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DE RUEHMO #0239/01 0330952
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O 020952Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1722
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 000239 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EFIN RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA WELCOMES PRESIDENT OBAMA BUT FOREIGN POLICY 
GOALS UNCHANGED 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  Russia will not change its foreign policy 
goals because of the financial crisis or difficulties in 
relations with the West and neighbors, according to FM Lavrov 
in his annual press conference on January 16.  Blaming the 
conflicts in 2008 mostly on the West, Lavrov nonetheless 
emphasized that Russia was ready for "equal cooperation." 
Moscow's top foreign policy priority was the CIS, though 
Russia did not seek new "spheres of influence."  The Georgia 
conflict had highlighted the need for a "polycentric system 
of governance" and a new European security model, whereas the 
financial crisis had emphasized the need to focus on real 
issues not "virtual projects" like NATO enlargement.  Both 
Lavrov and DFM Ryabkov expressed hope there would be changes 
in policy under the Obama Administration, leading to improved 
U.S.-Russian relations building off the April 2007 Sochi 
Declaration, with President Medvedev using a meeting with 
Russian Ambassador to the U.S. Kislyak to reinforce 
expectations of early and productive engagement.  Russia 
called for serious negotiations on a post-START Treaty, 
reconsideration of missile defense plans for eastern Europe, 
and direct U.S. dialogue with Iran.  Despite the positive 
comments on U.S.-Russian relations by GOR officials, the 
GOR-influenced media downplayed the U.S. inauguration.  In 
response to Lavrov, experts see Russian actions, particularly 
in Georgia and Ukraine, as likely to have negative 
consequences for its relations with the CIS and the West. End 
summary. 
 
No Change in Goals 
------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) In his annual press conference on Russia's foreign 
policy January 16, FM Lavrov emphasized that Moscow would not 
change its foreign policy goals laid out in President 
Medvedev's Foreign Policy Concept (reftel) despite the 
financial crisis and the difficult issues and relations 
Russia experienced in 2008.  Instead of highlighting Russia's 
foreign policy successes and future goals, Lavrov 
acknowledged that the previous year had been "rich in major 
controversial events that seriously affected the situation in 
the world."  He stressed that Russia had completed a period 
of "inner concentration," focusing on a "qualitatively new 
geopolitical situation," and now had a clear understanding of 
its national interests.  Noting that Russia was "ready for 
equal cooperation" with its international partners, he 
nonetheless blamed most of the difficulties of the prior year 
on the West's policies, particularly the recognition of 
Kosovo, desire to enlarge NATO to Georgia and Ukraine, and 
efforts to "contain Russia." 
 
¶3. (SBU) Calling the global financial crisis the most 
important event of 2008, Lavrov denied that the crisis (which 
is seriously affecting Russia) would have a significant 
impact on proposed major projects, such as the construction 
of the North Stream and South Stream pipelines, though it 
might slow some projects down due to a reduction in funds. 
Rather, the financial crisis would affect the methods by 
which foreign policy was conducted.  Lavrov predicted that 
"urgent issues" would replace "virtual projects" (such as 
NATO enlargement), with a new impulse to "strengthen the 
common agenda, de-ideologize international relations, and 
focus on pragmatic approaches." 
 
CIS Top Priority for Russia 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Lavrov stated that development of relations with the 
CIS was Russia's "absolute priority," noting the creation of 
a new Agency for the CIS within the MFA and President 
Medvedev's January 22-23 visit to Uzbekistan.  He denied that 
Russia was seeking "spheres of influence," stressing instead 
the long-standing ties between Russia and its neighbors and 
Moscow's desire to develop relations with those countries on 
an "equal, mutually beneficial basis." 
 
Need for New European Security Architecture 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Lavrov reiterated that the previous year's 
difficulties had merely reinforced the need for a 
"polycentric system of governance."  Repeating Russian 
arguments justifying its war with Georgia and contending that 
Georgian government actions had "forced" Moscow to recognize 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Lavrov indicated that such events 
demonstrated the "urgency" for a new European Security model. 
 He maintained that Medvedev's proposal was not designed to 
eliminate existing security institutions, including NATO; 
Russia sought to participate in the discussions and 
development of a new structure intended to remove remaining 
 
MOSCOW 00000239  002 OF 004 
 
 
dividing lines.  Lavrov repeated the GOR mantra that just as 
the financial crisis had shown that one country could not 
secure its financial security at the expense of any other, no 
country should ensure its security at the expense of another. 
 
Hope for Improved Relations with the U.S. 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Lavrov stressed that Moscow wanted to "actively 
cooperate" with the new U.S. Administration and hoped there 
would be "changes for the better" in U.S. foreign policy. 
This overarching message was reinforced by Medvedev on 
January 15.  In a meeting with Russian Ambassador to the U.S. 
Kislyak, Medvedev noted that despite disagreement on a number 
of issues, there were fields where the two countries "simply 
must work together," highlighting the global financial 
crisis, the fight against terrorism, organized crime and 
illegal narcotics, and non-proliferation.  He said Russia 
would like to see relations with the U.S. "evolve and develop 
intensively and constructively in all areas." 
 
¶7. (SBU) Russian leaders continue to highlight the April 2007 
Sochi Declaration as a bilateral template, with Lavrov 
calling for a "more substantive, constructive conversation" 
on a post-START arms control regime; a pause in development 
of the missile defense sites in eastern Europe and a 
reconsideration of Russia's 2007 proposals for a 
Russia-U.S.-European system for tracking and developing joint 
responses to missile threats; and the resumption of 
high-level economic dialogue.  Stressing that the U.S. and 
Russia had a "huge agenda," including the Middle East, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, nuclear and weapons proliferation, 
counternarcotics, combating international crime, and 
counterterrorism, Lavrov urged the U.S. to discard 
"unnecessary, virtual" projects, such as NATO enlargement, 
and focus on a common agenda. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Both Lavrov and MFA Deputy Foreign Minister for 
North America Sergey Ryabkov, in separate interviews January 
17 and 19, expressed the hope that the new U.S. 
Administration would open a window of opportunity to rekindle 
U.S.-Russian relations.  Even as speculation mounts in the 
media over early visits by the President and Secretary, both 
stressed that the problems in the relationship would not be 
solved overnight.  Emphasizing that it was up to the new 
Administration to determine the relationship with Russia, 
they said that Russia was ready for open, equal, pragmatic 
interaction with the U.S., and believed it was possible to 
build on past efforts to move the relationship forward. 
Lavrov, speaking to "Vesti" TV, pointed to the Sochi 
Declaration as embodying the principles upon which the 
relationship was founded: do everything to solve problems in 
the areas where our approaches are similar, and strive to 
ensure that differences on other issues do not hamper 
cooperation.  However, both Lavrov and Ryabkov, in his 
interview with ITAR-TASS, reiterated opposition to U.S. 
missile defense plans and NATO enlargement, and expressed the 
hope the U.S. Administration would "thoroughly review" the 
policies.  Ryabkov emphasized the top priority of negotiating 
a post-START treaty, while recognizing the differences in 
approach between the two sides. 
 
¶7. (SBU) In his "Vesti" TV interview, Lavrov welcomed the 
prospect of direct dialogue between the U.S. and Iran, noting 
that Russia's dialogue with Iran was developing "quite 
successfully." 
 
Desultory Reaction to Obama Inauguration 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) While Russian officials have favorably spun 
prospects for improved relations with the U.S., the 
GOR-influenced and state-controlled media have downplayed 
President Obama's inauguration.  Coverage has been desultory, 
with most newspapers carrying the story on inside pages, and 
little analysis or comment from officials or the press. 
Conservative attack dogs,such as TV commentator Mikhail 
Leontyev, have disparaged prospects for change, with other 
commentators referring to "G.W. Obama."  A number of Russian 
attendees at the Spaso House viewing of the inauguration 
commented on the strong contrast between the U.S. ceremony, 
with over a million "average" Americans on the Mall to 
witness it, and Medvedev's inauguration in May, which was 
limited to a small group of the elite.  There is clear 
sensitivity about the obviously free and fair competition in 
the U.S. electoral process, contrasted to Russia's "foregone 
conclusion."  Noting the debacle of Ukraine and Georgia, 
Russia in Global Affairs editor Fedor Lukyanov attributed 
small advances in Bishkek and Dushanbe to the effects of the 
 
MOSCOW 00000239  003 OF 004 
 
 
international crisis, and not the attractiveness of Russian 
foreign policy. 
 
Experts Express Skepticism 
-------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Although some commentators, such as Sergey 
Karaganov, Director of the Council on Foreign and Defense 
Policy, characterized Russia as having won in 2008 on foreign 
policy issues as the war in Georgia, NATO enlargement, and 
reemergence of Russia as a major power, many experts 
questioned Lavrov's positive spin and emphasized the 
consequences of Russia's actions on its relations with the 
rest of the world. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Andrei Fedorov, Director of Political Programs of 
the Council of Foreign and Defense Policy and former Deputy 
Foreign Minister (1990-1991), contended that there was little 
being done on a new EU-Russia Partnership Agreement, 
NATO-Russian relations were "still in a state of 
hypothermia," U.S-Russian relations were at a low point, 
Russian relations with the CIS were "far from desirable," and 
Russian relations with Ukraine were "the worst" in the past 
few  years.  He added that Russia's credibility as a reliable 
political partner had been undermined, the gas conflict with 
Ukraine "did not add optimism," and Russia had pushed the EU 
to revise the entire system of European energy security. 
Characterizing 2008 as a year of an "almost constant obstacle 
course" for Russia, he predicted that Russia would not gain 
new allies, but increasingly be required to defend its 
national interests alone. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Vladimir Milov, head of the World Energy Institute 
and member of the opposition party Solidarity, and Alexey 
Malashenko of the Moscow Carnegie Center, both posited to us 
that Russia's top foreign policy priority was to "retake 
post-Soviet space," but that its actions in Georgia and over 
the gas crisis in Ukraine were having the opposite effect; 
they were driving away Russia's former partners, including in 
Central Asia, where Russia's actions had thrown into question 
who could best guarantee their security.  Characterizing 
Russia's actions in Georgia and Ukraine as "major mistakes," 
Malashenko contended that they would have long-term 
consequences for Russia's relations in the region. 
 
¶12. (SBU) There has been incredulity over Lavrov's assertion 
that the financial crisis would not affect any major foreign 
policy projects, with a Kommersant editorial arguing that 
Russia's "ambitious expansion" into Latin America, creation 
of a Russia-Belarus Union State and plans to unite the CIS, 
and alternate pipelines were all likely victims.  All these 
projects, Kommersant reported, had run into serious problems: 
Russian oil and gas companies had said there were no funds to 
invest in Latin America; Russia-Belarus discussions on a 
Union State had been postponed twice and Lukashenko had not 
even recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia; the plan for the 
new MFA CIS Federal Agency to create a Russian analogue to 
AID had not materialized; and Gazprom, even before the 
dispute with Ukraine, had started seeking new investors for 
Nord Stream due to lack of money to pay for it.  Kommersant 
also noted that contrary to Lavrov's statement that 
Russian-EU interaction over the past year had been "a good 
example of a constructive, pragmatic approach," the EU, 
during the war with Georgia, had considered imposing 
sanctions on Russia; had decided to support the Nabucco 
pipeline; had frozen negotiations on the new PCA for two 
months; and had suggested that the next "victims" after 
Georgia and Ukraine could be Moldova.  Kommersant ironically 
noted that Lavrov's conclusion that "Russia has largely 
completed the period of focus" came from his 1856-1882 
predecessor Prince Gorchakov, who actually had said:  "Russia 
is accused of being isolated and silent in the face of facts 
that are not in tune with any law or with justice.  They say 
that Russia is angry.  Russia is not angry, Russia is 
focused." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) While acknowledging that there have been "major 
controversial events" in the past year, Lavrov and Russian 
officials continue to put the blame on the rest of the world, 
particularly the U.S., and intimate that if only the rest of 
the world would address issues in a pragmatic and open way 
and include Russia as an equal partner, all would be well. 
While there does seem to be a genuine hope and desire to 
improve relations with the U.S., Lavrov and other GOR 
officials have adhered to an uncompromising line that it will 
not come at the expense of concessions on Russia's perceived 
 
MOSCOW 00000239  004 OF 004 
 
 
"red lines." 
BEYRLE