O 272356Z FEB 09
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5969

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000197 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2019 
TAGS: UNSC PREL PHUM ETTC MCAP KN
 
SUBJECT: DPRK: RUSSIA AND JAPAN CONSIDER MISSILE LAUNCH 
RESPONSE 
 
Classified By: Amb. Alex Wolff for Reasons 1.4 (B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) In separate meetings with Ambassador Wolff, Russian 
Deputy Perm Rep Dolgov and Japanese Perm Rep Takasu offered 
different approaches to responding to a possible Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) missile launch.  Dolgov 
said that Moscow had sought to discourage the DPRK from this 
destabilizing action, but believed that the launch of a DPRK 
"space satellite" would not be a direct violation of UNSCR 
¶1718.  Russia's approach in the Council, he said, would 
therefore depend on a technical analysis of any launch. 
Wolff said the United States would consider any launch to be 
a violation of UNSCR 1718 and require a Council response. 
According to Japanese Perm Rep Takasu, Japan also believed 
that any launch would be a violation of 1718.  Japan, he 
said, believed the Council should respond with a resolution 
(not a Presidential Statement) that would enhance existing 
sanctions against DPRK.  Takasu urgently sought a U.S. 
response to this idea, as it would allow the Japanese foreign 
minister to better calibrate his message during an upcoming 
trip to Beijing.  In the event of a missile launch, Wolff 
emphasized to Takasu the need for prior consultation to avoid 
demonstrating disunity.  A Presidential Statement, Wolff 
added, might be a better first step.  END SUMMARY. 
 
RUSSIA: REACTION DEPENDS ON WHAT IS LAUNCHED 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶1.  (C) On February 27, Russian Deputy Perm Rep Dolgov told 
Ambassador Wolff that Moscow had been discouraging the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) from a possible 
missile launch.  Reading from instructions, Dolgov said that 
Moscow had warned DPRK not to pursue even a "space 
experiment," as this might be "evaluated under certain 
circumstances" as a violation of UNSCR 1718.  He said, 
however, that Russia's reaction in the Security Council would 
depend on the technical details of what precisely DPRK had 
launched.  Strictly speaking, he said, a launch that placed a 
satellite in orbit would not be a direct violation of UNSCR 
1718, even if it might be seen as a violation of the "spirit" 
of that resolution. 
 
¶2.  (C) Dolgov conveyed Russia's wish that no parties state 
publicly in advance whether such a launch would violate UNSCR 
1718, adding that UNSCR 1718 did not touch upon the peaceful 
exploration of space.  If there were to be a launch, he urged 
close coordination with the United States to analyze the 
missile trajectory and other technical parameters required to 
make an assessment of what actually had been launched.  He 
noted that this could take some time and therefore the 
Council should refrain from meeting until this analysis was 
complete. 
 
¶3.  (C) Wolff responded that even if DPRK claims the missile 
is a space launch vehicle, this act would constitute a 
violation of not just the spirit, but also the letter of 
UNSCR 1718.  Adding that a launch would also be highly 
provocative, Wolff said the Council would have to respond. 
He added that the United States shares the view that there 
should be prior consultations before any Council meeting, 
particularly so as to avoid highlighting any divisions among 
participants in the Six Party process.  He emphasized, 
though, that for political reasons -- including the need to 
manage the reactions of South Korea and Japan -- a Council 
meeting could not wait long after a launch.  Indeed, he 
observed, it could be better to channel the reactions of 
Japan and South Korea through Council action. 
 
JAPAN: WILL SEEK RESOLUTION, SANCTIONS ENHANCEMENT 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶6.  (C) Also on February 27, Japanese Perm Rep Takasu 
urgently requested a meeting to convey Tokyo's considered 
position following his conversation with Ambassador Rice the 
previous day and the Japanese foreign minister's discussion 
with the Secretary regarding Council action in response to a 
DPRK missile launch.  Takasu said Japan concluded that a 
missile launch would indeed be a violation of UNSCR 1718 and 
his foreign minister intended to state this publicly during 
his visit to Beijing the coming weekend. 
 
¶7.  (C) Citing the seriousness of the threat to Japan's 
security and the lack of progress on the DPRK-Japan bilateral 
relationship, Takasu said Japan would pursue a Security 
Council resolution in response to a launch.  A Council 
Presidential Statement (PRST), he argued, would not be strong 
enough.  He said Japan would not seek new sanctions, but 
rather the enhancement of existing sanctions measures found 
in UNSCR 1718, such as directing the Security Council's DPRK 
Sanctions Committee ("1718 Committee") to designate new 
individuals and entities responsible for the launch.  Takasu 
 
explained that if the United States were adamantly opposed to 
a resolution in response to a launch, then Japan would seek 
to calibrate its message to Beijing accordingly. 
 
¶8.  (C) Wolff said that the United States shares Japan's 
assessment that any missile launch would be a violation, both 
in spirit and letter, of UNSCR 1718 and would require a 
response from the Council.  He emphasized the need to consult 
closely in advance of a possible Council meeting so as to not 
demonstrate disunity.  Wolff observed that if DPRK 
successfully launched a satellite in orbit, then Russia and 
China would likely argue that no violation had occurred and 
would therefore be unlikely to support a resolution.  A PRST 
might be a better first step, he suggested.  Takasu said he 
understood and urged us to respond to their proposed approach 
urgently to help shape the Japanese foreign minister's 
presentation in Beijing. 
 
Rice 
 
 
NNNN