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Viewing cable 09BANGUI68, CAR ELECTIONS OF 2010: A SNEAK PEAK AT THE CANDIDATES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BANGUI68 2009-03-20 13:13 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bangui
VZCZCXRO5416
PP RUEHBZ RUEHGI
DE RUEHGI #0068/01 0791313
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 201313Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGUI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0869
INFO RHMFISS/AFRICOM
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0141
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0244
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0254
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0155
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0103
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0431
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0415
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0409
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1087
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 BANGUI 000068 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C SSARDAR, SLOPEZ, KWYCOFF 
PARIS FOR RKANEDA 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
AFRICOM FOR KOCH 
INR FOR BERTSEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT
SUBJECT: CAR ELECTIONS OF 2010: A SNEAK PEAK AT THE CANDIDATES 
 
REF: 09 BANGUI 22; 09 BANGUI 46; 09 BANGUI 56; 09 BANGUI 60 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The next elections in the CAR are scheduled 
for May 2010.  This report seeks to identify the potential 
candidates.  President Francois Bozize is the frontrunner and is 
likely to win the election, fairly or not, but there are other 
credible candidates and popular discontent is such that the next 
year could be a difficult one for Bozize.  While others may run, 
Post believes that the ten men in this telegram, plus two 
confidantes of the President, are the most credible candidates 
in the upcoming election. END SUMMARY 
 
------------------------------------------- 
BOZIZE: MOSTLY LIKELY, YET STILL NOT A LOCK 
------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) FRANCOIS BOZIZE:  The incumbent since coming to power 
in a March 2003 coup d'etat, Bozize won the 2005 elections as an 
independent candidate.  Obtaining 65 percent of vote cast in a 
runoff that was deemed acceptable by the international 
community, Bozize is the clear front runner for 2010.  Bozize 
does not have a formal political party but counts on the support 
of a political platform, "Kwa Na Kwa" (Work, only Work), and a 
coalition of presidential majority parties.  Post suspects he 
will soon convert this platform into a more traditional 
political party for the forthcoming elections. 
 
Assets: 
 
- Bozize has the advantage of incumbency and the use of 
government logistics, media and provincial officials that go 
along with it. 
 
- He also controls the military and especially the Presidential 
Guard, which while weak, is still the strongest armed force in 
the country. 
 
- Though his relations with the neighbors remain fickle and 
subject to financial chicanery, Bozize does maintain the broad 
support of the international community as Central Africa's 
legitimate ruler. 
 
- Bozize is no stranger to violence and intimidation (09 BANGUI 
22) and has shown a readiness to obtain his will through force, 
something that will be on the minds of his challengers. 
 
- Bozize has benefitted from six years worth of unrelenting 
kleptocracy and has the funds to far outspend any of his 
opponents, both through legitimate means and more unsavory 
methods. 
 
Weaknesses: 
 
- Rebellions in the north of the country are depressing symptoms 
of his inability to control most of the country. 
 
- Newspapers have been clamoring for Bozize to show even a 
modicum of leadership, but he remains fundamentally a reactor to 
events. His unwillingness or inability to develop the economy 
have has a sense of frustration and anger towards Bozize and his 
regime. Can he get ahead of the curve? 
 
- The recent seizures of property from diamonds producers (which 
may have been an element behind the latest new rebellion in the 
northwest (09 BANGUI 46)) have plainly laid bare malfeasance by 
the government.  Though an overall sense of fatalism by Central 
Africans towards their government does exist, there are signs of 
violent discontent with the brazen impunity of the government's 
actions such as the riots in Bangui in March 2009 (09 BANGUI 
60). 
 
- Bozize's position is also being threatened by some of his 
traditional benefactors and this could complicate his efforts 
(09 BANGUI 56). Both Presidents Deby and Qadhafi are suspected 
of trying to destabilize Bozize and are assumed by Post as being 
behind (or at least tolerating) the recent violence in northern 
CAR.  Though he counts on President Sassou for support, Post 
believes this may be a fickle friendship based on forestry 
 
BANGUI 00000068  002 OF 006 
 
 
concessions to Sassou's family rather than real amity. 
Certainly, Congo (Brazzaville) has not helped Central African 
exports via the river and the Brazzaville-Pointe Noire railroad. 
 
-------------------------- 
ZIGUELE: THE MOST CREDIBLE 
-------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) MARTIN ZIGUELE:  The President of the Movement for the 
Liberation of Central African People (MLPC) and former Prime 
Minister under President Patasse (09 BANGUI 56).  Runner up in 
the 2005 Presidential elections, Ziguele is a young, eloquent 
and outspoken economist and remains the most credible of 
Bozize's opponents. His party is one of the leading parties in 
the country and a member of the National Union of Active Forces 
(UFVN) opposition coalition.  Ziguele has publicly split from 
Patasse and is well positioned for the elections of 2010.  The 
MLPC is a member of the Socialist International. 
 
Assets: 
 
- As in 2005, Ziguele remains the candidate with the clearest 
vision and ideas for the development of the country.  He has the 
respect and support of many political leaders, especially those 
of the UFVN. 
 
- Ziguele is a member of the Kaba ethnic group, one of the CAR's 
largest and is from Ouham-Pende province, a collection of the 
most populous of the country's prefectures, giving him a solid 
foundation of support.  Furthermore, Ouham-Pende has suffered 
greatly from military operations since 2005 and frustration with 
the government runs high. 
 
- He has not participated in Bozize governments and is thus 
untainted by the frustrations of the last six years. 
 
- Ziguele, despite his connections to Patasse's excesses, still 
maintains a good reputation with the international community due 
both to his concise political vision (not a common trait among 
senior CAR politicians) and because of his work as an 
international economic consultant. 
 
Weaknesses: 
 
- Current leadership rivalries within the MLPC may harm 
Ziguele's chances of winning the presidential elections. The 
rift with Patasse, while making him more credible to the public, 
has weakened Ziguele's internal support. 
 
- His term as Prime Minister under Patasse, especially 
considering the atrocities committed by the forces of 
Jean-Pierre Bemba, could cause problems.  Some observers suspect 
he may even be called before the International Criminal Court. 
 
- Ziguele, though an economic consultant of some substance in 
Paris, does not have the financial resources of Bozize. 
 
- Because of violence in his home prefecture, a number of 
potential voters lack the sufficient identification to vote in 
2010 and many others are still residing in widely dispersed IDP 
sites and refugee camps abroad. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
THE SECOND TIER: WILLING, BUT LACKING CREDIBILITY 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
4. (SBU) ANGE-FELIX PATASSE:  Former CAR President (1993-2003) 
and former head of the MLPC, Patasse is a three time 
presidential candidate and two time winner who still harbors 
ambitions of returning to power.  His dependence upon foreign 
military assistance from Qadhafi and Bemba, as well as the 
violent excesses and corruption of his rule has severely 
dampened his credibility, if not his ardor, to become head of 
state for a third time.  Persona non grata until the December 
2008 peace talks, Patasse arrived in Bangui with much fanfare 
before returning to his Togolese residence in exile where he has 
lived since 2003.  His reentry did not translate into a new 
 
BANGUI 00000068  003 OF 006 
 
 
burst of popularity. 
 
Assets: 
 
- Patasse remains charismatic and still has some support in 
Ouham-Pende as well as the MLPC.  His populist rhetoric 
resonates among some and his rhetorical talents are well known. 
 
- Though the amounts are unknown, Patasse was thought to have 
amassed a fortune during his time as President and must still 
have formidable amounts in reserve.  Without question, this 
makes him a credible challenger despite his apparent lack of 
popularity. 
 
Weaknesses: 
 
- Most do not recollect the era of Patasse with any fondness. 
Bemba's raping and looting of Bangui convinced those who were 
not already turned off by his outright corruption and graft. 
 
- He may still be cited to appear before the International 
Criminal Court. 
 
- Patasse is diabetic and is in his 70s, thus his health is a 
concern.  He is still in mourning after the death of his second 
wife and was considerably enfeebled by her passing. 
 
5. (SBU) ANDRE KOLINGBA: the former CAR President (1981-1992) 
and current head of the Central African Democratic Rally (RDC), 
Kolingba ran in, and lost, the elections of 1992, 1993, 1999 and 
2005.  Health permitting, he will have another go in 2010 as his 
party has a broad national base. Kolingba resides in France, but 
makes short trips back to the CAR from time to time. 
 
Assets: 
 
- Despite being in long term opposition and ensuing political 
harassment that has come with it, many members have remained 
loyal to the RDC: it is the third largest party at the National 
Assembly with 8 elected deputies.  It is also a member of the 
UFVN. 
 
Weaknesses: 
 
- Kolingba cannot shed the memory of years of mismanagement and 
tribalism under his regime from 1981-1992. 
 
- He is aged, in poor health and is rarely seen in public. 
 
- Internal rivalries are starting to undermine his party. 
 
- Kolingba is not believed to have the financial resources to 
mount an effective campaign. 
 
6. (SBU) OLIVIER GABIRAULT:  President of the Alliance for 
Democracy and Progress (ADP) and member of the UFVN coalition, 
Gabirault's party has a substantial national base.  Gabirault 
served as Minister, Mayor of Bangui and is a Vice President of 
the Committee chairing the December 2008 Political Dialogue. A 
moderate, he has been mostly supportive of Bozize. 
 
Assets: 
 
- The ADP maintains its credentials as one of the first 
opposition parties in the CAR.  It fought for the advent of 
democracy in the CAR in the 1990's, with one its leading members 
being killed by Kolingba's guards in a protest rally in 1991. 
The party has continues to call for a genuine change, good 
governance and respect for human rights. 
 
Weaknesses: 
 
- Following the death of its founder, the party has been beset 
by internal leadership problems. 
 
- Gabirault is little known outside of Bangui. 
 
 
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- It is unlikely that Gabirault and ADP have the funds to see 
through an election. 
 
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THE REST: UNLIKELY BUT NOTEWORTHY 
--------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) JEAN-JACQUES DEMAFOUTH: A former Minister of Defense 
(1999-2001) during Patasse's regime, Demafouth has been accused 
of various nefarious deeds including the plotting of a coup and 
murder.  While in exile in Paris in 2006, he formed a political 
party - New Alliance for Progress (NAP) - but contiguously was 
involved in support of the rebel Army for the Restitution of 
Democracy (APRD).  He officially became President of the APRD in 
2008, concluding a ceasefire and a peace agreement with the CAR 
government. He took part in the December 2008 political dialogue 
and is currently fully involved in the country's disarmament 
program. 
 
Assets: 
 
- Demafouth has always displayed a desire to see genuine 
political change in the CAR.  He enjoys popularity within the 
CAR security forces because of his bold restructuring programs 
while Defense Minister. (Enough popularity, according to rumor, 
for Bozize to be wary of the FACA and to rely on the GP.) 
 
Weaknesses: 
 
- Though renowned in the north of the country, especially in the 
APRD areas, Demafouth is not well-known or accepted in other 
prefectures. 
 
- He is widely regarded as blindly power hungry. 
 
8. (SBU) AUGUSTE BOUKANGA:  A businessman, former Minister and 
President of the Union for Renewal and Development (URD), 
Boukanga was a senior member of the Movement for Democracy and 
Development (MDD) of the late President David Dacko.  Though he 
was briefly head of the party, ethnic rivalries put him at odds 
with the MDD and he left to form his own party.  The URD is a 
regional party that is mostly active in the southwest and center 
of the country. Though a candidate in the second round of the 
2005 race, he withdrew his candidacy in favor of Bozize.  He has 
since become an ally of the KNK, a member of the presidential 
majority and played an active role in the December political 
inclusive dialogue. If he runs, it will be to secure a 
bargaining position with whoever he thinks will win as he is 
unlikely to triumph on his own. 
 
Assets: 
 
- Boukanga is well known in the Lobaye and Ombella M'Poko 
prefectures and can secure substantial votes there. 
 
Weaknesses: 
 
- Slim chance of winning because he does not have a broad base 
in the country. 
 
- He remains close to Bozize and is thus unlikely to challenge 
him seriously. 
 
9. (SBU) HENRI POUZERE:  Has long been in the CAR political 
arena though he spent time in Gabon as a lawyer and a 
businessman.  A two time presidential candidate, Pouzere was 
elected to the National Assembly in 1999. After the 2005 
election, he formed LONDO, which he considers a political 
association rather than a genuine political party.  Pouzere is a 
member of UFVN and has remained very critical of Bozize's 
regime. Moreover, he has always been a strong partisan of 
democracy and the democratic process. 
 
Assets: 
 
- Pouzere is of the Banda tribe, the largest ethnic group in the 
CAR.  Voting based on ethnic background rather than political 
 
BANGUI 00000068  005 OF 006 
 
 
platform is frequent, which presents an opportunity for Pouzere. 
 
 
- His connection with the UFVN is an asset as is his integrity 
and his democratic credentials. 
 
Weaknesses: 
 
- His chances of winning are slim because he lacks a broad 
political base.  He would need the support of the UFVN coalition 
to win and this will likely go to Ziguele. 
 
- Like Bozize, he is an uncharismatic and uninspiring speaker. 
 
10. (SBU) JOSEPH BEDOUNGA:  The President of the Movement for 
Democracy and Renaissance in the Central Africa (MDREC), a party 
that was formed in the heat of the struggle for democracy in the 
1990's.  Bedounga is a businessman, political radical and noted 
contrarian, at odds with all the regimes that have been in power 
and as well as with most of the opposition. Bedounga did however 
serve as the Mayor of Bangui under President Patasse.  He 
announced his candidacy to the 2005 presidential elections, but 
did not compete because he did not pay the required CFA 5 
million fee (USD 5,000).  Bellicose as ever, Bedounga will 
certainly announce his candidacy for the 2010 elections. 
 
- Assets: Well known throughout the country for his radical 
positions. 
 
- Weakness: People quickly tire of his negativity and his party 
has no broad base in the CAR. 
 
11. (SBU) NICOLAS TIANGAYE: The former President of the CAR 
Human Rights League (1991-2004), Tiangaye announced the creation 
of the Republican Convention for Social Progress (CRPS) in 2008. 
 His party's vision is that of unity, democracy, good governance 
and human rights.  Tiangaye rose to fame as the attorney of 
former Emperor Bokassa during his trial in 1987. 
 
Assets: 
 
- Tiangaye enjoys great popularity for his integrity, his 
intelligence and his bravery.  Always a vocal defender of human 
rights in the CAR, he was also instrumental in the struggle for 
democracy in the 1990s. 
 
Weaknesses: 
 
- His party is one of the newest in the country and is virtually 
unknown. 
- He does not have the finances to truly vie for the presidency. 
 
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WAITING THEIR TURN 
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12. (SBU) SYLVAIN NDOUTINGAI: The current Minister of Mines, 
Energy and Hydraulic Power, Ndoutingai is Bozize's nephew and 
rumored to be the most powerful member of the Bozize clan; 
perhaps even more powerful than the president himself.  At the 
president's side since the 2003 coup, Ndoutingai is 
ostentatiously wealthy in an impoverished nation and influential 
despite being only 35 years of age.  Although considered to be 
economically illiterate, he is markedly arrogant and cunning, 
and commands respect (or fear) even if most willingly make known 
their distaste for him in private.  He is seen to be the 
patron/protege/partner of Saifee Durbar.  Ndoutingai was behind 
the recent government crackdown on the diamond sector and is now 
in control of virtually all of CAR's mining capacity.  Despite 
his unpopularity, he is believed to control the Presidential 
Guard, and with his wealth, he remains a prime contender to take 
power if Bozize was out of the picture. 
 
13. (SBU) JEAN BARKES NGOMBE KETTE: The current mayor of Bangui, 
Ngombe Kette has garnered strong, favorable reviews in his four 
years in office.  Lauded for his efforts to beautify Bangui 
proper and for reforms to the services provided by city hall, 
 
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Ngombe Kette would be a strong candidate for office if Bozize 
was, for some reason, not to run. 
A close confidante of Bozize, a restaurant Ngombe Kette owns 
even doubles as the kitchen of one of Bozize's residences. 
Considering his closeness to the President, Post thinks it 
extremely unlikely that he will run for president as long as 
Bozize is in power.  When asked by Post about the possibility of 
seeking national office, Ngombe Kette said, "I'm not getting 
into that (expletive)!"  Furthermore, though very popular in 
Bangui, the mayor is not widely known throughout the country. 
 
14. (SBU) COMMENT: While Bozize remains the odds on favorite in 
the race; the opposition, with Ziguele the most credible, poses 
a clear threat to his reelection.  Popular discontent is high in 
the country with six years of corruption, governmental impunity 
and lack of basic public services chaffing most Central 
Africans. 
 
Questions/Issues are: 
 
-- Can elections be made honest enough for the opposition to 
have a chance? 
 
-- The conventional wisdom was that failed elections would 
restart the various civil conflicts across the country - it 
appears that that has already happened. 
 
-- Is any rebel group serious about trying to seize power, or 
all they all content to merely roam the hinterland? 
 
-- Is there a limit to popular patience?  Could the lack of 
electricity, water, or medical attention, coupled with violent 
crime and the impunity of the GP trigger a serious popular 
uprising? 
 
It remains in the interest of the United States to try to 
prevent a violent collapse of government in the CAR.  It is thus 
in our interest to find resources to support the elections 
process. END COMMENT 
COOK