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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 000240 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR GG AF KG UP RS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH DFM KARASIN JANUARY 30: 
GEORGIA, AFGHANISTAN, CENTRAL ASIA-MANAS, UKRAINE 
 
REF: STATE 8443 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Karasin 
told Ambassador January 30 that the GOR hoped for more 
flexibility and a move away from "unilateralism" by the new 
Administration.  He said, while the international community 
could discuss the status and future of the region, Georgia 
needed to understand there was no military solution to the 
situation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the best way 
to restore stability was for Georgia to establish normal 
relations with the two enclaves.  He expressed support for a 
UN and OSCE presence in the respective zones, and said Russia 
favored something between a substantive resolution and a 
technical rollover of the UNOMIG mission.  He privately told 
the Ambassador that as long as the OSCE office in Tskhinvali 
reported directly to Vienna, not to or through Tbilisi, it 
should be possible to reach an agreement.  Karasin argued 
Morel's proposal to reestablish a plenary session in Geneva, 
without Abkhazia and South Ossetia, could lead to another 
failure of the talks.  He stressed Russia was putting 
pressure on Abkhazia and South Ossetia to agree to the 
incident monitoring and response mechanism in Geneva, but 
stressed Russia's influence was not "unlimited."  He noted 
that if the OSCE and UN missions were operating well, there 
was no need for frequent missions in Geneva.  He said Russia 
was only repairing "three berths" at Ochamchire for use by 
its Coast Guard, not establishing a naval base, and claimed 
Russia had fulfilled all the requirements of the 
Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement, while repeating complaints that 
Georgia had not. 
 
¶2. (C) Summary continued.  Karasin said Russia "absolutely 
supported" joint efforts to normalize the situation in 
Afghanistan. In response to the Ambassador's concern over 
reported Russian pressure on Kygyzstan over Manas Air Base, 
Karasin said the U.S. and Russia needed to have a "separate 
conversation" on the larger question of U.S. military 
presence in Central Asia, and on the "facilities and 
capacities" that Russia and the U.S. have in the region to 
support operations in Afghanistan.  He intimated that the 
issue of Manas would be discussed during Kyrgyz President 
Bakiyev's visit to Moscow.  Karasin expressed concern about 
the U.S.-Ukraine Charter of Strategic Partnership and asked 
for more information on the elements relating to the gas 
transport system and a U.S. diplomatic representation in 
Crimea.  End summary. 
 
U.S.-Russian Relations 
---------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Karasin said that the GOR saw a new chance for 
improving U.S.-Russian relations.  They hoped the U.S. would 
show more flexibility and move away from "unilateralism," 
especially on global and regional problems.  The U.S. role 
and strength were important, but should be put in a global 
context.  The Ambassador agreed that flexibility on both 
sides would be important, and noted the new Administration's 
commitment to dialogue and working with partners to find 
common ground. 
 
Georgia 
------- 
 
¶4. (C)  The Ambassador stressed that the U.S., EU and Russia 
needed to work together to bring about peace and stability in 
the region, and expressed concern about the continuing 
violence and the Russian presence in Perevi and Akhalgori. 
He emphasized the need to reach agreement on UN and OSCE 
mandates for the observer missions. 
 
¶5. (C) Karasin said the main problem was that Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, on the one hand, and Georgia on the other, had 
different agendas.  The former were trying to improve life 
and conditions in their regions, while Georgia's insistence 
on trying to reestablish its territorial integrity and return 
displaced persons, and failure to fulfill the terms of the 
Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement by returning its forces to their 
barracks, were creating a dangerous environment.  Georgia 
needed to understand (as the Europeans did) that a military 
solution would not work, and the only way to achieve 
stability was to establish normal relations with the 
"countries" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  He expressed 
concern about provision of military equipment to Georgia. 
 
MOSCOW 00000240  002 OF 004 
 
 
The Ambassador responded that the U.S. had been fully 
transparent about our return of Georgian equipment, and urged 
Russia to continue toning down statements about the U.S. 
"rearming" Georgia. 
 
¶6. (C)  In response to the Ambassador's objection to his use 
of the word "countries," and note that Russia was the only 
state in the region that had recognized the two enclaves, 
Karasin said Russia was interested in maintaining an 
international presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but 
wanted the new situation regarding the two zones reflected in 
the International Organizations' documents.  The Ambassador 
pushed back, stressing that Russia could not expect the 
Georgians to agree to anything that suggested they accepted 
the independence of the two zones.  Karasin said that 
Russia's recognition of the two enclaves meant only one 
thing: protection of Abkhazia and South Ossetia against 
further Georgian aggression.  This was why Russia was content 
that Nicaragua was the only other country that had recognized 
the two. 
 
UN, OSCE, EUMM, Geneva 
---------------------- 
¶7. (C) Karasin said he hoped the UN and OSCE mandates could 
be agreed in time for the February 17-18 meeting in Geneva. 
In the full meeting, he said Russia wanted a "fully 
substantive" UN Security Council Resolution, which should 
incorporate ideas from previous resolutions, but also include 
new ideas, such as taking into account the 1994 Moscow 
Agreement.  (Note: In a one-on-one discussion following the 
meeting, Karasin amended his description, saying Russia was 
looking for something "in between" a technical rollover and a 
substantive resolution). 
 
¶8. (C) The OSCE mandate was more complicated because the 
South Ossetians still were suspicious of the OSCE believing 
the OSCE had not prevented Georgia's "aggression."  Russia, 
Karasin said, kept insisting to the South Ossetians that the 
OSCE mission should have access to South Ossetia.  In 
response to the Ambassador's question, he said that if the 
eight monitors in South Ossetia found the need for "three or 
four" more people, Russia would consider it.  The Greek 
proposal was a good beginning.  The mission in Tskhinvali 
should not be "a branch of some office in Georgia," but 
should be an independent office of the OSCE, with a different 
name, reporting directly to Vienna.  In a one-on-one with the 
Ambassador at the end of the meeting, Karasin said if the 
Georgians could move away from the position that the 
Tskhinvali office had to report to or through Tbilisi, it 
should be possible to agree. 
 
¶9. (C) Karasin welcomed the signing of the memorandum of 
understanding on the EU Monitors, but stressed that the point 
in the memo calling for moves by the Russian side should 
instead refer to the South Ossetians. 
 
¶10. (C) Karasin expressed support for the incident monitoring 
and response mechanism, which he said "must" be agreed upon 
in Geneva.  He emphasized the importance of lines of 
communication between the EU, OSCE and UN representatives. 
In preparation for the Geneva meeting, he said Russia was 
pressuring Abkhazia and South Ossetia continually to agree to 
the mechanism, but "our influence is not unlimited."  Karasin 
contended that EU special envoy's proposal to redo the format 
of the Geneva meeting, including reestablishing a plenary 
session without Abkhaz and South Ossetia, followed by a 
larger session including the two enclaves in their individual 
capacities, could cause the talks to fail as the first ones 
had.  If Abkhazia and South Ossetia were not included in the 
plenary, Russia would also not participate, and if the Abkhaz 
and South Ossetians found Morel was preparing new formats, 
they would not go to Geneva. 
 
¶11. (C) Karasin said that Russia considered the Geneva 
process important and was not seeking to "break it," but 
believed that if the UN and OSCE missions were working well, 
there would be no need for frequent meetings in Geneva. 
Russia did not want a process "just for process' sake."  He 
added that the Georgians needed to stop provocative actions 
in Geneva, such as bringing "alternative" representatives 
like Sanakoyev.  The Ambassador stressed the importance of 
the meetings in Geneva as the only place where the Georgians, 
Abkhaz and South Ossetians could meet and seek flexibility. 
 
Ochamchire, Russian bases 
 
MOSCOW 00000240  003 OF 004 
 
 
------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) The Ambassador expressed concern at reports that 
Russia was seeking to build a naval base in Ochamchire, 
noting that this, together with an expanded Russian military 
presence at the Gudauta base and Upper Khodori Gorge were 
seen as provocative and exacerbated tensions.  Karasin said 
reports about Ochamchire were exaggerated; Russia was merely 
overhauling three existing berths to allow the stationing of 
three Russian Coast Guard vessels.  Nobody was seeking to 
base the fleet there.  He argued that Russia had fully 
fulfilled the terms of the August 12 and September 8 
Agreements; the forces in the two zones were there by 
agreement with the governments of those two regions.  Russia 
was not hiding the fact it wanted bases in the two zones to 
protect them.  Ambassador reiterated that plans to station 
over 7000 Russian troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
violated the Sarkozy-Medvedev agreements. 
 
Afghanistan-Manas-Central Asia 
------------------------------ 
 
¶13. (C) Karasin reiterated President Medvedev's statement of 
support for increased U.S.-Russian cooperation on 
Afghanistan, saying Russia was in favor of joint efforts. 
Karasin avoided a direct response to the Ambassador's concern 
over reports that Russia was pressuring Kygyzstan to end the 
U.S. presence at Manas Air Base (reftel); Karasin said the 
U.S. and Russia needed to have a "separate conversation" on 
the question of U.S. military presence in Central Asia, a 
subject which was "bigger than Manas."  The Central Asian 
countries "needed to be free to decide about the presence of 
other countries on their territories."  We should discuss and 
coordinate the "facilities and capacities" that Russia and 
the U.S. have in the region to support operations in 
Afghanistan.  He initially said the issue of Manas would be 
discussed during Kyrgyz President Bakiyev's visit to Moscow, 
but later backtracked, saying the focus would be economic 
matters, but "some political-military issues" would likely be 
addressed.  The Ambassador noted the February 10-11 
consultations on Afghanistan in Moscow would be a good 
opportunity to discuss these issues, but reiterated that 
pressure over Manas ran counter to Medvedev's expression of 
strategic support for U.S./NATO efforts in Afghanistan. 
 
¶14. (C) Karasin explained that he and the MFA CIS Directorate 
would continue to be responsible for political matters 
related to Central Asia and the Caucasus.  The new Federal 
Agency for the CIS, recently created within the MFA, would 
address humanitarian, economic and cultural matters, 
including the compatriots' question. 
 
Ukraine 
------- 
 
¶15. (C) Karasin expressed concern about the U.S.-Ukraine 
Charter of Strategic Partnership, saying there were three 
schools of thought about it:  1) it was a gesture by the 
outgoing Administration in compensation for not getting a 
NATO MAP; 2) it was an indication of support for NATO 
membership for Ukraine; and 3) it was simply a declaration of 
status.  In any event, Russia was concerned by two items and 
would appreciate additional information on U.S. intentions 
regarding:  1) the elements relating to the gas transport 
system,  and 2) the establishment of a U.S. diplomatic 
presence in Crimea. 
 
¶16. (C) Karasin said he expected Russian-Ukrainian relations 
to improve, as they had already hit the bottom.  Russia and 
Ukrainian officials continued to meet, and the GOR was 
concerned by Ukrainian provocations such as its claims about 
the Holodomor.  But he thought the gas agreement would hold, 
although President Yuschenko was sending ambiguous signals. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶17. (C)  In a brief one-on-one discussion following the 
meeting, Karasin stressed the difficulties posed by Russia's 
"Abkhaz and South Ossetian friends," asking us to counsel 
"restraint" on the Georgian representatives to avoid 
"blow-ups or walk-outs" which were in no one's interest.  He 
referred to unspecified pressure to de-emphasize the Geneva 
process (implicitly from elsewhere in the GOR) and reiterated 
the need to agree on the incident monitoring mechanism as an 
 
MOSCOW 00000240  004 OF 004 
 
 
antidote to such pressure.  Clearly, Karasin feels Geneva is 
under the gun to move from a discussion forum to something 
that produces tangible outcomes. 
BEYRLE