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Viewing cable 09PESHAWAR34, NWFP: PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY COMMENT ON SWAT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09PESHAWAR34 2009-02-23 11:52 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Consulate Peshawar
O 231152Z FEB 09
FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7841
INFO AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL LAHORE IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 
CIA WASHDC
NSC WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
S E C R E T PESHAWAR 000034 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/23/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PTER MOPS EAID PK
SUBJECT: NWFP: PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY COMMENT ON SWAT 
DEVELOPMENTS 
 
REF: PESHAWAR 33 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate 
Peshawar, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) Principal Officer met with Awami National Party (ANP) 
deputy leader Afrasiab Khattak and 11th Corps Commander General 
Aslam Masood separately on February 21.  While both confirmed 
that negotiations are taking place with Tehrik-i Taliban (TTP) 
to extend the ceasefire in Swat (due to expire February 25), 
press reports of a "permanent" ceasefire are premature.  The 
government is planning for schools, including those for girls, 
to re-open March 1.  However, the kidnapping and subsequent 
release of the district's senior administration official by 
militants on February 22 underscores the tenuousness and limits 
of the ceasefire.  Reinforcing local perceptions (reftel), some 
senior officials do not expect the truce to hold more than two 
to three weeks. 
 
2. (C) Masood termed TTP's demand for the withdrawal of the army 
as a "non-starter."  However, beyond plans to implement Shari'a 
law to "take away the militants' moral high ground," it is 
difficult to discern any serious planning for the day when this 
deal fails.  We are pressing ahead with host government 
counterparts on assistance needs -- humanitarian relief, shoring 
up law enforcement, help for schools -- to give the government 
as much advantage as possible in this period of relative quiet. 
However, as important as these components are to rebuilding 
public confidence, the single key ingredient for stabilizing 
Swat is a sufficient heavy force level to cut off outside 
support and to overwhelm the militants who are controlling 
strategic areas of the valley -- a commitment the military has 
yet to make.  End Summary. 
 
Swatis "Relieved" 
----------------- 
 
3. (C) Khattak told PO that the mood in Swat was one of relief 
after months of non-stop violence.  The ANP deputy leader who 
visited the district February 19-20 reported that shops in 
Mingora were open in the evening and night-time rocketing had 
ceased. 
 
North of Mingora Unsafe 
----------------------- 
 
4. (C) The main road north of Mingora, however, remained unsafe 
despite the ceasefire, Khattak said.  The point was reinforced 
in conversations with 11th Corps about access for humanitarian 
assistance.  Even Tehrik Nifaz-i-Shariat Mohammadi (TNSM) leader 
Sufi Mohammad, Khattak said, traveled via secondary roads on the 
left bank of the Swat River to reach Mullah Fazlullah's 
stronghold at Matta (20 km north of Mingora). 
 
5. (C) According to local press reports, Swat's District 
Coordination Officer (DCO) was kidnapped outside Mingora (NFI) 
by TTP on February 22 to "discuss important matters."  The DCO 
and his bodyguard team of six were reportedly released later in 
the day after two TTP supporters in custody were allowed to go 
free.  NWFP Minister for Social Welfare Sitara Ayaz who has the 
lead on relief for internally displaced persons (IDPs) told PO 
February 24 that ANP intends to put the onus on Sufi Mohammad 
for dealing with this "violation" of the ceasefire. 
 
6. (C) Upper Swat beyond Khwazakhela (30 km north of Mingora) 
remains in the hands of community leaders who have successfully 
resisted TTP since late 2007.  Swat's northern most areas are 
populated by non-Pashtun Kohistanis, Khattak said, and the 
tribal structure there is still intact. 
 
Ceasefire Holding, But For How Long? 
------------------------------------ 
 
7. (C) 11th Corps Commander Masood told PO the ceasefire was 
holding but offered no comment on how long that is likely to 
last.  Khattak reported that the military was negotiating an 
extension but was pessimistic that any ceasefire would remain 
intact.  Interior Advisor Rehman Malik told Ambassador he 
expected the ceasefire would last for only two to three weeks. 
TTP spokesman Muslim Khan publicly contradicted weekend reports 
that a permanent extension of the 10-day "unilateral" ceasefire 
had been reached and was quoted saying that the status of the 
ceasefire would be reviewed after it had expired. 
 
TNSM-TTP Negotiations 
--------------------- 
 
8. (S/NF) TNSM and TTP representatives met February 20 to 
arrange for a meeting between Sufi Mohammad and his son-in-law 
Mullah Fazlullah in the coming days.  Khattak said that ANP is 
not participating in these discussions, but that ISI has a 
representative present who is providing some back briefing to 
ANP.  (Note:  There are reports that some present at the 
discussions are quietly expressing doubts that TTP will lay down 
arms permanently.) 
 
TTP Demands 
----------- 
 
9. (C) ANP and 11th Corps accounts of TTP demands tally. 
Fazlullah is asking for withdrawal of the army, release of TTP 
prisoners, compensation for 2,000 TTP supporters killed or 
wounded in the fighting, and amnesty.  11th Corps commander 
commented that withdrawal of the army was a "non-starter."  The 
provincial government, Khattak said, is insisting that girls' 
schools re-open on March 1 and that the military is supporting 
this point.  (Note:  Fazlullah reportedly announced February 22 
that girls would be allowed to sit for annual exams.) 
 
Taking Away TTP's "Moral High Ground" 
------------------------------------- 
 
10. (C) PO expressed concern to Khattak and Masood that 
negotiations with TTP are sending a signal of weakness.  The 
government, PO noted, has gone down this route before in past 
failed peace deals.  Masood maintained that the issue of Shari'a 
law made the situation in Swat different and that the 
government's announcement was taking away TTP's "moral high 
ground."  If the militants renew violence, the government, 
Masood said, will have the support of the people who just want 
peace and Shari'a.  (Comment:  We see no appreciable difference 
between this plan and the provincial government's 
reasons/actions in May 2008 that ultimately failed.) 
 
11. (C) PO asked the 11th Corps Commander what measures would be 
taken to cut off Baitullah Mehsud's support for TTP in Swat. 
Masood acknowledged the problem, but said that army is 
"physically" blocking Mehsud's help from getting in.  The 
military, he continued, was also working on a "larger strategy" 
(NFI) to deal with Baitullah.  (Note:  According to local press 
reports on February 23, Baitullah, South Waziristani commander 
Mullah Nazir, and North Waziristan's Gul Bahadur announced an 
alliance and the formation of a joint 13-member Shura 
Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen.  The group reportedly declared Afghan 
Taliban's Mullah Omar as its "supreme leader" with Pakistani 
leadership rotating among the three -- a sign that this new 
"alliance" has not entirely suppressed local rivalries.  Post is 
gathering more details on this development.) 
 
Assistance -- Next Steps 
------------------------ 
 
12. (C) PO emphasized to Khattak and 11th Corps Commander that 
the United States was ready to help.  Humanitarian assistance 
was being channeled through the United Nations, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, and other NGOs.  These 
organizations had reported to the Embassy that there were plenty 
of supplies on hand to expand the relief effort.  Expanded 
access into the Swat valley, however, was the issue.  PO asked 
that civilian and military officials allow "one-stop shopping" 
for assistance implementers to gain permission for access to the 
district.  In addition to humanitarian relief, PO outlined 
possible fast-track help to repair schools and strengthen police 
stations. 
 
13. (C) 11th Corps Commander requested Consulate's Special 
Forces representative help with food packages, bedding/clothes, 
and medicine for 20,000 families.  The military intended, he 
said, to distribute these directly in Swat.  11th Corps Chief of 
Staff, Brigadier Aamer, projected that a U.S. team could visit 
Swat for an assessment o/a February 25 when the 37th Division 
commanding officer was back in Swat. 
 
14. (C) PO asked Masood about strengthening the liaison with 
11th Corps by establishing some permanent space at the 
headquarters.  PO observed that a more regular presence would 
assist our coordination on IDP relief as well as border issues. 
Masood agreed to review the request.  (Comment:  We read that 
response as "no," but will continue to push on better access. 
In 2006-2007, there was some office space available for a 
liaison officer at 11th Corps.  The change in command in the 
summer of 2007 and periodic flare up in tensions along the 
border eroded that small foothold at the headquarters.) 
 
15. (C) Khattak said he was heading a Task Force for Swat that 
will fold in the IDP relief coordination that has been taking 
place thus far.  U.S. mission representatives, he said, would be 
welcome to participate.  PO encouraged Khattak to include 11th 
Corps which had not been participating in coordination efforts. 
Khattak agreed to do so. 
 
NWFP "Self-Defense" Force 
------------------------- 
 
16. (C) NWFP Chief Minister Hoti publicly announced February 22 
that he has directed provincial officials to hand out 30,000 
rifles to "patriotic people" and "peace loving groups" for 
self-defense.  Police station house officials reportedly have 
been ordered to ensure that the weapons are not given to 
"terrorists and troublemakers."  Inter-Services Public Relations 
Director MG Abbas confirmed the Army had been consulted about 
this proposed self-defense plan.  It is not clear whether the 
offer includes ammunition, or if it covers Swat under a 
ceasefire.  Separately, Abbas confirmed that the Army has no 
plans to withdraw from Swat and is "keeping other options open" 
if peace negotiations in Swat fail. 
 
Comment 
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17. (C) Beyond plans to implement Shari'a law "to take away the 
militants' moral high ground," it is difficult to discern any 
serious planning for the day when this deal fails.  As important 
as humanitarian relief and law enforcement assistance are to 
rebuilding public confidence, the single key ingredient for 
stabilizing Swat is a sufficient heavy force level to overwhelm 
the militants who are controlling strategic areas of the valley 
-- a commitment the military has yet to make. 
 
 
TRACY