O 171334Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8138
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000138 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
SECSTATE AF - A/DAS BOULWARE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2021 
TAGS: PREL USAU PGOV MR IS
SUBJECT: MAURITANIAN RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL 
 
REF: A. STATE 14163 
     ¶B. NOUAKCHOTT 6 
     ¶C. NOUAKCHOTT 47 
     ¶D. NOUAKCHOTT 101 
     ¶E. NOUAKCHOTT 118 
 
Classified By: CDA Cornelius Walsh, reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C/NF)  Summary:  Having watched the evolution of the 
Israeli relations issue in the context of the Mauritanian 
political crisis, we believe that the junta, particularly 
Foreign Minister Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, is deeply 
concerned about the repercussions of a formal break in the 
Mauritanian-Israeli relationship.  Their steps to date, while 
detrimental to Israeli interests, have been incremental and 
hesitant.  However, given the volatile nature of the issue, 
American engagement at this very sensitive time may be used 
by more radical members of the junta and its constituents, 
who have a planning horizon much more limited than that of 
the Foreign Minister, as a pretext to sever the relationship 
and free Mauritania from what they consider its onerous 
restraints.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U)  Since the advent of the coup d'etat in early August, 
Embassy Nouakchott has observed and reported on the junta's 
approach towards relations with Israel as well as the 
attitudes and statements of other participants in the current 
political crisis affecting Mauritania.  Inasmuch as Israeli 
Ambassador Arbel had not presented his credentials prior to 
the coup and that Israel hewed to the western policy of 
non-recognition, this kept the issue off the table for some 
months.  Always a delicate subject, it appeared that both the 
junta and its opponents preferred that the issue not enter 
their political world. 
 
¶3. (U)  The late December Israeli incursion into Gaza, 
however, changed the nature of the discussion.  The junta 
found itself pressured by its domestic constituency, its 
opponents, and fellow Muslim states to cut relations with 
Israel as a show of solidarity with Gaza and the Muslim 
mainstream.  Indeed, it appears that some states offered 
recognition and financial support for just such a gesture. 
Large and sometimes violent anti-Israeli demonstrations 
focused on the Israeli Embassy in Nouakchott further forced 
the junta to address the issue.  On the domestic front the 
junta appeared to be in a competition with its opponents as 
to which could be more anti-Israel than the other. 
 
¶4. (C/NF)  Despite these pressures, the junta has proceeded 
slowly and very carefully in its measures against the Israeli 
presence.  It has recalled its Ambassador (Ref B), declared a 
freeze in relations (Ref C), almost surreptitiously closed 
its Embassy in Tel Aviv and removed its personnel (Ref D), 
and finally two weeks ago informally called the Israeli 
Ambassador and asked that he take "appropriate measures" 
regarding the freeze (Ref E).  As of February 16, the Israeli 
Ambassador has not been contacted again by the junta's 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
¶5. (C/NF)  We have sometimes considered the junta's steps to 
be an attempt to have its cake and eat it as well, i.e., give 
the appearance of distancing itself from Israel while 
maintaining a straightened relationship.  However, its 
hesitancy, its apparent rejection of blandishments from Iran, 
Libya and other players, and its rhetorical back and forth 
with the opposition lead us to believe that the junta is well 
aware of the serious consequences of an actual break in 
diplomatic relations.  The formal break is indeed a card that 
the junta may wish to play at some point.  However, 
indications until now have been that it will not do so 
without a pretext or an action that will allow it to gain an 
advantage either from international partners (it already has 
anti-sanction support from the Arab League) or against its 
domestic opponents. 
 
¶6. (C/NF)  Intervention at this point may be the pretext the 
junta desires/needs to make its final break.  Using a USG 
reminder as the focus of its rupture would burnish the 
junta's "eastern" credentials with a number of Muslim states. 
 Having identified the United States as the most adamant of 
its international critics, the junta would also be tempted to 
use such an intervention to undermine our democratic 
credentials with the Abdallahi administration, the FNDD, and 
other parties with whom we have worked throughout the past 
six months.  There are those, evidenced, in a recent article 
in a minor local newspaper "Points Chauds" who choose to see 
the sanctions question and the internationalization of the 
Mauritanian crisis as (in the words of the paper's headline) 
"the Jewish lobby against the Arab pressure group, who will 
have the last word?"  We would therefore recommend that the 
request outlined in Ref A be reconsidered. 
 
¶7. (C/NF)  Comment:  In our conversations with the Israeli 
Ambassador we sense that the GOI does not realize that the 
full spectrum of political opinion in Mauritania, junta, 
anti-junta, and opportunistic, is opposed to continuing 
relations with Israel.  The sole factor that has kept the 
junta from a full breach is its understanding that such a 
move would make its relations with the United States and the 
west that much more difficult.  This is understood as well by 
the opposition parties which, while goading the junta to take 
action, do not make such a break a sine qua non in their own 
position papers.  In our view, the Israelis could garner 
possible good will in the future were they to follow the 
Mauritanian lead and depart quietly and unofficially to 
return just as quietly when conditions here and in the Middle 
East improve.  There is, of course, the danger that this 
would be another pretext for a formal break but there is also 
the possibility that the junta and/or any follow-on 
administration would consider such discretion as a positive 
factor in the future.  End Comment. 
 
 
HANKINS