VZCZCXYZ0010
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBU #0376/01 0902221
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 312221Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3443
INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 000376 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019 
TAGS: PGOV SNAR ASEC PREL MASS EAID AR
SUBJECT: NEW GOVERNMENT PLAN REFLECTS GROWING IMPORTANCE OF 
CITIZEN SECURITY ISSUE TO ARGENTINES 
 
REF: BUENOS AIRES 102 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Wayne for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: President Fernandez de Kirchner announced 
a new public security plan on March 27 to respond to rising 
public concerns about crime.  The plan is focused on the 
provinces of Buenos Aires and Mendoza and includes promises 
of 4,000 new police to patrol the streets, a redeployment of 
gendarmerie (frontier guard) forces, and substantial 
purchases of equipment such as vehicles and public video 
cameras.  The announcement received some positive press as a 
belated but necessary response to a perceived rise in 
criminality, but also drew complaints for a lack of strategic 
focus.  Minister of Justice and Security Anibal Fernandez had 
to clarify the next day that, although the plan envisioned 
hiring of retired as well as previously dismissed police, 
only those who had been dismissed for minor infractions would 
be considered for reinstatement.  The new measures probably 
reflect pressures from Kirchner allies in the provinces that 
the government needs to act on public security concerns, 
especially given Congressional elections in June.  The is the 
first major response by the federal government to these 
public concerns.  The new measures may also signal an 
opportunity for greater U.S. engagement as well, as they open 
the door wider to cooperation with partners on law 
enforcement and public security issues.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Against the backdrop of mid-term congressional 
elections June 28 and polling showing crime and security as 
the top public concern, President Cristina Fernandez de 
Kirchner (CFK) on March 27 announced a security initiative 
focused on the Provinces of Buenos Aires and Mendoza (plan 
"Convivencia Ciudadana").  The Plan calls for an expenditure 
of 400 million pesos (USD 108 million) and the hiring of up 
to 4,000 retired police, the redeployment of 1,500 
gendarmerie (frontier guard) to troubled urban and peri-urban 
areas, the purchase of 500 patrol cars, and the installation 
of 5,000 security cameras. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In announcing the plan, CFK acknowledged the 
legitimacy of public concerns about crime but also took a 
stab at the media for fanning public fears.  She suggested 
that those who have traveled to other large cities in the 
world would know that the media abroad covered crime 
differently than in Argentina, where a single case of rape or 
murder or kidnapping was covered incessantly on television 
"from morning until night," leaving the impression that there 
had been "350 crimes rather than one or two."  She urged 
people not to "sensationalize" but to "search for solutions." 
 President Fernandez de Kirchner also shared her views on the 
socio-economic sources of criminality, noting that 
unemployment and wealth disparities fed crime.  This, she 
said, meant that any plan for public security must also 
encompass "a model for economic development and income 
redistribution." 
 
¶4. (SBU) Two elements in CFK's announcement drew immediate 
questions.  The first was a line suggesting that former 
military officers would be considered for law enforcement 
jobs.  Human rights groups questioned the wisdom and 
constitutionality of the step, and it was quickly retracted 
by Casa Rosada sources as an error.  The second issue 
revolved around announced plans to fill 4,000 new police 
positions in the two provinces with retired police officers 
but also some dismissed for cause.  Questioned about the 
suitability of hiring dismissed officers, Justice Minister 
Fernandez clarified that only those dismissed for minor 
infractions would be considered for reinstatement. 
 
Another Ad Hoc Response? 
------------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) Experts and opposition politicians reacted with a 
number of criticisms to the President's "plan," while fervent 
Kirchner supporters have mostly downplayed the security issue 
rather than address this response.  One independent Peronist, 
Paola Spatola of the "Guardia Peronista," said rehiring 
dismissed officers would be "a mistake."  Opposition 
politician Eugenio Burzaco of Buenos Aires-based center-right 
PRO also questioned the hiring of dismissed police, and 
described the overall plan as little more than a bandage. 
Norberto Quantin, who had played a planning role on security 
issues for President Nestor Kirchner, criticized the 
 
government's decision to announce the resource side of their 
plan without a larger strategic vision; he described the 
government response as "incoherent," suggesting it was 
motivated primarily by "electoral" considerations. 
Left-of-center daily "Critica" wryly noted similarities 
between the 2009 plan and one announced in 2004 by former 
President Nestor Kirchner, a plan for new police and patrol 
cars that it said had gone largely unimplemented.  It dubbed 
the plan after Susana Jimenez, the country's popular 
talk-show host, who has made a significant issue out of 
citizen security.  Critica also noted that law enforcement 
agencies, including the Police and Gendarmerie, had received 
budget cuts in recent days just as the supplemental plan was 
being announced. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Local security analyst Marcela Donadio of the 
think-tank SER 2000 told Poloff March 30 that the initiative 
simply did not constitute a "plan," because it addressed only 
resources without much thought about how they would be used. 
The real "force of the plan," she said, was the redeployment 
of more gendarmerie to help with crime patrols in Buenos 
Aires.  This was the only law enforcement force in Argentina 
that maintained its prestige in the eyes of the public. 
 
¶7. (C) Gendarmerie Commanding General Hector Schenone 
confided to ICE Country Attache his concern about finding the 
personnel to fulfill the Casa Rosada's mandate, asking "where 
am I going to pull so many men from?"  He told the Ambassador 
that they would do their best to deploy but that the task was 
immense.  Unnamed Gendarmerie sources quoted in "Perfil," an 
independent newspaper critical of the Kirchners, went so far 
as to say that the redeployments from border-policing would 
leave Argentina open to drug-trafficking across the northern 
border, a concern that Schenone did not raise.  Asked about 
this particular concern, analyst Donadio suggested the 
Gendarmerie would be more likely to take men from 
infrastructure protection roles than from the borders. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment: The critics of the GOA's security plan 
undoubtedly make many telling points.  The plan appears to 
have been launched without a great deal of strategic 
thinking, at least as presented to the public.  A close aide 
to Buenos Aires Governor Daniel Scioli told the Ambassador 
that Scioli had pressed the Kirchners very hard to get the 
assistance as his public in the BA suburbs was increasingly 
upset and critical because of the increase in crime, much of 
it perceived to be drug related.  Scioli and others also 
apparently argued that without action on public security in 
BA Province, the government could not expect to do well in 
June Congressional elections, and BA Province is where the 
Kirchners need to win. 
 
¶9. (C) Whatever the motivations, the fundamental recognition 
by the government of a crime problem and its announced 
intention to apply more law enforcement resources to securing 
the environs of greater Buenos Aires represents a step 
forward.  The government realizes that this issue has 
political resonance and that it needs to be seen making 
progress, in areas from violent crimes to narcotics 
trafficking to trafficking in persons. 
 
¶10. (C) The new measures, and the public mood that they 
reflect, also would seem to open the door wider to 
cooperation with partners on law enforcement, anti-narcotics, 
public security and justice issues, including with the United 
States.  While our engagement needs to be relatively cautious 
in the run-up to the June elections, we should take the 
opportunity now to begin exploring possibilities for 
collaboration in public security, including via regional 
initiatives.  This is an issue that matters to Argentines of 
every class and background. 
WAYNE