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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PESHAWAR 000022 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/7/2019 
TAGS: MOPS PTER EAID PGOV PK
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH 11TH CORPS COMMANDER 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, Peshawar, 
Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d) 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) On January 26, Ambassador met with 11th Corps Commander, 
Lieutenant General Masood Aslam and Chief of Staff Brigadier 
Aamer to discuss internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the 
situation in Swat.  General Masood advocated a mixed approach to 
IDP assistance -- encourage some to go home where help would be 
distributed via tribal leaders while offering some direct cash 
relief to IDPs who must remain in camps or with family.  In 
Swat, which General Masood described as a military priority 
"even before Bajaur or the Waziristans," the military is 
adopting tactics to respond to small mobile bands of militants 
and will concentrate first on bringing down violence in Mingora, 
one of Swat's principal cities.  The pressure of coping with the 
IDP situation is falling on government infrastructure in the 
NWFP and the tribal areas, and the military is no exception -- 
and it comes at a time when it is clear that Swat requires a 
robust force to counter local militants.  End Comment. 
 
IDP Assistance 
-------------- 
 
¶2. (C) On January 26, Ambassador met with 11th Corps Commander, 
Lieutenant General Masood Aslam and Chief of Staff Brigadier 
Aamer to discuss internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the 
situation in Swat.  Peshawar Principal Officer, Deputy Chief of 
the Office of the Defense Representative Pakistan, BG Joe 
DiBartolomeo, and CJTF-101 Liaison Officer (notetaker) also 
attended the meeting. 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador opened by noting that the conditions at the 
Kacha Gari IDP camp (approximately five miles west of Peshawar), 
which she visited earlier in the day, were better than she had 
expected.  General Masood agreed with her assessment.  He 
emphasized that the IDP issue could not be viewed as a purely 
humanitarian issue in isolation from the need to restore peace, 
rebuild, and provide compensation in Bajaur, Mohmand, and Swat, 
areas that have been most affected by military operations over 
the past year. 
 
¶4. (C) General Masood added that durable rehabilitation for an 
affected area should focus on utilities, schools, and health 
services.  He relayed his frustration with current relief 
efforts by stating that money was being spent, but with no 
lasting impact.  The relief, he said, felt as if it was 
"trickling in."  Ambassador asked how assistance should be 
provided -- through tribal leaders, cash, or vouchers.  General 
Masood responded that a combination of all three methods would 
be needed. 
 
¶5. (C) Some areas, Brigadier Aamer noted, were ready for IDPs to 
return, and IDPs from those areas should be encouraged to leave 
the camps immediately.  Aid to these individuals could be 
distributed in their home areas by the Political Agent (PA) with 
the help of tribal leaders who could help ascertain appropriate 
levels of assistance and compensation.  IDPs who remain in the 
camps and who are staying with relatives must also receive 
relief, preferably cash, commensurate to their losses.  Direct 
assistance for these groups would require a thorough vetting 
process, but this approach would avoid the earlier error made 
when all IDPs were compensated at a flat rate of payment 
regardless of their estimated losses. 
 
¶6. (C) General Masood expressed optimism that if the 11th Corps 
received the appropriate manning levels promised, which he 
expected, then the 11th Corps could build "teams" to address 
issues relating to relief and services.  ODRP Deputy relayed 
that in his meetings with the General Headquarters (GHQ) in 
Islamabad, GHQ intended to establish planning cells at the 11th 
Corps to address these types of issues.  Principal Officer 
suggested that the recently established Civil Military 
Coordination group in Peshawar (an interagency forum for 
Pakistani and U.S. agencies) could  also take up this issue. 
 
A New Strategy in Swat 
---------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) General Masood outlined 11th Corps' "new" strategy in the 
Swat District.  The military, he said, will not try to be 
"everywhere all the time."   Instead, military forces would 
focus along lines of communication and supply first, and then 
expand outward.  General Masood observed that militants in Swat 
 
PESHAWAR 00000022  002 OF 002 
 
 
moved in small bands of no more than five to ten fighters each, 
making it particularly easy to slip in and out of large cities 
like Mingora.  He intended to focus his forces first on Mingora, 
which has witnessed a steady increase in violence in recent 
months.  Success with the dense population there, he said, would 
have benefits throughout Swat.  More uniformed soldiers would be 
on the streets and guarding schools and other soldiers would 
move among the population in plain clothes. 
 
¶8. (C) Responding to Ambassador's question about the source of 
militants in Swat, General Masood stated that some were local, 
some had come from the Wazaristans, some from Bajaur, and 
possibly some had come from Afghanistan.  PO noted that Mullah 
Fazlullah has recently become bolder, organizing parallel 
"courts" that are handing down judgments and meting out 
punishments.  General Masood said that his forces would counter 
such criminal actions with checkpoints dispersed throughout Swat 
in order to quickly react to these activities.  Military forces 
would also engage in multiple areas simultaneously to serve as a 
"quick reaction force" to prevent the small groups of militants 
responsible for the courts from concentrating in any one area. 
 
¶9. (C) Ambassador asked how Swat, which was renowned as a 
popular tourist spot, had deteriorated to such a degree. 
General Masood acknowledged that initial military operations in 
Swat had focused on the traditional objectives of key terrain 
(the high ground) and not on an enemy force-oriented objective 
(groups of militants).  The initial shock of the operations 
flushed militants out, but a vacuum was created during the 
interim government; during this period, the militants were able 
to regroup. 
 
¶10. (C) General Masood recalled that trouble in Swat is not new. 
 The main basis of discontent is dissatisfaction with the 
judicial system and education.  The 11th Corps Commander 
maintained that if Shari'a law was actually implemented, then it 
would ultimately backfire on the militants.  Brigadier Aamer was 
unwilling to assign blame largely to the Awami National Party 
(ANP) for Swat's security deterioration.  ANP, he said, had done 
the best it could but lacked assets for dealing with the 
militants.  General Masood concluded by emphasizing Swat's 
importance to the military -- even before Bajaur -- because of 
the threat that an eastward spread of militants would represent 
to Pakistan's key artery in the north, the Karokoram Highway. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) The pressure of coping with the IDP situation is falling 
on government infrastructure in the NWFP and the tribal areas, 
and the military is no exception.  How much the military will be 
able to help with relief is unclear, particularly if it takes on 
a renewed commitment in Swat.  It is clear, however, that an 
unchecked militant presence in Swat represents a threat to the 
Karokoram Highway to the east of the district.  Given the 
difficulties that security forces have already encountered in 
Swat and the importance of the Karokarom link, Pakistan's 
military leadership appears to have decided that it cannot 
afford the risk of waiting until the militants have become even 
more entrenched in the north. 
TRACY