O 011305Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0022

S E C R E T RIYADH 000211 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
TO SECRETARY OF STATE HILLARY CLINTON FROM AMBASSADOR FORD 
¶M. FRAKER 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO FOR JEFFREY FELTMAN AND DAVID HALE; P FOR 
WILLIAM BURNS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2019 
TAGS: PREL SA
SUBJECT: TRANSITION OVERVIEW PAPER FOR SAUDI ARABIA 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR FORD M. FRAKER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B and D) 
 
 
¶1.  (S/NF)  SUMMARY:  Most Embassies deal with the 
governments of long-established nation states.  In Riyadh we 
deal with a family, who within living memory created a new 
state and then named it for themselves.  Preserving the unity 
of their diverse state and their prerogatives as the ruling 
family are the Al Saud's overriding priorities.  They do not 
want, and can not afford, a religious war of civilizations, 
oil prices so high that they destroy demand, regional 
instability that threatens their borders or an Arab Israeli 
conflict that undermines regimes closely tied to the United 
States.  Their interests are, to a surprising degree, aligned 
with our own.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Long-term Policy Objectives 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S/NF) 
     A billion Muslims turn to Mecca five times a day.  What 
is said there in the Great Mosque matters.  We want continued 
Saudi assistance in combating both terrorism and extremist 
ideologies. 
 
     Two Saudi kings have proposed plans to resolve the Arab 
Israeli Conflict.  We want a renewed Saudi commitment to a 
comprehensive Middle East Peace. 
 
     From the world's largest oil exporter and most 
significant swing producer, we want increased and more 
physically secure oil production. 
 
     Saudi Arabia produces nearly half of the Arab World's 
GDP and is the only Middle East country in the G-20.  We want 
the Kingdom to play a constructive role in international 
financial markets and continue holding most of its 460 
billion dollars worth official foreign reserves in U.S. 
assets. 
 
     We want improved U.S.-Saudi military cooperation and 
interoperability. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Near-term Risks to U.S. Interests 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S/NF) 
     A successful terrorist attack on Saudi oil production 
facilities, a Saudi decision to significantly reduce oil 
production or a Saudi decision to cancel ARAMCO's ongoing 
efforts to increase oil production capacity by twenty five 
percent. 
 
     A Saudi decision to reduce official holdings of U.S. 
Treasury securities. 
 
     A Saudi decision to pursue nuclear energy programs 
without U.S. involvement. 
 
     A loss of confidence in the U.S. as a reliable supplier 
of defense equipment and the resulting loss of U.S. 
influence, market share and military interoperability. 
 
     Difficulties for Saudi travelers that discourage Saudi 
students, investors and policymakers from visiting the U.S. 
 
------------------------ 
Early Action Items 
------------------------ 
 
¶3. (S/NF) 
     Saudi Arabia is our most important ally in the Arab 
World.  For seventy five years, the U.S.-Saudi relationship 
has been conducted at the highest levels of government. 
President Obama should visit the Kingdom within his first 100 
days in office. 
 
     Saudi advice not to invade Iraq was ignored.  This has 
colored their willingness to cooperate on a range of regional 
issues.  An early Presidential visit would demonstrate 
renewed U.S. commitment to consultations and encourage 
greater Saudi cooperation with regards to the Peace Process, 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, the Horn of Africa and 
repairing the global financial system. 
 
     In stark contrast to their previous policies, the 
Saudis are now exporting religious tolerance.  President 
Obama should publicly support King Abdullah,s Inter-Faith 
Dialogue.  High-level USG support for this initiative will 
advance our efforts to defeat extremism and foster stronger 
Saudi cooperation on other regional security issues. 
 
     Twenty five percent of Saudi visa applicants are caught 
in a Security Advisory Opinion process which delays their 
travel from between one and four months.  Thousands of 
potential students, tourists and business visitors are simply 
going elsewhere.  We need to quickly reduce delays caused by 
this system. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
How the Embassy is Pursuing Objectives and Addressing Risks 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶4. (S/NF)  We regularly seek Saudi political and economic 
support on a wide range of regional security issues and 
encourage increased oil production. 
 
¶5. (S/NF)  The Joint Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (JCCIP) was created last May.  This is a major 
effort to protect Saudi Arabia's energy infrastructure from 
terrorist attacks.  The Saudis believe we have been slow to 
deliver the training and other assistance they need.  We need 
to move more quickly on JCCIP. 
 
¶6. (S/NF)  In order to increase the volume of Saudi oil 
production available for export, we have agreed to work with 
the Saudis on nuclear energy for domestic consumption.  Such 
cooperation can proceed only after the Saudis are fully 
compliant with our nonproliferation requirements and we are 
pursuing this goal. 
 
¶7. (S/NF)  Saudi Arabia has proven itself to be an effective 
ally in combating terror and extremism.  The Kingdom is our 
largest terrorist intelligence exchange partner in the world. 
 With substantial U.S. cooperation, Saudi Arabia is arguably 
the only country in the region to have directly confronted 
and defeated Al-Qaeda at home. 
 
¶8. (S/NF)  We have highly successful, long-standing security 
assistance programs with the Ministry of Defense and the 
Saudi Arabian National Guard.  Through JCCIP, we are 
beginning a third program with the Ministry of Interior. 
These programs support our military and counter-terrorist 
security objectives. 
 
¶9. (S/NF)  After a hiatus of twenty years, we have notified 
Congress of significant arms sales to Saudi Arabia including: 
 JDAMs, AIM-9X, AWACs upgrades and over five billion dollars 
worth of light armored vehicles.  Future requests may include 
F-15 aircraft and a major upgrade of Saudi naval forces in 
the Persian Gulf. 
 
¶10. (S/NF)  A Western educated elite is essential to a more 
tolerant and pluralistic Saudi Arabia.  We encourage study in 
the U.S., strong links between U.S. and Saudi educational 
institutions and exchange programs for current and future 
Saudi leaders.  All of these require greater ease of travel 
for Saudis going to the United States which is something we 
have worked hard to secure. 
 
FRAKER