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C O N F I D E N T I A L MELBOURNE 000033 
 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR DS/IP/EAP AND DS/IP/TIA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2019 
TAGS: ASEC PTER PGOV AS
SUBJECT: VICTORIA ILL PREPARED FOR TERROR ATTACKS? 
 
REF: A. MELBOURNE 18 
     ¶B. 08 MELBOURNE 141 
     ¶C. 08 MELBOURNE 117 
 
Classified By: MICHAEL E. THURSTON, CONSUL GENERAL, FOR REASONS 1.4(B) 
AND (G) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C/NF) Victoria's Inspector General released an audit in 
mid-January criticizing the state government's preparation 
for a potential terrorist attack.  The report found that a 
lack of cooperation between police and government agencies 
and a confusing tangle of legislation may slow the state's 
response to an attack.  While Victoria's Premier appears to 
be taking the report's findings seriously, the possibility of 
a terrorist attack in Australia remains a very remote fear in 
the hearts of most Victorians.  End Summary. 
 
Better Coordination Needed 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU/NF) A report prepared by Victoria Inspector General 
(IG) Des Pearson in January finds the state's readiness to 
respond to a potential terrorist attack lacking in several 
important respects.  First, the report says that oversight 
and governance structures "could be more effective."  The 
co-existence of two pieces of legislation providing for the 
protection of key infrastructure in the event of a terrorist 
attack (the Terrorism (community protection) Act of 2003 and 
the Victorian Framework for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection from Terrorism of 2007) "is confusing and hinders 
coordination" between state authorities and police.  The 
roles and responsibilities of the agencies involved in 
implementing the two pieces of legislation are "unclear" and 
the state has not developed adequate metrics for measuring 
Victoria's readiness to respond to a terrorist attack as 
required by the legislation. 
 
¶3. (SBU/NF) Second, the IG's report finds that three lead 
agencies in Victoria (Human Services, Justice, and the 
Department of Innovation, Industry and Regional Development) 
"were not aware" that some infrastructure in their industry 
sectors is considered to be "critical."  In addition, the 
terms for mandated audits of risk management plans for 
essential services have not been defined.  The report 
declares, however, that arrangements for an emergency 
response in the energy, water, and transport sectors are 
"considered reasonable." 
 
¶4. (SBU/NF) Finally, the report recommends that the 
Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) should exercise 
"firmer leadership" in administering implementation of the 
legislation.  Other recommendations include clarifying the 
roles and responsibilities of key actors as well as providing 
definitive guidance on what constitutes an essential service. 
 Police and DPC officials were also encouraged to standardize 
reporting on training exercises in order to better identify 
lessons learned. 
 
Reaction 
-------- 
 
¶5. (C/NF) According to an experienced officer in the Victoria 
police's security intelligence group, the IG's report was a 
justified wake up call to Premier John Brumby.  The rapid 
creation of several pieces of legislation (background 
included below) aimed at preparing Australia and Victoria to 
respond to terrorist attacks was a "knee-jerk" reaction to 
9/11 and has since "lost steam."  He agreed with the report's 
assessment that cooperation between the DPC and the police is 
insufficient and noted that there is still substantial 
confusion over what constitutes "critical infrastructure." 
 
¶6. (C/NF) The officer noted that Victoria's plan for 
responding to a terrorist attack is too complex.  Similar to 
the IG's report, he indicated that overlapping jurisdiction - 
between various pieces of legislation as well as between the 
state and federal governments - has weakened the laws' 
effectiveness.  Finally, there are several vulnerabilities 
not included in existing laws or emergency planning such as 
addressing threats to major events (to which Melbourne is 
frequently home) as well as places where people are known to 
congregate such as major intersections in the city's central 
business district. 
 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶7. (SBU/NF) According to the report, "Australia's 
counter-terrorism capability operates through a cooperative 
partnership between national, state and territory 
jurisdictions, with joint responsibility for developing and 
maintaining nationwide capability.  The Commonwealth (federal 
government) has the national coordination responsibility." 
The National Counter-Terrorism Committee (formed in 2002) is 
comprised of federal, state and territory governments and is 
responsible for maintaining the national counter-terrorism 
plan. 
 
¶8. (SBU/NF) In November 2002, the Victorian government 
released its counter-terrorism policy statement entitled 
"Enhancing Victoria's Domestic Security: New measures for the 
fight against terrorism."  The document recommends that the 
Victoria police assist operators of "essential services" 
including electricity, gas, water, transport and fuel in the 
development, validation, and audit of their risk management 
plans.  Much of the state's essential services and critical 
infrastructure is privately owned or operated.  Primary 
responsibility for providing adequate protection rests with 
owners/operators. 
 
¶9. (SBU/NF) The Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) and the 
Terrorism (Community Protection) acts were introduced in 
2003, establishing new counter-terrorism powers including 
provisions for the protection of declared essential services. 
 According to the IG's report, Victoria was the only 
jurisdiction to introduce legislation requiring critical 
infrastructure to be protected.  Victoria later released two 
additional counter-terrorism policy papers in 2005 and 2006 
aimed at bolstering community integration initiatives as an 
attempt to remove the base causes of terrorism. 
 
¶10. (U) A copy of the IG's report may be found online at: 
http://www.audit.vic.gov.au/reports_publicati ons/reports_by 
_year/2009/20090121_terrorism_response.aspx 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (C/NF) While the release of the IG's report created at 
least one spectacular front page headline ("Victoria 
ill-prepared for terror attacks, says auditor"), the story 
has not gained significant traction in the public domain. 
Victoria has invested A$255 million (US$165 million) in 
counter-terrorism initiatives since 2002 including a wide 
array of preventative measures such as community policing 
(septel).  Post has talked off-line with contacts in the 
Victoria government who have said that the Premier is taking 
this issue seriously and intends to respond in full to the 
report.  For many Victorians, however, the thought of a 
terrorist attack in Australia is at most a fleeting fear 
brought to the fore only occasionally.  The recent trial of 
Abdul Nacer Benbrika and his co-conspirators (reftels) served 
to raise the profile of a potential terrorist attack in 
Australia, but only for a moment. 
 
 
THURSTON