O 061627Z FEB 09
FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7821
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C O N F I D E N T I A L PESHAWAR 000021 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/6/2019 
TAGS: MOPS PTER EAID PGOV PK
SUBJECT: MILITARY RENEWS OPERATIONS AS SWAT GOES FROM BAD TO WORSE 
 
REF: 08 PESHAWAR 538 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate 
Peshawar, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Army units led by 11th Corps and supported by Frontier 
Corps restarted operations in Swat on February 1 with the 
Northwest Frontier government's acknowledgment that it has lost 
effective control of the district to local taliban.  As many as 
70 militants have reportedly been killed in clashes north of 
Mingora.  Overall losses among security forces are unclear, but 
some casualties have occurred with the renewed operations.  Two 
local NGO workers were killed while collecting wounded. 
 
¶2. (C) The military's revised strategy is to have internally 
driven "snap actions."  As many as 60,000 internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) have arrived in camps established in the greater 
Mingora area with additional IDPs beginning to arrive in 
Peshawar.  11th Corps has invited U.S. military representatives 
to visit Swat to assess what humanitarian assistance could be 
provided to the Pakistani military to alleviate civilian 
distress in the conflict zone.  Frontier Corps is planning 
additional operations in Dir, west of Swat, in anticipation of 
militants' efforts to flee the area.  While the current 
operation in Swat is a renewed attempt at re-establishing the 
writ of the government, it is unclear if the implementation of 
the "snap actions" strategy will also have an effective hold 
phase.  End Summary 
 
Fazlullah Terrorizing Swat 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Since the beginning of 2009, militants led by Swat 
Taliban leader Maulana Fazlullah have extended their control 
over Swat, a district of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) 
located about 90 miles from Islamabad.  Fazlullah is loosely 
allied with Taliban militants from the FATA, and his tactics 
have even led his father-in-law Tehreek Nafaz Shariat 
Mohammadi's (TNSM) leader Sufi Mohammed to disown him. 
Fazlullah's Taliban announced that girls could receive either no 
education or only through grade four, banned women from 
marketplaces and shops, continued to threaten CD and barbers 
shops, and established several parallel courts to disburse their 
version of sharia law.  A local religious leader who tried to 
resist Fazlullah was killed and his beheaded body appeared in a 
village square.  According to the NWFP Inspector General of 
Police Malik Naveed, over 600 specially trained police 
(including specially trained elite forces) have deserted or 
refused duty posts in Swat leaving the local population to fend 
for themselves.  In 2008, over 70 police officers were killed 
and 150 were wounded in Swat.  Reports from the area indicate 
the militants are deforesting the area (known as little as three 
years ago as a tourist destination) and seizing orchards, a 
prime source of livelihood.  The Swat area has largely become a 
"no-go" area even for local politicians, with ruling coalition 
partner Awami National Party (ANP) leaders announcing ultimatums 
from Peshawar but not being in any position to implement them. 
On January 27, the ANP admitted that its provincial government 
had lost its writ in Swat. 
 
¶4. (C) On January 26, Fazlullah's FM radio broadcast released a 
list of 46 people wanted before his sharia courts, including 
former and sitting ministers and members of parliament. 
Fazlullah also announced that if these people did not stop their 
opposition to the Swat taliban, they would face death. 
Fazlullah uses his infamous FM broadcasts to spread his violent 
message and to scare local residents.  The broadcast, which 
starts at 8 every night, outlines newly proscribed "un-Islamic" 
activities and announces the names of people the Taliban have 
recently killed or those they plan to kill. 
 
¶5. (C) In response, there has been a growing chorus of protests 
in parliament, in street demonstrations, and in the media 
calling upon the GOP to take control of Swat.  The 11th Corps, 
which as of early January told us that it had all but written 
off Swat as being under militant control, has now been forced to 
respond. Since January 26, security forces have announced a 
24-hour curfew in much of Swat. In addition, Interior Minister 
Rehman Malik announced on January 30 that the government planned 
to flush Swat of all militants within weeks. 
 
 
Renewed Swat Operations 
----------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Army units led by 11th Corps and supported by Frontier 
Corps began operations in Swat on February 1.  While details are 
sketchy, elements from two brigades of the 37th Division, 
headquartered in Dir were accompanied by forces from four wings 
of the Frontier Corps in operations near Mingora.  (Note: A wing 
is approximately 650 men.  End note.)  According to the Pakistan 
military, since July 2008 the military has led seven major 
operations in Swat. 
 
¶7. (C) As many as 70 militants were reportedly killed in clashes 
north of Mingora since February 1.  NWFP Governor Ghani told 
Principal Officer that nine soldiers were killed on February 2 
while attempting to assist a police post that had been 
surrounded by militants at Barikot (15 km south of Mingora). 
Other security forces' casualties are unclear. 
 
¶8. (C) Contacts at 11th Corps maintain that law enforcement 
agencies have successfully linked up the northern and southern 
portions of the Swat valley and "dominate" the main roads. 
However, local contacts who traveled on the main road north of 
Mingora in early February, told Pol/Econ Chief that militant 
check points above Charbagh (approximately 10 km north of 
Mingora) were still present, some in view of government check 
posts along the main road.  To check militant influence in the 
"built up" areas such as Mingora as well as further north, 11th 
Corps Commander General Masood described to Ambassador a revised 
strategy of "snap actions" that would respond rapidly to hot 
spots in the district such as local taliban court and punishment 
sessions. 
 
60,000 Internally Displaced Persons 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) As many as 60,000 new internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
have arrived in informal camps established in the greater 
Mingora area with additional IDPs from Swat beginning to arrive 
in the greater Peshawar area according to USAID contacts.  The 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) received 
permission on February 6 to begin working up to Mingora and is 
preparing to assist the latest flow of IDPs.  Post understands 
that World Food Program is planning to deliver food to Mingora. 
Prior to the start of the operation, an undetermined number of 
IDPs were moving around inside Swat, as fighting ebbed and 
flowed, but few had fled to other districts; most stayed with 
families or friends in areas not yet hit by military operations. 
 Over 33,000 IDPs were registered with UNHCR in various 
locations outside of Swat as of February 2. 
 
NGO Staff Killed 
---------------- 
 
¶9. (C) According to Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), two of its 
local staff doctors were killed on February 1 while collecting 
injured people in an ambulance during fighting near Charbagh. 
MSF has completely suspended its medical activities in Swat, 
including all life-saving operations.  An ICRC contact said that 
their understanding was that the MSF ambulances had been caught 
in the crossfire of a gun battle that ended up lasting nearly 
seven hours, and that MSF itself had not been targeted. 
However, he did not exclude the possibility that militants were 
concerned ambulances were being used to transport things other 
than people or medical supplies, and therefore were beginning to 
be targeted. 
 
11th Corps Invitation 
-------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) During a February 3 meeting between 11th Corps Chief of 
Staff Brigadier Aamer and Peshawar Principal Officer with 
Special Forces and Border Assistance Coordinator in attendance, 
the Chief of Staff invited U.S. military to visit Swat 
immediately to assess what kind of humanitarian assistance could 
be provided to help the Pakistani military respond to civilian 
needs in conflict zones.  Aamer noted that there are significant 
humanitarian needs where operations are taking place, but that 
the fighting had made it extremely difficult for civilian 
agencies to access these areas.  (Note:  We are pursuing this 
invitation, which is unprecedented and a complete turn around 
from a year ago when 11th Corps stalled on our requests for 
access to Swat to assess assistance needs.) 
 
Operation In Dir Next? 
---------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Frontier Corps is planning additional operations in Dir, 
west of Swat, in anticipation of militants' efforts to flee the 
area.  When and with what forces the Dir operation will use has 
yet to be determined.  Local observers have expressed concern 
that militants are filtering as far south as Chakdarra and 
Batkhela (approximately 40 km south of Mingora) to launch 
attacks.  These locations control a key road junction where the 
Swat and Dir valleys split off.  Militant dominance of these 
points could impede the ability to move assets into Swat from 
its headquarters at Timergara in Dir as well as giving militants 
improved access into Bajaur.  In Upper Dir, there are reports 
that militants are using an illegal FM radio station to 
broadcast a call "to join jihad" and to issue a list of "ten 
most wanted" individuals. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) While the current operation in Swat appears to be a 
renewed attempt at reestablishing the writ of the government, it 
is unclear if the implementation of the "snap actions" strategy 
will be followed by an effective hold phase.   The population of 
Swat is likely to be skeptical of the government's long term 
commitment to their security given the perceived lack of 
determination by the GOP concerning Swat over the last two 
years.  The residents of Swat have repeatedly experienced the 
return of militants as soon as the military pulls out.  Local 
and provincial politicians see the solution as three fold: 
return of law and order, implementation of speedy justice 
(whether it is named sharia or not), and economic development. 
However, in order to implement any long-lasting solutions, the 
GOP must have police and civilian infrastructure ready to assist 
the local population and establish the writ of government when 
the military finishes its operations. 
 
 
TRACY