O 171320Z FEB 09
FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7834
INFO AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL LAHORE IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 
CIA WASHDC
NSC WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L PESHAWAR 000028 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/17/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PTER MOPS EAID PK
SUBJECT: NFWP GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCES IMPLEMENTATION PLAN OF SHARI'A LAW 
IN SWAT 
 
REF: Islamabad 323 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate 
Peshawar, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) On February 16, the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) 
government announced a commitment to implement Shari'a law in 
Swat following negotiations with the banned terrorist group 
Tehrik Nifaz-i-Shariat Muhammadi (TNSM).  The provincial 
government is forwarding proposed amendments to the "Shari'a 
Nizam-i-Adl" regulation for President Zardari's approval.  In 
return, TNSM leader (and father-in-law of Mullah Fazlullah) Sufi 
Mohammad has agreed to lead a delegation to Swat to persuade 
militants to lay down arms permanently.  While Fazlullah's 
Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) was not explicitly linked to the deal, 
the militant group announced a 10-day cease fire on February 15 
on the heels of the release of a Chinese engineer and reports of 
the release of 15 to 30 TTP sub-commanders from government 
custody.  UNHCR plans to take advantage of the ceasefire to 
deliver humanitarian supplies into Swat. 
 
¶2. (C) President Zardari called Ambassador February 16 to say he 
had no intention of signing any executive orders until the 
militants laid down their arms.  Minister of Information Sherry 
Rehman, Awami National Party (ANP) deputy leader Afrasiab 
Khattak and other NWFP officials are emphasizing that 
implementation of Shari'a law is contingent upon "complete 
restoration of peace" in Swat.  TTP is insisting that "once 
Islamic law is imposed, there will be no problems in Swat." 
These positions appear to represent the same collision course 
that essentially led to the failure of the government's deals 
and strategy in the spring of 2008 in Swat.  There is no agreed 
upon revised Shari'a regulation for signature by Zardari; he has 
rejected several previous drafts and - particularly faced with 
broad international condemnation - remains reluctant to sign off 
on the amendments.  The real immediate damage, however, is a 
deal that is sending a signal of government weakness and that 
provides space to militants to strengthen in Swat and adjacent 
NWFP districts.  See reftel for Ambassador's discussion with 
Chief of Army Staff General Kayani on the Swat agreement.  End 
Summary. 
 
Shari'a Announcement -- Only a "Pledge" 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) ANP's Khattak briefed Principal Officer February 16 
following Chief Minister Hoti's public announcement of the 
provincial government's commitment to implement Shari'a law in 
the NWFP's Malakand Division (Swat, Malakand, Dir, Buner, 
Chitral districts) and Kohistan district.  (Note: Khattak is 
really running the party with the lack of leadership and health 
issues of ANP leader Asfandyar Wali Khan.)  The Chief Minister, 
he said, had convened all NWFP political parties earlier in the 
day and gained unanimous support for the government's decision. 
Jamaat-i Islami (JI) which has traditionally had a strong base 
in northern areas of the NWFP boycotted the meeting, Khattak 
added.  (Note:  JI is chafing over the disputed results of a 
recent by-election and probably did not want ANP to get the 
political credit for this deal.) 
 
¶4. (C) Khattak insisted that negotiations with TNSM's Sufi 
Mohammad resulted only in a "pledge" by the NWFP government to 
implement Shari'a.  (Note:  Sufi has had a "protest camp" set up 
in Lower Dir since October 2008, demanding the implementation of 
Shari'a law in the Malakand Divison.)  Implementation would only 
take place after a review and reform of the 1999 "Shari'a 
Nizam-i-Adl" regulation -- and once there is "complete 
restoration of peace" in Swat.  In return for this pledge, Sufi 
has agreed to play a role in establishing peace in Swat by 
undertaking activities such as "leading police back to their 
stations."  Khattak promised to provide the Consulate with a 
translated copy of the pledge and the proposed revisions to the 
1999 Shari'a regulation. 
 
Differences Between Now and Spring 2008? 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) PO observed that there appeared to be no appreciable 
differences between the government's deals in the spring of 2008 
in Swat and the government's latest announcement.  Given the 
failure of that strategy, PO asked why should TTP militants 
listen to Sufi now when they hadn't done so before?  Khattak 
maintained that the government had not made an explicit 
commitment to Sufi to implement Shari'a in the earlier round of 
deals.  (Note:  While technically that appears to be accurate, 
the government's deal with Mullah Fazlullah did make that 
commitment.)  Khattak also commented that the Pakistani military 
leadership and ISI had played a significant role in the latest 
round of negotiations, bringing pressure to strike a deal.  ISI, 
he said, had very clearly acted as Sufi's "handler," coaching 
and coaxing him during discussions, particularly when he became 
difficult. 
 
No Talks with TTP 
----------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Khattak said that the government had neither negotiated 
the 10-day ceasefire announced by TTP nor had any involvement in 
reported prisoner releases.  "This was not part of our deal." 
PO queried what would happen if TTP launches further attacks on 
the government.  "The army will be free to act decisively and 
will retaliate," he replied.  (Note:  Director General of 
Military Operations MG Javed Iqbal told Office of Defense 
Representative Pakistan Chief RADM Lefever February 16 much the 
same thing - the army has no intention of leaving Swat in the 
near term.  However, it is not clear whether army forces in Swat 
would remain at their present levels, particularly with other 
operational demands in the northern tribal areas, including 
Bajaur.)  What would constitute "complete" restoration of peace, 
PO probed.  That atmosphere, Khattak said, would be "obvious." 
An immediate period of some quiet though, Khattak continued, 
would give the police in Swat some breathing space to regroup. 
Tackling TTP's Fazlullah effectively, Khattak remarked, also 
depended on cutting off his support from Baitullah Mehsud. 
 
Broader Implications for NWFP 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) PO asked about the broader implications of the pledge to 
implement Shari'a in Malakand Division.  Would Shari'a be 
extended to other NWFP districts?  The provincial government, 
Khattak said, would oppose applying the Shari'a regulation 
outside the Malakand Division.  The Swat area had a different 
legal history which made it possible to draw this line, he 
asserted.  (Note:  We are hearing that the government's 
announcement has set off calls for the implementation of Shari'a 
in Bajaur which is home to militants with TNSM roots.)  In his 
press conference, NWFP Chief Minister Hoti insisted that the 
proposal for Shari'a law was in accordance with Pakistan's 
constitution, but legal experts already are disputing this 
claim.  There is no agreement in Pakistan on what "Shari'a" law 
actually entails. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) With the defacto collapse of the police in Swat, the 
army's inability to check the district's deteriorating security, 
and the increasing signs of creeping militancy in neighboring 
districts, Khattak made it clear that the government had chosen 
this course out of fear of "losing the whole Malakand Division." 
 Past failed peace deals have tended to leave the militants with 
the advantage, in part because the government used breathing 
space to focus resources on other trouble spots.  The 
government's ability to use the "breathing space" this time 
around to its advantage may depend on resources that the federal 
government and the international community can bring to bear 
quickly to strengthen the government's hand, particularly 
regarding law enforcement institutions, internally displaced 
persons, and the sagging morale of the military. 
 
 
TRACY