VZCZCXYZ0008
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBU #0375/01 0902148
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 312148Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3439
INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1947
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1322
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 1145
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 000375 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019 
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS PGOV AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: DEFENSE MINISTRY REQUESTS THAT U.S. 
MILITARY GROUP VACATE OFFICES IN DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS IS 
LEAKED TO PRESS 
 
REF: A. CRAIG-FRIEDMAN/BURNETT EMAIL 3/27/2009 
     ¶B. WAYNE-MCMULLEN EMAIL 3/31/2009 
     ¶C. IIR 6 804 0221 09 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Wayne for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Argentine daily finance and business paper 
"Ambito Financiero" released a relatively accurate story 
March 31 that the Ministry of Defense had requested the U.S. 
Military Group vacate its offices in the Argentine MOD 
headquarters, "Edificio Libertador," within 45 days.  That 
request, sent to the head of the Embassy's Military Group 
March 20 in a letter from MOD Secretary for International 
Affairs Alfredo Forti, cited the Ministry's need for the 
office space; it did not directly address the GOA's 
continuing obligations to provide office space under our 1964 
bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement.  As of March 30, 
prior to the leaked story, Embassy had prepared and cleared 
with Washington and Southcom a response to Minister of 
Defense Garre from the Ambassador declining to concur with 
the eviction and invoking the bilateral agreement's 
requirement that we negotiate a mutually agreed solution 
under the agreement.  On March 31 we moved forward with that 
response, which offers talks on the issue at the next Defense 
Bilateral Working Group planned for May/June 2009, after 
adding a line regretting the press report. 
 
¶2. (C) Prior to the leak, we had been in touch with the MFA 
(which is the Argentine signatory of the 1964 agreement) via 
Minister Taiana's Chief of Staff Alberto D'Alotto.  DCM 
apprised him of the MOD request and gave our interpretation 
of Argentina's obligations on March 26.  After the leak on 
March 31, Ambassador spoke with Argentina's Ambassador to the 
U.S. Hector Timerman (in London, preparing for President 
Kirchner's G20 participation).  Timerman acknowledged both 
the seriousness of the move and the unfortunate timing given 
upcoming participation by both presidents in the G-20 Summit 
Meeting and the Summit of the Americas.  He said he would 
communicate with Foreign Minister Taiana.  On March 31, DCM 
again spoke with D'Alotto and also passed Embassy's non-paper 
on the issue to a member of Presidential Chief of Cabinet 
Sergio Massa's staff.  End Summary. 
 
Long Percolating Issue Bursts into Public View 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶3. (C) Military Group and Defense Attache contacts in the 
Argentine Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces have for over 
nine months advised us privately that MOD Nilda Garre wanted 
the U.S. Military Group to vacate offices in the MOD 
headquarters, Edificio Libertador, as well as possibly the 
cooperation offices we utilize in the headquarters of the 
Navy, Army and Air Force.  Garre, said MOD officials, was 
concerned that the United States was perceived to have 
unequal access to GOA facilities and that the GOA would be 
unable to grant such office space to other government 
militaries should they request it.  MOD advisors (protect) 
had also privately told us that Garre was deeply influenced 
by the statements of Ecuadorian President Correa and other 
GOE officials who claimed in 2008 they were not fully briefed 
on the extent of U.S. military and intelligence cooperation 
"and cohabitation" with their own officers.  They said they 
thought she was concerned about the risk to her and the GOA 
of similar embarrassment if anyone were to question the 
special arrangement for housing U.S. military.  In the March 
20 letter from MOD Secretary for International Affairs 
Alfredo Forti to the leader of the Military Group in the 
Embassy, however, the only justification given was that the 
MOD needed the space for its own purposes (Note: The letter 
also asks that we vacate offices in the three service 
headquarters, which are not pressed for space.  End Note.) 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) In previous discussions and at a December 2008 
Defense Bilateral Working Group, Military Group, DAO, and 
Embassy Officers have emphasized that: 
 
-- the GOA-provided office space is an explicit obligation 
under the 1964 bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreeent and is 
considered a counter-part contribution to facilitate the flow 
of U.S. military training, support and equipment; 
 
-- no other governments provide training or support on this 
scale and so were unlikely to justify a similar claim to 
 
 
space; 
 
-- the USG had no immediate alternatives to house its 
Military Group offices; and 
 
-- we were amenable to discussions at the next Defense 
Bilateral Working Group (tentatively scheduled for April/May 
2009) that would seek to address the MOD's needs for space 
while sustaining our ability to provide important 
cooperation. 
 
¶5. (SBU) We have also emphasized the broad range of 
education, training and other support we provide to the 
Argentine MOD and armed forces, including fuel, lodging, and 
transportation for Argentine participation in a variety of 
hemispheric and regional exercises, as well as support for an 
MOD priority, defense logistics reform.  Overall, the core 
program is USD 2 million, with another USD 1-2 million in 
exercise-related support.  Since 2004, we have provided USD 
14 million in military assistance. 
 
¶6. (C) At a dinner with Political Counselor and Pol-Mil 
Officer on March 19, Vice Defense Minister for Military 
Affairs German Montenegro (protect) and senior staff member 
Nicolas Dapena (protect) said that the Forti letter was 
imminent.  They urged us not to view the request that MilGrp 
vacate as any sort of signal about the bilateral or 
military-to-military relationship, describing the requested 
eviction as the culmination of a single issue that had clear 
personal importance to the Minister.  Political Counselor 
noted that the timing would nonetheless be problematic and 
that our understanding of the Defense Cooperation Agreement 
was that Argentina had certain obligations.  (Note: 
Montenegro and Dapena acknowledged rumors that Garre might be 
called upon to run for Congress for the pro-Kirchner slate in 
June 28, 2009, mid-term elections, but said she could hold 
office through the campaign.  End Note.) 
 
Engaging the Government 
----------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Following the receipt of Forti's letter, Embassy began 
immediate work on a response to send directly to Garre with a 
copy to the MFA, whom we suspect was not informed of the 
MOD's decision to request a change to the 1964 agreement.  By 
formally noting our lack of concurrence with the request to 
vacate, we intend to invoke the agreement and formal 
discussions it appears to require.  DCM also spoke with MFA 
Chief of Staff Alberto D'Alotto to inform him of the issue 
and on March 26 shared with him a non-paper giving background 
on the issue. 
 
¶8. (C) On March 31, following publication of the story, DCM 
shared Embassy non-paper on the issues with Jorge O'Reilly, a 
member of Chief of Cabinet Sergio Massa's staff, on the 
understanding he would forward it to Massa and other 
colleagues in the Casa Rosada.  DCM also conferred by phone 
with MFA Cabinet Chief D'Alotto.  Ambassador phoned Argentine 
Ambassador to the United States Hector Timerman, in London 
preparing for CFK's participation in the G20.  Timerman said 
he understood the seriousness of the issue as well as the 
poor timing on the eve of President CFK's first encounter 
with President Obama.  He promised to speak directly to 
Foreign Minister Taiana about the matter.  Political 
Counselor shared our non-paper with the North America Desk at 
the MFA and with Vice Defense Minister Montenegro. 
 
The Leak and Our Public Response 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) On March 31, reporter Edgardo Aguilera reported in 
financial and economic newspaper "Ambito Financiero" that the 
Military Group had been given 45 days to vacate.  Although it 
contained a few erroneous details, the report is largely 
accurate and appears to be based on MOD sources.  As such, we 
have revised the Ambassador's letter to Garre to include 
regret that the issue has gone public.  Aguilera writes that 
the GOA move is odd in the wake of the positive meeting in 
Chile between President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK) 
and U.S. Vice President Biden.  He notes that "there is a 
certain duality in the messages the government is sending to 
the Obama Administration."  A local radio network has 
reported the story with a pro-U.S. angle as well, questioning 
the wisdom of restricting military-to-military cooperation. 
 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) Aguilera's story goes on to speculate on whether 
the move presages a cut-off in military ties.  Infobae, an 
Argentine wire service, picked up the story but added 
incorrectly that the Defense Cooperation Agreement dates from 
the "1970s."  Because this might imply it was established 
under the military dictatorship (1977-1983), we have reached 
out to Infobae and had that fact corrected to reflect that 
the agreement dates from 1964, when Argentina was ruled by 
the democratically elected government headed by civilian 
president Arturo Illia.  Embassy press guidance will avoid 
any discussion of the MOD request but will note on background 
that the U.S. presence stems from a bilateral agreement 
signed by the Embassy and the Foreign Ministry in 1964. 
 
Letter of the Agreement 
----------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) In a non-paper provided to the MFA on March 26 and 
to the Chief of Cabinet's office on March 31, Embassy 
underscored that the bilateral agreement in Article II 
recognizes the need for personnel to implement cooperation 
and establishes that "such personnel shall be granted 
reasonable facilities and services, including office space, 
custodial services, and suitable motor transportation, 
necessary to enable them to perform their duties."  Although 
we let go of the chauffer-driven cars provided to our service 
representatives, we continue to fully utilize the office 
space at Edificio Libertador and at the three service 
headquarters.  Our presence in the service headquarters in 
fact pre-dates the agreement by many years, including a 
continuous presence at navy headquarters since the early 
1930s. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Under Article III, the agreement says that "the two 
Governments will consult concerning any matter relating to an 
amendment or change considered desirable in this agreement as 
a result of its application."  Given this clause, our 
response to Garre notes that the Embassy cannot concur in the 
proposed change, offers to discuss the matter at the Defense 
Bilateral Working Group, and notes that we will share our 
views with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (letter shared 
with WHA/BSC and PM per ref a). 
 
Other Issues 
------------ 
 
¶13. (C) The eviction challenge coincides with two other 
high-profile issues in discussion with the MOD.  First, on 
March 18, Secretary Forti convoked Military Group Commander 
to request information on participation in WHINSEC courses by 
members of the Gendarmerie (border patrol) and Prefectura 
(coast guard), services which fall under the authority of the 
Minister of Justice.  Military Group Commander declined to 
offer this information on another branch of the Government of 
Argentina.  The request appears to flow both from service 
rivalry and from Minister Garre's known hostility toward 
participation in WHINSEC. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Second, and somewhat incongruously, the eviction 
coincides with Minister Garre's personal request for Military 
Group and Embassy facilitation of an expedited purchase of a 
helicopter for the presidency under the FMS program.  Garre 
personally called the Ambassador on March 23 to discuss the 
transfer and to seek his assurances that we were doing 
everything possible to ensure rapid delivery.  The official 
offer for this sale is being delivered to the MOD today, 
marking an extremely rapid response for this type of request. 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶15. (C) We tend to agree with the private assurances of MOD 
officials that there was no meaning to the timing of the 
eviction notice and that the step is not intended to start a 
more general downgrading of military-to-military relations. 
It appears to represent Garre pushing forward on an issue 
that has been a personal irritant to her for some time, 
perhaps even with the intention of resolving it to her liking 
before leaving office in the short-term.  Nonetheless, 
reversing a U.S. presence dating back over seventy years and 
potentially complicating a healthy and mutually-beneficial 
military cooperation relationship is no small step, and we 
 
 
are urging officials throughout the GOA to (re)consider it in 
that context.  Moreover, with our lack of consent affirmed, 
the GOA appears to have no immediate basis for implementing 
its delineated 45-day timeline.  We will press both the MOD 
and MFA strongly that absent bilateral talks under the 
agreement or an abrogation of the agreement (a step which 
requires a six month notice), our intention will be to remain 
in the GOA-provided offices. 
 
Action Request 
-------------- 
 
¶16. (C) Military cooperation has been a mainstay of our 
bilateral relationship, even during difficult periods under 
the Kirchners.  We encourage Department to include this among 
priority issues for the Secretary to raise with Foreign 
Minister Taiana when they meet on April 7.  Ideally, we would 
like the GOA to reverse this decision entirely and recognize 
the mutual advantages of the Military Group presence.  At a 
minimum, Argentina needs to adhere to the 1964 Defense 
Cooperation Agreement and accept bilateral talks toward 
resolving the issue in a manner acceptable to both 
governments. 
WAYNE