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FM AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
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RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0016
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RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 1579

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRAZZAVILLE 000080 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM CF
SUBJECT: EU/USA/UNDP MEET WITH MINISTER IN CHARGE OF ELECTIONS: 
STATE OF PREPARATIONS 
 
BRAZZAVILL 00000080  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  On March 17, at the initiative of the 
European Union, the EU (commission and presidency (Belgium) plus 
the resident chiefs of mission of France and Italy), the UNDP 
resrep/resident coordinator, and the U.S. Ambassador met with 
Minister of Territorial Administration Raymond Mboulou and a 
large team including the National Elections Commission (CONEL) 
head and the Director General of Electoral Affairs (DGAE) from 
the Ministry.   The meeting was an opportunity to pose questions 
in a semi-public format to those who are charged with organizing 
the July 5 Presidential elections.  Though they project 
confidence about the technical details of the process, there are 
significant political, technical, and timing hurdles ahead if 
Congo is to have a relatively successful election this year. 
This cable is both a report of the meeting and a discussion of 
the technical state of preparations.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (SBU) BACKGROUND:  The role of external donors in Congo's 
presidential election this year is yet to be determined, but is 
likely to be very small.  In mid-December, the U.N. organized a 
headquarters mission to assess and propose a possible U.N. 
program of assistance, resulting in a proposal estimated to cost 
$2.5 million to provide four technical advisors and material 
support for the election period, largely devoted to advising the 
DGAE and CONEL and training and supplying Congolese NGOs 
interested in participating in civic education and verification. 
 However, according to UNDP, the proposal is not yet funded.  We 
understand that a proposal by the European Commission office 
here for EU funding for a similar effort was not immediately 
approved and was somewhat controversial in Brussels; current 
indications from the EU commission office here are that Brussels 
is considering a contribution of 500,000 Euro to the 
UNDP-managed  "basket."  We are not aware of any other bilateral 
funding under consideration at this time, and with the election 
(July 5) just 100 days away, it is doubtful that funds could be 
programmed responsibly. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Under the terms of the Cotonou Agreement, the EU 
conducts a periodic political dialogue with the Congo 
government, and in that context, during a session on March 6, 
the commission, the presidency, and the other member states 
represented here (only/only Belgium, France, and Italy) obtained 
Congolese agreement to a follow-up session on the subject of the 
preparations for the July Presidential election.  They invited 
UNDP, as the prospective manager of the only external support 
forthcoming for the election, and the United States, to 
participate.  The meeting, held on March 17, brought together 
the aforementioned foreign representatives with a large number 
of Congolese officials, including Minister Mboulou, the 
President of the National Elections Commission, and the Director 
General for Electoral Affairs of the Ministry of Territorial 
Administration. 
 
¶4. (SBU) STATE OF PLAY ON ORGANIZING THE ELECTIONS:  The 
heavyweight on the Congo government side is the Ministry of 
Territorial Administration, whose mandate, funding, and 
personnel far outweigh the very much less effective National 
Elections Commission (CONEL).  In fact, it is our assessment 
that CONEL is very much a marginal player.  Its mandate seems to 
be limited to a supervisory role on the actual day of polling, 
with all other matters, including voter identification and 
registration, manning the polling stations, and vote counting 
largely in the hands of the Ministry.  It would not be an 
exaggeration to say that CONEL seems very much to be an 
appendage added to the process as a result of the National 
Conference, with very little authority or funding actually 
exercised.  The government attempts to present an image of CONEL 
as an inclusive and independent electoral commission, as 
required under various international agreements, but it is not. 
It is chaired by a government nominee (a judge), with a first 
vice president from the "presidential majority" (apparently 
specified this way by the national conference), a second vice 
president from "the opposition" (which the government believes 
is the opposition represented in the national legislative 
bodies), and a third vice president from "civil society." 
However, in each case of the three vice presidents, the actual 
appointment to CONEL is made by President Sassou-Nguesso, 
choosing from a list of three offered to him by the constituency 
represented.  Furthermore, in the case of at least two of the 
most viable opposition candidates for this year's election, 
their parties are not represented at all in the national 
legislative bodies. 
 
¶5. (SBU) POLITICAL STATE OF PLAY:  There are now roughly eight 
 
BRAZZAVILL 00000080  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
candidates announced for the July election (and this does not 
include President Denis Sassou-Nguesso, who has not announced 
despite daily press-conferenced appeals to him to do so by 
various unknown parties and miniscule organizations).  We will 
be providing a more detailed look at the candidates in the 
coming weeks, but in this message, suffice to say that none of 
them enjoys national backing nor, indeed, adequate financial 
support to conduct a national campaign.  There is one grouping 
of parties, the "Opposition Headquarters," that has spoken out 
on organizational issues.  In a meeting in February, eighteen 
parties came together to offer comments and resolutions 
regarding the process.  Notably, they urged the government to 
call together the "presidential majority" and the opposition to 
agree to a structure for organizing the elections, and offered 
thirteen suggestions for what ought to be included in such a 
structure, including (a) repealing the existing election law; 
(b) adopting a new law setting up an independent electoral 
commission; (c) dissolving CONEL; (d) annulling the results of 
the December-January revision of voters lists; (e) conducting a 
special administrative census (instead of using the revised 
voter lists); (f) assuring equal access to public media for all 
candidates; (g) respecting free movement of politicians; (h) 
assuring freedom of the press; (i) financing for political 
parties; (i) permitting the return of political self-exiles; (j) 
publication of the 2007 general census; and (k) opening of an 
official internet site on the elections.  They also accused the 
government of padding the voter lists with 500,000 extra voters 
during the ongoing revision exercise.   The "Opposition 
Headquarters" did not offer any program for the future or new 
ideas, aside from the procedural steps listed above. 
 
¶6. (SBU) With the opposition taking at least preliminary steps 
toward adopting a common procedural program, the question of the 
"concertation" between the government side and the opposition 
has been much-commented-upon in the press, both before and since 
the meeting of the "Opposition Headquarters."  Most recently, 
the "Prime Minister," Isidore Mvoua, made a statement falling 
short of a firm commitment from the government side, indicating 
that such a process would take place.  However, no time or venue 
has been proposed, and more importantly Sassou-Nguesso has not 
been heard to endorse the launching of such a 
politically-fraught exercise.  Every day that passes renders it 
less likely that any of the suggestions made by the opposition, 
some which have merit if there to be a reasonably well-conducted 
election here, could be put into effect. 
 
¶7. (SBU) MEETING THE MINISTER:   The meeting March 17 was 
largely devoted to a series of technical questions posed by the 
foreign participants and responses from the Congolese.  In their 
extremely detailed responses, the Congolese said that the next 
stage in the process, which will occur within a few days, will 
be the posting of the revised electoral lists at each polling 
station.  There will be a two-week period during which members 
of the public or representatives of the putative candidates can 
bring errors and omissions (dead/underage/fictitious  voters, 
absence from the lists, for example) to the attention of the 
responsible officials.  They noted that election management had 
been (underline) completely/completely decentralized since the 
2008 legislative elections.   Thus correcting the lists was a 
question for the departmental-level officials who are in charge 
under decentralization.  (COMMENT: Apparently there are 6,000 
polling stations, so any national effort to verify the lists (by 
one or more opposition parties) during a two-week period would 
be a massive and expensive undertaking. End comment.) 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Minister also detailed the local organization of 
the polling stations as a mirror of the organization of CONEL, 
with a presiding officer "representing the State" and assisted 
by representatives of the presidential formation, the 
opposition, and civil society, in addition to several other 
officials with designated functions who will be on hand as well. 
 He said that after a given polling station closes at 6 p.m., 
vote counting will begin immediately and will be open to 
representatives of candidates at the polling station level. 
Results will be posted at the polling station when completed and 
forwarded to the department-level elections committee to be 
consolidated into a report to CONEL.  He noted that UNDP has 
already provided computer hardware, software, and training to 
each of the department level election committees. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Addressing another political question, the resignation 
of the "second vice president" (i.e. from the opposition) from 
CONEL, the Minister washed his hands of it by saying that he had 
 
BRAZZAVILL 00000080  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
discussed the need for a slate of three names with the leader of 
the opposition formation in the National Assembly and could do 
no more until the three names were put forward.  He noted that 
the largest opposition party, the UPADS, has three factions, 
each of which will probably present a candidate, and two of the 
factions are represented in the Assembly. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The UNDP resrep made a strong statement in support of 
the "concertation" between ruling group and opposition and noted 
that UNDP had been designated by donor countries to assure 
coordination of external support.  The Minister responded that 
the door was open, but on the government side he emphasized 
firmly that it was Prime Minister Mvouba who was in charge.  He 
also noted that the central financial authorities had made 
available one-quarter of the envisaged political party funding 
for the Presidential election, which would be allocated in 
accordance with the criteria established in the electoral law, 
perhaps in about a month.  The minister emphasized as well that 
the election would be held on July 5.  This was necessary, he 
said, because the President's term expires on August 14 (also 
Congo's national day), and there is a mandatory time delay 
established by law between the publication of the results and 
the inauguration of the elected President. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Wrapping up, the EU representative made a pitch for 
the concertation to include the adoption of a code of good 
conduct by the competing parties in the runup to the election. 
The Minister acknowledged that he had received a draft of such 
an agreement provided by the EU's experts and that this 
document, along with an actual example from Benin, was under 
review.  He made no commitment regarding the code of conduct. 
He then tweaked the Americans for not having made any 
commitments to support the elections (though, in the absence of 
any funding, we have done some low- or no-cost work with NGOs) 
and asked whether, in light of the American experience in 
absentee/advance voting, we thought it would be a good idea to 
have the security forces (army, police, gendarmes) vote in 
advance of the general population so that they would be able to 
give their full attention to security on July 5.  The Ambassador 
said that in the U.S., the military's votes were considered in 
terms of their duties as citizens.  He cautioned the Minister to 
look at the political impact of having those under military 
discipline be ordered to vote on a particular day, and on a day 
when civilian citizens did not have the opportunity themselves 
to vote, lest it be regarded as an effort to maximize turnout by 
a group of Congolese who might have a particular vote in mind. 
(Comment:  This was a lead balloon for the Minister - he does 
not like to have his ideas called into question, and was clearly 
looking for a ringing endorsement.  End comment.)  The minister 
concluded with a surprise announcement that the government had 
decided to drop the fees for the issuance of national identity 
cards and that he would be going to the press later in the day 
to ask all citizens to obtain their free cards to facilitate 
their participation in the Presidential election. 
 
¶12. (SBU) COMMENT:  Taken at face value, the comments of these 
Congolese officials portray a sincere desire to have a decent 
election.  But stripping away all the official reasons why 
something is being done a particular way or why it can't be done 
another way, it is clear that so far, the organizers of the 
election are proceeding in their own way without any 
accommodation of the views of the outside-government political 
class.  None of the concerns of the opposition have been 
addressed, and there is so far no dialogue under way between the 
presidential "majority" and the opposition.  It is thus 
overwhelmingly clear that the government, beholden to those in 
power, holds all the cards in this election and does not intend 
to shuffle them. 
 
¶13. (SBU) COMMENT CONTINUED:  The impending presidential 
election has also introduced an element of unease and 
apprehension about security into the body politic here, given 
that Congolese history shows a correlation between elections and 
violence, particularly in 1997.  We are hearing of many 
Brazzaville residents, both Congolese and foreign, who are 
scheduling their annual leave for late June-July, not because 
they necessarily expect unrest but because of this history, and 
many dependents of European diplomatic missions have been 
quietly encouraged to take a break during the campaign period 
and the weeks after the election.   END COMMENT. 
EASTHAM