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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000038 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR RPM, SCA/A 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS MARR NATO AF
SUBJECT: RFG: TAKING FORWARD THE AFGHAN-PROPOSED MILITARY 
TECHNICAL AGREEMENT AT NATO 
 
REF: A. COMISAF DECEMBER 30 TACTICAL DIRECTIVE 
     ¶B. MILITARY TECHNICAL AGREEMENT PROPOSAL (AF/NATO) 
 
USNATO 00000038  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Walter Andrusyszyn for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary and Comment: THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST, see 
Para 11.  ISAF Senior Civilian Representative Gentilini 
briefed NATO Permanent Representatives on January 28.  He 
argued that NATO should, with caution, view the draft 
military technical agreement on revised force procedures, 
proposed by the Afghan Defense Ministry in early January, as 
a political opportunity.  By entering negotiations, he said, 
ISAF could demonstrate a willingness to have its troops 
comply with jointly agreed but distinctly Afghan terms, 
sending a strong signal that ISAF is empowering the Afghan 
government and doing everything it can to prevent civilian 
casualties.  He added that the civilian casualties issue now 
dominates every meeting with Afghan officials.  Gentilini 
cautioned, however, that NATO should not get ahead of a U.S. 
bilateral response, since the Afghans approached the U.S. 
first with a draft in December.  He urged a thorough military 
and legal review of draft language, which he said contained 
several "problematic" clauses. 
 
¶2.  (S) Gentilini's emphasis on responding to the Afghans 
cautiously but in a timely manner, and following the U.S. 
lead, is a pragmatic approach.  Post thinks a mutually 
acceptable military technical agreement would not only 
buttress Afghan public support for the international military 
presence, but also strengthen the Allies' commitment to the 
ISAF mission.  Post seeks guidance on NATO taking forward a 
response to the draft military technical agreement.  End 
summary and comment. 
 
Exchange of Draft Military Technical Agreements 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶3.  (S/REL NATO) In early January, Afghan Defense Minister 
Wardak passed to ISAF Senior Civilian Representative 
Gentilini a draft military technical agreement, which lays 
out revised conduct procedures for international forces.  The 
document was similar to one the Afghans gave the U.S. in 
December 2008.  The U.S. told the Afghans it could be several 
months before we could provide a response, to give the new 
Administration time to consider the initiative.  In the 
meantime, ISAF Commander General McKiernan issued a revised 
Tactical Directive (December 30, ref A), addressing many of 
the concerns the Afghan government raised about civilian 
casualties. 
 
¶4.  (S/REL NATO) An initial discussion at NATO of the draft 
military technical agreement generated informal consensus 
among Allies to move slowly, synchronize a response with the 
U.S., and seek political, military, and legal advice.  The 
Secretary General (SYG) sought advice from the NATO legal 
advisor and asked the North Atlantic Council to agree to task 
military authorities to give their advice.  He said he would 
send the Afghan government a "holding letter" noting that 
NATO would need time to consider the proposal and work on a 
response.  The SYG planned to ask President Karzai to refrain 
from politicizing deliberations as an element of his 
re-election campaign. 
 
Bolstering ISAF on Civilian Casualties and Urging Caution 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶5.  (S/REL ISAF) Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) 
Gentilini provided an update to NATO PermReps on January 28. 
He said NATO should, with caution, view the draft military 
technical agreement as a political opportunity to demonstrate 
ISAF's willingness to have its troops comply with jointly 
agreed, but distinctly Afghan, terms.  While a revision of 
ISAF force procedures should not precede a U.S. bilateral 
response, he continued, reaching agreement with the Afghans 
 
USNATO 00000038  002 OF 003 
 
 
could give ISAF a political boost on the issue of civilian 
casualties.  The SCR said this had become the most important 
issue in Afghanistan, dominating daily Afghan press and every 
meeting with Afghan officials. 
 
¶6.  (S/REL ISAF) Gentilini hailed COMISAF's recent Tactical 
Directive as "excellent" and said it had already helped 
reassure the Afghan government and public of ISAF's 
commitment to avoiding civilian casualties.  But he noted 
that ISAF's directive is perceived as one-sided.  Despite his 
enthusiasm that a mutually acceptable Afghan-ISAF military 
technical agreement would send a strong public signal that 
ISAF is taking active steps to prevent civilian casualties, 
Gentilini advised cautious and assiduous military and legal 
review of the draft language.  He noted that the existing 
proposal from Defense Minister Wardak contained several "very 
problematic" clauses. 
 
¶7.  (S/REL NATO) Ambassador Volker intervened and agreed that 
NATO has an opportunity to "put ourselves on the same side" 
with the Afghan government by considering a revised technical 
agreement, but stressed that caution must prevail on choosing 
appropriate language, and NATO efforts should dovetail with 
those of the U.S. 
 
MOD and MFA Flexible -- Karzai Unhelpful 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S/REL ISAF) Gentilini conveyed that Wardak and Afghan 
Foreign Minister Spanta view the Ministry of Defense draft as 
a flexible starting position.  They understand that NATO 
wants to synchronize its response with the U.S., Gentilini 
said.  Wardak told the SCR that he does not expect a final 
decision from NATO by the Defense Ministers' meeting in 
Krakow, Poland, February 19-20 (which Wardak will attend), 
but would be pleased with an interim response such as a 
textual counter-proposal from the Allies. 
 
¶9.  (S/REL ISAF) Gentilini said Wardak implied that he 
personally is not pushing an accelerated timeline, but he 
cannot control Karzai.  The Afghan President recently met 
with families of reported civilian casualties and told them 
he would give the U.S. and NATO a month to respond to the 
draft military technical agreement.  The SCR thought Karzai's 
comments were bluster and that with interim feedback from 
NATO (and, ideally, the U.S.) the Ministers could probably 
manage the President's rhetoric.  The SYG said he would speak 
to Karzai on the margins of the Munich Security Conference 
(February 6-8) to urge his patience as NATO formulates its 
response. 
 
Alliance-knitting benefits 
-------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) The approach Gentilini outlined resonated at NATO, 
and Norwegian, German, Italian, UK, and Portuguese PermReps 
voiced support.  Short of directly asking the U.S. to 
initiate bilateral talks on the military technical agreement, 
Allies were clear that they want the U.S. response to drive 
NATO's.  If the U.S. uses this window of opportunity to 
negotiate with the Afghans and align draft language to meet 
our interests, it is likely the Alliance will try to match 
our text, signaling cohesion and solidarity.  This is a good 
chance to show Allies that the U.S. is taking a cooperative 
approach and encouraging the Afghan government's principled 
participation in decision-making. 
 
¶11.  (S) ACTION REQUEST: Post seeks guidance on NATO taking 
forward a response to the draft military technical agreement. 
 Post learned that the international staff is considering a 
timeline that would have Defense Ministers in Krakow 
(February) task the Military Committee to prepare its advice 
in time for a May Chiefs of Defense meeting, enabling Defense 
Ministers to endorse an agreement as early as June.  Post 
 
USNATO 00000038  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
expects continued weekly discussion of this topic. 
 
VOLKER