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S E C R E T STATE 018868 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2039 
TAGS: AF MARR MOPS NATO PREL
SUBJECT: INFORMING NATO ALLIES OF POTENTIAL CHANGES TO 
U.S. SOF POSTURE IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: A. A)STATE 15959 
     ¶B. B)15623 
 
Classified By: A/S DANIEL FRIED FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) This is an action cable, see para 4. 
 
¶2. (S) BACKGROUND: As part of the troop increase in 
Afghanistan ordered by the President (REF A), the United 
States will also significantly increase the number of Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) units.  The new SOF units are needed 
in Afghanistan to carry out four tasks: provide support for 
the Afghan National Army commando forces; partner with other 
Afghan National Army units; provide support alongside the 
Afghan National Army for the Afghan Public Protection Program 
pilot project; and partner with select Afghan National Police 
special response teams.  Additionally, SOF are needed in 
Afghanistan by mid-2009 in order to have maximum effect, 
particularly in support of the Afghan election. 
 
¶3. (S) BACKGROUND: Ensuring that Allies and ISAF contributors 
have a good understanding of the goals and purposes of this 
potential increase (REF B), particularly the emphasis on 
supporting, training and mentoring Afghan National Security 
forces, will be crucial to avoid misperceptions that could 
undermine support for our efforts in Afghanistan.  In 
addition, in order to address any questions that NATO allies 
may have about SOF command relationships under the potential 
increase, we would like to use this opportunity to describe 
the new SOF command node, which is meant to improve 
synchronization of SOF activities in the field. 
 
¶4. (C/REL ISAF) ACTION USNATO and USMILDEL: USNATO and 
USMILDEL should draw from the following points to brief 
Allies in the North Atlantic Council and/or bilaterally to 
Allied Missions as appropriate as well as seeking where 
necessary a suitable forum or forums that include non-NATO, 
ISAF Contributors: 
 
-- (U) The U.S. government recognizes that success in 
Afghanistan requires building host nation governance 
capacity, including legitimate and capable security 
institutions; 
 
-- (C/REL ISAF) As part of the increase of U.S. forces and 
capabilities in Afghanistan, we are increasing the number of 
Special Operations Forces throughout the summer of 2009; 
 
-- (C/REL ISAF) The primary focus of this increase is to 
continue developing the capacity and professionalism of the 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), enabling them to 
protect the population and promote the legitimacy of the 
Afghan government; 
 
-- (C/REL ISAF) These additional U.S. SOF elements will 
partner with Afghan National Army (ANA) Commando kandaks, ANA 
kandaks, and Afghan National Police (ANP) SWAT units.  We 
envision that U.S. SOF would live with and advise and mentor 
their Afghan counterparts as they accompany them on missions; 
 
-- (C/REL ISAF) Additionally, a small number of our SOF will 
partner with ANA to support a pilot program in Wardak 
Province to develop an Afghan public protection force - 
district-level units comprised of villagers selected and 
vetted by local/district Shuras, responsible for protecting 
local village infrastructure and denying insurgents safe 
haven.  U.S. SOF will not/not arm these community units, but 
will provide logistical support, training, and mentoring to 
this Afghan-led community engagement program.  U.S. SOF will 
also play a vital contributing role in providing a level of 
professionalism, transparency, and accountability. 
 
-- (C/REL ISAF) In light of more conventional forces in 
theater, GEN McKiernan has approved the stand-up of a 
Combined Forces Special Operations Component 
Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) as a new SOF command element 
in theater, and as a higher command to CJSOTF-A.  This new 
SOF command will contribute toward improving the 
synchronization of U.S. SOF efforts in Afghanistan as well as 
increasing coordination and interoperability with general 
purpose forces.  The already-established SOF Intelligence 
Fusion Center will enable coordinating activities between 
NATO (ISAF) and U.S. OEF SOF.  CFSOCC-A will also support 
CJSOTF-A in expanding SOF partnerships with ANSF. No other 
changes to our command and control architecture for SOF are 
currently planned; 
 
-- (C/REL ISAF) Along with our broader plans to increase U.S. 
forces and resources in Afghanistan in 2009, this increase in 
Special Operations Forces partnering with Afghan forces will 
represent a significant effort on the part of the United 
States.  We urge all of our Allies and ISAF partners to 
consider ways that we might all do more in Afghanistan; 
 
-- (C/REL ISAF) As further details are developed regarding 
U.S. SOF deployments, Department of Defense officials will 
provide more information to their NATO and ISAF counterparts. 
 
-- (C/REL ISAF) (if raised) A small number of our Special 
Operations Forces will partner with elite ANP SWAT units. 
Such ANP units will remain within the Ministry of Interior 
chain of command and so we consider this limited partnership 
appropriate.  We do not envision a role for SOF in training 
and mentoring regular ANP; 
 
-- (C/REL ISAF) (if raised) Using the term "SOF surge" to 
refer to these efforts is inaccurate.  "Surge" does not 
accurately depict what we will be a sustained mission to 
partner with, train, and mentor ANSF until they are able to 
defend their own people and territory.  It also does not 
capture our efforts to better manage SOF in theater for 
increased unity of effort; 
 
-- (C/REL ISAF) (if raised) While the additional U.S. SOF 
deploying to Afghanistan will be primarily in a training and 
advising role to ANSF, the types of missions they might need 
to undertake could vary greatly.  Therefore, all U.S. SOF 
would remain under SOF-specific chains of command. 
CLINTON