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FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7739
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000122 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2019 
TAGS: PREL ENRG RS CZ BO UP PL
SUBJECT: UKRAINE, POLAND, CZECH REPUBLIC SUMMIT ON GAS, 
BELARUS, AND EURO-ASPIRATIONS 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DAN SAINZ FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D 
) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  President Lech Kaczynski's January 28 
meeting in Wroclaw with Ukrainian President Yushchenko and 
Czech Prime Minister Topolanek, representing the EU 
presidency, produced only an inconclusive assessment of the 
Ukraine-Russia gas agreement.  Officials from President Lech 
Kaczynski's office and the Czech Embassy told us February 2 
that no major decisions were made, and offered different 
perspectives on Yushchenko's demeanor.  The Polish official 
said Yushchenko was concerned about the "ambiguity" of the 
gas deal but emphasized throughout the meeting that he would 
respect it.  The Czech official, on the other hand, said 
Yushchenko flip-flopped between declaring his acceptance of 
the agreement terms and threatening to cancel it on the 
grounds it would ruin Ukraine economically.  Yushchenko also 
sought reassurances of European support for Kyiv's 
Euro-Atlantic aspirations.  The Wroclaw meeting also touched 
on Belarus; the Polish President's office told us it 
supported an invitation to Belarusian President Lukashenka to 
the EU summit in May to launch the Eastern Partnership.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
NO MAJOR DECISIONS, BUT MUCH FRETTING 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Maciej Jakubik, who handles Eastern neighborhood 
issues in the Presidential Chancellery, and Jan Tomasek, 
Czech DCM in Warsaw, told us in separate meetings that "no 
major decisions" emerged from President Kaczynski's January 
28 trilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Yushchenko and 
Czech Prime Minister Topolanek. The meeting--organized at 
Kaczynski's initiative--took stock of the Ukraine-Russia gas 
agreement, as well as the damage done to Ukraine'sreputation 
during the January gas dispute with Russia.  Topolanek, 
according to both officials, pumped Yushchenko for details 
about the agreement terms and warned the Ukrainian President 
not to cancel the deal.  Topolanek argued that Ukraine was 
lessening its reliance on Russia by moving towards market 
prices for energy supplies.  Kaczynski warned Yushchenko that 
Ukraine's credibility in Europe had been damaged and that 
Kyiv would have to redouble efforts to be seen as a reliable 
partner. 
 
DIFFERENT VIEWS OF YUSHCHENKO 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Our Polish and Czech interlocutors offered different 
assessments of Yushchenko's role at the meeting.  Jakubik 
said Yushchenko was concerned about the "ambiguity" of the 
gas deal but emphasized throughout the meeting that he would 
respect it in order to avoid damage to Ukraine's 
Euro-Atlantic aspirations.  Jakubik, who participated in the 
Wroclaw meeting, implied that the Ukrainian President was 
relatively calm throughout the meeting but noted that 
Kaczynski and Topolanek appeared frustrated at times when 
Yushchenko recited long lists of gas-related statistics like 
"a good Communist bureaucrat."  Tomasek, on the other hand, 
told us the Czech Ambassador participated in the meeting and 
had observed that the occasionally agitated Yushchenko 
flip-flopped between declaring his acceptance of the 
agreement terms and threatening to cancel the deal. 
Yushchenko emphasized that the agreement Ukrainian Prime 
Minister Tymoshenko negotiated would "economically ruin" 
Ukraine due to lost transit revenues.  He also warned there 
would soon be a third "gas war" with Russia.  According to 
Tomasek, the Ukrainian president told the other leaders that 
Europe should thank him for accepting the deal despite the 
damage Ukraine would incur. 
 
WITH WHOM DOES POLAND NEGOTIATE FOR GAS? 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Kaczynski unsuccessfully tried to discern the fate of 
RosUkrNego (RUE) and its gas supplies to Poland after the gas 
deal was brokered.  Yushchenko apparently did not know. 
Ukrainian Prime Minister Tymoshenko had bought RosUkrNego's 
debt, but it was unclear who owned its gas supplies.  Jakubik 
told us that Polish officials were trying to figure out with 
whom they should deal to resume RosUkrNego's gas shipments to 
Poland; Gazprom has not responded to their queries.  (NOTE: 
Separate from the current dispute, Poland's state-owned oil 
and gas company, PGNiG, is in ongoing negotiations with 
Gazprom to extend contracts set to expire at the end of 2009. 
 GoP officials have long hoped to remove RUE from the deal in 
favor of such direct contracts with Gazprom.) 
 
MIXED RESULTS FOR EASTERN PARTNERSHIP 
------------------------------------- 
 
WARSAW 00000122  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) Yushchenko evidently received "a positive response" 
from Kaczynski and Topolanek regarding Ukraine's 
Euro-Atlantic aspirations.  Jakubik and Tomasek, however, 
assessed that the Ukraine-Russia gas conflict would probably 
have a mixed impact on the EU's will to pursue the Eastern 
Partnership program with Ukraine and its neighbors.  On the 
one hand, the conflict demonstrated the importance of drawing 
Europe's Eastern neighbors closer to the EU fold, 
particularly in enhancing Europe's energy security and 
promoting transparency in the region.  On the other hand, the 
conflict reinforced Europe's perception of Ukraine as an 
unreliable partner.  Tomasek added that the Eastern 
Partnership faced two other major challenges: 1) the impact 
of the economic crisis on the EU's will to adopt visa-free 
arrangements with its Eastern neighbors; and 2) the lack of 
cooperation among the former Soviet republics. 
 
POLISH PRESIDENT'S OFFICE: BRING LUKASHENKA INTO THE FOLD 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶6. (C) Jakubik told us that Yushchenko had voiced support in 
Wroclaw for drawing Belarus towards the EU, a plea that 
Kaczynski welcomed.  Jakubik strongly endorsed the idea of 
inviting Lukashenka to the May EU summit that will launch the 
Eastern Partnership initiative.  Poloffs cautioned that the 
EU should extend such an invitation to Lukashenka only on the 
basis of significant, demonstrable reforms.  Jakubik replied 
that Europe had to seize this critical moment to draw Belarus 
to the West before Russia fully engulfs the country. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶7. (C) It took MFA officials two days to get a read-out on 
President Kaczynski's meeting in Wroclaw, but Kaczynski and 
the Tusk government are largely in agreement concerning 
Poland's underlying policy of drawing its Eastern neighbors 
into the West's orbit.  However, in the case of Belarus, 
Polish MFA officials have offered differing opinions as to 
what the EU should require before issuing an invitation to 
Lukashenka to attend the launching of the Eastern Partnership 
-- some call only for no back-sliding by Minsk, while others 
call for further progress. 
ASHE