VZCZCXRO4145
PP RUEHAST RUEHCHI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHPW
DE RUEHBI #0079/01 0580541
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 270541Z FEB 09
FM AMCONSUL MUMBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6971
INFO RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 2147
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 8210
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0022
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0009
RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0126
RUCNIND/ALL INDO COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MUMBAI 000079 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/OCS/ACS 
DEPT FOR CA/EX 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AMGT ASEC CMGT CASC PTER KSAC IN
SUBJECT: MUMBAI ATTACKS, LESSONS LEARNED 
 
MUMBAI 00000079  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1.  (U) Begin Summary. The Mumbai Consulate has compiled the 
following lessons learned after managing the response to the 
terrorist attack which occurred in on November 26.  The attack 
engaged the entire Consulate - consular officers, public 
affairs, security officers, management and political/economic 
officers.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) Background: Beginning at 2120 on Wednesday, November 26, 
ten men staged attacks at nine different locations in southern 
Mumbai, India, using explosives and firearms.  At least four of 
these sites, hotels and a cafi, are heavily frequented by 
Americans and other non-Indian travelers to Mumbai.  The other 
sites included a cinema, hospital, train station, and a Jewish 
community center. In addition, bombs were left in at least two 
taxis, one of which detonated in northern Mumbai and the other 
in an eastern portion of the city.  Over 40,000 American 
citizens, most of Indian origin, are estimated to live in 
Mumbai's Consular district, and large numbers of tourists come 
to the city at this time of year.  This catastrophic attack was 
unprecedented in India, where past terrorist strikes have 
involved targeted bomb and grenade attacks. The events unfolded 
over a period of days and involved multiple specific locations 
as well as moving attacks and confrontations with law 
enforcement personnel.  Reports of hostages, injured and missing 
Americans, lost belongings, impending evacuations, and multiple 
deaths flooded the U.S. Consulate General throughout the events. 
 Significant numbers of Americans were directly affected, and 
thousands of concerned travelers in India and family members in 
the U.S. contacted the Department and the Consulate for 
information and assistance.  The entire Consulate was mobilized 
to staff the crisis: FSNs, FSOs, and EFMs from all sections, 
foregoing a long Thanksgiving weekend. The Consulate switchboard 
fielded over 3000 phone calls, and countless other calls and 
emails came directly to employees' personal cell phones, direct 
lines, and PDAs. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Managing the Crisis: We created two working groups to 
handle the event. The first group consisted of POL-ECON / Public 
Affairs / Management /RSO/FCS and the health unit and focused on 
reporting to the Department and Delhi, public affairs, security 
and management.  The second group was a consular group and 
focused on meeting the needs of our American Citizens. We 
received inquiries from 788 Americans. The three hotels attacked 
provided guest lists that included 98 Americans and members of 
the Consulate were in telephone contact with at least 24 
Americans trapped in the hotels until evacuation.  Of 171 
confirmed deaths, 29 were non-Indians from 15 different 
countries. Six Americans lost their lives, more than from any 
other country except India. Two Americans were wounded. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The Working Groups were disbanded on Monday, December 
1 and regular consular operations resumed on that day.  A normal 
schedule of 1100 NIV interviews began on Tuesday, December 2. 
The ACS Unit continues to process death certificates, the return 
of personal effects, and other follow-up action that resulted 
from the attacks, in addition to a normal workload of routine 
services. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) SPECIFIC LESSONS LEARNED: 
 
¶A. Immediate response: Personnel Accountability.  As post 
management became aware of the crisis, our immediate response 
was to activate our phone tree and account for all employees and 
family members.  Consulate issued a warden notice within about 
two hours of the first events.  Our continuing challenge was to 
understand the evolving nature of the attack. No one, including 
local police, clearly understood what was happening.  First 
reports were of a "gangland" style shooting at Leopold's Cafe 
and other locations.  During the course of the night it became 
clear that this attack was different from previous events, and 
it was unclear how it would end. 
 
¶B. Security: Limited RSO resources at Post and in the Mission 
India limited the initial response provided, although Post 
benefited greatly from the additional agents, local guards, and 
police who augmented security programs and allowed DS to focus 
 
MUMBAI 00000079  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
on the need to assess the safety environment of Consular staff. 
This was also the area that post received the most immediate and 
needed security reinforcements with help from Delhi and other 
consulates.  While we were able to get communication out to our 
staff via phone trees, we realized that if the phone had gone 
down - we could have had a problem.  We subsequently renewed and 
strengthened our radio program. 
 
¶C. Technology.  Technology was both an asset and a hindrance to 
good communication.  At times, the volume and variety of 
information coming in to the Consulate was difficult to manage 
effectively.  The Consulate's switchboard received over 3000 
calls, which were routed to a message that did not include 
information on emergency services and needed to be changed. 
Over 1000 emails were exchanged between the CA Task Force and 
post, and were not always addressed to the appropriate 
responder.  Despite the abundance of communication tools, it was 
difficult to access good information because of the moving, 
changing situation.  The CA Task Force provided valuable 
assistance in fielding inquiries and providing a 
point-of-contact regarding information about missing citizens. 
This work was aided by the Consular Task Force (CTF) software in 
the Combined Consular Database (CCD), which provided a point of 
coordination between Conoffs in Mumbai and in Washington.  PDAs 
and cell phones were also invaluable for in-field work, but slow 
system speeds, inconsistent availability of equipment, and 
network unreliability limited this use.  Onsite Consular ISC 
staff provided access to systems, including increasing the size 
of mailboxes, providing FSNs and TDYers with access to systems, 
and connecting phones to long distance service. Extra cell phone 
batteries, telephones and more frequent radio program are 
recommended. 
 
¶D.  Public Affairs played an important role in disseminating 
information for the benefit of Americans who need to know what 
action to take.   Hot line information should be released for 
television.  Post also recommends in an emergency, one POC be 
identified for updating, approving, and posting travel alerts, 
travel warnings, warden messages, website information, and email 
auto-responses for all of Mission India during crisis situations 
in order to ensure consistent and timely release and posting of 
public information. 
 
¶E. Consular Working Group:  The Consular Section Chief headed 
the Consular Working Group and coordinated with CA's Task Force. 
Key officers who live near the Consulate set up the phone center 
within an hour of the attacks and constituted the 12-hour 
consular night shift over the following four days.  Officers 
were assigned to visit hospitals, morgues, and evacuation sites 
for the purpose of identifying American citizens and were 
accompanied by Medical Office or RSO staff, when possible.  GOI 
security forces changed locations of evacuation sites and in 
some cases some sites could not be approached safely.  Each case 
was evaluated by the security officer and Consul General.  Each 
Consular shift was organized around POCs who monitored 
developments about specific affected sites and individuals. 
This allowed both continuity and handoff between shifts, and 
provided an informed and consistent contact for concerned family 
members and the CA Task Force. Post notes the usefulness of S/ES 
recommendations to use identified skills appropriately, and 
benefited from the experience of an FSO who spoke Hebrew and was 
able to work with the affected orthodox Jewish community.  Hindi 
and Marathi speakers were assigned to contact hospitals, and one 
officer who had worked on after-event reporting in Islamabad 
coordinated logging and reporting. 
 
¶F.  Locally engaged staff were key.  LES staff member knowledge 
and experience was invaluable, particularly with providing 
contact information, and access to local services and contacts. 
Post noted that some FSNs had more thorough knowledge of the FAM 
than experienced FSOs and helped ensure ongoing service to 
American citizens during and after the events.  Emergency 
passports were issued throughout the ordeal and Post coordinated 
exit permits with Indian immigration authorities on behalf of 
travelers. Onsite services were provided due to the danger of 
travel; Post used an onsite passport photographer and arranged 
 
MUMBAI 00000079  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
for exit permits to be issued at the airport. 
 
¶G.  Coordinating with other consulates helped.  Eighteen foreign 
nationals were killed, in addition to six Americans.  Small 
staffing and large demand from their own citizens affected the 
response from other foreign Consulates.  Dual nationals and 
overseas residency created some confusion in identifying 
nationality and appropriate services for some.  Post coordinated 
closely with Israeli consuls on behalf of Israeli-American 
victims, and coordinated onsite evacuation reception with a 
number of Consulates and the affected hotels. 
 
¶H.  TDYers were ready to come in and we appreciated the support 
provided by the department.  In hind-sight, we probably did not 
need everyone that eventually arrived but we were not sure how 
long the event was going to go on.  We could have used a handful 
of consular officers to work NIV operations for two days just to 
allow some officers rest before normal operations resumed. 
 
¶I.  Management: The GSO/Acting Management Officer provided 
resources to assist with round-the-clock staffing and offsite 
operations, including hiring extra cars and drivers for TDY 
staff, additional maintenance shifts, and providing direct 
assistance to affected Americans, including transport and food. 
Post recommends that fiscal authorization be provided even 
faster in crisis situations.  The RMPO arrived within a few days 
and conducted well-received workshops for FSNs and FSOs on the 
effects of post-traumatic stress and planned a repeat visit.  If 
possible we would have brought the RMO/P in earlier to help with 
Amcit hostages who had been trapped by the attacks in the hotels. 
FOLMSBEE