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UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000078 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/MNA, VCI/NA, L/ACV, IO/UNP 
DOE FOR NN-40 
JCS FOR J5/DDIN 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP, ATSH/NCB/NT, AND DTRA 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM AORC KTBT IR
SUBJECT: COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT): On-Site 
Inspection (OSI) Discussions at Working Group B (WGB)-32 
 
REF: State 11462 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: REFTEL requested U.S. Delegation provide detailed 
reporting of the on-site inspection (OSI) discussions at Working 
Group B (WGB)-32 of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization. 
As instructed delegation was primarily in a listening and 
information gathering mode, and avoided putting forth definitive 
positions except where explicitly noted in the detailed guidance in 
REFTEL.  This cable provides the requested reporting on the OSI 
discussions which began on February 9 and concluded on February 18. 
Reporting on the balance of WGB-32 activities will be provided 
SEPTEL at the conclusion of the meeting.  Aside from the first ever 
US ever presence, the other notable aspect of this discussion was 
the large and generally unhelpful Iranian delegation.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Following the pro forma February 9, 2009, opening plenary 
of the thirty-second session of Working Group B of the Preparatory 
Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization, WGB held six sessions (under the direction of Task 
Leader Malcomb Coxhead (AUS)) on elaboration of the draft On-Site 
Inspection Operational Manual, and two sessions each (under the 
direction of Task Leader Vitaly Shchukin (RF)) on the OSI Major 
Program and on Common Issues Related to the Integrated Field 
Exercise (conducted August 26 to September 28, 2008, at a former 
USSR nuclear Test Site in Kazakhstan). 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Even though the delegation remained cautious and low-key 
in its participation in the OSI work of WGB, U.S. attendance at the 
OSI sessions drew immediate attention.  The U.S. had requested that 
both OSI task leaders avoid making any statements welcoming or 
calling undue attention to the return of the U.S. in OSI meetings, 
and both obliged.  However, the first U.S. intervention in the OSI 
manual discussions caused many heads in the room to immediately turn 
in the direction of the U.S. delegation.  A UK delegate commented 
later that he had actually taken the trouble to note that it took 
one hour twelve minutes before the first U.S. intervention; it was 
thus clear that official U.S. presence in the room was immediately 
having an effect on the dynamics of the discussion. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The delegation of Iran was easily the largest national 
delegation present during the OSI discussions, having approximately 
10 members in the room at any given time.  The delegation included, 
according to Iran's statements, at least one legal expert. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
DRAFT ON-SITE INSPECTION OPERATIONAL MANUAL 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) TL Coxhead opened discussions on the OSI operational 
manual by reminding delegations that WGB-30 had agreed on a 
framework, set out in CTBT/WGB/TL-18/37, for the third round of 
elaboration of the draft OSI Operational Manual and that discussions 
would proceed with a review of changes proposed for the Model Text, 
contained in CTBT/WGB/TL-18/39.  Iran immediately asked for time to 
review the proposals in TL-18/39 and indicated that it would soon 
table two national papers that contained its own set of proposed 
changes.  The Task Leader reminded all delegations of the agreed 
framework and that the proposals contained in TL-18/39 had been 
available for review and comment on the Experts Communication System 
(ECS) since December 2008.  Other Signatories, such as the UK and 
Germany, had provided comments, which the Task Leader took into 
account when formulating his proposals to address the concerns 
expressed in Signatory comments.  Iran countered that it was 
operating with the understanding that WGB was still in the second 
round of elaboration.  Iran and others would not concede the Task 
Leader's point.  The issue of the appropriate round of elaboration 
and, therefore, the framework for proceeding in WGB-32 remained a 
source of irritation throughout the remainder of the operational 
manual discussions. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Discussions then turned to the proposed revisions of the 
Model Text contained in TL-18/39, examining French recommendations, 
UK and German comments, and Task Leader proposals.  Per REFTEL 
guidance, the U.S. posed no objection to FR1-4, supported FR16, and 
commented on FR21-23, but resolution was not achieved because Iran 
posed challenges.  Among other issues, Iran insisted that the manual 
text explicitly require the OSI Inspection Team (IT) to 
"demonstrate" to the Inspected State Party (ISP) its impartiality 
and open-mindedness and for the IT to "respect" the rights of the 
ISP.  All other French proposals were accepted to U.S. satisfaction 
per guidance.  During the course of the discussions, the U.S. Del 
 
sought clarifications of proposed textual changes and for a "sense 
of the room" on approaches to critical provisions of the OSI regime. 
 In taking this approach, the U.S. Del was able to point out, 
without pointing fingers, some "sloppiness" in drafting and 
inconsistencies in application of critical provisions.  Germany 
commented it appreciated having "new" (U.S.) eyes on the operational 
manual. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) With the conclusion of discussions on TL-18/39 and Task 
Leader non-papers on ISP Equipment and Operators, and Equipment 
Checking at the point of entry (POE), Task Leader Coxhead allowed 
discussion of proposals from the Iranian national papers.  Of note, 
China indicated it also had specific new proposals but would allow 
discussion of them to be deferred to the next WGB.  Most of the 
Iranian proposals spurred discussion amongst chiefly the UK, France, 
Germany, Israel, and Russia.  Egypt, Algeria, Czech Republic, 
Croatia, and Slovakia also made infrequent but useful interventions. 
 One of the most contentious Iranian proposals was adding the 
statement "any approved change by the Executive Committee (to the 
manual) will be applied for each State Party that formally announces 
its agreement with that change."  The UK delegation was adamant that 
such a statement goes against the spirit of the Treaty, because it 
creates tiers of obligations amongst Parties.  Other contentious 
Iranian proposals centered on the issue of overflights.  Egypt 
supported a proposal that required flight plans to be available to 
the ISP when the IT arrives at the POE.  Task Leader Coxhead, a PTS 
staff member, and some participants of the Integrated Field Exercise 
in 2008 (IFE08) all stated that such a requirement was impractical 
for a variety of technical reasons, but Iran would not concede, so 
the issue was left for later discussion.  Iran also insisted the 
Treaty Protocol gives the ISP the right to provide all inspection 
equipment used during overflights.  Coxhead and other delegations 
said they read the Protocol to mean the ISP has the right to provide 
 
the aircraft, with equipment standard to an aircraft, for use during 
overflights.  Again, Iran would not concede, so the Task Leader said 
he would request legal guidance from the PTS on rights the Protocol 
gave the ISP in this regard.  Separately, Iran also presented the 
novel legal argument that Treaty provisions allowing the ISP to 
recover costs incurred by the ISP during the conduct of an OSI to 
mean that the CTBTO also would be liable for the cost of mitigating 
any environmental damage caused by the OSI.  When Iran insisted that 
other delegations need to think about Iran's position on liability 
for environmental damage, Coxhead remarked that Iran should be the 
one to give the matter more thought.  Coxhead concluded the 
discussion of the proposals made by Iran by stating that they could 
be revisited during later WGB meetings. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Task Leader Coxhead presented a draft paper (to be 
published as CTBT/WGB/TL-18/41) on a program of work for the third 
round of elaboration of the draft OSI Operational Manual, with 
priority given to dealing with lessons identified from the IFE08 and 
unresolved issues in the Model Text.  Of the fourteen topics listed, 
four will be addressed at WGB-33 in August/September 2009: 
inspection preparations; IT health and safety; overflights; and IT 
support.  The remaining issues will be addressed in the following 
three WGB meetings.  These ten issues are: effective function of the 
IT at its base of operations; equipment checking; passive seismic; 
radionuclides; confidentiality and managed access; reporting and 
post-inspection activities; phenomenology; drilling; subsidiary 
documents; and other issues.  Coxhead stressed that discussion on 
each of these issues would focus on previously disputed language 
vice new issues with proposed textual changes.  However, perhaps as 
a concession to Iran, China, and the United States, Coxhead then 
said it would still be possible to raise new language issues from 
the floor at WGB or, preferably, by national or friend papers that 
were able to be reviewed by all delegations prior to a meeting. 
U.S. Del notes that Russia and France also have issues they wish to 
raise.  The Task Leader finally asked for the "Friends of the Task 
Leader" (i.e., individuals from various Delegations who work 
intersessionally impartially, without regard to their national 
positions) to draft issue papers on each of these fourteen 
priorities to focus on the issue principles and not textual 
minutiae.  Iran offered to help on papers covering the issues of 
overflights and confidentiality and managed access, but Iran and 
France both expressed concern the Task Leader was changing the 
methodology of OSI manual discussions. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Washington should note that the issue of a schedule for 
completion of round three of the elaboration process was discussed 
by WGB but not agreed.  However, WGB did agree that the goal of the 
third round should be producing a near final version of the OSI 
 
 
Operational Manual, that is, a manual that could be slightly 
adjusted and then approved by the first Conference of States Parties 
following CTBT entry-into-force.  China and Iran rejected an 
intermediate goal of connecting the production of the manual to the 
next major OSI training cycle, since this would obviously require 
accelerated drafting efforts and additional meetings of WGB for 
discussions. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Task Leader Coxhead, the UK OSI representative, and 
others remarked privately that the U.S. had returned to 
participating in the draft OSI Operational Manual work at a very 
opportune time, since work on the manual was entering a new phase. 
They suggested that by re-engaging in these discussions at this time 
the U.S. would have a greater opportunity both to shape how the work 
on the manual would proceed and to ensure U.S. equities, to include 
the effectiveness of the OSI element of the CTBT verification 
regime, would be protected.  Task Leader Coxhead specifically 
solicited the U.S. to supply a "Friend of the Task Leader" to work 
on the issue paper(s) that would address managed access and 
confidentiality issues.  The U.S. Del said that they would take this 
request back to Washington, and noted that the U.S. would look at 
the complete list of OSI Operational Manual issues to see if the 
U.S. would want to contribute "Friends" on other topics. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Despite the fact that the more extreme views of ISP 
rights espoused by Iran seemed relatively unsupported by other 
delegations, there is reason to be concerned that the Operational 
Manual discussions leading up to this WGB may have gone too far in 
protecting ISP rights - including the over-application of managed 
access rights - at the expense of the IT's ability to accomplish its 
mandate. Requirements have been introduced in the manual requiring 
the IT continuously not only to remain fair and open-minded but also 
to find ways of demonstrating to the ISP that the IT is acting in 
such a manner. The impression given is that WGB has been less 
focused on ensuring that the inspectors can effectively and 
efficiently carry out an inspection that can resolve the event of 
concern that led to the call for the OSI. Washington will need to 
carefully examine the Operational Manual and assess this balance to 
help ensure that the OSI can be effective in resolving concerns 
while still providing adequate protection to legitimate national 
security concerns of the ISP. 
 
----------------------------- 
OSI MAJOR PROGRAM DISCUSSIONS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Task Leader Shchukin opened discussions by inviting the 
PTS OSI Division Director, Boris Kvok (RF), to review the 
accomplishments of the 2008 Program of Work and the execution of the 
plan for 2009.  There will be five OSI-related field exercises this 
year.  These exercises could present opportunities for U.S. 
technical experts to participate in OSI-related work, which 
personnel from the PTS OSI Division privately indicated they would 
welcome.  Noble gas field equipment will be tested in October in 
what is called NG09.  The Swedish SAUNA, Russian ARIX, and Chinese 
XESPM radio xenon systems will be tested during this exercise.  The 
PTS's expected outcome of the exercise is to finalize the design of 
its OSI noble gas detection system and sampling equipment.  The PTS 
will conduct in the summer a "catch-the plume" exercise to test its 
search logic and sampling strategy.  It will use a mobile SAUNA 
system to detect xenon gas released by a nuclear reactor in Europe. 
An experiment called DE09 will take place in Finland.  It will test 
the Seismic After-Shock Monitoring System (SAMS), the Field 
Integration Management System (FIMS), and Continuation Period 
Technologies (CPT) equipment during industrial underground 
explosions that are expected to create cavities similar in size to 
underground nuclear explosions.  The PTS plans to test its recently 
purchased gravimeter in Hungary in September.  Finally, the PTS is 
planning an earth resistivity field exercise in the UK. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Following the briefings on the programs of work and 
development of noble gas equipment, the UK commented that the 2009 
Program of Work needs prioritization in view of limited staff.  Iran 
questioned the authority of the OSI Division of the PTS to implement 
lessons learned from the IFE08 in its 2009 Program of Work, 
specifically highlighting training.  Iran also questioned the use of 
consultants by the OSI Division to accomplish work for the IFE08. 
France indicated that because of the changed political environment 
and possible earlier than previously thought entry-into-force of the 
treaty, the OSI Division should expand its scope of work and an 
increase in resources, including staff. 
 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Task Leader Shchukin then moved to a brief discussion of 
the PTS OSI Division Strategic Plan, suggesting that the plan 
developed in 2006 (CTBT/PTS/INF.793) required updating.  The PTS 
presented a plan for updating the Strategic Plan and there was 
little discussion by delegations.  The U.S. Del asked about the WGB 
OSI Strategic Plan, suggesting that whatever guidance WGB provided 
to the PTS should be linked to the WGB Strategic Plan.  The response 
provided by Task Leader Shchukin acknowledged that WGB does not have 
a Strategic Plan for the development of the OSI element of the CTBT 
verification regime.  However, WGB does have milestones for the 
development of the program.  During discussion on the refinement of 
OSI milestones, France insisted the Task Leader explore three 
scenarios when making milestones.  The first scenario was a 
continuation of OSI activities under a constant budget, or the 
current "no real growth" situation.  France questioned whether such 
a scenario would allow WGB to reach its OSI milestones by 2013, the 
year suggested by several past WGBs for the first full-up "Mock OSI 
Inspection."  The second scenario was a sweeping change in the 
political environment towards a push for EIF causing a large 
increase in available funding.  Iran cautioned the Task Leader to 
not be "overly optimistic" with a scenario like this.  The third 
French scenario, which they called the "realistic" scenario, was a 
moderate increase in the budget over the next few years.  The Task 
Leader took these into consideration and said he would open a 
discussion on the ECS on the steps associated with each milestone 
and present a new paper on OSI milestones at WGB-33. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) The issues of setting deadlines and obligations for 
meetings were raised at various times throughout OSI discussions. 
Iran and Russia both oppose any mention of a deadline for completing 
OSI work, even in the hypothetical "if we are to complete OSI work 
in two years..." formulation.  Iran said it would be imprudent to 
set a deadline because entry-into-force might occur before the 
deadline.  Russia added that, based on its experience of working on 
the same OSI issues for over 10 years, anyone who is able to set a 
credible deadline is a "seer."  Of note, Germany, France, Australia, 
Israel and the UK at times each echoed this sentiment of having 
worked on the same issues for 10 years without satisfactory 
resolution.  Brazil questioned whether there is any basis for having 
OSI meetings outside of the February and September WGB meetings.  It 
does not consider meetings such as the planned May meeting to be 
"regular" meetings. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) The Task Leader asked for topics of discussion at WGB-33. 
 The UK wants to discuss setting up a technical workshop to address 
the issue of drilling during the conduct of an OSI.  Similarly, 
Israel wants to discuss setting up a technical workshop to address 
the issue of phenomenology.  Australia wants to discuss developing a 
strategic plan for WGB. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) The chief of the equipment section in the OSI Division of 
the PTS approached the US Del regarding his interest in cooperation 
with U.S. experts on geophysical techniques to be used during OSI. 
He noted that his area of expertise was exploration geophysics and 
the technology used in applying those methods in the field.  He 
noted particular interest in giving inspector trainees skilled in 
the field of geophysical techniques greater experience in utilizing 
these techniques in contaminated environments.  He expressed 
interest in the idea of an exercise applying just the geophysical 
(not radionuclide) techniques at the site of an actual underground 
nuclear explosion.  The U.S. delegation noted that the U.S. was 
still considering the scope of its involvement in OSI activities, 
but that the U.S. certainly had a great deal of expertise to be 
brought to bear on geophysical field techniques.  Of note, the PTS 
representative expressed unhappiness with the particular type of 
ground penetrating radar equipment that had been purchased by the 
organization.  He also noted a desire to tap the U.S. experience in 
drill-back to underground test cavities. 
 
------------------------------ 
INTEGRATED FIELD EXERCISE 2008 
------------------------------ 
 
¶18.  (SBU) Task Leader Shchukin began discussions with a review of 
the post-Integrated Field Exercise 2008 (IFE08) activities.  Many of 
the presentations on the IFE08 concentrated on the evaluation 
process of the exercise and not the exercise itself or the results 
of the exercise.  Despite the lack of presentation on "lessons 
learned" from IFE08, a clear division in the delegations formed on 
how to handle these lessons.  Iran insisted that these lessons 
 
needed to be "digested" before any further OSI-related exercises are 
planned.  Brazil supported the position that all lessons need to be 
evaluated and implemented before any new training occurs.  On the 
other side of the issue, France, Israel, and the UK insisted that 
progress needs to continue on training and exercises by applying 
lessons as they are learned. 
 
¶19.  (SBU) There was a similar division on whether any other IFEs 
should be conducted.  Brazil indicated that it did not foresee 
another IFE being conducted prior to entry into force of the treaty. 
 Iran called IFE08 a "unique event" while also calling for observers 
to take part in future IFEs.  France, Germany, the UK, and Russia 
indicated that IFEs are useful and necessary.  Russia went as far as 
to state that IFEs should be conducted periodically before and after 
entry into force to maintain readiness.  Russia also indicated that 
the IFE needs to be conducted in a geographic location other than 
Kazakhstan. 
 
¶20.  (SBU) During discussions of IFE08, Iran requested that the 
final report on the exercise discuss the weaknesses of the exercise 
and not just the strengths.  Iran then stated it viewed IFE08 as a 
"monopoly of certain states" which was against the spirit of the 
treaty.  (Of note, 47 states participated in IFE08, with the largest 
percentage coming from Europe.)  Brazil also noted concern about who 
was selected to participate and the number of countries represented 
on the IT.  It was noted by the PTS that participants were selected 
based on expertise in their fields, not on political considerations, 
and that if the treaty only allows for 40 members on an IT, at most 
only 40 countries will be represented.  It was also noted by the PTS 
that, of three South American nominees for participation in IFE08, 
two withdrew from participation at the last minute. 
 
¶21.  (SBU) France, the UK, and Egypt all expressed concern that 
technical training on the equipment used in the field during IFE08 
was inadequate prior to deployment.  The PTS noted that the training 
is being revised based on the experiences of IFE08 and estimated 
that inclusion of all the suggestions would make training 12-13 
weeks long instead of the current six weeks.  The PTS was concerned 
that so much training would make it difficult for technical experts 
to take time off of their jobs to get fully trained and were 
considering how to best utilize electronic learning tools.  Israel 
noted that only IT leaders and a few others would need to take the 
full 12-13 weeks training and instead most inspectors would only 
need to take training directly related to their field 
responsibilities. 
 
¶22.  (SBU) France noted multiple times their concern that areas of 
disagreement on the results of IFE08 were not going to be adequately 
discussed.  It noted that the results of Workshop 16 (WS-16) on the 
lessons learned from IFE08, to take place the first week of May, 
would not be applied until at least September because WS-16 ends the 
week before the May WGB meetings.  It was also concerned that an 
external review of the results of IFE08 were not going to be 
properly discussed. 
 
---------------------------- 
MEETING WITH DIRECTOR OF OSI 
---------------------------- 
 
¶23.  (SBU) Members of the U.S. delegation had a private meeting with 
Boris Kvok, Director of OSI, to discuss the current state of OSI. 
The Del asked for a list of priority PTS documents the U.S. could 
read to be quickly acquainted with the current issues and his views 
on what issues the U.S. could help with.  Kvok agreed and 
subsequently provided lists on these topics to the U.S. Del.  Kvok 
said he recognized that OSI is lagging behind the other divisions of 
the organization in terms of progress towards completion and 
readiness for entry-into-force.  He outlined three pillars the OSI 
division will focus on: training personnel, acquiring equipment, and 
finishing the OSI Operational Manual. 
 
¶24.  (SBU) Kvok said OSI will need to train 200-300 inspectors 
before or soon after entry-into-force of the treaty.  He reached 
this number by saying two 40-person ITs would need to be ready at 
any given time to cover the possibility of a "rare" simultaneous 
inspection, and each IT will require 80-120 personnel to be trained 
to account for substitutions and those who will not be able to join 
an OSI at a given time.  (Note: Kvok's explanation suggests that 
only 160-240 trained inspectors will be required.)  Kvok hoped to 
have an INF paper for the August WGB-33 session that discusses the 
status of trained inspectors prior to entry-into-force.  He also 
 
said he believes about 25% of inspectors needed to reside within the 
CTBTO to make deployment issues easier to handle after 
entry-into-force. 
 
¶25.  (SBU) Kvok said they needed to have at least one set of 
inspection equipment in their custody or available through a 
standing agreement with a providing State Party prior to 
entry-into-force.  A second set of equipment would eventually need 
to be obtained.  He estimated that each set of equipment will cost 
$8 million. 
 
¶26.  (SBU) Kvok said he considers the U.S. to be important to 
completing the OSI manual.  He noted that a renewed U.S. push 
supporting the treaty would mean the OSI Division needs to make a 
"huge jump" in its capabilities.  It had planned to be ready for 
entry-into-force by 2013, but now wanted to be ready in two to three 
years.  He said that, in light of the personnel and equipment needs 
still to be met, the PTS needs to formulate their budget with an eye 
to entry-into-force. 
 
¶27.  (SBU) Kvok noted that during an OSI, there will be great 
emphasis on meeting the short deadlines.  As such, he expects 
inspectors and equipment to be mobilized upon submission of an OSI 
request.  However, if the Executive Council declines the OSI request 
within 96 hours (as it has the right to do), he estimates the OSI 
mobilization will cost the organization about $500,000.  He 
suggested that a special untouchable fund for OSI activities be 
established, such as that which exists for the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, to cover such expenses. 
 
¶28.  (SBU) Kvok said he has reserved spots for the U.S. in the 
technical workshop that is to occur in May, despite not knowing if 
the U.S. would participate.  He said he hopes the U.S. can send 
technical experts to this workshop and renew work in OSI. 
 
--------------------------- 
MEETING WITH EUROPEAN UNION 
--------------------------- 
 
¶29.  (SBU) The U.S. delegation met with members of the European 
Union to discuss various issues including OSI (discussion of issues 
other than OSI will be handled in SEPTEL reporting).  The EU noted 
it considers entry-into-force of the Treaty at the earliest date 
possible to be its top nonproliferation goal.  It is looking towards 
the U.S. to aid in completion of the CTBT verification regime.  As 
such, it plans to create a road-map for what still needs to be done 
and the resulting budget implications.  The EU asked if the U.S. 
could provide information or research on the measurement of soil 
background radiation.  They said the PTS would need to conduct 
research in this area to accurately calibrate OSI-related equipment, 
but if the U.S. was prepared to share its research on the topic, it 
could save the PTS both time and money. 
 
------------------------------ 
MEETING WITH FRENCH DELEGATION 
------------------------------ 
 
¶30.  (SBU) The U.S. delegation met with the French delegation along 
with a representative from the Czech Republic (which currently holds 
the European Union rotating presidency) to discuss its views on the 
state of OSI.  The French believe OSI is the worst division in the 
PTS and suffers from many problems.  The French stated that the main 
problem is management.  It also said the budget for OSI is poor. 
The French are very concerned with what it saw as differences 
between the internal and external reports on IFE08, noting that the 
results of IFE08 further highlighted the problems facing OSI.  The 
French and Czech Republic/EU representatives saw logistics as a big 
problem during the exercise, as would be the case for any OSI.  They 
also noted that a lack of equipment and resources for training was 
very evident in the field. 
 
¶31.  (SBU) The French said there is a strong need to improve the 
PTS's strategic plan for OSI and favored the development of a WGB 
strategic plan, supporting the earlier U.S. intervention.  They 
believe there needs to be explicitly defined goals and timelines for 
achieving these goals.  They have major issues with the OSI 
Operational Manual, and, because of its length, they doubt an IT 
will read or use it.  Finally, they noted that Iran's interventions 
in OSI slowed things down far too often and something needed to be 
done to address this. 
 
¶32.  (SBU) In a later conversation, a U.S. Representative asked the 
Czech representative how well the adversarial relationship between 
ISP and IT was modeled during the IFE08.  He answered that, in some 
ways, it was modeled very well.  An EU representative played the 
role of ISP leader and conducted an extensive review of technical 
equipment, complete with attempting obstruction.  But overall, there 
is not a sense of what the balance will be between ISP and IT 
rights/obligations. 
 
---------------------------- 
MEETING WITH THE CHAIRMAN OF 
WORKING GROUP B 
---------------------------- 
 
¶34.  (SBU) In a meeting with U.S. representatives, WGB Chairman Haak 
expressed strong concern regarding the capability and competence of 
the OSI Division in the PTS.  In his view, the OSI program was 
seriously behind the other elements of the verification system such 
as IMS.  He expressed the view that the top three priorities of WGB 
needed to be OSI, OSI, and OSI. 
 
SCHULTE