VZCZCXRO2635
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0733/01 0771204
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181204Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2254
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BAGHDAD 000733 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE HILL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ GCC
SUBJECT: IRAQ 201: SNAPSHOT OF IRAQ'S REGIONAL DIPLOMATIC 
ENGAGEMENT 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 630 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 575 
     ¶C. BAGHDAD 532 
 
Classified By: PMIN Robert Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
(U)  This one in a series of messages intended to provide 
background for policy-makers on Iraq. 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Ref A provided a broad overview of Iraq's diplomatic 
relations with its neighbors and a proposed U.S. strategy for 
consolidating Iraq's regional reintegration.  Ref B analyzed 
Iraqi-Iranian relations.  This cable aims to complement those 
messages by providing a snapshot of practical efforts that 
have been undertaken over the past several months to 
strengthen Iraq's engagement with its neighbors.  This cable 
also reports on the status of new Arab embassies in Baghdad 
and how internal GOI deficiencies (the weak position of the 
MFA vis-a-vis other GOI bodies and its sour relationship with 
the Prime Minister's Office) make progress slower than it 
otherwise could be.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
Iraq's Regional Reintegration: A Long-standing Policy Goal 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Since the fall of the Saddam regime, U.S. strategy 
has sought to help reintegrate Iraq into its neighborhood, 
strengthen its bilateral ties with key Arab countries, 
encourage those countries to take a more active role in 
supporting Iraq's development as a stable, peaceful neighbor, 
and anchor Iraq firmly in the camp of Arab moderates.  While 
many of these countries had voiced support in the abstract 
for these goals, concrete steps were few and far between. 
Sunni Arab states' anxiety about the nature and intentions of 
Iraq's new Shi'a-led government and its relations with Iran 
compounded very real security concerns about reestablishing a 
diplomatic presence in Baghdad -- concerns rooted in tragic 
events including the August 2003 bombing of the Jordanian 
Embassy and the July 2005 kidnapping and murder of the 
Egyptian Ambassador. 
 
----------------------------- 
2008 - Concrete Steps at Last 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) A virtuous cycle of engagement began in late Spring 
¶2008.  The June 5 visit of UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin 
Zayid initiated a string of high-level visits to Baghdad from 
Iraq's neighbors.  Then in September/October, key Arab states 
(UAE, Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait and Syria) returned Ambassadors 
to Iraq.  The GOI reciprocated by naming Ambassadors to Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Qatar, Turkey, Lebanon and Bahrain (albeit 
with a delay until early 2009 before they were dispatched to 
their posts) but has not yet named Ambassadors to Egypt, UAE 
or Kuwait.  At present, all of the new Arab embassies in 
Baghdad continue to operate temporarily and in a very limited 
fashion from the Rasheed Hotel in the International Zone (IZ) 
(except for Syria which has an operating embassy in the Red 
Zone).  They hope to begin moving into permanent, secure 
quarters in the IZ later this Spring when renovation work on 
their assigned properties in the Diplomatic Zone adjacent to 
the U.S. Embassy are complete. 
 
¶4.  (U)  Para 9 presents a detailed country-by-country 
summary of Iraq's engagement with its neighbors. 
 
------------------------------------- 
GOI Internal Deficiencies Make Things 
More Difficult Than They Have to Be 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  The decisions of Arab states to dispatch high level 
official delegations, send Ambassadors and reopen embassies 
in Baghdad signaled a new level of confidence in Iraq's 
future, as well as an understanding that a stable Iraq is a 
Qfuture, as well as an understanding that a stable Iraq is a 
key counterweight to Iranian influence in the region.  Visits 
by Arab VIPs have become, if not commonplace, then at least 
no longer remarkable and a gauge of how far we have come in a 
relatively short period of time.  That said, there is also a 
sense of frustration -- by many of these countries, as well 
as by us -- that the GOI has not taken full advantage of 
these overtures.  The fact that Iraq has yet to name 
ambassadors to the UAE, Kuwait or Egypt, is a case in point. 
Similarly, new Arab diplomatic missions in Baghdad report 
regular difficulty in getting answers and/or timely 
 
BAGHDAD 00000733  002 OF 005 
 
 
assistance from the Iraqi MFA as they work to stand up their 
embassies. 
 
¶6.  (C) In part, these are problems of capacity, training and 
resources at the MFA.  The circle of competent officials in 
the Foreign Ministry who have the confidence of, and are 
empowered by Foreign Minister Zebari is very small.  The 
dedicated MFA team working directly with the new Arab 
embassies is even smaller.  In October, as the full brunt of 
the increased number of visits and Arab Embassies was at its 
peak, Ambassador Crocker stressed to Foreign Minister Zebari 
the urgent need for MFA to beef up its resources in this 
regard.  Zebari promised that he was implementing such a 
plan, although until now it appears that very limited 
progress has been made. 
 
¶7.  (C) More troubling, however, has been the dysfunctional 
relationship between Zebari and Prime Minister Maliki.  Their 
inability to agree on key Iraqi diplomatic assignments has 
left many key Iraqi ambassadorships vacant for an inexcusable 
length of time.  (Note: The Ambassador, DCM and other emboffs 
have repeatedly raised the need to appoint key ambassadors 
with Maliki, his Chief of Staff and MFA officials including 
Zebari.  End note.)  Similarly, the battle between the Prime 
Minister's Office and the MFA for control of various IZ 
properties (until recently held by the U.S.) led to confusion 
and delay in designating these properties for new Arab (and 
other country) embassies.  In each case, internal GOI 
friction caused delays in steps that should have been -- 
relatively speaking -- straightforward, and slowed progress 
in developing these bilateral relationships to a level where 
they could focus on more substantive issues. 
 
¶8.  (C) That said, as we look ahead to the coming months, 
Baghdad will see the opening of several real, 
bricks-and-mortar Arab embassies (UAE, Jordan, Bahrain, 
Kuwait, and possibly Egypt) staffed with permanent diplomats. 
 At that point, hopefully, the focus of their (and our) 
efforts will not be simply on reestablishing their presence 
in Iraq, but on the important goals of promoting productive 
relationships across the full range of issues that make up a 
healthy bilateral relationship. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Country by Country - Where Things Stand 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) A summary of key events/aspects of Iraq's engagement 
with its neighbors follows: 
 
UAE 
--- 
 
-- June 5: UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayid visits 
Baghdad, the highest ranking Sunni Arab official to do so 
since the fall of Saddam. 
 
-- July 6-7: PM Maliki visits Abu Dhabi, during which the UAE 
announces cancellation of Iraq's $7 billion debt and the 
appointment of Ambassador Abdullah al-Shehhi as UAE 
Ambassador to Iraq. 
 
-- July  17-19: UAE hosts the Friends of Iraq meeting in Abu 
Dhabi. 
 
-- September 4: Ambassador Al-Shehhi travels to Baghdad and 
presents his credentials during an initial five-day visit. 
 
-- October 3: UAE Crown Prince Muhammad bin Zayid, along with 
the UAE's Interior, Defense and Foreign Ministers visit 
Baghdad. 
 
-- December 2: Ambassador al-Shehhi hosts a large UAE 
National Day reception at the Rasheed Hotel.  Since 
September, Ambassador Al-Shehhi and a small embassy team have 
worked out of the Rasheed.  Renovation work is underway on 
two villas immediately adjacent the NEC that, when ready 
later in the Spring, will house their new embassy.  Despite 
the UAE's role in catalyzing the return of other Arab 
countries to Baghdad, the GOI has still not agreed internally 
on who will be Iraq's Ambassador in Abu Dhabi.  We have 
Qon who will be Iraq's Ambassador in Abu Dhabi.  We have 
repeatedly stressed to the Prime Minister's Office and the 
MFA the need to resolve this quickly and fill this gap. 
 
Jordan 
------ 
 
-- June 12-13: Prime Minister Maliki visits Amman. 
 
-- August 11: King Abdullah visits Baghdad, becoming the 
 
BAGHDAD 00000733  003 OF 005 
 
 
first Arab Head of State to do so since the fall of Saddam. 
 
-- September 14: three Jordanian diplomats arrive in Baghdad 
to reestablish Jordan's diplomatic presence and begin work on 
renovating an IZ property that will become the Jordanian 
embassy. 
 
-- October 15: Jordanian Ambassador Nayef Fantoul al-Zeidan 
arrives in Baghdad for a week-long visit and presents 
credentials. 
 
Ambassador Al-Zeidan has not been back to Baghdad since this 
initial October visit and will only return when the permanent 
Embassy facility is ready for occupancy).  Jordan's 
diplomatic team (lead by a Charge) currently operates out of 
the Rasheed.  They believe they will be able to move into 
their permanent IZ quarters in late April/early May.  Embassy 
Amman has reported the possibility that Jordanian PM Dhababi 
will lead a delegation to Baghdad in the coming weeks.  In a 
recent conversation, the Jordanian Charge indicated that a 
Ministerial visit may be pushed back to coincide with 
Jordan's May 25 National Day. 
 
Turkey 
------ 
 
-- July 10: Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan visits Baghdad and 
meets with GOI leadership. 
 
-- December 24: PM Maliki visits Ankara, with much discussion 
focused on economic, energy, and water issues.  During that 
meeting, Turkish President Gul rebutted GOI criticisms that 
GoT Special Envoy Ozcelik had been interfering in internal 
Iraqi affairs, particularly as it related to U.S.-Iraqi 
negotiations on a bilateral security agreement. 
 
March 14-15: President Talabani travels to Ankara for 
official visit. 
 
March 22-23: President Gul to visit President Talabani and PM 
Maliki in Baghdad. 
 
Note: Septel will cove the Iraqi-Turkish relationship as seen 
from Baghdad in more detail. 
 
Bahrain 
------- 
 
-- September 2-4: Bahraini technical team makes initial visit 
to view possible IZ properties for the Bahraini Embassy. 
 
-- October 7: Bahraini Ambassador Salah Ali al Malki arrives 
for initial visit to Baghdad 
 
-- October 16: Ambassador Malki presents credentials 
 
-- October 18: Bahraini Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid makes 
a one-day visit to Baghdad to meet with GOI leaders. 
 
Since November, Ambassador Malki his made several visits to 
Baghdad, most recently in late February to attend the Kuwaiti 
National Day reception. He continues to operate out of the 
Rasheed when he is in Baghdad as renovation work is 
proceeding slowly at the IZ property to be the Bahraini 
Embassy. 
 
Kuwait 
------ 
 
-- October 21: Kuwaiti Ambassador Ali al-Mou'min arrives in 
Baghdad for initial one-week visit, becoming the first 
Kuwaiti Ambassador in Baghdad since Saddam's invasion.  He 
presents credentials the following day. 
 
-- November 10: A personal representative of the Amir of 
Kuwait arrives in Baghdad with Ambassador al-Mou'min to 
Baghdad to personally deliver an invitation to the January 
19-20 Arab League Economic Summit it Kuwait to President 
Talabani. 
 
-- November - February: Ambassador al-Mou'min makes several 
visits to Baghdad seeking to gain GOI agreement on the lease 
terms of an IZ property for the future Kuwaiti Embassy. 
Issue is still not resolved. 
 
-- January 19-20: President Talabani leads Iraqi delegation 
to the Arab League Economic Summit in Kuwait. In bilateral 
discussions on the margins of the Summit, there is agreement 
that the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister will lead a delegation to 
Baghdad shortly to discuss all outstanding issues between the 
 
BAGHDAD 00000733  004 OF 005 
 
 
two countries.  Initial reports that the long-running Kuwait 
Airways case had been settled prove to be premature. 
 
-- February 25: Ambassador Al-Mou'min hosts well-attended 
Kuwaiti National Day celebration at the Rasheed Hotel, the 
first time Kuwait has held an event in Baghdad since Saddam's 
1990 invasion. 
 
-- February 26: Kuwaiti Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister Sheikh Mohammed al Sabah visits Baghdad -- the 
highest level Kuwaiti official to do so since Saddam's 
invasion (Ref C).  The two sides agree to form a senior level 
joint commission to deal with all outstanding bilateral 
issues that would meet initially in Baghdad, perhaps by the 
end of March. 
 
Despite the progress above, the GOI has yet to name an 
Ambassador to Kuwait.  Embassy Baghdad continues to press the 
Prime Minister's Office and MFA to resolve this issue quickly 
and send an Ambassador as an important gesture of 
good will. 
 
Egypt 
----- 
 
-- October 5: Egyptian Foreign Minister Abul Gheit visits 
Baghdad and Sulimaniyeh for meetings with Prime Minister 
Maliki, President Talabani, Foreign Minister Zebari and other 
GOI officials.  While in Baghdad, Abul Gheit also 
visits IZ villas that MFA has identified to be the site of 
the future Egyptian Embassy and announces Egypt's intention 
to reopen an Embassy in Baghdad.  Both GOI and GOE officials 
report the visit as a success. 
 
Mid-March:  Iraqi delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister 
Abbawi visits Cairo for talks on strengthening the bilateral 
relationship, including steps needed to reopen an Egyptian 
embassy in Baghdad .  Egyptian delegation expected to visit 
Baghdad soon to follow-up. These discussions follow several 
visits to Baghdad by Egyptian technical teams. At present, 
Egypt has yet to name an ambassador to Iraq nor reestablish a 
diplomatic presence in Baghdad, and Iraq has not named an 
Ambassador to Cairo (currently represented at Charge level). 
 
 
----------- 
Arab League 
----------- 
 
-- August:  Senior Egyptian Diplomat Hani Khallaf named Arab 
League Ambassador to Iraq, filling a vacancy from 2007 when 
former Arab League Ambassador Lemani resigned. 
 
-- March 16-19: Arab League Secretary General Amr Mousa 
visits Baghdad for meetings with GOI leaderships and key 
Iraqi political figures. 
 
March 17: Foreign Minister Zebari publicly announces that 
Iraq will request to host the Spring 2010 Arab League Summit 
 
 
Syria 
----- 
 
-- September 16: The SARG names Nawaf Fares, then Governor of 
Quneitra Province, as its first Ambassador to Iraq, ending 
two decades of bilateral estrangement. 
 
-- September 28: The GOI names Ambassador Ala'a Jowadi, the 
head of the MFA's Arab Department, as Ambassador to Syria. 
This represents an upgrading of representation from the 
Charge level. 
 
-- October 16: Ambassador Fares presents credentials to 
President Talabani and takes up his post. 
 
-- January 28: Iraqi Ambassador Jowadi arrives in Damascus 
and presents credentials to President Asad on February 16. 
 
Syrian-Iraqi relations were strained in November following 
the events at the Syrian border town of Abu Kamal regarding 
the Abu Ghadiyya network.  While initial press reports 
indicated Syria would withdraw its Ambassador, this proved 
untrue and Syrian Ambassador Fares remained in Baghdad 
throughout. 
 
Lebanon 
------- 
 
-- July 17: Lebanese Parliamentary bloc leader Sa'ad Hariri 
 
BAGHDAD 00000733  005 OF 005 
 
 
visits Baghdad and Najaf; meets with GOI leadership as well 
as Ayatollah Sistani. 
 
-- August 20: Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora visits Baghdad 
for meetings with GOI leadership. 
 
-- September 28:  Iraq names Omar al-Barzanji as Ambassador 
to Lebanon, to replace Ambassador Jawad al-Hairi who died 
July 12, 2008, of a heart attack. 
 
-- January 29: Ambassador al-Barzanji arrives in Beirut to 
take up his post. Lebanon continues to be represented at the 
Charge level in Baghdad. 
 
Saudi Arabia 
------------ 
 
-- September 28: The GOI names Ghanem al-Jumaili, its 
Ambassador in Tokyo, as Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, upgrading 
Iraq's diplomatic representation in Riyadh from the level of 
Charge. 
 
-- Late January: Saudi Arabia grants Agrement to Ambassador 
al-Jumaili who is expected to take up his post shortly. 
 
Progress in improving Iraqi-Saudi ties has been slow owing to 
Saudi King Abdullah's continuing suspicions about the nature 
of the Maliki government and its ties to Iran. 
 
Qatar 
----- 
 
-- September 28: Iraq names Jawad al-Hindawi as Ambassador to 
Qatar.  This represents an upgrading of representation from 
the Charge level. 
 
-- February 4: Ambassador al-Hindawi arrives in Doha to take 
up his post. 
 
-- February 8: KRG President Massoud Barzani visits Doha. 
 
President Talabani will lead the Iraqi delegation to the 
March 30 Arab League Summit in Doha.  Also, UNAMI has 
informed us that the Qatari First Lady may visit Iraq in 
early May for a cultural/educational visit, possibly tied to 
a UNESCO initiative. 
 
BUTENIS