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FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2584
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 000527 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID EINV ETRD AO CH KE MI ML MP
RW, SF, SG, TZ, UG, ZA 
SUBJECT: PRC LAUNCHES PR CAMPAIGN IN AFRICA 
 
REF: A. 2008 BEIJING 03996 
     ¶B. BEIJING 286 
     ¶C. BEIJING 288 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson.  Reasons 1. 
4 (b/d). 
 
 SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) President Hu Jintao's February 10-17 trip to Africa 
capped a series of recent high-level visits intended to 
burnish China's image in Africa, according to Chinese and 
African contacts in Beijing.  Our contacts contend that China 
is doing a great deal to assist Africa.  At the same time, 
they acknowledge that China's image in Africa has suffered 
from the business practices of some Chinese firms and China's 
limited engagement with African civil society.  China's 
recent PR offensive in Africa suggests the government is 
increasingly aware of its image problem and determined to 
demonstrate China's interests in Africa go beyond extracting 
natural resources and profits.  Scholarships to African 
students and the establishment of Confucius Institutes are 
two tools of "soft power" increasingly used by China to 
improve its image in Africa.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) In recent weeks, PolOff and EconOff discussed China's 
engagement with Africa with a number of Chinese scholars and 
African diplomats and students living in Beijing, including 
Ministry of State Security-affiliated China Institutes of 
Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) Institute of 
Asia and Africa Studies scholars Zeng Qiang and Xu Weizhong, 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) Africa scholars 
Yang Lihua, Liu Naiya and He Wenping, MFA-affiliated China 
Institute of International Studies (CIIS) scholar Wang 
Hongyi, Rwandan diplomat Emile Rwagasana and African PhD 
students Guillaume Moumouni and Biggest Mundele.  This report 
is based on those discussions, as well Chinese press reports 
on recent high-level visits. 
 
A Flurry of High-Level Visits to Africa 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) President Hu Jintao's February 10-17 trip to Africa 
was the highlight of a flurry of Chinese high-level visits to 
the continent in the first six weeks of 2009.  In addition to 
Hu, who traveled to Mali, Senegal, Tanzania and Mauritius 
(with an earlier stop in Saudi Arabia), Minister of Commerce 
Chen Deming visited Kenya, Angola and Zambia January 12-19. 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi traveled to Rwanda, Uganda, 
South Africa and Malawi January 13-17, continuing an MFA 
tradition of making Africa the destination of the Foreign 
Minister's first overseas trip of the year.  On all of these 
trips, Chinese leaders made a concerted effort to highlight 
China's assistance to Africa.  During his trip, President Hu 
officially opened a malaria prevention center in Mali, 
visited Chinese aid projects in Senegal, attended the 
official opening of a Chinese-constructed national sports 
stadium in Tanzania and visited a Chinese cultural center in 
Mauritius.  At an MFA briefing before Hu's trip, Assistant 
Foreign Minister Zhai Jun stressed that "none of these four 
African countries is rich in energy and resources, which 
clearly shows that China-Africa relations are not only energy 
resources relations." 
 
¶4. (SBU) Although Commerce Minister Chen visited three 
relatively resource-rich countries, he also sought to 
demonstrate that China's engagement with Africa goes beyond 
energy and resources.  In a January 21 interview with Xinhua 
News Agency, Chen offered a number of statistics to highlight 
China's growing assistance to Africa (which will be covered 
in greater detail septel). 
 
¶5. (C) CICIR scholar Zeng Qiang told us these recent 
high-level visits reinforced the image of China as a friend 
and supporter of Africa.  He argued that one advantage China 
enjoyed over the United States was that China has a larger 
number of senior-level officials, including the nine members 
of the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo Standing 
Committee, who make regular visits to Africa to highlight 
China-Africa cooperation.  As an example, he cited China's 
top legislator Wu Bangguo, who visited five African countries 
November 3-14, 2008, his fourth visit to Africa as National 
People's Congress Standing Committee Chairman. 
 
China's State-Run Media Reinforces the Message 
 
BEIJING 00000527  002 OF 004 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶6. (SBU) China's state-run media provided prominent coverage 
of President Hu's Africa trip, reinforcing the government's 
message of Chinese assistance to Africa.  A front-page story 
in China Daily's February 17 edition highlighted Hu's keynote 
speech in Tanzania, where he pledged China would continue to 
increase its aid to Africa despite the global financial 
crisis.  The front-page story of the February 16 state-run 
Global Times hailed Hu's trip as "the first visit of a leader 
of one of the world's great powers to these relatively 
resource-poor African countries since the beginning of the 
global financial crisis, countries that have practically been 
forgotten in the West."  Quoting favorable African media 
coverage, the article said "China will not toss aside its 
African allies during the global economic recession" and 
"considering China's large amount of technical and financial 
assistance provided to Africa, African countries should 
consider China its number one partner."  During the MFA's 
official readout of Hu's trip February 26, African Affairs 
Department  West Africa Division Deputy Director Zhao Yong 
stressed the "traditional friendship" between China and 
Africa rather than the degree of partnership.  In keeping 
with standard party lines, he emphasized the growth of 
"win-win cooperation" and mutual understanding amongst 
developing nations. 
 
Concerns about Chinese Firms' Hurting China's Image 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶7. (C) Many Chinese officials and scholars offer a rosy view 
of China's engagement with Africa, at least in public, 
emphasizing the mutual benefits of China's investment, trade 
and aid.  However, as reported ref C, a number of Chinese 
officials and scholars now acknowledge that China's 
engagement with Africa has not been entirely positive. 
Responding to growing criticism of China's economic 
engagement with Africa, the government encouraged think tanks 
to research and report on this image problem in the months 
leading up to the 2008 Summer Olympics.  Reviews of African 
press and NGOs revealed complaints and criticisms directed at 
Chinese companies (mostly smaller firms new to Africa) for 
exporting low-quality goods to Africa, paying African workers 
low wages, hiring few local workers, and polluting the local 
environment (ref C). 
 
¶8. (C) Chinese scholarly research on China's image in Africa 
presented to the Chinese government helped galvanize 
senior-level attention to the practices of Chinese companies 
in Africa, though CASS scholar Yang Lihua told us that 
China's efforts to improve corporate behavior had begun in 
earnest in 2007, when President Hu pressed Chinese companies 
in Namibia to respect local laws and show greater social 
responsibility.  Corporate social responsibility remained a 
prominent theme of recent high-level visits.  In his February 
16 speech in Tanzania, President Hu encouraged Chinese firms 
operating in Africa "to shoulder more social responsibility 
and forge friendly ties with local communities."  In Mali, he 
stressed that a PRC-financed bridge across the Niger River 
would rely primarily on local labor, employing between 500 
and 1000 local workers.  While visiting a road project in 
Kenya January 14, Commerce Minister Chen said "foreign 
projects are related to our national image and reputation, 
and the contractor shall overcome difficulties with a high 
sense of responsibility and mission." 
 
¶9. (C) Government-supported organizations that promote 
Chinese investment in Africa, such as the China-Africa 
Business Council (CABC) and China-Africa Development Fund 
(CADF), are also making efforts to promote corporate social 
responsibility and ensure investment projects abide by local 
laws and are environmentally sustainable (ref C).  The 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) is also doing its part to 
promote improved Chinese business behavior in Africa.  In 
August 2007, MOFCOM held a seminar that brought together 67 
Chinese companies working in Africa.  According to MOFCOM 
African Affairs Department official Lin Pei, Chinese 
companies at the seminar had signed a document in which they 
committed "to provide quality goods and services, provide 
more local employment opportunities, respect local laws, 
observe internationally recognized business ethics, 
understand and respect local religious beliefs and customs 
and actively participate in philanthropy in the fields of 
education, health and environmental protection."  CASS' Yang 
said the proposal was a step in the right direction but 
lacked an enforcement mechanism.  She predicted China would 
 
BEIJING 00000527  003 OF 004 
 
 
continue to face public relations problems as more and more 
Chinese firms go to Africa.  CIIS scholar Wang Hongyi 
(protect) has recommended that China adopt a foreign 
investment law requiring Chinese companies investing abroad 
to respect local labor laws and protect the environment.  In 
his view, China was the primary beneficiary of its engagement 
with Africa.  He criticized China for repeating the mistakes 
of European colonizers, arguing that China's investment in 
Africa was not benefiting African society enough.  He 
suggested China do more to ensure that its investments in 
Africa improved Africans' living conditions.  However, Wang 
acknowledged that his views were not shared by many 
government officials and, as a result, had not been passed up 
the bureaucratic chain to senior officials. 
 
¶10. (C) Another complaint reported ref C is the tendency for 
some Chinese firms to bring workers from China to carry out 
infrastructure projects, thus depriving African workers of 
job opportunities.  CASS Senior Researcher Liu Naiya has 
advocated for Chinese firms to outsource some of their 
production to African countries where labor costs are lower 
than in China.  Another CASS Africa scholar, He Wenping, said 
Chinese leaders were aware of this issue and noted that some 
companies were already responding.  She cited the examples of 
the China National Petroleum Corporation, which sends large 
numbers of its Sudanese employees to China for training, and 
the China Road and Bridge Company, another big state-owned 
enterprise involved in a range of infrastructure projects in 
Africa.  For their Kenya operations, 95% of their workforce 
is made up of Kenyans.  However, He also pointed out that 
hiring indigenous workers was easier for large state-owned 
enterprises.  Smaller Chinese companies new to Africa that 
base their business models on low-cost bids and fast 
completion times do not have the time, expertise, or 
resources to train local staff, relying instead on Chinese 
technical workers to complete projects quickly and 
efficiently. 
 
Limited Engagement with Civil Society 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) While China generally enjoys strong relations with 
African governments, some Chinese scholars point to China's 
limited engagement with civil society as a weakness in its 
foreign policy.  CICIR scholar Xu Weizhong noted that China 
had succeeded in establishing close ties with high-level 
government officials in Africa but had been much less 
successful in developing ties with African NGOs and civil 
society organizations (CSOs).  He said that he had suggested 
to Chinese officials more contact with NGOs and CSOs as a way 
to improve China's image among ordinary Africans.  Xu said 
some Chinese officials realized the need for China to reach 
out to ordinary Africans, citing the Chinese ambassador's 
participation in the China-Africa Dialogue on Civil Society 
held in Kenya in 2008.  Nevertheless, Xu acknowledged that 
most Chinese officials gave little thought to supporting 
African civil society and few Chinese companies in Africa 
were involved in philanthropic activities.  CASS' He Wenping, 
who participated in the 2008 Dialogue, had a somewhat more 
optimistic view.  She noted that the Dialogue participants 
had publicly called for stand-alone regular civil society 
dialogue, and that with the passage of time there would be a 
trend for this civil society dialogue to feed in to 
China-Africa government-to-government relations.  She was 
certain there would be no civil society engagement in the 
China-Africa ministerial meeting scheduled for November 2009 
in Cairo, but considered it possible that the subsequent 
ministerial in 2012 might include civil society 
representatives. 
 
Scholarships and Confucius Institutes: Soft Power Tools 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶12. (C) One of the tools of China's "soft power" is 
scholarships to African students to study in China.  By the 
end of 2008, more than 20,000 African students had studied in 
China on Chinese government scholarships.  Guillaume Moumouni 
and Biggest Mundele (protect) are two of the approximately 
1200 African students annually who have received full 
scholarships from the Chinese government to study in China. 
Both are PhD students at Peking University, one of China's 
most prestigious universities.  Moumouni, a student from 
Benin who is writing his PhD dissertation on China's policy 
of "non-interference" in Africa, told PolOff that competition 
for the scholarships was intense.  Of the hundreds of 
applicants in Benin, only 23 had been selected.  Mundele, a 
 
BEIJING 00000527  004 OF 004 
 
 
student from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) pursuing 
a PhD in economics, said more than 100 DRC students a year 
received full scholarships to study in China.  The 
scholarships not only covered tuition, airfare, and room and 
board but also included a modest monthly living allowance of 
approximately USD300.  The students lived in a dormitory with 
other graduate students and said they enjoyed good relations 
with their classmates, both Chinese and foreign.  After 
completing their studies, they planned to return to their 
home countries to teach at a university, although both 
acknowledged that their Chinese language skills and 
experience in China could help them land relatively 
well-paying and prestigious positions in government or 
business. 
 
¶13. (C) Not surprisingly, both students have relatively 
positive views of China's engagement with Africa.  Moumouni 
argued that China appealed to African countries as a fellow 
developing country that had not colonized Africa, in contrast 
to Western countries whose legacy of colonial rule in Africa 
continued to color African views of the West.  He said 
African consumers generally had a positive view of China 
because they now enjoyed low-cost consumer goods that 
previously had not been available or had been too expensive. 
The two students acknowledged that some African manufacturers 
saw China as a competitive threat that could put them out of 
business, and workers were critical of China for paying low 
wages, violating labor laws and bringing in Chinese workers 
rather than hiring locals.  However, both defended China's 
investment in Africa as critical for the continent's 
development.  "If China does not invest in DRC's natural 
resources, then who will?" asked Mundele, who said the DRC's 
natural resources would be wasted without Chinese investment. 
 Moumouni said Chinese government scholarships to African 
students had not only improved China's image in Africa but 
had also created a cadre of well-educated, Chinese-speaking 
Africans who have returned to their home countries with 
positive views of China and a familiarity with Chinese 
culture and practices. 
 
¶14. (C) Another tool of China's soft power is 
government-funded Chinese language and cultural institutions 
known as Confucius Institutes.  Beijing-based Rwandan 
diplomat Emile Rwagasana told PolOff that China planned to 
open a Confucius Institute at the Kigali Institute of 
Education in September 2009 (ref B).  In his view, China's 
active promotion of its language and culture was an effective 
way to market itself and improve its image in Africa. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶15. (C) China counts on decades of close political ties with 
African governments and its surge in aid, trade, and 
investment ties with the continent to secure its economic 
interests in access to African natural resources and markets 
and its political interests in a large bloc of countries that 
will support China in international fora.  That said, Beijing 
understands that the inevitable frictions resulting from a 
more intense economic relationship mean it can no longer take 
for granted a positive reputation in Africa.  Beijing will be 
even more sensitive to its image in the run-up to the 
triennial China-Africa ministerial meeting planned for this 
fall in Egypt.  As noted ref C, this image consciousness 
could provide increased motivation for China to pursue 
greater cooperation with African regional organizations, 
NGOs, and other donor nations )- including the United States 
)- in promoting transparency, good governance, sustainable 
development, and long-term stability in Africa. 
PICCUTA