P 041716Z FEB 09
FM AMCONSUL STRASBOURG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0149
INFO CIA WASHDC
EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
AMCONSUL STRASBOURG

C O N F I D E N T I A L STRASBOURG 000003 
 
 
EUR ALSO FOR EUR/ERA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/4/2019 
TAGS: PREL AORG FR GG RU
SUBJECT: COE:  GEORGIA TOUGHENS STANCE; RUSSIA DOES NOT GIVE AN INCH 
 
REF: STRASBOURG 001 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: V. Carver, CG, Strasbourg, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
SUMMARY 
- - 
¶1.  (C)  The Council of Europe continued February 4 to discuss 
the consequences of the war between Russia and Georgia.  Georgia 
toughened its rhetoric and called for the COE to issue a 
statement should Moscow veto UNOMIG's extension.  Russia 
continued to refuse monitoring of its COE commitments.  The 
Czech EU Presidency referred to the EU's September 1 statement, 
particularly its support for territorial integrity and 
sovereignty and its condemnation of Russia's recognition of 
Abkhazia's and S. Ossetia's "independence."  We reiterated U.S. 
support for the EU's statement.  Should the COE deadlock 
continue, and even if Russia vetoes the extension of UNOMIG's 
mandate, the EU delegations here will likely remain divided on 
pushing for a formal COE statement that calls for monitoring of 
Russia.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The Spanish Chair noted that FM Moratinos had spoken 
with his Georgian counterpart January 29 and that Georgia would 
present new proposals in the coming days.  The Georgian 
Ambassador stressed that Tblisi would not accept an action plan 
that did not include monitoring of both Georgia's and Russia's 
conflict-related COE commitments (Note:  not a new position). 
Rather, Georgia will work with the Spanish Chair to try to find 
"new wording" that might be acceptable to Moscow.  The Georgian 
emphasized that the COE's draft action plan would lose its added 
value and the COE some of its credibility if it could not 
include monitoring of both countries' commitments. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The Georgian Ambassador added that he hoped for 
progress at the Geneva talks February 17-18 on access over the 
administrative border into South Ossetia.  He observed that the 
OSCE Mission in Georgia had ended because of Russia's "veto," 
and called on the COE to issue a statement should Russia do 
likewise with UNOMIG.  He highlighted the COE Parliamentary 
Assembly's (PACE - REFTEL) resolution that had noted that 
Georgia had met "most" of its obligations regarding an October 
PACE resolution on the conflict while Russia had met "almost 
none" (Note:  the resolution notes that Russia had met "some" of 
its obligations). 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Adopting a more subdued tone than usual, the Russian 
Ambassador resorted to his claim that the Georgians were 
blocking adoption of an action plan.  This, he added, would 
deprive the COE of "any real role in the zone of conflict."  The 
Russian said he was "sorry" about the PACE results, terming the 
PACE's resolution "a force pulling us back." 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The Polish Ambassador stressed that an earlier draft 
of the action plan had been supported by 37 delegations and "it 
was not Georgia" that had blocked its adoption.  He added that 
discussion of the war several months after the fact "is a bit 
ridiculous" and underscored that the COE needs monitoring of 
both countries to obtain a "good picture" of events on the 
ground. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The Czech EU Presidency referred to the EU statement 
of September 1, particularly its condemnation of Russia's 
recognition of the breakaway republics and its call on other 
states not to recognize them.  Switzerland and Norway supported 
the EU's statement.  We reiterated U.S. support for the 
statement and for "almost all" of the previous interventions, 
particularly that of the Polish Ambassador. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶7.  (C) The Spanish Chair continues to get nowhere.  The 
Russians stressed months ago that they would not agree to be 
"put on the same level as that of the aggressors."  The 
Georgians are insisting on monitoring for both countries and 
have the PACE resolutions of October 2008 and January 2009 to 
support their position.  As evidenced in the "vote to have a 
vote" on the action plan last November, however, the EU is 
divided here.  Some members do not want to push Moscow with a 
formal vote.  They fear that in so doing, Moscow will retaliate 
by cutting off its limited cooperation with Human Rights 
Commissioner Hammarberg, who has been concentrating on the 
return of IDPs and refugees to their homes.  Seen from here, 
their fear is well founded.  We have stressed to many 
delegations individually that, while we support the 
Commissioner's work, the apparent price for his continued work 
in the conflict zone seems high - the credibility of the COE 
will be diminished if its major decision-making body cannot 
decide to characterize Moscow's actions for what they are - a 
contravention of Russia's COE commitments. 
 
CARVER