P 020503Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1395
INFO AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 0009
FBI WASHDC PRIORITY
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
DIA WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T BUJUMBURA 000103 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
DS/TIA/ITA, DS/IP/AF 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019 
TAGS: ASEC PTER BY
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE 
BUJUMBURA, BURUNDI - SPRING 2008 
 
REF: A. STATE 13023 
     ¶B. 2006 KAMPALA 1804 
     ¶C. 2006 BUJUMBURA 805 
 
Classified By: Charge, JoAnne Wagner; Reasons 1.5 (c) 1. 
 
 
1.(U) Embassy Bujumbura's responses are keyed to reftel A: 
 
------------------------- 
(U) POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
------------------------- 
 
¶I. (U) DEMONSTRATIONS 
 
¶A. (U)Anti-American sentiments are not pervasive within any 
of Burundi's ethnic or religious communities. The ruling 
CNDD-FDD party received monetary and political support from 
Sudan during Burundi's 1993-2005 civil war. Sudanese support 
continues, invigorated by a May 2007 visit by Sudanese Head 
of State Omar al-Bashir to Burundi. Burundi has a small, 
moderate Muslim minority. This minority is almost entirely 
located within Bujumbura and is strongly factionalized. The 
former head of the ruling CNDD-FDD political party, Hussein 
Radjabu, is a Muslim who has previously made the pilgrimage 
to Mecca. Radjabu has courted and received monetary support 
from Islamic nations such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, the Sudan 
and Iraq in the past. In April, 2007 Radjabu was arrested and 
sentenced to 13 years for sedition; he is appealing his 
conviction. Allegedly, Radjabu was recruiting former rebels 
for the purpose of destabilizing the current government. 
Despite being a prisoner, Radjabu maintains influence and 
some control over his Muslim loyalists. The real extent of 
Radjabu's resources, authority and potential is unknown, as 
is his exact disposition with respect to the United States. 
That said he likely retains some ability to influence the 
political and religious environment. 
 
Overall Burundi's Muslim population is of the more tolerant 
variety. Many of Burundi's Muslims originate from either 
India or Pakistan and are active within their ethnic 
communities, which also include many Christians. 
 
i. There have been no anti-American demonstrations within the 
last 12 months. 
 
ii. There have been no anti-American demonstrations near or 
in front of U.S. diplomatic facilities within the last 12 
months. 
 
iii. There have been no anti-American demonstrations of any 
size within the last 12 months. 
 
iv. There have been no anti-American demonstrations as a 
result of U.S. foreign policy initiatives, military actions, 
or domestic issues within the last 12 months. 
 
¶B. (U) Demonstrations are infrequent, are generally 
nonviolent and are well controlled by the police. However, 
any demonstration or spontaneous gathering has the potential 
to become violent. For example, in March 2008, a United 
Nations car transporting an American citizen employee was 
stopped by former UN workers protesting a contract 
termination.  When the driver tried to push the vehicle 
through the crowd, the demonstrators attacked the vehicle 
with rocks.  The vehicle was badly damaged but no one was 
injured.  Similarly, in July, disgruntled ex-UN workers 
staged two simultaneous grenade attacks on UN vehicles. In 
September motorcycle taxi drivers staged a violent 
demonstration against new licensing restrictions.  They 
damaged passing vehicles and temporarily shut down traffic in 
the center of town until the demonstration was violently 
dispersed by the police. 
 
i. There have been no violent demonstrations that have 
resulted in damage to USG property or injuries to USG 
personnel. 
 
ii. There have been no violent demonstrations that have 
penetrated the perimeter security line. 
 
¶C. (U) In May, 2008 students demonstrated at UNESCO, the 
Ministry of Education and the president's office to demand 
unpaid allowances promised by the government. Students threw 
stones, injuring two of their own and one police officer. The 
police fired live ammunition into the air and launched tear 
gas to disperse the mob. 
 
i. This student protest took place one block away from the 
United States Embassy, and on the same street. 
 
ii. Each of the two demonstrations in this reporting period 
numbered between 100 and 200 participants. 
 
iii. Demonstrations have been generally nonviolent and well 
controlled by the police, with no damage to USG property. 
However, any demonstration or spontaneous gathering has the 
potential to become violent. 
 
iv. Anti-government demonstrations did not result in damage 
to USG property. 
 
II. (C) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS 
 
¶A. (C) The Burundian government is working to finally resolve 
a protracted intrastate conflict and is currently attempting 
to implement the last details of a ceasefire agreement with 
the FNL, the country,s remaining rebel group. The FNL and 
the GoB signed a cease-fire agreement in September 2006, but 
in April 2008, the FNL staged simultaneous small unit attacks 
with small arms and mortars on police and military position 
around the capital of Bujumbura.  When the FNL fired 130mm 
rockets into the city a few days later, the military began to 
drive the rebels from their previous positions surrounding 
the city.  After 20 days of daily fighting in the areas 
surrounding Bujumbura a new cease-fire declaration was 
signed, followed by subsequent declarations detailing 
timelines for implementing the ceasefire. The FNL has made 
some movements towards beginning the demobilization process, 
but its commitment to the process remains suspect.  The bulk 
of the individuals who have begun reporting to the 
demobilization camps is believed to be new recruits; the 
majority of the FNL,s actual fighters remain in the field. 
The conflict has again assumed the characteristics of the 
low-level insurgency it resembled prior to the fighting in 
April 2008. The FNL has frequently engaged in small clashes 
with FDN (Burundi National Defense Forces) and police 
positions, mostly in response to FNL criminal rather than 
insurgent related activity. Looting, ambushes against 
vehicles, extortion, armed robbery and grenade attacks 
against the civilian population are the continuing and 
preferred method of obtaining logistical support for the FNL 
in the field. The FNL is again active in the area surrounding 
Bujumbura but this may be a last attempt to gather logistics 
in advance of demobilization.  Further fighting is possible 
but not expected at this time. 
 
¶B. (C) The FNL generally have freedom of movement throughout 
the interior of the country; however they are more 
concentrated around Bujumbura in Bujumbura Rural, the 
northern regions of Cibitoke and Bubanza, and the southern 
regions near Nyanza Lac. 
 
¶C. (C) There are no U.S. diplomatic facilities located in 
these regions, other than in Bujumbura, the capital. 
 
¶D. (C) No factions have specifically targeted American 
interests or advocated an anti-American political philosophy 
or orientation. 
 
III. (S) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES 
 
¶A. (S) Burundi's National Police (PNB) is staffed by former 
rebel fighters, police and gendarmerie. The majority of the 
police force has just completed its first formal week-long 
training course in basic human rights and policing. Two more 
week-long courses are underway but the average police officer 
still has had little training.  Mid-level officers have some 
training but do not aggressively seek to enforce the law 
without specific orders to do so. The highest echelon of the 
PNB is well-educated and well-trained but seems unable to 
pass relevant knowledge to their subordinates. 
 
In general, the level of professionalism and competence is 
sufficient to deter petty criminal activity where police are 
continuously present in sufficient numbers. In cases of more 
serious crimes not committed in the actual presence of 
police, reaction times are too slow to help the victims; 
serious investigations are only undertaken in the most 
notable cases and legitimate prosecution rare.  In fact, 
serious crimes are often attributed to the police, other 
government actors, or the FNL. The police are not generally 
active outside of cities during hours of darkness so 
criminals operate in rural areas with impunity at night. 
 
Although the investigative capacity of Burundian law 
enforcement personnel is very limited, they are cooperative, 
willing to learn and generally eager to assist the U.S. 
 
¶B. (S) The second officer of the PNB to attend the 
Investigator Training Program at the FBI National Academy has 
recently graduated. Efforts are underway to enroll officers 
of the PNB and inspectors into the International Law 
Enforcement Academy (ILEA)in Botswana. Officers have already 
attended a drug course and a cyber-crime course at ILEA. 
Although Post's training initiatives are still in their 
infancy, PNB effectiveness and willingness to cooperate have 
improved.  The PNB have also received significant training 
from the UN, the Netherlands, China, France, Belgium and 
Egypt. 
 
¶C. (S) Corruption is widespread throughout the PNB. The 
assimilation of demobilized rebels from various groups active 
during the civil war undermines the capabilities of the PNB. 
Low pay, inadequate training and the fact that many current 
police formerly made their living through criminal means have 
created a situation in which crimes are committed without 
consequences and in some cases the police are implicated in 
criminal activity. 
 
¶D. (S) The host country intelligence service (Service 
Nationale de Renseignement (SNR)) may be capable of deterring 
transnational terrorist activity. However, the SNR focuses 
its efforts more on influencing national politics in favor of 
the ruling party rather than on monitoring potential external 
threats. It is additionally burdened by issues similar to 
those confronting the National Police. The SNR is are 
allegedly behind assassinations of local businessmen, 
opponents of the ruling party and other persons. 
 
¶E. (S) Host country intelligence services have been 
cooperative in the past on those rare occasions when the 
Embassy has had to ask for assistance.  In general, however, 
rumors that those at the head of the SNR are deeply involved 
in extra-judicial actions including assassination, detentions 
and intimidation cause the Embassy to limit its interaction 
with the intelligence service. 
 
¶F. (S) Burundi was specifically threatened by Somalia-based 
terror groups for its participation in the African Union,s 
peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Although Post is 
unaware of any major GoB anti-terrorism successes, they have 
vigorously pursued investigations into individuals or events 
suspected of being linked to terror when prodded by the 
international community. 
 
¶G. (S) The host country is generally responsive to U.S. 
requests to provide additional police forces for protective 
security functions. Our requests are limited to providing a 
few extra police for large social occasions and occasional 
protective motorcades. Post does not utilize local police as 
bodyguards. 
 
¶H. (S) Post assesses the overall security of Bujumbura,s 
International Airport as good/average.  Airport security has 
improved significantly over the past year. The international 
airport complies with international standards. In the event 
of conflict the UN mission currently in Burundi would augment 
security at the airport and on the road leading to the 
airport. Should the security environment deteriorate, small 
arms fire from FNL forces directed against commercial 
passenger and cargo aircraft is likely. 
 
¶I. (S) Burundian customs officials and immigration agencies 
are generally thought to be ineffective and corrupt. It is 
easy to obtain fraudulent Burundian or regional identity 
documents and passports. The Bujumbura international airport 
is considered to be the easiest place regionally to pass 
fraudulent documents en route to Europe. The airlines have 
recently employed contractors who scrutinize travel documents 
and as a result security has tightened significantly. 
 
¶J. (S) Border patrol forces are ineffective.  Burundi's 
borders are porous. The border police typically exercise 
control only at official entry and exit points. Uncontrolled 
foot and waterborne traffic from neighboring countries is 
commonplace. Border security has improved in response to 
specific terror threats against the GoB, and consequently 
some individuals have recently been detained attempting to 
cross the border illegally. 
 
----------------------- 
INDIGENOUS TERRORISM 
----------------------- 
 
¶I. (SBU) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS 
 
¶A. (SBU) There are no indigenous anti-American terrorist 
groups in Burundi. The FNL is a Hutu-dominated rebel group 
which could conceivably harbor a grievance against the U.S. 
for its support of the Tutsi-led government in neighboring 
Rwanda; at this time there is no indication that this is the 
case. 
 
¶B. There have been no attacks against American targets in 
Burundi. 
 
¶C. There have been no attacks against American targets in 
Burundi. 
 
¶D. There have been no attacks against American targets in 
Burundi. 
 
¶E. There have been no attacks against American targets in 
Burundi. 
 
¶F. There have been no attacks against American targets in 
Burundi. 
 
¶G. There are no indigenous anti-American terrorist groups in 
Burundi. 
 
II. (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS 
 
¶A. (SBU) The FNL (formerly PALIPEHUTU-FNL) is the only 
indigenous group being tracked by Post that might be 
considered a terrorist organization. The government of 
Burundi informally considers the FNL a terrorist group, and 
has used the threat of formally labeling as such as leverage 
during ongoing peace negotiations. At present, the FNL is 
generally considered a &negative force,8 and not a 
terrorist group. 
 
¶B. (SBU) In April 2008 the FNL used small arms and mortars to 
stage simultaneous small unit attacks on police and military 
positions. These attacks took place within two km of Embassy 
housing. A few days later the FNL fired three 130 mm rockets 
into the city. One of the rounds landed within 400 m of two 
Embassy residences, another rocket landed within 400 m of a 
separate Embassy residence. Embassy residences were not the 
target of the attacks, but their relative proximity to 
high-profile targets and the gross inaccuracy of the rockets 
put the properties in the line of fire. 
 
¶C. (SBU) The April attacks were indiscriminate and lethal; 
over 100 people were killed. 
 
¶D. (SBU) To date, Americans have not been killed or injured 
in FNL attacks. 
 
-------------------------- 
 TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM 
-------------------------- 
 
¶I. (S/NF) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS 
 
¶A. (S/NF) In 2008, the GoB received specific threats against 
the government and president of Burundi from the 
Somalia-based terror group Al-Shabaab for the country's 
support of the AMISOM mission. In September 2006 Post became 
aware of surveillance being conducted on our facilities by 
Al-Ittihad Al-Islami, an East Africa-oriented 
Al-Qaeda-affiliated group (reftel B and C). The size and 
activities of these groups in Burundi are unknown. 
 
¶B. (S/NF) Al-Shabaab is an operational organization that has 
threatened to attack in Burundi. Post believes that 
AL-Shabaab lacks the resources to stage an attack in Burundi 
at this time.  The group has carried out lethal attacks on 
Burundian troops in Somalia and will likely continue to focus 
their efforts there. Post assesses Al-Ittihad Al-Islami as an 
operational group limited in its activities and potential at 
this time. 
 
¶C. (S/NF) The GoB is not sympathetic to extremist Islamist 
ideology. It is possible that the GoB is unaware that an 
Islamist terrorist group is operating in Burundi due to the 
GoB,s limited control of its borders and investigative 
capabilities. 
 
¶D. (S/NF) It is unknown whether any NGOs operating in Burundi 
are affiliated with this group. Most NGOs operating in 
Burundi are affiliated with western nations. The activities 
or presence of Muslim or Middle Eastern NGOs is unknown, but 
not estimated to be significant. If there are Middle Eastern 
NGOs operating in Burundi it is possible that they could have 
a relationship with these groups. 
 
¶E. (S/NF) As noted in paragraph 2A, there is a Muslim 
minority active in Burundi. This minority is largely 
comprised of Indian and Pakistani expatriates. There are also 
some Sudanese and East African Muslims. The radical Islamic 
ideology of an Islamic terrorist group is not likely to 
appeal to the small moderate Muslim community here. 
 
¶F. (S/NF) Post assesses the level, intent and scope of 
hostile intelligence services in-country to be low. Hostile 
intelligence services are not particularly active in Burundi. 
However, Post has noted surveillance of official U.S. 
facilities perpetrated by apparent Chinese nationals on 
several occasions.  Within the government of Burundi, there 
are those who have links to Muslim countries in the Middle 
East, in particular to the former head of the CNDD-FDD 
political party Hussein Radjabu. It is unknown whether he has 
established a relationship with the intelligence services of 
these nations. Post has no direct information to indicate 
that a relationship between Burundi's intelligence services 
and those of Sudan has been established, but high ranking 
officials in the SNR admit that lack of contact with western 
nations may drive them to seek other partners. Considering 
the relationship between the two countries, it would be 
unwise to rule out such a relationship after high-level 
meetings between the presidents of Burundi and Sudan.  In 
November of 2008 a discreet Iranian delegation met with the 
president of Burundi in Bujumbura. Reports suggest that the 
delegation was soliciting votes against an anti-Iranian 
resolution in the UN Security Council but what the GoB was 
offered for its support is unknown. 
 
¶G. (S/NF) Weapons and explosives are readily available in 
Burundi. The Burundian military and police do not adequately 
secure their weapons and ammunition, and rampant corruption 
means official weapons and ammunition are often used by 
criminals. The possibility that a terrorist group could 
obtain Burundian military and police weapons and explosives 
using overt or covert means is high. In late July 2008, a 
soldier working at a logistics base in Musaga attempted to 
sell 40 RPG-7 rockets and 600,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition 
to the FNL. Burundi's porous borders provide an opportunity 
for weapons and explosives to be smuggled undetected from 
neighboring countries, including eastern neighbor Democratic 
Republic of Congo. The surrounding region is host to a 
vibrant black market in small arms and grenades, and weapons 
of this type are always available at low cost. Grenades and 
automatic weapons are in common use by criminals for crimes 
as petty as cell phone theft; it would be quite simple for a 
terrorist element to acquire a significant arsenal. 
 
¶2. (U) Point of contact is RSO Christopher A. Bakken (257) 
22-207-000 x7305 
 
 
Wagner