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DE RUEHSI #0207/01 0360747
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FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0892
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY
RUEANFA/NRC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000207 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2019 
TAGS: PARM PREL PGOV DOE KNNP GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: BORDER CONTROL CHANGES WORRY 
INTERNATIONAL DONORS 
 
REF: TBILISI 2107 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4 (B) 
AND (D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary and comment.  Organizational changes within 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOIA) effective January 1, 
specifically in the Border Police and Patrol Police, have 
changed operations at Georgia's ports of entry.  Previously, 
the Border Police controlled operations and passenger 
processing at all ports of entry and along the "green" 
border.  Under the reorganization, which took effect on 
January 1, the Patrol Police will now be responsible for 
functions at the ports of entry.  The Border Police retained 
control of the green borders and the Coast Guard for the open 
waters.  Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Eke Zguladze 
assured DCM that the reorganization was part of a management 
decision to improve the efficiency of border post operations 
and to combat corruption with Border Patrol ranks.  However, 
the transition has been disorganized and poorly executed. 
Although there were reports of individuals at the border 
posts being intrviewed in order to retain their jobs, 
Zguladze insisted that the vast majority of the Border Police 
officers trained over the years with USG assistance will 
remain at their posts, and simply be transferred to the 
Patrol Police.  Emboffs will continue to monitor these 
changes closely to ensure that the transfer of functional 
responsibility at the ports of entry does not impair 
operations, especially given the substantial U.S. investment 
in training border personnel and providing equipment.  In one 
case, Emboffs learned that portal monitors at some ports of 
entry are not being used.  End Summary and comment. 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES 
 
¶2. (U) As of January 1, the oversight of operations and 
passenger processing at the ports of entry were transferred 
from the Border Police to the Patrol Police.  The Border 
Police aviation unit was transferred to the Ministry of 
Defense, but airborne assistance will be furnished by the MoD 
in response to specific requests for support by the Patrol 
Police.  In addition, the Border Police rapid response unit 
was disbanded.  The Border Police Command and Control Center 
(C3) was restructured into two units directly under the MOIA: 
the Operational Management and Border Technology Center in 
the Operational Technical Department, and the Operational 
Support Office in the Information Analytical Department. 
These units manage the maintenance of the technical systems 
at the borders and service all of the border agencies.  The 
Georgian Navy has been dissolved and is in the process of 
being integrated into the Coast Guard, which remains a law 
enforcement agency within the Border Police, but it is now 
only in charge of open water operations.  The Police Academy 
will be responsible for training all of the officers working 
at the border crossings; the maritime academy in Batumi will 
provide training for the Coast Guard.  The Police Academy 
plans to add five full-time instructors and fifteen 
contractors to their current staff in order to meet the 
additional requirements resulting from the reorganization. 
The Government of Georgia stated that the reorganization was 
necessary to increase transparency of the Border Police and 
decrease incidents of corruption at the borders; the 
government has already credited the reorganization with 
Qgovernment has already credited the reorganization with 
success in the latter.  Just one week after the transfer of 
responsibilities took place, the press reported on the 
arrests of three individuals who attempted to bribe officers 
at the borders. 
 
RESULTS ACHIEVED WITH THE HELP OF US ASSISTANCE 
 
¶3. (C) Through the Georgian Border Security and Law 
Enforcement (GBSLE), Export Control and Related Border 
Service (EXBS), and Second Line of Defense (SLD) programs, 
the U.S. government has enhanced Georgian border security by 
providing extensive advisory support, training, 
infrastructure, equipment, and other assets to Georgian 
border agencies.  The training and equipment enabled the 
Border Police to operate and maintain communications and 
border data management systems and radiation portal monitors 
and related equipment; to identify and interdict dual-use, 
special nuclear and other radioactive materials; and to 
perform effective inspections on vehicles and cargo arriving 
at air, land, and sea ports of entry. 
 
¶4. (C) Because we have a robust program of support and 
cooperation planned for 2009, DCM called on Deputy Minister 
 
TBILISI 00000207  002 OF 002 
 
 
of Internal Affairs Eke Zguladze January 22 to ask for 
additional information about the planned reorganization. 
Zguladze, accompanied by Police Academy Director Khatia 
Dekanoidze, assured the DCM that the changes were part of a 
management plan to break up the inefficient Border Police by 
transferring some of its functions to the Patrol Police. 
Zguladze also noted that the reorganization was partly 
intended to reduce corruption within the Border Police and 
said that the changes would not negatively affect working 
level operations.  She told the DCM that the vast majority of 
personnel at the border check points would not lost their 
jobs; instead, they would simply "change uniforms" and 
continue to do their jobs.  Zguladze said that the Patrol 
Police planned to retain the majority of personnel at the 
borders who had been trained by the USG and were experienced 
in using and maintaining the equipment.  She appreciated our 
interest in ensuring that proposed training was given to the 
right officers and pledged to work with us to make that 
happen. 
 
PROBLEMS FROM REORGANIZATION REMAIN 
 
¶5. (C) Emboffs have had meetings with officials in the MOIA, 
Border Police, Patrol Police and Police Academy to understand 
how they plan to resolve issues related to the 
reorganization, but no one has been able to articulate a 
comprehensive strategy to deal with the concerns raised. 
Georgian officials have, however, expressed their desire for 
continued cooperation and willingness to work with the U.S.G. 
towards a resolution of these issues.  During visits to Poti 
and Batumi ports and the Vale border crossing on January 26 
and 27, Department of Energy (DoE)/SLD officials had a 
difficult time determining the extent to which previously 
trained officers were or were not operating at earlier 
installed sites.  At Poti, a Coast Guard official informed 
the SLD team that while two officers who had been trained 
were transferred from the Border Police to the Patrol Police, 
their skill and knowledge levels were incompetent.  At Vale, 
one person remained who had received some training in 2007, 
however, he admitted that he had not retaned what he had 
learned.  Encouragingly, officials with the Operational 
Management and Border Technology Center said they will go to 
the sites to determine who needs to be trained or retrained, 
check on hand-held equipment availability and operability, 
and perform a general equipment check. 
 
COMMENT: ADJUSTING TO THE NEW REALITY 
 
¶6. (C) The reorganization of the MOIA and transfer of 
functions from the Border Police to the Patrol Police is 
commendable in its goal of combating corruption.  However, 
our experts are concerned that the Patrol Police may have 
difficulty immediately operating and maintaining existing 
equipment at field locations.  We are also concerned about 
the ability of the Police Academy to provide training to 
newly employed or assigned staff in the numbers necessary to 
maintain effective enforcement at ports of entry, given that 
they have not focused on border-related training programs. 
We will have to coordinate closely with the Ministry and the 
individual law enforcement agencies to ensure that our 
training programs are focused on the appropriate personnel 
and that Georgia is not vulnerable to illicit trafficking of 
nuclear and other radioactive material. 
Qnuclear and other radioactive material. 
LOGSDON