TelegramC O N F I D E N T I A L   UNESCOPARI   02110211 
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RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHFR #0211/01 0421455
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111455Z FEB 09
FM UNESCO PARIS FR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS FR 000211 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL: 2/10/2018 
TAGS: PREL UNESCO KWBG JO IS
SUBJECT: MUGHRABI GATE UPDATE 
 
REF:  A) 08 USUNESCO PARIS FR 001944 
  B) 08 AMMAN 3391 
  C) 08 TEL AVIV 2589 
 
 
Classified by Charge Stephen Engelken for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Tension over Middle East issues is high at UNESCO, 
due in part to the emotions aroused by the Gaza conflict.  Deputy 
Director General Barbosa feels this will make it all the harder to 
manage the Mughrabi Gate issue (reftel).  There has been no change in 
the situation since the issue nearly brought UNESCO's October 2008 
Executive Board meeting to a standstill (REF A), and the sides remain 
at loggerheads over the fundamental issue of who controls the site. 
Israel is determined to prevent Executive Board Chairman Yai from 
involving a large number of countries in negotiations on this issue 
as he tried to do at the last Executive Board. Barbosa would like to 
go farther and convince Yai (Benin) to withdraw the issue entirely 
from the agenda of the April 2009 Executive Board session.  Whether 
Yai can do this will depend at least in part on whether or not the 
situation remains stable.  Should Israel begin construction of the 
ascent without the agreement of Jordan or the Palestinians, it will 
be virtually impossible to keep this item off the Board's agenda. End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Mission has recently discussed the Mughrabi Gate situation 
with UNESCO's Deputy Director-General Marcio Barbosa (most recently 
on February 6) and with Tibor Shalev-Schlosser International 
Organizations Director at Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (on 
January 28). We found both nervous about how to manage this issue at 
the April 14-30 Executive Board session while emotions run high over 
Gaza. 
 
¶3.  (C) Barbosa complained that the situation is essentially 
unchanged since the last Executive Board meeting in late October. 
Jordan cancelled a proposed "encounter" with the Israelis in November 
in apparent protest at its not being allowed to have its own 
engineers measure the site to prepare a precise architectural plan 
for the ramp Jordan proposes to pay for and build. Israel has not 
answered a December 2008 letter from the World Heritage Committee 
making comments on the proposed Israeli design. (On February 6, 
however, Barbosa told visiting IO Acting A/S Warlick that the World 
Heritage Center staff believe that Israel's latest design proposal 
falls within the scope of the rules of the World Heritage 
Convention.) There may be little new to discuss at the April Board, 
Barbosa feared. 
 
¶4.  (C) Barbosa observed that the real dispute is not over the shape 
of the ramp but who builds it. Changes in the design of the ramp may, 
therefore, not be enough to satisfy Jordan.  Barbosa admitted that he 
does not know what to do now.  If this becomes an argument over 
control of the area rather than the design of the ramp, UNESCO is in 
a bind.  This goes beyond its mandate.  We are approaching the end of 
our ability to help, Barbosa lamented. 
 
¶5.  (C) Schlosser saw things similarly.  He told Charge on January 28 
that the question UNESCO can address is not who builds the ramp, but 
how the ramp is built.  Schlosser suggested strongly that Israel can 
be flexible on the design of the ramp but not on control of the site. 
He noted that there is a "big difference" between the plan now being 
discussed and the one that had been originally submitted. 
 
¶6.  (C) Schlosser added that there is a third plan "in the drawer" 
which takes into consideration concerns expressed by the World 
Heritage Center and which he described as providing a "level of 
flexibility to the maximum extent possible".  Schlosser said that 
Israel is still willing to meet the Jordanians, either with UNESCO or 
bilaterally, but only on the condition that any visit to the site 
would not result in the development of a separate plan.  Israel will 
never permit Jordan to build the ramp itself. 
 
¶7.  Both Barbosa and Schlosser wanted to avoid a repetition of the 
last Executive Board when Chairman Yai tried to involve the regional 
vice-chairs (India, Brazil, South Africa, Norway, Lithuania, and 
Egypt) along with the U.S., France (then EU President), and Spain 
(current World Heritage Chair).  The result had been a confused 
muddle.  Schlosser reported that he had met Yai in late January and 
had obtained his agreement to the following: 
 
- That DDG Barbosa would take the lead in negotiations as a 
"facilitator"; 
- That issues would be separated out between "political and 
professional" (technical); 
- That the Executive Board should stay within the parameter of 
decision of the World Heritage Committee; 
- That the text to be negotiated would be presented by the 
Secretariat, and not drafted by one of the parties, and would be 
based on previous decisions; and 
- That negotiations would start as soon as possible after the Board 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL: 2/10/2018 
TAGS: PREL UNESCO KWBG JO IS
SUBJECT: MUGHRABI GATE UPDATE 
 
begins. 
 
¶8.  (C) Barbosa wanted to go even farther and have the Mughrabi item 
removed entirely from the agenda of the next Executive Board.  He 
said he had approached Yai on this point already and urged the U.S. 
to support the idea.  Asked for his opinion, Schlosser agreed that a 
postponement would be acceptable to Israel. When reminded that this 
would mean the issue would be discussed at the World Heritage 
Committee meeting in late June in Seville, Schlosser said he would 
prefer to have the discussion in that Committee whose remit is purely 
technical.  The fact that Israel currently sits on the World Heritage 
Committee and does not have an Executive Board seat also helps make 
World Heritage a better venue from Israel's perspective.  Schlosser 
warned, however, that the Jerusalem Planning Authority might make 
some decision with regard to the site between now and April that 
would make it hard for UNESCO to argue that the situation is 
unchanged. 
 
¶9.  (C) Comment:  It is hard to blame Barbosa for trying to have this 
difficult item removed from the Board's agenda.  We will find an 
occasion to tell Yai we support Barbosa.  We are not, however, very 
optimistic this gambit will succeed.  It will be hard for Yai to 
ignore the fact that the Board at its last session asked for a report 
on the issue at the next session. Any change on ground, of course, 
would make it virtually impossible for Yai to remove the item. 
 
¶10.  (C) Comment Continued:  What is most important is to ensure that 
all sides have a negotiating framework they can accept.  We must hope 
that Yai genuinely implements the points he and Schlosser agreed.  We 
are not confident he will, however, since several influential states 
like India have been trying to find an opening to play a role on this 
issue and Yai is clearly interested in cultivating their support. 
 
ENGELKEN