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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000615 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE HILL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PMIL MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ 201:  WHERE IS THE GREEN LINE? 
 
Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor John Fox; reasons 1.4(b) and 
(d) 
 
(U)  This is one in a series of messages intended to provide 
background for policy-makers on Iraq.  It is a joint 
Embassy/MNF-I message. 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary:  None of the many interpretations of a 
"Green Line" separating Kurdish-administered areas from the 
rest of Iraq has either support across ethnic lines or a 
conclusive legal basis.  The term "Green Line" was first used 
to describe the "front-line trace" between Peshmerga and 
Iraqi Army positions following the 1991 Kurdish uprising 
against Saddam.  Those positions generally followed the 
terrain, separating mountainous areas of Dohuk, Erbil, and 
Sulaymaniyah Provinces (including small portions of Ninewa, 
Kirkuk, Salah-ad-Din, and Diyala) from flat lands to the 
south-west.  The Iraq constitution passed in 2005 recognizes 
the Kurdish Regional Government's authority as the official 
government of areas held by the Kurds on March 19 2003, 
implicitly delineated by what we now refer to as the Green 
Line.  We have fairly detailed information on the locations 
of Iraqi Army units as of March 16 2003, but there is a 
dispute regarding the location of the Peshmerga, who claim to 
have been in control of territory to the rear of the IA 
positions.  End summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
After the First Gulf War 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2. (SBU) The first widespread use of the term "Green Line" 
referring to a line of separation between Kurdish and 
Arab-dominated areas of Iraq was in the aftermath of the 1991 
Kurdish Uprising.  It was based on the relatively stable 
front-line military positions (the "front-line trace") of 
Kurdish Peshmerga and Iraqi Army forces, and recognized de 
facto Kurdish control over a majority of the territory in 
what are now the governorates (provinces) of Dohuk, Erbil and 
Suleimaniyah, as well as small portions of territory in the 
governorates of Ninewa, Kirkuk and Diyala.  The Green Line 
did not correspond to the northern no-fly zone patrolled by 
U.S., British, and French forces following the first Gulf 
War, which barred GOI aircraft in the airspace north of the 
36th parallel.  Instead, it ran generally north-west to 
south-east, separating more mountainous (and more easily 
defensible) terrain to the north from the flatter lands to 
the south.  This first Green Line corresponded generally to 
the historical division between Semitic-language speakers in 
the plains and deserts of central Iraq, and Indo-European 
language speakers in the mountains to the north. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
The Post-2003 Transitional Period 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3. (C) The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) signed in 
March 2004 by the Iraqi Governing Council provided the 
governing framework for Iraq until the ratification of the 
Iraqi Constitution in 2005.  TAL Article 53(A) states that 
&the Kurdistan Regional Government is recognized as the 
official government of the territories that were administered 
by that government on 19 March 2003 in the governorates of 
Dohuk, Erbil, Suleimaniyah, Kirkuk, Diyala and Ninewa.8  TAL 
Article 53(A) did not more specifically define those 
territories, however.  (Comment:  It is not clear to us 
whether "administered by" was meant to refer simply to the 
presence of Kurdish Peshmerga and the absence of Iraqi Army 
troops, or whether Kurdish political authorities had to 
exercise the functions of government in those areas.  The 
Qexercise the functions of government in those areas.  The 
parties themselves do not generally debate these legal 
questions in any deatil.  End comment.)  While there is 
fairly accurate information available regarding the 
disposition of Iraqi Army units as late as March 16 2003, we 
know less about Peshmerga positions as of March 19 2003. 
Also, military positions were fluid throughout this period, 
with small numbers of Peshmerga infiltrating southward in 
anticipation of Coalition operations.  It is possible that 
some areas in what are now the disputed territories had 
troops from both sides, while others had few or none from 
either side. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
The Constitutional Period and Article 140 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4. (C) The Iraqi constitution approved by referendum 15 
October 2005 superseded the TAL, with two exceptions.  The 
constitution's Article 143 that annuls the TAL exempts TAL 
 
BAGHDAD 00000615  002 OF 002 
 
 
Article 53(A), recognizing KRG authority over certain areas 
of northern Iraq, and TAL Article 58, which sets out a 
process for remedying the forcible displacements of Kurds and 
others during Saddam's Arabization efforts.  Moreover, 
Article 140 of the constitution explicitly commits the 
executive to fully implement all the provisions of TAL 
Article 58, although it includes some confusing language 
regarding a deadline for full implementation by December 31 
¶2007.  (Note:  Some Arab politicians claim that the meaning 
of the language in Article 140(2) is that the provisions of 
TAL Article 58 are null and void if full implementation is 
not achieved by the December 2007 deadline.  Kurdish leaders 
strenuously disagree, noting that their support for the 
constitution was contingent on the incorporation of language 
addressing Arabization, and threaten that a constitution 
stripped of these provisions would not have the support of 
the KRG.  End note.)  There are numerous references to the 
Kurdistan region in the constitution, including Article 117, 
which confers recognition of the Kurdistan region and "its 
existing authorities," although the specific districts and 
sub-districts determined to have been "administered by" the 
KRG as of March 19, 2003 are never enumerated. 
 
- - - - - - 
Enter UNAMI 
- - - - - - 
 
¶5. (C) As the December 2007 deadline approached with no sign 
the government would move to implement provisions of TAL 
Article 58, and in the absence of political consensus on the 
way forward, UNAMI offered to produce reports on each of the 
disputed territories to serve as a baseline of factual data 
and, officials of the United Nations Assistance Mission to 
Iraq (UNAMI) hoped, a starting point for political 
negotiations to resolve territorial disputes.  While no Iraqi 
legal mechanism conferred this role on UNAMI, in August 2007 
UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1770 provided UNAMI 
with a mandate to  advise, support and assist, the 
Government of Iraq and the Council of Representatives on the 
development of processes to resolve disputed internal 
boundaries.  To head the UN effort, the Secretary General 
appointed Staffan de Mistura as his Special Representative. 
While UNAMI's efforts were not formally endorsed by either 
the GoI or the KRG, both sides acquiesced in them -- the 
Kurds to see whether the UN could facilitate a deal, many 
Arabs in the belief that repeated delays would eventually 
drain the energy required to make any territorial changes 
favoring the Kurds. 
 
¶6. (C) The first round of UNAMI reports, in June 2008, was 
designed to build confidence.  UNAMI officials thus picked 
four areas they thought were relatively non-controversial: 
Acre, Hamdaniya, and Makhmour Districts in Ninewa Province 
and Mandali, a sub-district of Balad Ruz in Diyala Province. 
Its findings suggested that Acre and Makhmour, homogeneous 
Kurdish areas long-administered by Kurdish authorities, 
should join the KRG, while multi-ethnic Hamdaniya should 
remain part of Ninewa.  They suggested that Mandali, from 
which Kurds were substantially forcibly removed, should stay 
in Diyala.  GOI officials and Sunni Arab political leaders 
studiously ignored the reports.  Kurdish officials were 
publicly critical of the proposal, arguing that Acre and 
Makhmour were already widely accepted as Kurdish areas 
administered by the KRG and complaining that UNAMI had placed 
less weight on the most important criterion -- the desires of 
Qless weight on the most important criterion -- the desires of 
local residents.  The Kurds refused to provide an official 
reaction to the first round of reports, saying they would 
wait to see the entire set of reports.  UNAMI will release 
reports on all the disputed territories in northern Iraq in 
mid-April, including a menu of options to resolve Kirkuk 
Province, and will announce it is organizing a framework to 
guide discussions among Iraqis. 
 
 
 
BUTENIS