VZCZCXRO7514
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHYE #0078/01 0411605
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101605Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY YEREVAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8617
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHFRS/AMCONSUL STRASBOURG PRIORITY 0010
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 YEREVAN 000078 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM COE AM
SUBJECT: LATEST PACE RESOLUTION SPURS LIMITED REFORM 
PROGRESS 
 
REF: A. YEREVAN 26 
     ¶B. YEREVAN 71 
 
YEREVAN 00000078  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Joseph Pennington, reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
-------- 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1. (C) With its January 27 passage of Resolution 
1643, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe (PACE) elected to give Armenia more time to 
complete reforms highlighted in previous PACE 
resolutions 1609 and 1620, focusing on the way 
forward negotiated by rapporteurs John Prescott and 
Georges Colombier (reftels).  The Assembly also 
stopped short of accusing Armenia of having 
"political prisoners."  After months of dilatory 
reform progress, the GOAM now seems energized to 
fulfill its promises to PACE to reform the criminal 
code before the next PACE Monitoring Committee 
meeting March 30.  Ruling coalition figures have 
suggested that the criminal code amendments will be 
used as a face-saving mechanism to drop charges 
against at least some defendants accused of the 
March 1, 2008 violence. Whether this will amount, 
de facto, to a complete amnesty, or a more 
incremental solution is still unclear. 
 
¶2.  (C) Government officials were annoyed with 
PACE's continued -- as they see it -- meddling in 
Armenia's democratic problems, but now seem 
relatively happy to have a concrete, achievable and 
near-term plan that will get them back in PACE's 
good graces and put this scrutiny behind them. The 
opposition, meanwhile, is disappointed by what they 
see as only tepid criticism of Armenian authorities 
and a willingness to let the GOAM off the hook. 
However, there is a more conspiratorial view in 
opposition circles that sees the mild PACE 
criticism as "proof" that a Nagorno Karabakh peace 
deal is nigh, and reportedly is licking its chops 
in anticipation of whipping up anti-government 
populism over that issue.  Some hope that, combined 
with looming economic distress and Sargsian's 
damaged legitimacy, the NK issue can arouse enough 
public protest eventually to bring down the 
government.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------- 
RESOLUTION 1643 
---------------- 
 
¶3. (C) In Resolution 1643 adopted on January 27, 
PACE welcomed several positive steps by Armenian 
authorities, such as the establishment of the 
multi-partisan factfinding group to inquire into 
the events of March 1, the decision to draft 
amendments to Articles 225 and 300 of the Criminal 
Code, and the increasing number of pardons, 28 to 
date, that have been granted by the President of 
Armenia.  (NOTE:  The opposition complains bitterly 
in public and privately that the pardons are a 
sham.  They claim that only a few of those pardons 
were genuinely opposition figures -- who had been 
coerced into falsely admitting guilt in exchange 
for the pardons -- while the remainder were common 
criminals or even government-sponsored "agents 
provocateurs." They report that many of these 
latter, politically-unknown figures had already 
been freed from prison for one reason or another. 
END NOTE) 
 
¶4. (U) PACE called upon the Armenian authorities to 
ensure that the fact-finding group is given full 
access to information from all state bodies and 
officials, including those that have left office or 
have been replaced since the March 1 events. The 
Resolution expressed regret that the authorities 
have not so far used amnesty, pardons or the 
dropping of charges to release all those who did 
not personally commit a crime. The Assembly did not 
use the term "political prisoners," instead 
pointing out that "the charges against a 
significant number of persons, especially those 
charged under Articles 225-3 and 300 of the 
Criminal Code and those based solely on police 
evidence, could have been politically motivated." 
 
¶5. (C) PACE decided not yet to suspend Armenia's 
 
YEREVAN 00000078  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
delegation -- a largely symbolic step that would 
deprive the Armenian delegation of voting rights in 
the consultative Assembly, but would be an 
unusually sharp, public rebuke of the country's 
democracy performance.  Instead, the Assembly 
agreed with the strategy negotiated by co- 
rapporteurs Prescott and Colombier to give Armenia 
three more months to implement agreed reforms. As 
forshadowed by Ref A, and confirmed by the National 
Assembly speaker (Ref B), and now by Armenia's PACE 
delegation MPs Davit Harutunian (Republican Party) 
and Armen Rustamian (Dashnaksutyun), the compromise 
hinges on Armenia's redrafting of its Criminal Code 
articles 225 ("mass disorder") and 300 ("usurpation 
of state power") to be explicit in defining the 
necessary elements of the crime. 
 
---------------------------- 
RULING COALITION'S REACTION 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6. (U) In public, President Serzh Sargsian's 
Republican Party praised PACE for not imposing 
sanctions against Armenia and not using the term 
"political prisoners." Republican Party 
Spokesperson Eduard Sharmazanov proclaimed this a 
victory and the result of the recent display of 
political will and reforms of the President.  Armen 
Rustamian, ARF member of the Armenian delegation to 
PACE, was more cautious in his positive public 
assessments: "now the ball is on our side of the 
field and we have to present proof of the work 
realized before the session of PACE Monitoring 
Committee due in late March." He commented that it 
is crucial to ensure that the issue concerning 
Armenia is not discussed at the spring session of 
PACE.  To do that, Armenian authorities will have 
to undertake consistent steps in implementation of 
PACE requirements. 
 
¶7.  (C) Privately, PACE Delegation leader Davit 
Harutunian (who chairs parliament's State and Legal 
Affairs Committee, which has jurisdiction over the 
criminal code revisions), told Ambassador and 
PolChief in separate conversations that he is 
working as fast as he can to re-draft the relevant 
criminal code amendments in time.  Harutunian 
claimed credit for having proposed this compromise 
to National Assembly Speaker Hovik Abrahamian, who 
then pitched it to Prescott and Colombier (with 
President Sargsian's blessing).  He commented that 
the government's initial re-draft -- written by 
Harutunian's despised rival, the Prosecutor General 
-- was terrible, and he was re-writing it 
completely.  Harutunian said he had already spoken 
for several hours with the Council of Europe's 
designated Venice Commission representative 
assigned to work with Armenia on this issue. 
 
¶8.  (C) Harutunian said he intended to present the 
revised draft criminal code articles to the 
National Assembly by February 19, and hoped they 
would be approved on their first reading the week 
of February 23, during the parliament's regular 
session.  The required second reading would follow 
in "mid-March," which would keep Armenia on track 
to implement the new procedures before the March 30 
PACE monitoring committee session.  Harutunian 
mentioned that the revisions would clear the way 
for authorities to drop some of the charges against 
the opposition defendants; he predicted that the 
article 300 charges would be dropped, but some 
vestige of the article 225 charges would likely 
remain to be prosecuted.  He informed that under 
the Armenian Constitution, ex post facto changes to 
the criminal code are applied to pending cases if 
they are to the advantage of the defendant. 
Changes contrary to the interest of the defendant 
cannot be applied retroactively. 
 
¶9.  (C) Harutunian said he had spent considerable 
time urging the  Venice Commission representative 
to support the need for the revised Criminal Code 
articles to be very explicit and leave no room for 
judicial interpretation -- because judges and 
prosecutors in Armenia have shown that they cannot 
be counted on to exercise discretion fairly and 
objectively, but will exploit any loopholes to 
exercise prejudice in favor of the government's 
preferred outcome. 
 
YEREVAN 00000078  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶10.  (C) PolChief also discussed the matter with 
Harutunian's colleague on the PACE delegation, 
Armen Rustamian, who chairs the Foreign Relations 
committee in parliament and is also the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaksutyun) 
representative to the Governing Coalition. 
Rustamian confirmed  Harutunian,s timetable, and 
said the challenge in drafting the revisions was to 
find the right balance between protecting freedom 
of assembly, while also protecting the state from 
bona fide threats to the constitutional order. 
Rustamian predicted that the revisions would face 
resistance from the Prosecutor General and Justice 
Minister, but was confident they would nonetheless 
pass, because "there is no choice."  He noted that 
his own party had been persecuted under former 
President Levon Ter-Petrossian (LTP), whose 
administration abused an earlier generation of 
these same criminal code provisions to declare the 
Dashnaks a threat to national security and the 
constitutional order.  Rustamian commented that the 
Dashnaks have for months advocated within the 
governing coalition for the political detainees to 
be freed by an amnesty, but the dominant ruling 
coalition partners had refused.  He said the 
current approach amounted to a much-delayed amnesty 
by another name.  He was confident the government 
would use these revisions as a face-saving tactic 
to free the remaining opposition detainees, after 
dropping all charges. 
 
---------------------- 
OPPOSITION'S REACTION 
---------------------- 
 
¶11. (U) The opposition Armenian National Congress 
(ANC), led by former president Levon Ter- 
Petrossian, was far more skeptical of PACE 
Resolution 1634.  The ANC said publicly that 
Armenian authorities are simply buying time with 
cosmetic changes, and that PACE had been taken in 
by this. In a statement released January 28, the 
opposition alliance argued that most of about 60 
oppositional prisoners have been charged under 
different articles of the Criminal Code -- not (or 
not only) 225 and 300. The ANC is concerned that 
the issue of those prisoners remains unaddressed. 
(NOTE:  All of the "Trial of Seven" defendants, the 
most prominent opposition figures jailed, are 
charged under articles 225 and 300, though two of 
them -- MPs Myasnik Malkhasian and Sasun Mikaelian 
-- also face charges of felony resisting arrest and 
illegal weapons possession.  END NOTE) 
 
¶12. (U) The ANC further criticized Prescott and 
Colombier for avoiding meetings with the opposition 
during their last trip to Yerevan. "We believe the 
quality of their report, and consequently the 
credibility of the PACE, has suffered as a result" 
the ANC statement read.  Senior ANC policy 
coordinator Levon Zurabian lambasted Resolution 
1634 in Strasbourg after it was adopted, saying it 
was based on "one-sided and false information," and 
accused the Assembly of being taken in by 
government promises.  Once back in Yerevan, 
however, Zurabian took a more moderate tone 
February 3, commenting that the resolution "creates 
the basis for working to free the political 
prisoners, and sets a particular course for 
restoring democratic freedoms."  Zurabian 
reiterated that he did not trust the GOAM to 
fulfill its commitments, implying that PACE will be 
able to respond again if/when that proves true. 
 
¶13. (C) The opposition Heritage Party also 
complained scathingly about Resolution 1634, 
publicly denouncing the Assembly for " compromising 
its principles in Armenia and several other 
countries in the region, including on freedom of 
expression, justice, torture in prisons, and other 
rights."  In a private meeting with poloffs January 
29, Heritage Faction Leader Armen Martirosian was 
much more relaxed. He said the PACE decision not to 
suspend Armenia was fair, since Armenia is viewed 
in comparison with other countries that have 
undergone democratic reversals but had not been 
suspended.  However, he felt the Assembly should 
have left the term "political prisoners" in the 
text of the Resolution in order to &sober up8 the 
 
YEREVAN 00000078  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
Armenian authorities.  LTP confidante and top ANC 
leader Davit Shahnazarian expressed mild 
disappointment with Resolution 1634, but did not 
dwell on the issue, in a February 9 meeting with 
Ambassador and PolChief. 
 
¶14.  (C) The acting chairman of the Armenian 
National Movement, Khachik Kokobelian, which is a 
leading constituent part of the ANC coalition, told 
PolChief privately that many in the ANC leadership 
had come around to the point of view that 
Resolution 1634 is good news.  He said they 
interpreted the relative softness of 1634, as 
evidence that Armenia and Azerbaijan must be close 
to announcing a framework agreement on resolving 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  He said that ANC 
headquarters was delighted with this prospect, 
because they relished the chance to whip up 
nationalist fervor against President Sargsian and 
believed this would lend renewed passion to the 
ANC's anti-government campaign.  Kokobelian claimed 
that he was thoroughly disgusted by such a 
strategy, which he considered both highly cynical - 
- given LTP's record on the issue as president -- 
and counter to Armenia's national interests in 
achieving a peace settlement. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶15.  (C) While Resolution 1634 may have backtracked 
a bit more than we might have liked in its language 
describing Armenia's continuing democratic deficit, 
the approach of negotiating an achievable concrete 
plan with the GOAM to get Armenian democracy back 
on track with specific improvements seems a path of 
constructive engagement.  We hope that Rustamian is 
more correct than Harutunian in his assessment that 
all the politically-motivated defendants will be 
freed as a result of the revisions.  It is possible 
that Harutunian is hedging to lower our 
expectations, against the risk of a failure of 
political will, but it is also entirely likely that 
the government wants to hold onto some 
prosecutorial leverage against the opposition 
detainees if it feels it can get away with it. 
 
¶16.  (C) On the opposition side, as nutty as 
Kokobelian's scenario may sound, we cannot rule out 
that it may be a correct portrayal into the 
opposition's thinking.  That would explain the 
disconnect between the opposition's public and 
private tone on the issue.  This kind of Byzantine 
geopolitical reasoning and tendency to attribute 
events to the supposed hidden agendas of the "great 
powers" is very much in tune with how LTP and his 
senior aides think.  Nothing would so delight LTP, 
we suspect, as to topple Serzh Sargsian using the 
same issue and populist tactics that Sargsian (with 
Robert Kocharian and the late Vazgen Sargsian) used 
to oust Ter-Petrossian in 1998.  Meanwhile, 
Heritage leader Armen Martirosian also predicted to 
PolChief that rising public anger over a cresting 
economic crisis, combined with Sargsian's damaged 
democratic legitimacy, will rally the people around 
the opposition banner in greater numbers than ever 
come springtime, and will ultimately topple the 
government.  ANC leaders continue to claim 
privately that they will maintain a low public 
profile -- in the face of internal pressure from 
their supporters to be more aggressive -- so as to 
leave authorities plenty of maneuvering room to 
negotiate with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, 
without being weakened by domestic discord. 
YOVANOVITCH