O P 171857Z FEB 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 
UNESCO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 
GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 014421 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019 
TAGS: EG IS IR MEPP UN
SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton?s February 12, 2009, 
Meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit 
 
¶1. Classified by NEA Acting Assistant Secretary Jeff 
Feltman for reasons: 1.4 (b) & (d). 
 
¶2.  (U) February 12, 2009; 13:00 p.m.; Washington, DC. 
 
¶3.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
The Secretary 
NEA Acting Assistant Secretary Feltman 
 
Egypt 
Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit 
Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S. Sameh Shoukry 
 
¶4.  (S) SUMMARY.  Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister 
Aboul Gheit met on February 12 and engaged in a warm 
discussion on the need to strength the U.S.-Egyptian 
bilateral relationship.  The FM was delighted when the 
Secretary accepted Egypt?s invitation to attend the 
upcoming March 2 Donor?s Conference in Cairo and urged a 
presidential visit in Cairo or Washington soon. 
Regarding peace efforts in the region, Aboul Gheit said 
the United States had only two options, either pick up 
the Clinton Parameters of December 2000 or the Annapolis 
process from where it left off.  On Iran and Syria, 
Aboul Gheit urged caution in any attempt to engage both 
countries.  The FM urged the United States not to 
actively oppose the candidacy of Hosny Farouk for UNESCO 
Director General.  Both leaders agreed on the need to 
get the U.S.-Egyptian bilateral assistance program back 
on track. END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------- 
EMBRACING CHANGE 
---------------- 
 
5.(S) Aboul Gheit opened the meeting by conveying warm 
greetings from President Mubarak.  He was effusive in 
his praise of Secretary Clinton and expressed hope that 
a "very difficult" eight-year period in the relationship 
was over.  He noted that Egypt is "eager to embrace 
change."  The Secretary emphasized the United States 
strong, continuing commitment to work with Egypt. 
 
---------------------- 
GAZA DONORS CONFERENCE 
---------------------- 
 
¶6. (S) Aboul Gheit then turned to the March 2 Gaza 
Donors conference, stating that President Sarkozy and 
PM Berlusconi would attend.  Noting that it would be an 
"excellent follow up" to the Mitchell visit, he asked 
the Secretary to attend the conference and for the 
United States to be a co-sponsor.  The Secretary 
confirmed her attendance and underscored that the United 
States wanted to work closely with Egypt on the 
framework for the conference in order to ensure a 
positive outcome.  The Secretary stated that the United 
States wanted the conference to send a message about 
Egypt's leadership and to make clear to others in the 
region the importance we attach to Egypts role and our 
support for like-minded states that share Egypts 
strategic approach. 
 
---------------------------- 
THE UNITED STATES IS BACK 
---------------------------- 
 
7.(S) Delighted with the Secretarys response, an 
effusive Aboul Gheit urged the Secretary to deliver a 
speech at the conference and assured that she would be 
received by  President Mubarak.  He said that although 
Sarkozy and Berlusconi would be there at the same time, 
that the attention should be on the Secretary, to 
symbolize the return of the United States to the 
Israeli-Arab negotiations.  Foreign Minister Aboul 
Gheit noted that the Europeans had begun to assert 
themselves during the U.S. transition period; the 
Secretarys presence in Cairo would clearly convey the 
message that "the United States is back." 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
PROPOSED MEETINGS AT FRINGE OF DONOR CONFERENCE 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
8.(S) In terms of other meetings in Cairo, Aboul Gheit 
suggested that the Secretary meet with the GCC+3.  He 
also suggested a GCC+3 meeting with the P5+1, noting 
that this had been a very useful gathering to send 
signals to Iran and others.  Aboul Gheit proposed that 
if the Secretary were to arrive in the afternoon of 
March 1, that she could do one of these sessions then, 
with the following session the following evening.  The 
Secretary responded positively but noncommittally, 
saying that she would have to check her schedule.  "We 
want to send a signal that we know who our friends are," 
the Secretary said. 
 
--------------------------- 
PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL VISIT 
--------------------------- 
 
9.(S) Aboul Gheit asked when "we can allow our two 
presidents to meet," and encouraged that it be soon.  He 
conveyed that President Mubarak would be willing to 
travel to the United States or to host the President in 
Cairo, adding, You decide."  He noted that given the 
President's promise to deliver a speech in a Muslim 
country, Cairo would be the perfect venue, given that it 
is the seat of al-Azhar University and the center of 
the Arab world.  Other countries like Morocco or 
Indonesia, while important, he noted, are peripheral to 
the real Arab heartland, which is what the President 
hopes to reach.  In terms of audience, the FM said "I 
can provide 20,000 people" in a secure venue, listening 
to the Presidents message.  The Secretary agreed to 
convey the invitation.  She cautioned that President 
Obama is currently constrained by the work needed to 
address the economic challenges, "but I will faithfully 
represent your arguments." 
 
---------- 
ASSISTANCE 
---------- 
 
¶10. (S) Aboul Gheit raised the issue of U.S. assistance 
to Egypt, asking that the USG "re-open the Egypt 
program."  "Decisions were taken unilaterally," he said, 
which is not how allies and friends should deal with 
one another.  While Egypt had remained "polite," the FM 
said that Egyptians had "distanced themselves" in this 
regard.  He urged that the United States and Egypt work 
to mend this aspect of the relationship.  The Secretary 
expressed understanding, acknowledging that there had 
been both cuts in the program and programmatic decisions 
made by the United States.  "I'm going to look into 
this," she promised.  She noted that Congress is also a 
factor in the assistance relationship, and underscored 
the need to examine how to "get Members of Congress to 
see you as a friend and ally." 
 
--------------------------- 
PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION 
--------------------------- 
 
¶11. (S) Aboul Gheit said that Omar Soliman had reported 
to him that a longer-term calming should be ready for 
announcement on February 17 or 18.  The Israelis are now 
informed.  On February 22, Egypt will host all of the 
Palestinian factions in Cairo to launch a reconciliation 
process that "could last days or weeks, if not months." 
The "quiet" and the reconciliation process should allow 
the PA, Abu Mazen, and Salam Fayyad "some relief" from 
the threats of illegitimacy, as a start to restoring 
their authority.  The Secretary urged that we be kept 
informed of how this is progressing, as we needed to 
understand what the conditions for Palestinian 
reconciliation will be. 
 
¶12. (S) Responding to the Secretary's comments about 
"lost ground and lost time," Aboul Gheit noted that, in 
terms of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the 
United States had only two options:  either pick up the 
Clinton Parameters of December 2000, or pick up the 
Annapolis process from where it left off.  "There is no 
third way."  The Secretary asked about the Arab League 
Initiative.  It is still there, the FM acknowledged, but 
the Israelis never picked up on it, with the issue of 
refugees being more difficult than the issue of 
Jerusalem.  Israel cannot accept the formulation on 
refugees, he said, but maybe it can be set aside 
temporarily.  He emphasized the need for Egypt to 
understand what the United States was doing regarding 
negotiations, referring to the failed 2000 Camp David 
summit when "we didn't know what was happening." 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
IRANIAN INFLUENCE AND ARAB POLITICAL DISARRAY 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (S)  In response to the Secretary's questions about 
Palestinian reconciliation efforts, Aboul Gheit spoke of 
a "region in the midst of a war" -- a cold war that 
often turns hot and then back to cold.  This is largely 
due to the fact that Iran wants to extend its influence 
across the region and to "collect cards" to use in 
bargaining over its nuclear program.  Iran has IRGC 
forces "everywhere."  Iran uses Hamas and Hizballah. 
"Sadly," even some Arabs are collaborating with Iran, 
such as Syria and Qatar.  Imagine, he noted, Qatar is a 
"principality" of only "60,000 maybe 100,000 people, and 
it is creating havoc in the region."  He noted that 
there are more Egyptian guest workers in Qatar than 
Qatari citizens.  Iran also promoted "two wars in two 
years," he said, referring to Gaza and the 2006 Lebanon 
war.  Iran is destabilizing the region and must be 
confronted everywhere. 
 
¶14. (S) Aboul Gheit urged that the United States, should 
it decide to engage, do so "with eyes wide open."  He 
predicted that the USG would discover by the end of 2009 
that the Iranians did not deliver anything and that the 
Iranians "express what they don't believe."  The 
Secretary emphasized that, indeed, the USG was going 
into this process well aware of the difficulties.  But 
any engagement should demonstrate clearly that Iran 
either can deliver or that it won't deliver.  At this 
point, people question whether the United States is to 
blame for Iranian intransigence, but engagement should 
show exactly where the problems are. 
 
¶15. (S) Aboul Gheit added that that the threat of 
sanctions is not sufficient, and the threat of war 
contradicts the message the Administration is trying to 
send to the Muslim world.  So he suggested being "very, 
very firm" in any talks with the Iranians.  He mused 
about whether, ultimately, the United States should 
agree to enrichment on Iranian soil that is heavily 
patrolled by comprehensive international supervision. 
 
------ 
SYRIA 
------ 
 
¶16. (S) On Syria, Aboul Gheit noted that Egypt is aware 
that the United States wants to try a new approach.  He 
said that Egypt is planning an effort to reconcile Arab 
differences among ourselves.  He cautioned that the USG 
should be cautious with Syria, noting that the Syrians 
seek to escape the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, to 
obtain assurances about the future of their regime, seek 
a return of the Golan Heights, and want acknowledgement 
of their predominance in Lebanon.  The Syrians should be 
"forced to pay a price" for any of these, and not be 
given any of these up front.  He concluded by urging the 
United States to tell the Syrians to "stay away from the 
Iranians." 
 
--------------- 
UNHELPFUL QATAR 
--------------- 
 
¶17. (S) Finally, Aboul Gheit said, "there is Qatar." 
Qatar is financing "everything."  Qatar claims to have 
frozen the Arab peace plan and to have ordered the Arab 
states to cut off ties to Israel.  What is motivating 
Qatar is an image of "the great state of Qatar" -- a 
Qatar that hosts the Lebanese factions for a Doha 
accord, the Sudanese for another Doha accord, the 
various Arabs to respond to the Gaza crisis, and so on. 
The FM opined that the only country that can check 
Qatar's behavior is the United States.  The United 
States needs to say, you are troubling our allies and 
confusing our policies."  The FM suggested that the Emir 
and the Prime Minister need to feel that "Washington is 
cold." 
 
----------------------------- 
HOSNY CANDIDACY FOR UNESCO DG 
----------------------------- 
 
¶18. (S) Aboul Gheit raised the issue of Egyptian Cultural 
Minister Farouk Hosny's UNESCO DG candidacy.  "I hope, I 
hope, I hope, if you can't support him, that you won't 
oppose him."  The Secretary said that we had real 
concerns about Hosnys statements.  Moreover, as we ask 
the Israelis to take a lot of hard decisions regarding 
negotiations and facts on the ground, we do not need 
additional problems.  Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit said 
that perhaps he could solve the issue with the Israelis, 
by promising them that, if Hosny is elected, his first 
visit as UNESCO DG would be to Israel.  The Secretary 
responded that Israeli concurrence could help, but we 
still had our own concerns.  She recommended that Egypt 
seek other candidates. 
 
------------------------------- 
PROPOSED FRENCH SUMMIT IN APRIL 
------------------------------- 
 
¶19. (S) Aboul Gheit and the Secretary briefly conferred 
on the idea of a French-hosted summit in early April, 
and agreed that it was premature to commit to such a 
step.  The Secretary noted that the Israeli political 
calendar made the timing especially awkward. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
EGYPTS PUSH FOR INCLUSION IN G-8/G-20 
-------------------------------------- 
 
20.(C) Aboul Gheit made a pitch for Egypt to be included 
in an expanded G-20 and that the group of five 
"outreach" countries to the G-8 be expanded to include 
Egypt on a permanent basis.  The Secretary said that she 
would look into the issue. 
 
CLINTON