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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #0433/01 0821256
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P 231256Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9145
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000433 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA, EUR/SE, EUR/CARC; NSC FOR MARIA 
GERMANO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS EPTER ENRG AJ AM TU
SUBJECT: CEVIKOZ DISCUSSES TURKEY-ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN 
INTERPLAY 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Azerbaijan's concerns that Armenia will 
stiffen its negotiating position on Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K) if 
Turkey opens the border with Armenia are legitimate, 
according to MFA Deputy U/S Cevikoz.  Armenia needs to be 
persuaded that relations with Turkey cannot be enhanced 
genuinely without steps on N-K; Turkey will propose economic 
incentives to help motivate all sides.  The Turks believe 
President Aliyev is forward-leaning on N-K, demonstrated by 
his position on the political status of Lachin, even as 
specifics on the width of the corridor remain to be 
determined.  Cevikoz forecast "shifting alliances" in the 
Caucasus that would emerge from Turkey-Armenia normalization; 
Russia will be content to see Azerbaijan and its energy 
resources drift toward it.  Ambassador underscored the 
importance Azerbaijan attaches to using its gas to develop 
economic and political ties to Western Europe.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) MFA Deputy U/S Unal Cevikoz outlined for Ambassador 
March 20 how he believes Turkey can bring along both Armenia 
and Azerbaijan in support of Turkey normalizing relations 
with Armenia while gaining progress on resolving the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  Aware that the Armenian Diaspora 
is accusing Turkey (and by implication Yerevan) of trying to 
split the Diaspora from Armenia, Cevikoz said he believed 
that Armenian President Sargsian had taken stock of the 
situation his people find themselves in politically and 
economically.  Their creeping loss of sovereignty to Russia 
is a threat to the power of the ethnic Armenian leadership, 
and Sargsian has decided that Armenia needs to open up to the 
West.  And that can only happen through Turkey.  Genocide 
recognition, Cevikoz said he believed, is moving lower on the 
Armenian list of priorities, though it will always be there. 
The Diaspora does not care about the economic condition of 
the Armenian people, Cevikoz said. 
 
¶3. (C) Cevikoz noted Aliyev's impressive showing in the March 
18 referendum amending the constitution.  He implied a degree 
of Turkish uncertainty concerning Article 101, paragraph 5, 
which not only lifts term limits, but also authorizes 
prolonging the presidency (i.e., without elections) in time 
of war (which Azerbaijan has been in with Armenia perpetually 
since 1993).  If Aliyev can deliver on development, he will 
likely remain President for a long time.  This may give him 
an opportunity to implement his vision for Azerbaijan.  The 
question is:  what kind of vision? 
 
¶4. (C) Cevikoz said he finds Aliyev forward-leaning on N-K, 
pointing out that he has compromised in principle on the 
political status of Lachin.  If he can reach his goal on the 
ultimate status of N-K and the territorial integrity of 
Azerbaijan, and is confident Armenia will not challenge it, 
he will be flexible.  The width of Lachin is also important. 
Azerbaijani Deputy FM Azimov said the Armenians want the 
entirety of Lachin province as a corridor.  That is 
unacceptable to Azerbaijan, as it was ethnic Azeri territory. 
 Cevikoz did not speculate on what would be a reasonable 
width. 
 
¶5. (C) Azerbaijani concerns are legitimate:  Armenia could be 
become a tougher negotiator on N-K following a deal with 
Turkey, according to Cevikoz.  As such, Armenia needs to be 
persuaded that this is a package deal, i.e., that relations 
with Turkey cannot be enhanced genuinely without steps on 
N-K.  Existing, unofficial trade between Turkey and Armenia 
is about $150 million per year.  Opening the border will at 
best double that; it will not produce much of an economic 
bang for Armenia, at least not at first.  Noting a fear in 
Armenia that the Diaspora will cut off financial support if 
it goes ahead on a deal with Turkey, Cevikoz proposed that 
Turkey offer Armenia economic incentives, though he offered 
few specifics apart from road-building.  Turkey will seek to 
involve Azerbaijan in any such projects.  Cevikoz predicted 
that the announcement/initialing of an agreement with Armenia 
-- which he said would happen very soon -- would trigger 
criticism from the Azerbaijani people.  Turkey can deal with 
it in the short run, but will need to see developments on N-K 
and regional cooperation projects if it is to withstand 
sustained criticism.  Cevikoz also suggested that Turkey play 
a more active role in the Minsk Group chairmanship process, 
but has not explored this idea with the French or Russians. 
 
ANKARA 00000433  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) Cevikoz predicted the whole Caucasus would change 
following Turkey-Armenia normalization, forecasting "shifting 
alliances."  The Russians view the development as a win-win. 
The present lack of relations between Turkey and Armenia, and 
the dominance Russia can exert over Armenia, suits Moscow 
fine, but if there is a normalization, then Moscow will be 
equally content with the damage to Turkey-Azerbaijan 
relations and expect to see Azerbaijan and its energy 
resources drift toward it. 
 
¶7. (C) Ambassador underscored the importance of progress on 
an East-West corridor.  Azerbaijan sees a way forward when 
dealing with the Turkish MFA, but not with BOTAS.  Azerbaijan 
is not going to just give away its gas to Turkey, he 
stressed.  Oil is economic; gas is political.  The 
Azerbaijanis are getting squeezed by the Russians and the 
Iranians and desperately want to strengthen their ties to 
Western Europe.  They are not as confident as Turkey, which 
is part of and has security guarantees from the West. 
 
¶8. (C) COMMENT:  Cevikoz's views represent the classic, 
sophisticated, hard-line, and zero-sum approach to such 
issues that characterizes the MFA bureaucracy.  His seniors 
take a more flexible position, realizing that a 
Turkish-Armenian agreement is a political decision, that 
still has to be decided at the very top levels. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey 
 
Jeffrey