VZCZCXRO5612
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0402 0902100
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 312100Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3973
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7477
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4907
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6167
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4371
RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 1694
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 6864
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4176
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 2149
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7724
RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 1794
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 2728
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0908
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9333
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7528
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3827
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//SCJ2-I/J5/HSE/DIA REP//
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000402 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019 
TAGS: PREL SNAR MOPS MARR XR BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S DEFENSE MINISTER PURSUING REGIONAL 
COUNTERDRUG COOPERATION 
 
REF: BRASILIA 388 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, Reason 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) In a discussion with Ambassador Sobel March 28, 
Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim (protect) said he 
knew of President Lula's offer to President Obama during 
their March 14 meeting to look for ways that the region could 
work with the United States on counterdrug issues, possibly 
through the South American Defense Council (SADC) of the 
Union of South American Nations (UNASUL).  He said that the 
SADC might be the perfect way to get other countries to 
engage their militaries in the fight against drug 
trafficking.  Jobim intends to work the SADC possibility 
directly with Brazilian presidency (not through the Ministry 
of External Relations) and plans to speak to President Lula 
about the matter in the next couple of weeks. 
 
¶2. (C) Jobim told the Ambassador that he is committed to 
getting the military involved in fighting crime on Brazil's 
borders, where the military has legal authority to act on 
criminal matters within a 150-kilometer strip.  The Federal 
Police (DPF) is not up to the task alone, he said.  Jobim 
mentioned his particular concern with regard to the presence 
of Colombian and Mexican drug cartels.  He noted that he has 
a good relationship with his Bolivian counterpart already, 
adding that Lula has asked him to go to Mexico, at Calderon's 
request, to talk about cooperation on counterdrug/public 
security issues. 
 
¶3. (C) Comment: Brazil has generally been hesitant to involve 
the military in counter-crime efforts, both because of the 
military history here and because of concern that it might 
lead to corruption in the military.  Although the latter 
concern is legitimate and would need to be carefully 
monitored, Jobim's plan to engage the military signals a 
major step forward in Brazil's thinking about both the 
severity of transnational crime, and drug trafficking in 
particular, and how to address it.  The issue remains highly 
sensitive, both within the government and among the Brazilian 
public.  Moreover, Jobim's intention to work around 
MRE--which reflects the fact that MRE has not been a central 
player in crafting the GOB approach to military 
cooperation--adds a significant bureaucratic sensitivity to 
the already difficult task of uniting South America in this 
cause.  (Note: In a similar vein, a senior presidency foreign 
policy adviser commented just a week earlier that the 
presidency, rather than MRE, is the principal manager of 
South America policy.  See reftel.) As we engage Brazil on 
regional counterdrug efforts, it will be important to take 
these sensitivities into account. 
SOBEL