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DE RUEHUNV #0044/01 0341226
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P 031226Z FEB 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8962
INFO RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000044 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR IO, IO/T, ISN/MNSA, VCI/NA 
JCS FOR J5/DDIN 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP, ATSD/NCB/NT, AND DTRA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2014 
TAGS: AORC KTBT PARM MNUC
SUBJECT: MOVING FORWARD ON THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY 
 
REF: UNVIE 13 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, reasons 1.4, b and d. 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary.  With the United States one of nine 
countries whose ratification is necessary for the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to enter into force, the 
new Administration's promise of a change in US policy has 
drawn great attention in Vienna.  Although good progress has 
been made in recent years in the development of the 
International Monitoring System (IMS), the "eyes and ears" of 
the Treaty, lack of prospects for entry into force of the 
Treaty has eroded international support for continuing 
efforts on the IMS.  There are several short and medium term 
steps the U.S. could take even without ratification that 
would immediately signal renewed U.S. support of the Treaty, 
including re-joining discussions on efforts to promote 
ratification and sessions devoted to the On-Site Inspection 
regime envisaged by the Treaty, as well as paying the roughly 
USD 45 million owed to organization.  Hurdles to continued 
progress toward completion of the IMS include lack of G77 
support, due to the poor prospect of entry into force of the 
Treaty, and the lingering issue of a Palestinian request for 
observer status in the organization.  End Summary. 
 
Ratification and Entry into Force 
--------------------------------- 
 
2.(C) In Vienna, many countries see the Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as an integral piece of the 
constellation of international disarmament treaties.  The 
prospect of U.S. ratification of the CTBT, if closely coupled 
with efforts to actually bring the Treaty into force, could 
significantly improve the atmosphere in a range of 
non-proliferation discussions, including efforts at the IAEA 
on Iran and an international fuel bank. 
 
¶3. (C) Annex II of the CTBT lists 44 states which must ratify 
the Treaty before it comes into force.  35 of these countries 
have already ratified.  Six Annex II states have signed the 
Treaty but not yet ratified:  the United States, China, 
Indonesia, Iran, Egypt, and Israel.  Finally three Annex II 
states have neither signed nor ratified: India, Pakistan, and 
the DPRK. Mission strongly believes that any possible 
movement toward U.S. ratification should be accompanied by a 
strong effort to bring about ratification by other Annex II 
states. 
 
¶4. (C) Up to this point Iran has been able to pose as a 
strong supporter of the Treaty, even though it has not yet 
ratified.  Since U.S. policy has been that the U.S. does not 
support the Treaty and will not move toward ratification, it 
has not been possible to call Iran's bluff on this issue.  If 
a number of outstanding states, particularly Egypt and 
Israel, could be persuaded to ratify, Iran would find itself 
isolated and forced to answer the question of why it has not 
ratified. 
 
The International Monitoring System 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) The Treaty envisages a verification system comprised 
of 321 stations of different sorts around the world, along 
with 16 radionuclide laboratories.  As of the end of 2008, 
235 stations and ten radionuclide laboratories had been 
certified.  This figure amounted to 73 percent of the primary 
IMS stations, 74 percent of the auxiliary seismic stations, 
and 63 percent of the radionuclide labs.  The remaining 
stations will be more difficult to bring on line, for either 
political reasons or the challenging physical locations 
(Antarctica, for example.) 
 
Possible Short and Medium Term Actions 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (U) We offer below a short list of steps the 
Administration could take to signal a new approach, even 
while awaiting  a Congressional decision on ratification. 
Mission has already begun to move in this direction, 
attending, for example, a recent informal meeting on 
ratification where the Ambassador dropped by briefly. 
 
-- Re-engage with On-Site Inspection Activities:  The U.S. 
does not currently participate in CTBTO activities concerning 
the on-site inspection portion of the Treaty, in accordance 
with the policy enunciated in 2002.  The U.S. has also had a 
policy of withholding the portion of its assessment which 
would have gone to on-site inspection activities.  A quick 
decision to re-engage on the on-site inspection activities 
would send a strong signal to the international community 
that that the U.S. was ready to play an active role in 
promoting the Treaty. 
 
-- Re-engage with Article XIV Activities:  Article XIV of the 
Treaty calls for states signatories to cooperate actively to 
promote ratification.  It also calls for Article XIV 
conferences to be held periodically to assess the progress 
toward ratification and consider strategies for moving 
ratification forward.  The next such conference will be held 
in New York in September 2009.  Conference organizers chose 
New York as the venue with the hope that the Secretary might 
be able to attend.  Participation by the Secretary would send 
a very strong signal of renewed engagement. 
 
-- Take the Lead:  Current policy calls for U.S. delegations 
at CTBT meetings to keep a low profile.  The U.S. delegations 
never make national statements, for example.  If the U.S. 
adopts a policy of support for the Treaty, the U.S. should 
once again exert leadership at meetings, instead of passively 
defending narrow U.S. interests. 
 
-- Pay Up:  The U.S. has been late in the payment of its 
assessments, and the Administration has not requested 
sufficient funds from Congress.  Any new policy of support 
for ratification of the CTBT should be accompanied by a clear 
effort to pay all U.S. obligations in full and on time.  The 
U.S. now owes roughly USD 45 million (depending on the Euro 
exchange rate) for unpaid 2008 and 2009 assessments. 
 
-- Fund Developing Country Experts:  The Preparatory 
Commission, relying on extra-budgetary funding, has begun a 
program of funding the participation of experts from the G77. 
 Reftel explains proposed US funding as a way to encourage a 
more cooperative attitude from the G77. 
 
-- Consider Contributions:  Finally, the U.S. should consider 
enhanced support for the Provisional Technical Secretariat 
through the use of voluntary contributions and cost-free 
experts, as is the case with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, for example. 
 
Short and Medium Term Obstacles:  the G77 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The G77 has in recent years taken an increasingly 
negative view of the CTBT, largely because of lack of U.S. 
support for the Treaty and the consequent conclusion that 
entry into force of the Treaty was impossible.  In addition, 
many countries were unhappy that the U.S. pushed for 
completion and operation of the International Monitoring 
System, while rejecting the Treaty.  Some argued that the 
U.S. wanted to have its cake and eat it to, remaining aloof 
from Treaty obligations while enjoying the benefits of a 
world-wide monitoring system. 
 
¶8. (U) As a result of these concerns and consequent lack of 
broad-based support, absent a realistic prospect of entry 
into force of the Treaty, progress on the IMS has been 
slowed.  On the one hand, the budget of the PTS has remained 
essentially static for the last several years, despite the 
great costs of operating and maintaining the large number of 
stations being certified and coming on line.  Another result 
of lack of broad support for moving ahead with the IMS was 
the decision that the IMS would only operate "provisionally," 
pending greater prospect of entry into force of the Treaty. 
While "provisional operation" is not well defined, it has 
prevented the PTS from moving toward full 24/7 operation, and 
it has allowed Iran and the G77 to argue against the need to 
continue with the construction and certification of new 
stations. 
 
¶9. (U) As the Secretary stated in her confirmation hearing, 
any U.S. decision to ratify the Treaty should be accompanied 
by strong efforts to bring the Treaty into force.  A 
realistic prospect of entry into force would radically change 
the atmosphere in meetings and remove rhetorical targets for 
countries such as Iran. 
 
Short and Medium Term Obstacles:  Palestinian Observership 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶10. (U) In recent sessions of the Preparatory Commission, the 
request of Palestine for observer status in the Commission 
has taken up an inordinate amount of time and caused much ill 
will.  Up to this point, the PrepCom has operated as a 
consensus organization, but the Palestinian issue threatens 
to break this precedent.  At the last PrepCom meeting in 
November 2008, Egypt was only dissuaded from calling for a 
formal vote on the issue when it was persuaded that it would 
lose.  The U.S. position has been that the Preparatory 
Commission is a technical organization which should be kept 
free of politics.  Since Palestine is not a state and, in any 
case, the Treaty does not specify any IMS stations in the 
immediate region, it has no reason to be an observer in the 
PrepCom. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The Israelis have told the PrepCom chair that this 
is an issue which must be dealt with in capitals.  Either the 
Palestinian Authority or some country acting on its 
behalf--Egypt, for example-- must approach the Israeli 
Government to discuss the matter.  Neither the Palestinians 
nor the Egyptians have been willing to take such a step, and 
the stalemate continues to poison the atmosphere in the 
Preparatory Commission. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Mission suggests that the Department might wish to 
consider whether resolution of the observership issue could 
be used in Middle East talks as a possible confidence 
building measure that would bring ancillary benefits in 
Vienna. 
SCHULTE