VZCZCXYZ0012
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #8873 0590042
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 280025Z FEB 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0000
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0000
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0000

S E C R E T STATE 018873 
 
NOFORN,SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2034 
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC SY IN
SUBJECT: SHIELD S04D-08: PREVENTING INDIAN FIRMS FROM 
CIRCUMVENTING EXPORT CONTROLS 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 26 
     ¶B. 08 STATE 135408 
 
Classified By: SCA Acting DAS Michael Owen for reasons 
1.4 (b), (c), and (d) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 6. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (S//NF) The U.S. would like to continue the dialogue we 
initiated with the GOI regarding Syrian efforts to procure 
Australia Group-controlled chemical production equipment 
for its chemical weapons program (Ref B).  This equipment 
is also controlled by India.  According to Ref A, GOI 
export control officials are inclined to wait until the 
Indian firms Goel Scientific Glass Works Pvt. Ltd. and Garg 
Scientific Glass Industries apply for export licenses 
before intervening in this matter.  The GOI also requested 
additional information about the Syrian Scientific Research 
Center (SSRC).  Goel has a history of evading Indian export 
controls through the use of front companies and misleading 
packaging, so the U.S. is concerned that the GOI may never 
even see a license application for these dual-use items. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Given the serious proliferation risks of this 
potential transfer, the GOI needs to be more proactive in 
enforcing its export control laws and regulations, 
including its 2005 Weapons of Mass Destruction Act. 
Specifically, the GOI should conduct an industry outreach 
visit to both firms to remind them of their export control 
obligations and provide them with information on the GOI's 
Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and 
Technology (SCOMET) list.  The U.S. has successfully used 
industry outreach visits conducted by law enforcement 
agents from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and 
the Commerce Department to bolster export control 
compliance, discourage would-be proliferators, and build 
cooperative relationships with firms that produce strategic 
goods. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) We encourage India to take all steps necessary to 
ensure that this transfer does not occur.  India has a 
general obligation as a Chemical Weapons Convention State 
Party to never, under any circumstances, assist anyone in 
the development of chemical weapons.  In addition, the 
Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) 
requires us to report to Congress transfers of goods, 
services and technology on multilateral control lists, such 
as the Australia Group, to these countries.  Sanctions may 
be imposed against individuals and entities identified in 
such reports. 
 
¶5.  (S//REL ISRAEL, UK) We understand that Israel and the 
UK have also previously demarched the GOI regarding Goel 
and Garg.  We believe coordinating a trilateral demarche 
will help maximize its impact on decision-makers in New 
Delhi, ensure a unified message, and minimize the 
duplication of effort. 
 
-------------- 
ACTION REQUEST 
-------------- 
 
¶6.  (S//REL ISRAEL, UK) Department requests that posts in 
London and Tel Aviv inform appropriate host government 
officials of U.S. plans to demarche the GOI and deliver the 
points in paragraph 8 as a nonpaper.  Request these posts 
urge host government officials to consider conducting a 
trilateral demarche in New Delhi.  Department requests 
Embassy New Delhi coordinate at the highest available level 
with local representatives of Israel and the United Kingdom 
to deliver the points in paragraph 8 to appropriate senior- 
level Indian officials. 
 
¶7.  (S//NF) Please begin all responses with SHIELD S04D-08 
and slug for ISN. 
 
¶8.  (U) Begin talking points/nonpaper for India: 
 
(SECRET//REL INDIA, ISRAEL, UK) 
 
-- In the spirit of our cooperation in preventing 
proliferation, we would like to provide additional 
information regarding the two Indian companies that may be 
planning to sell equipment to an end-user in Syria that 
could assist Syria's chemical weapons program.  We would 
also like to provide more information regarding the Syrian 
Scientific Research Center (SSRC). 
 
-- As you are aware, based on previous discussions, the 
SSRC is the Syrian government agency responsible for 
developing and producing weapons of mass destruction and 
the missiles to deliver them.  While the SSRC has an 
overtly promoted research function, its activities focus 
substantively on the development of chemical and biological 
weapons, and we are concerned that the equipment mentioned 
previously may be diverted to the SSRC. 
 
-- We understand that this equipment is controlled on your 
SCOMET list.  We have concerns, however, based on past 
practice of these entities, that the companies in question 
-- the Goel Scientific Glass Works Pvt. Ltd. and Garg 
Scientific Glass Industries -- may attempt to circumvent 
Indian export controls by applying for export licenses 
under subsidiary company names. 
 
-- In the past, we understand that at least one of these 
companies has circumvented Indian export regulations by 
shipping products through carrying and forwarding agents 
who then forwarded the products on to the recipient 
countries of concern.  The packages were shipped in inner 
and outer containers concealing the ultimate destination. 
 
-- We are concerned that either firm may attempt to 
circumvent Indian laws and regulations again. 
 
-- When we raised this matter with MEA officials recently, 
we learned that no export control license has been received 
for such an export to Syria.  We encourage you to take 
preventive measures now, prior to receiving an export 
license application, to ensure that such an export does not 
take place. 
 
-- We have found that conducting industry outreach visits 
are an effective method of dissuading firms that might 
consider engaging in illegal export activities.  They are 
also an opportunity to provide firms that manufacture, sell 
or export controlled goods with information on export laws, 
control lists and procedures. 
 
-- Industry outreach visits also provide an opportunity to 
encourage industry to help enforcement export control rules 
by reporting suspicious export inquiries to the government. 
 
-- Moreover, as State Parties and supporters of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), it is our common 
obligation never under any circumstances to assist, 
encourage or induce, in any way, anyone, including states 
not party to the CWC, to engage in any activity prohibited 
to a State Party under the Convention. 
 
-- We value our bilateral cooperation on nonproliferation 
matters and urge you to take all steps necessary to prevent 
entities in your country from assisting other countries' 
chemical or biological weapons programs. 
 
-- We look forward to the Indian government sharing with us 
the results of its investigation into this matter. 
 
End talking points. 
CLINTON