P 251250Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2122
INFO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 
AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 
AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000462 
 
 
FOR DS/IP, DS/CIS, DS/IP/EUR, DS/SPC/MSG, DS/DSS/OSAC, DS/DSS/ICI, 
DS/ICI/CAS, DS/ICI/PSS, DS/CIS/PSP, DS/PSP/FPD, DS/PSP/PSSD, 
DS/DSS/ITA, DS/AO/PMD, DS/IP/FPO, DSERCC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC KSAC
SUBJECT:  ACEQ - MOSCOW, YEKATERINGBURG, AND VLADIVOSTOK 
 
¶1.  Crime mobility - Response F 
 
Gangs and other criminal elements roam freely day or night, and 
target Embassy officials (Emboff) and affluent residential areas for 
burglary. 
 
Narrative:  The increasing number of violent robberies against 
American and Locally Engaged (LES) employees reported to RSO in 2008 
continued the trend from 2007.  These crimes include an increased 
number of strong-arm robberies where pickpockets used force instead 
of surreptitious theft.  The number of racially and ethnically 
motivated assaults, and anti-American assaults and harassment, 
remained high.  Russia saw at least 120 racially motivated murders 
in 2008, including another decapitation of an immigrant laborer in 
December with photos taken by the perpetrators sent to the press to 
claim credit for the act.  An African American exchange student was 
stabbed in December in an apparent racially motivated crime. 
 
¶2.  Crime ambiance around Emboff neighborhoods - Response D 
 
Embassy neighborhoods are within walking distance (approximately one 
mile), of areas in which bands of criminals freely operate and where 
street and residential crimes frequently result in violence to 
residents. 
 
Narrative:  All off-compound embassy housing is gated and secured by 
guards, either provided by the Russian UpDK organization or by 
private security.  Overall, the host government pays a great deal of 
attention to these housing areas, including surveillance cameras, 
smart-card access devices, and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
key fobs.  However, outside of these residential compounds, there 
are no dedicated security measures.  Embassy employees are typically 
not specifically targeted based on their diplomatic status, rather, 
criminal acts directed toward official Americans tend to be the 
result of the perception of wealth, anti-American sentiment, or 
crimes of opportunity. 
 
¶3.  Aggressiveness of Criminals - response C 
 
Criminals commit street crimes and burglaries, and are not deterred 
by risk of confrontation with occupants during burglaries. 
 
Narrative:  Residential security measures employed by the embassy in 
conjunction with host nation provided security prevent most 
burglaries.  More often perpetrators commit crimes outside of 
residential compounds rather than risk entering a building with 
active security measures such as guards and CCTV cameras.  For this 
reason, most crimes against embassy personnel are robberies and 
burglary from/of vehicles.  However, there have been incidents 
reported by non-official Americans of burglaries and home invasion 
robberies.  Incidents in nightclubs and bars do occur and can 
quickly escalate into assualt, sometimes with racial motivations. 
 
¶4.  Arming of Criminals - response C 
 
Criminal perpetrators are usually carrying firearms, (handguns and 
shoulder weapons) and knives. 
 
Narrative:  Both official and private Americans have been robbed at 
gunpoint, knifepoint, and clubbed unconscious with blunt objects. 
Criminals have easy access to firearms and knives. 
 
¶5.  Aggregation of Criminals - response D 
 
Criminal perpetrators usually operate in groups of greater than four 
individuals, are disposed frequently to be confrontational and 
gratuitously violent. 
 
Narrative:  Organized criminal groups are extremely widespread in 
Russia.  Local police have responded by arresting an increased 
number of members of extremist groups targeting ethnic minorities. 
Groups of disenfranchised and often intoxicated youth frequently 
engage in harassment and violence against American visitors.  Some 
groups continue to engage in shootings and bombings of competitors. 
The use of violence in the protection racket appears to be falling, 
however, this may be in part due to the success corrupt law 
enforcement groups have had in taking over the industry.  Robberies 
of individuals are typically conducted by two or three males. 
Pickpocket teams work the Metro stations and areas frequented by 
tourists, and vary in size from one or two up to more than a dozen. 
 
 
¶6.  Deterrence/Response of Police - response C 
 
Local police or neighborhood associations are generally ineffective 
at deterring crime, and response to alarms or emergency calls are 
often too slow (15 minutes or longer) to disrupt burglaries or 
invasive crimes in progress in Emboff neighborhoods; police have a 
mediocre record in apprehending suspects after the fact. 
 
Narrative:  Few of the criminal acts involving the American 
diplomatic community result in arrests or prosecutions.  Most of the 
incidents involving theft or physical assaults on official Americans 
are rarely reported to the police due to historically poor 
responses.  Individuals who do report crimes frequently describe a 
lack of interest on the part of the police, active discouragement of 
making an official report, and even extortion of bribes from the 
victim. 
 
 
¶7.  Training/Professionalism of Police - response F 
 
Police are a negative factor; police are unprofessional, 
ill-trained, generally inept, uncaring, and they are corrupt and may 
collaborate with criminal elements, or carry out crimes themselves 
under protection of their official status. 
 
Narrative:  The F rating reflects the general state of law 
enforcement in Russia.  While Militia officers who work with the 
embassy or are in liaison positions are generally professional and 
reasonably well-trained, a significant number if not the majority of 
police officers in Russia use their occupation to extract bribes. 
 
The efforts of the professional officers are undermined by the vast 
extent of corruption within the ranks.  RSO receives several reports 
per year from official American employees who are solicited by 
police officers for bribes, most often when stopped for traffic 
infractions or by police in public parks or tourist areas.  Private 
citizens and embassy employees with limited immunity more often 
report solicitation and extortion efforts by police.  In 2008, 
Transparency International reported that the level of corruption in 
Russia rose for the eighth straight year.  The organization also 
documented the high level of corruption within the Russian courts in 
2007, quoting the chairman of the constitutional court, Valery 
Zorkin, who told the newspaper Izvesti that, "...bribe taking in the 
courts has become one of the biggest corruption markets in Russia." 
 
 
A large number of Russian businesses are forced to pay a percentage 
of their revenue to a "krysha" or "roof."  This payment is intended 
to ensure the criminal ring soliciting the money will not harm the 
proprietor or business, and to defend the business against other 
extortion attempts.  This system is so lucrative that groups from 
many of the law enforcement agencies have entered the protection 
racket, illegally using their official authority and equipment to 
collect protection money. 
 
President Medvedev has again recently addressed the issue of 
official corruption, including an enforcement sweep which resulted 
in the arrest of many law enforcement officers.  One new approach 
brought forward by the Duma was the banning of officers from 
inspecting small and medium-sized businesses due to rampant 
extortion.  Unfortunately to date the benefits of such efforts have 
not yet been observed. 
 
BEYRLE