatar of 
UN/AU Mediator Bassole.  Hassan said the DPF will not 
negotiate with the Bashir government.  However,  he 
surprisingly supports the JEM-GOS Doha talks because the 
talks "will unite the Islamists under the same banner"  and 
make it easier to oppose Khalil Ibrahim and the JEM. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Mixed Reaction to Potential Role of Egypt 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Sharaf told us that JEM considers Egypt's position 
unacceptable because the GOE is completely biased toward the 
GOS.  He accused Egypt of "obstructing peace talks in Doha." 
Ishaq said that the Fur community is not supportive of 
Egypt's role as a mediator.  He stated that Egyptian State 
Security will not even allow them to express their dissent 
with Khartoum.  Hamed told us that Egypt has always viewed 
 
CAIRO 00000470  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
Sudan in terms of its Nile waters interest, but recently had 
changed (NFI).  He opined that Egypt has a role to play in 
resolving the crisis in Darfur because "Egypt is better than 
Qatar."  He mentioned that the GOE had sent an invitation, 
through its embassy in Chad, inviting SLA Unity to 
participate in a conference on Darfur in Cairo in April 
(NFI).  Nour told us that SLA-Minawi would like to see Egypt 
more involved in the Darfur issue, but he opined that the GOE 
is "more worried about Arab problems in Gaza than African 
problems in Darfur."  He also stated that Egypt does not have 
the money necessary to play a principle role, unless its 
efforts are backed by the U.S., UAE and Saudi Arabia.  Hassan 
said that Egypt's only role was in supporting Bashir or the 
NCP because Egypt only wants stability.  However, he noted 
that Egypt is looking to engage with the rebel groups to 
counter Libyan efforts to unite the Darfur factions, and to 
"hedge its bets" in Sudan.   As evidence, he said Egyptian 
State Security is now allowing his group more latitude to 
express their opposition to the Bashir government. 
 
-------------------------- 
Arab League Not a Mediator 
-------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) All the leaders stated that the Arab League (AL) is 
not a good mediator because it favored Khartoum and failed to 
act in Darfur for the first five years of the conflict. Only 
JEM admitted that the AL performed well in the role of 
facilitator during the Doha talks. Hassan said the League was 
an extension of the Egyptian MFA and stated that Khartoum 
recent rejection of Moussa's proposal may change the AL's 
position on Sudan. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
JEM relying on International Community to Push Peace 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶10. (C) Sharaf and Mahmoud told us that JEM will continue to 
negotiate with the GOS, but not with President Bashir. 
Sharaf told us that JEM leaders believe "peace is the 
strategic choice."  Sharaf and Mahmoud laid out six key 
factors to reaching peace in Darfur. Humanitarian issues are 
paramount and China's unequivocal support for the GOS sends 
the wrong message.  The international community needs to 
establish an "oil for food" program in Sudan so that the GOS 
does not buy weapons, but rather feeds its people.  "No fly 
zones" should be enforced over Darfur to protect the citizens 
from further GOS aggression. The international community must 
insist on justice because "there can be no peace with 
impunity."  JEM will continue to support the Qatari 
Initiative for Peace, but China needs to play a role to 
encourage GOS implementation of agreements. Libya and Egypt 
are peace spoilers and must be kept from interfering in the 
peace negotiations. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Fur Community Looking to be Included in Process 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶11. (C) Ishaq told us that a peace process that includes the 
Fur and all Darfuri factions is needed.  He stated that 
current peace talks have only addressed Zaghawa needs.  Ishaq 
advocated for a U.S.-led initiative to unite the factions and 
bring them all to the table.  He told us that his brother, a 
key advisor to Abdel Wahid al-Nur, said that SLA-Nour would 
attend U.S.-backed peace talks. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
SLA Focused on Humanitarian Crisis, Regional Solution 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶12. (C) Hamed said that the first priority was to stop the 
suffering in Darfur.  "Without progress on the humanitarian 
front such as provision of food and medicine, there can be no 
dialogue."  He told us that the SLA believes regional 
countries like Chad, Egypt, Eritrea, and Libya should play a 
role in resolving the crisis.  Hamed mentioned that Libya is 
trying to unite various factions and tribes to bring them to 
the negotiating table, and he hoped this would lead to a 
 
CAIRO 00000470  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
Darfuri "national group" composed of Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa 
and Arabs that could enter into "serious political dialogue" 
with the GOS. However, Hamed noted that there was a need to 
have a party at the table to compel the GOS to implement 
agreements because the "the Government signs agreements and 
does the opposite." 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Abuja is the Basis for Future Peace Talks 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Nour told us that SLA-Minawi is upset that the USG 
supports the Doha talks because Doha disregards the 
U.S-brokered Darfur Peace Agreement, signed by Minni Minawi 
in Abuja in 2006.  He said that all future peace negotiations 
should be based on the Abuja Agreement. However, Nour was 
pessimistic, saying that nothing will change on the ground in 
Darfur in the next six months.  He stated that the GOS can 
handle the security situation and no rebel group is strong 
enough to challenge the government. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Fearing of Re-Islamization and Land Grab Efforts 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶14. (S) Hassan told us that the GOS, in order to oppose the 
Western-backed ICC, is moving to toward hosting Islamic 
movements similar to Iran.  He said that Khartoum's message 
is "either leave us alone or we will use Islamic cells to 
defend ourselves."  Hassan said that the GOS released Hassan 
al-Turabi to re-brandish its Islamic credentials and allow it 
to host "Islamic militant groups." Hassan also said that if 
pressure from the West continues the GOS will hold the CPA 
hostage. When pushed he admitted that this is not a smart 
move, but he opined that Bashir is not intelligent, and the 
pressure is forcing the government into "chaotic thinking." 
 
¶15. (S) Hassan called on the USG and UNSC to impose a "no-fly 
zone" over Darfur to protect those that support the ICC and 
efforts of Western NGO's.  In the absence of UNSC action, he 
told us that Darfuri groups plan to use their military 
resource to grab areas of land to protect themselves and 
their supporters. 
 
¶16. (U) Minimize considered. 
 
SCOBEY